No Plain-Error Relief for Rule 11(b)(3) Factual-Basis Defects Absent Concrete Prejudice; Below-Guidelines “De Facto Life” and Disparity Challenges Are Unavailing Without Record Support

Introduction

In United States v. Adam Power (7th Cir. Mar. 20, 2026), the Seventh Circuit affirmed Adam L. Power’s convictions and 60-year sentence after he entered an open guilty plea to thirty-four child-exploitation and child-pornography counts. The case arose from an investigation linking multiple Snapchat accounts and IP addresses to the distribution, receipt, and production of child pornography. According to the factual proffer, Power impersonated a girl online, targeted minor boys (including some he knew through positions of authority), and induced them to create and send nude images and videos.

On appeal, Power pursued two avenues of relief: (1) vacatur of guilty pleas on eight counts for an allegedly inadequate factual basis under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(3); or (2) vacatur of the sentence as substantively unreasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The Seventh Circuit rejected both.

Summary of the Opinion

The court held that even if there were defects in the factual basis for the eight challenged counts, Power could not obtain relief on plain-error review because he failed to show prejudice—i.e., a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty absent the alleged Rule 11 error. The panel emphasized that acquittal on those eight counts would not have materially changed Power’s sentencing posture: even then, his Guidelines exposure would remain a de facto life term, and the challenged counts did not affect any mandatory minimum.

As to sentencing, the court found the 60-year term substantively reasonable. Power’s “de facto life sentence” argument failed because he did not present life-expectancy evidence to the district court, and in any event the district court’s § 3553(a) explanation was adequate. His claim that certain “outdated” guideline enhancements made his sentence unreasonable also failed because removing them would not have changed the Guidelines range. Finally, his disparity argument was foreclosed because a below-Guidelines sentence cannot constitute an “unwarranted disparity” in Seventh Circuit doctrine.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Rule 11(b)(3), plain-error review, and prejudice

  • United States v. Goliday, 41 F.4th 778 (7th Cir. 2022): The court used Goliday as the primary Seventh Circuit template for Rule 11(b)(3) claims raised for the first time on appeal. It supplied both the standard of review (plain error when the defendant did not object or move to withdraw) and the instruction to evaluate prejudice by considering the entire record. The panel also distinguished the kind of prejudice present in Goliday—where the Rule 11(b)(3) error “meaningfully impacted” sentencing exposure (including by triggering a mandatory minimum)—from Power’s case, where the challenged counts did not materially change exposure.
  • United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55 (2002): Cited (via Goliday) for the proposition that unpreserved Rule 11 errors are reviewed under the plain-error framework.
  • United States v. Triggs, 963 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 2020): Provided the articulation of plain error quoted in the opinion and served as an example of cases where intervening caselaw can undermine the legal basis of pleas—something absent here.
  • United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 (2004): This was the linchpin for the prejudice inquiry. The panel applied the Supreme Court’s requirement that a defendant show “a reasonable probability that, but for the error[s], he would not have entered the plea[s],” and relied on the Court’s warning that the burden should not be “too easy” given the finality interests associated with guilty pleas. It also furnished the rhetorical yardstick: “what he might ever have thought he could gain by going to trial.”
  • United States v. Williams, 946 F.3d 968 (7th Cir. 2020): Used to clarify that appellate courts may ask what a defendant could have gained at trial, but may not “second-guess” the decision if the record shows it is reasonably probable the defendant would have taken the chance—even “foolishly.” The panel invoked Williams to stress the absence of any record facts suggesting Power would have risked trial.
  • United States v. Aybar-Peguero, 72 F.4th 478 (2d Cir. 2023): Cited as a comparative example where prejudice could be shown because the defendant consistently denied the mens rea element during the plea colloquy. The reference underscores what was missing here: hesitation, confusion, or element-related objections.

Substantive reasonableness and deference to the district court

  • United States v. De Leon, 140 F.4th 920 (7th Cir. 2025): Supplied the abuse-of-discretion standard for substantive reasonableness.
  • United States v. Walsh, 47 F.4th 491 (7th Cir. 2022) and Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Used to justify deference based on the district court’s superior position to assess facts and apply § 3553(a).
  • United States v. Oregon, 58 F.4th 298 (7th Cir. 2023): Provided the “nearly irrebuttable” presumption of reasonableness for below-Guidelines sentences and also supported the rule that a sentence below the Guidelines range “cannot be an unwarranted disparity.”
  • United States v. Taylor, 907 F.3d 1046 (7th Cir. 2018): Cited for the requirement that the defendant show the sentence does not comport with the § 3553(a) factors to overcome the presumption.
  • United States v. McDonald, 981 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 2020): Central to rejecting Power’s “de facto life” argument. The panel treated the failure to present life-expectancy arguments and data to the district court as fatal to rebutting reasonableness on appeal; it also affirmed that even an effectively life-length sentence can be reasonable where the district court explains it consistent with § 3553(a).
  • United States v. Fitzpatrick, 32 F.4th 644 (7th Cir. 2022): Reinforced that what is “required” is an adequate explanation consistent with § 3553(a).

Disparity arguments and the Guidelines’ “anti-disparity” function

  • United States v. Nania, 724 F.3d 824 (7th Cir. 2013): Cited for the proposition that an unwarranted-disparity challenge to a below-Guidelines sentence is a “nonstarter.”
  • United States v. Gonzalez, 765 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2014): Quoted (via Oregon) for the categorical statement that below-Guidelines sentences cannot be unwarranted disparities.
  • United States v. Blagojevich, 854 F.3d 918 (7th Cir. 2017): Used to explain the structural premise: “the Sentencing Guidelines are themselves an anti-disparity formula.”

2. Legal Reasoning

A. Rule 11(b)(3): why Power could not show plain-error prejudice

The court’s analysis is notable for its pragmatic approach to prejudice. Rather than deciding in detail whether the factual basis was insufficient for each challenged count, the panel “proceed[ed] directly to the substantial-rights prong.” Under Dominguez Benitez, the question is not whether the plea colloquy was imperfect, but whether the defendant can show a reasonable probability he would have insisted on trial.

The court gave multiple record-based reasons why that probability was not shown:

  • Minimal practical upside from trial on the eight counts. Even if Power had prevailed on all eight challenged counts, he would still face an extraordinarily long Guidelines range on the remaining counts (the opinion describes 560 years vs. 740 years). The court treated this as strong evidence that going to trial would not have been a rational response to the alleged Rule 11 defects, and thus undermined any claim that Power would have rejected the plea.
  • No change to mandatory minimum exposure. Unlike cases where the challenged count(s) drive mandatory minimums (as in the prejudice analysis discussed in Goliday), Power’s challenged counts did not.
  • The plea strategy was aligned with the sentencing presentation. Power’s counsel argued at sentencing that his most significant positive attribute was accepting responsibility for “each and every” count. The panel used this to infer a coherent tactical reason for pleading guilty across the board, making it harder to credit an after-the-fact assertion that he would have chosen trial.
  • No colloquy indicia of confusion or dispute. The record lacked the kinds of hesitation or element disputes that can support a finding of prejudice. The panel contrasted Power’s record with cases like United States v. Aybar-Peguero where the defendant persistently denied the required mens rea.

In short, the opinion tightens the practical demands of the prejudice showing in multi-count pleas: a defendant cannot rely on a bare assertion of “I would have gone to trial,” especially where the marginal sentencing consequences are negligible and the record reflects a plea-based acceptance strategy.

B. Substantive reasonableness: de facto life, “outdated” enhancements, and disparities

The panel applied conventional Seventh Circuit sentencing review with three important moves.

  1. “De facto life” arguments must be developed in the district court. Relying on United States v. McDonald, the court held that Power’s appellate reliance on life-expectancy evidence could not rebut reasonableness because he did not present the argument or supporting data below. This is a recurring appellate theme: where a sentencing claim depends on empirical premises (life expectancy, actuarial estimates), the district court must be given a chance to consider and test those premises.
  2. The court reaffirmed that an effectively life-length term can be reasonable if explained under § 3553(a). Even assuming the 60-year sentence functioned as life, the panel held the district court’s explanation was sufficient: it identified aggravating facts (numerous victims; persistent targeting; abuse of trusted roles) and the statutory purposes (seriousness, respect for law, just punishment, protection of the public, deterrence).
  3. Guidelines mechanics can defeat “enhancement” arguments even when the judge criticizes the enhancement as “outdated.” Power argued that because the judge described two enhancements as “outdated,” the sentence became unreasonable since it exceeded what the range would have been without them. The panel responded with a Guidelines calculation point: even subtracting those enhancements, other counts would enter the grouping computation, and the total offense level would still hit the Guidelines’ level-43 ceiling—producing the same “life” range and the same statutory-cap aggregation to 740 years. The doctrinal upshot is that enhancement critiques do not necessarily translate into a lower advisory range when grouping rules and the level-43 cap govern the final output.

Finally, the panel treated Power’s disparity arguments (comparisons to median sex offenders and median first-degree murder offenders) as foreclosed: under United States v. Nania and United States v. Oregon, a below-Guidelines sentence “cannot be an unwarranted disparity,” because the Guidelines already implement the anti-disparity objective. The court also stressed that judges need not perform empirical comparisons to national sentencing data to validate a sentence’s consistency with similarly situated defendants.

3. Impact

  • Rule 11(b)(3) challenges in multi-count cases face a heightened practical barrier on appeal. The opinion signals that where the challenged counts do not change mandatory minimums and do not meaningfully alter overall sentencing exposure, the defendant will struggle to establish that the alleged factual-basis error affected the decision to plead guilty.
  • Sentencing arguments grounded in empirical claims should be preserved with evidence. The decision reinforces that “de facto life” claims—when based on life expectancy—should be supported with data presented to the sentencing judge, or they risk being dismissed as insufficient to rebut reasonableness on appeal.
  • Guidelines “outdated enhancement” critiques may be legally irrelevant if they do not change the advisory range. Especially in child-pornography cases where offense levels can exceed the level-43 cap and grouping rules dominate, removing certain enhancements may not move the needle.
  • Disparity claims remain difficult when the sentence is below the Guidelines. The opinion consolidates Seventh Circuit doctrine treating below-Guidelines sentences as essentially insulated from “unwarranted disparity” attacks.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Rule 11(b)(3) “factual basis”: Before accepting a guilty plea, the judge must ensure there are facts showing the defendant actually committed the crime’s elements. The purpose is to prevent guilty pleas to conduct that does not constitute the charged offense.
  • Plain-error review: If the defendant did not object in the district court, an appellate court will reverse only for a clear error that affected substantial rights and seriously harmed the judicial proceeding’s fairness or integrity.
  • Prejudice (substantial rights) in the plea context: The defendant must show a reasonable probability that, without the error, he would have rejected the plea and gone to trial. It is not enough to show a technical mistake occurred.
  • Guidelines grouping and the level-43 cap: When there are many counts, the Guidelines combine them using grouping rules to produce a single offense level. If calculations exceed level 43, the Guidelines treat it as level 43, which corresponds to “life” for all criminal history categories.
  • “De facto life sentence”: A term-of-years sentence so long that the defendant will likely die in prison. Courts may consider this characterization, but arguments often require record support (e.g., actuarial or medical evidence).
  • Unwarranted disparity: A claim that similarly situated defendants receive different sentences without justification. In the Seventh Circuit, a below-Guidelines sentence is generally not treated as creating an “unwarranted” disparity because the Guidelines are designed to reduce disparities.

Conclusion

United States v. Adam Power underscores two practice-critical points in federal criminal litigation. First, unpreserved Rule 11(b)(3) claims will not succeed absent a concrete, record-supported showing that the defendant would have rejected the plea—an especially demanding showing where invalidating some counts would not change mandatory minimums and would not materially affect overall sentencing exposure. Second, in substantive-reasonableness review, below-Guidelines sentences enjoy an exceptionally strong presumption of reasonableness, “de facto life” arguments dependent on empirical claims must be built in the district court, and disparity arguments are largely foreclosed when the sentence is below the advisory range.