Date: Sep 24, 2026

Connected Offenses May Be Tried Together Despite Their Different Subject Matter

United States v. Dustin Sean McCabe — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, September 22, 2026 (unpublished)

Introduction

Dustin McCabe operated a Florida scuba-charter business. After a diver died while boarding his modified boat, the Coast Guard shut down the business. McCabe subsequently obtained Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans using payroll representations the government alleged were false. A jury convicted him of seaman’s manslaughter, making a false statement within federal-agency jurisdiction, and three counts of wire fraud.

On appeal, McCabe did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on each charge. He argued that the manslaughter count should not have been joined with the other counts in one indictment and, even if joinder was initially proper, should have been tried separately to avoid prejudice. The Eleventh Circuit rejected both arguments.

Summary of the Opinion

The court held that the indictment alleged a sufficient connection among the offenses under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a). McCabe allegedly misrepresented the boat’s intended recreational use, operated it commercially in circumstances that led to the death, and sought PPP funds after the resulting shutdown. The death and shutdown thus helped explain the impetus for the later alleged fraud; the charges were linked by more than their timing.

The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 14 by refusing to sever the manslaughter count. Witness testimony supported that count, the district court twice instructed jurors to consider each offense separately, and it excluded a prejudicial photograph. McCabe had not shown prejudice that those protections could not address. The court affirmed all five convictions.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

United States v. Hersh supplied the standard of de novo review for whether initial joinder was proper. United States v. Weaver established that a joinder error warrants reversal only if it actually prejudiced the defendant by substantially influencing the verdict; it also supported the presumption that jurors follow instructions to assess counts independently.
United States v. Tapia supplied the different standard for reviewing a refusal to sever: abuse of discretion. That distinction matters because a properly joined indictment can still call for separate trials if a joint trial would be unfair.
United States v. Annamalai directed courts to construe Rule 8(a) broadly in favor of initial joinder and to begin with the indictment’s allegations. It also articulated the demanding standard for overturning a denial of severance: compelling prejudice against which the trial court could provide no protection. United States v. Walser placed the burden of establishing proper initial joinder on the government.
United States v. Dominguez was central to the joinder ruling. It recognized that one illegal activity’s providing the impetus for another can establish a common scheme for joinder. Its approval of joinder between drug-distribution and mortgage-fraud charges furnished an analogy for the alleged connection between McCabe’s maritime offenses and subsequent loan fraud. Applying that approach, the court found the allegations in McCabe’s indictment sufficient; it did not need to rely on disputed trial evidence or overlapping witnesses to establish initial joinder.
United States v. Morales distinguished a Rule 14 prejudice claim from a Rule 8 challenge: the former assumes initial joinder was proper but contests the fairness of trying the charges together. United States v. Kabbaby, quoting United States v. DeSimone, required a defendant seeking severance to show clear and compelling prejudice that the trial court could not alleviate. United States v. Novaton required courts to balance that fairness concern against the public interest in efficient trials.
United States v. Lopez illustrated that prejudice may arise whenever different offenses are tried together, even where some allegations are particularly grave. The decisive question is whether the prejudice prevents a fair trial despite available safeguards—not whether the joined charges create any adverse impression at all.

Legal Reasoning

Initial joinder. Rule 8(a) allows offenses to be charged together if they are of the same or similar character, arise from the same act or transaction, or are connected with or part of a common scheme or plan. The court relied on the alleged connection among these otherwise different offenses. According to the indictment, McCabe falsely described the Southern Comfort as a recreational vessel, used it for commercial charters, and then sought PPP funds after the fatal incident shut down that business. That alleged progression explained why the later applications were made and supplied context for the government’s fraud allegations. It was not merely a coincidence of dates.

McCabe argued that texts, the shutdown order, and overlapping witnesses did not adequately connect the counts. The court found that objection beside the point for its Rule 8(a) analysis: the allegations on the indictment’s face established the necessary relationship. Because it found joinder proper, the court had no occasion to apply the harmless-error rule for misjoinder.

Severance and prejudice. Rule 14 permits separate trials even for properly joined offenses when a joint trial would be unfair. McCabe argued that the manslaughter evidence was comparatively weak, emotionally charged, and unnecessary to prove the financial offenses. The court responded that witnesses testified about the boat’s problems, McCabe’s knowledge of them, and his failure to repair or disclose them. It also regarded the fatal incident and shutdown as relevant context for the PPP applications, while recognizing the need to guard against unfair prejudice.

The district court addressed that risk by excluding a prejudicial photograph and instructing jurors both at the start of trial and before deliberations to consider each count and its evidence separately. The appellate court presumed the jury followed those instructions. McCabe had also raised a concern that joinder might compromise his ability to testify, but he had not demonstrated that severance would materially change how he could present his defense. In those circumstances, the court found no abuse of discretion.

Impact

The decision illustrates how Rule 8(a) can accommodate distinct kinds of charges when an indictment alleges a concrete causal or motivational connection between them. It does not establish that offenses are joinable simply because they involve the same defendant, occur close in time, or follow a serious event. Nor does proper joinder eliminate Rule 14’s independent protection against an unfair joint trial.

For future litigants, the opinion underscores two practical points: prosecutors must make the connection apparent in the indictment, and defendants seeking severance must identify prejudice that instructions or other trial measures cannot adequately cure. Because this opinion is marked “Not for Publication,” it is best understood as an application of existing Eleventh Circuit principles rather than a new binding rule.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Joinder: Putting multiple charges in one indictment and trying them together. Rule 8(a) governs whether they may be combined initially.
Severance: Separating charges for trial. Under Rule 14, a judge may do this even when initial joinder was lawful, if a joint trial would cause undue prejudice.
Prejudice: In this context, a risk to trial fairness—for example, that jurors will use evidence of one charge to decide another improperly. An unfavorable impression alone does not require severance.
De novo review and abuse-of-discretion review: The appellate court decides the legal joinder question afresh, but gives greater latitude to the trial judge’s judgment about whether separate trials were needed.

Conclusion

United States v. Dustin Sean McCabe affirms that different offenses can be tried together when the indictment alleges a meaningful connection between them. A serious, emotionally charged count does not automatically require a separate trial: the defendant must show prejudice that the court’s safeguards cannot remedy. Here, the alleged sequence linking the maritime and PPP offenses justified joinder, and the trial court’s protections supported its refusal to sever.