United States v. Cardenas-Ramirez: Concerted “Car-Swap” Transfers and High-Value Cargo Support Drug-Conspiracy Knowledge; Acquitted Conduct Remains Usable at Sentencing Under Watts (Non-Retroactive § 1B1.3(c) Issue Not Reached)

Introduction

In United States v. Cardenas-Ramirez (5th Cir. Feb. 24, 2026) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Fifth Circuit affirmed Carlos Cardenas-Ramirez’s conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, even though the jury acquitted him of the companion count of possession with intent to distribute. The case arose from a DEA investigation into a trafficking cell led by Cesar Herrera. Agents observed (1) an item transfer between Herrera and Cardenas-Ramirez at a Dollar General, (2) a second stop at another Dollar General where Cardenas-Ramirez manipulated the cargo and then (3) a “car swap,” after which the Sentra was driven to a residence where agents found sealed speaker boxes containing 14.07 kilograms of cocaine.

On appeal, Cardenas-Ramirez raised two principal issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the elements of a drug conspiracy (including foreseeability/knowledge of the five-kilogram threshold), and (2) whether the district court violated due process by considering acquitted conduct at sentencing.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit held that a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Cardenas-Ramirez (1) agreed—at least tacitly—to participate in a cocaine-trafficking plan, (2) knew of the illicit nature of the activity and intended to join it, and (3) voluntarily participated—particularly through coordinated driving, handling of the cargo, and a vehicle swap recognized as a trafficking technique.

As to drug quantity, the court concluded that the jury could rationally infer Cardenas-Ramirez knew or reasonably should have known the conspiracy involved at least five kilograms, based on the weight of the sealed speaker boxes, his proximity to and handling of them, and his own statement acknowledging their unusual heaviness and his suspicion of contraband.

On sentencing, the court reaffirmed that under United States v. Watts, a district court may consider conduct of which a defendant was acquitted. It noted—but did not decide—an argument concerning the November 2024 Guidelines amendment (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c)) excluding acquitted conduct from relevant conduct calculations, because the argument was raised for the first time at oral argument and, in any event, sister circuits have treated the amendment as non-retroactive. The judgment was affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Appellate sufficiency review framework

  • United States v. Gonzalez (citing United States v. Hale): Established the de novo standard for reviewing a preserved sufficiency challenge and the requirement to view evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.
  • United States v. Garcia (quoting United States v. Dean): Reiterated classic sufficiency principles—reasonable inferences for the verdict, no need to exclude every hypothesis of innocence, and deference to the jury’s credibility calls.
  • United States v. Bourrage (quoting United States v. Mesquias): Emphasized that sufficiency review is “highly deferential,” and reversal is appropriate only when no rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

These cases supplied the methodological backbone: the panel did not ask whether it believed Cardenas-Ramirez’s narrative, but whether a rational juror could reject it and infer guilt from the observed coordination, communications, handling, and concealment indicators.

2) Elements of drug conspiracy and proof by “concert of action”

  • United States v. Bourrage (quoting United States v. McClaren): Provided the three elements of conspiracy—agreement, knowledge/intent, and voluntary participation.
  • United States v. Bourrage (first quoting United States v. Daniels; then quoting United States v. Lopez): Confirmed that the agreement need not be express; a tacit “mutual agreement” may be inferred, and “concert of action” can evidence agreement and participation.
  • United States v. Thomas and United States v. Segura: Used as analogues for inferring conspiratorial agreement from coordinated vehicle positioning and communications facilitating a transfer.

The panel used these authorities to treat the parking-lot choreography—pulling alongside Herrera, remaining present while items were loaded, then proceeding to a second location and coordinating a car swap—as probative “concert of action,” sufficient for an inferred agreement and participation.

3) “Hidden contraband” and additional suspicious circumstances showing knowledge

  • United States v. Villarreal: Recognized that knowledge may often be inferred from control of a vehicle containing drugs, but when contraband is “hidden,” additional suspicious circumstances are required.
  • United States v. Gonzalez-Lira: Invoked by the defendant to argue that sealed/opaque containers require additional circumstantial evidence of guilty knowledge.
  • United States v. Aguilar-Alvarez (citing United States v. Jones): Supported the inference that lying to law enforcement can show consciousness of guilt.
  • United States v. Vazquez: Reinforced the “entrusted with valuable cargo” inference—large quantities/values of drugs are unlikely to be given to an unwitting courier.

Assuming (without deciding) that the “hidden contraband” rule applied to opaque speaker boxes, the court found ample “additional” suspicious facts: the fake ID at the traffic stop (consciousness of guilt), the extraordinarily valuable shipment (trust inconsistent with an unwitting driver), and Cardenas-Ramirez’s own admission that the speakers were unusually heavy and that he suspected contraband.

4) Jury’s role in credibility and competing narratives

  • United States v. Gaspar-Felipe (quoting United States v. Garza; then quoting United States v. Parker): Restated that appellate courts do not make credibility determinations; the jury may credit government witnesses and disbelieve a defendant’s explanations.

This principle was decisive against the defense theme that his post-arrest statements (e.g., he refused to move the car “because he did not want problems”) negated culpability. The panel treated those statements as arguments the jury was free to reject.

5) “Car swap” as trafficking method

  • United States v. Garcia: Treated vehicle swapping as a recognized trafficking technique to reduce detection risk and shield stash locations, thus supporting a guilty inference rather than innocence.
  • United States v. Duran (quoting United States v. Iglesias): Cited as persuasive reinforcement that coordinated transfers and vehicle swaps reflect mutual trust consistent with conspiracy.

Rather than viewing the swap as an abandonment or reluctance, the court framed it as operational security typical of traffickers—confirming “voluntary participation” in a coordinated distribution scheme.

6) Drug quantity as an Apprendi-triggering fact and the scope/foreseeability inquiry

  • Apprendi v. New Jersey: Required proof beyond a reasonable doubt of any drug quantity that triggers enhanced statutory penalties.
  • United States v. Daniels: Clarified that drug quantity in a conspiracy indictment functions as a required fact for enhanced penalties, but not a “formal element” whose failure would invalidate the conviction (it primarily affects sentencing exposure).
  • United States v. Gonzalez: Used by analogy to show how physical indicia of a transport mechanism can support foreseeability of at least five kilograms.
  • United States v. Delgado: Reaffirmed that reviewing courts do not reweigh evidence and must draw reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict.

Applying these cases, the panel upheld the jury’s five-kilogram finding (or foreseeability/knowledge of that scope) based on the observed and admitted weight of the sealed speaker boxes, defendant’s handling/adjustment of them, and the fact the load ultimately contained 14.07 kilograms.

7) Acquitted conduct at sentencing and the (non-retroactive) Guidelines amendment issue

  • McClinton v. United States: Noted to acknowledge ongoing fairness concerns expressed by individual Justices about acquitted conduct sentencing.
  • United States v. Watts: Treated as controlling authority that sentencing courts may consider conduct underlying acquitted charges.
  • United States v. Gaspar-Felipe: Cited for the Fifth Circuit’s reaffirmation that Watts forecloses due-process challenges to acquitted-conduct consideration.
  • United States v. Simpson, United States v. Henderson, and United States v. Coleman: Cited to note sister circuits’ conclusions that the November 2024 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c) amendment is not retroactive.
  • Arsement v. Spinnaker Expl. Co., LLC: Applied to decline consideration of an issue raised for the first time at oral argument.

Doctrinally, the panel’s sentencing discussion is less about adopting a new rule than about reaffirming hierarchy: (1) whatever normative concerns may exist (McClinton v. United States), (2) lower courts remain bound by United States v. Watts, and (3) appellate procedure limits late-breaking arguments (Arsement v. Spinnaker Expl. Co., LLC). Notably, the panel added an observation that even under the new § 1B1.3(c) text, the acquitted conduct here appeared intertwined with (“establishe[d], in whole or in part”) the instant conspiracy offense—signaling a potential alternative ground if the amendment were applicable.

Legal Reasoning

1) Agreement

The court treated agreement as inferable from coordinated conduct rather than direct admissions. Cardenas-Ramirez’s presence during the transfer, his act of driving the “receiving” vehicle to a second location, and the encrypted communications tied to his attributed number supported the inference of a tacit agreement with other participants. Under the court’s cited conspiracy framework, that “concert of action” was enough for a rational jury to find an agreement.

2) Knowledge and intent, despite sealed speaker boxes

Acknowledging the “hidden contraband” line of cases, the panel assumed the government needed “additional circumstantial evidence” of guilty knowledge because the cocaine was inside sealed, opaque speaker boxes. It then identified multiple independent indicators:

  • Consciousness of guilt: the fake Mexican driver’s license presented after the car swap.
  • High value of shipment: more than $300,000 worth of cocaine supports an inference that traffickers would not entrust such a load to an unwitting person.
  • Weight-based suspicion: defendant’s own statement that the speakers were “too heavy,” combined with his admission that he suspected contraband based on weight.

The court’s reasoning is cumulative: even if any one item might be explained away, together they allow a rational inference of knowledge and intent.

3) Voluntary participation

The defense attempted to frame defendant’s reluctance to keep driving as exculpatory. The panel rejected that framing as a matter of sufficiency review and trafficking common sense: the jury could disbelieve his interrogation narrative, and the car swap itself is a recognized trafficking technique suggesting purposeful participation.

4) Five kilograms or more: what the jury could infer

The court linked physical observation to threshold quantity. Agents testified the cocaine added 15–20 pounds to the speaker boxes. Five kilograms is a little over eleven pounds. The jury saw photos, heard testimony about Herrera’s “bending over” as if lifting something heavy, and learned that Cardenas-Ramirez personally handled and adjusted the boxes and described them as “heavy.” From those facts, the panel held, a rational jury could infer that he knew or reasonably should have known the conspiracy’s scope met or exceeded five kilograms.

5) Acquitted conduct at sentencing

The panel treated the due-process challenge as foreclosed: United States v. Watts allows consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing, and United States v. Gaspar-Felipe confirms the Fifth Circuit’s adherence to that rule. The court noted the new U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c) amendment but did not address its retroactivity because the argument was raised too late (at oral argument), and because other circuits have deemed it non-retroactive.

Impact

  • Strengthening “concert of action” proofs in transfer cases: The opinion illustrates that even a brief role—driving a receiving vehicle, being present during loading, coordinating by phone, and executing a car swap—can support a conspiracy conviction.
  • Hidden-container knowledge can be shown without “classic” nervousness indicators: The court accepted alternative suspicious circumstances (fake ID, value, weight-based suspicion) rather than requiring nervousness, inconsistent stories, or direct admissions.
  • Quantity foreseeability can be inferred from weight and handling: Physical indicia (how heavy an object is, how it must be lifted/handled) may support findings tied to statutory thresholds.
  • Acquitted-conduct sentencing remains intact in the Fifth Circuit: Unless and until higher authority changes United States v. Watts, the panel signals continued adherence—while also previewing procedural hurdles and retroactivity limits for defendants invoking § 1B1.3(c).
  • Appellate procedure matters: The refusal to address the § 1B1.3(c) argument underscores that timing can determine whether potentially significant sentencing arguments are heard at all.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Sufficiency of the evidence”: On appeal, the question is not whether judges think the defendant is guilty, but whether any rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence in the government’s favor.
  • Drug “conspiracy”: A conspiracy is an agreement—often proved indirectly—plus knowledge/intent and voluntary participation. It can be shown through coordinated actions that make sense only if people are working together.
  • “Hidden contraband” rule: When drugs are concealed (e.g., in sealed containers or compartments), courts often require extra suspicious facts to prove the driver knew about the drugs—because mere proximity might be ambiguous.
  • “Acquitted conduct” at sentencing: Even if a jury finds “not guilty” on one count, a judge may (under current federal precedent) still consider the underlying conduct at sentencing if proved by a lower standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
  • Apprendi and drug quantity: If the government seeks a higher statutory sentencing range based on drug quantity, that quantity must be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • Guidelines “retroactivity”: A new Sentencing Guidelines amendment usually does not help people sentenced before it took effect unless the amendment is expressly made retroactive.

Conclusion

United States v. Cardenas-Ramirez reinforces two practical doctrines in federal drug prosecutions: (1) conspiracy convictions can rest on coordinated, role-based conduct—especially parking-lot transfers and car swaps—paired with circumstantial knowledge indicators such as shipment value, deception during stops, and weight-based suspicion; and (2) in the Fifth Circuit, United States v. Watts continues to permit consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing, notwithstanding growing policy criticism and the post-sentencing adoption of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c). The opinion’s broader lesson is that defendants facing sealed-container cases should expect courts to assess knowledge through the totality of “suspicious circumstances,” and that sentencing challenges based on evolving Guidelines policy will rise or fall on preservation and retroactivity.