United States v. Matos: The Second Circuit Adopts Hunter’s “Miscarriage of Justice” Exception to Appeal Waivers—But Holds Routine Guidelines Disputes Still Waived; Standing-Order Incorporation Satisfies Pronouncement of Supervised-Release Conditions

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit  |  Date: Aug. 13, 2026

1. Introduction

United States v. Matos arose from Samuel Matos’s participation in a Syracuse-area drug trafficking organization. Matos pleaded guilty under a plea agreement containing a broad appellate waiver: he agreed not to appeal any prison sentence of 135 months or less. The district court sentenced him to 100 months’ imprisonment and a five-year term of supervised release.

On appeal, Matos raised two distinct sets of issues:

  • Sentencing challenges: alleged procedural error in calculating criminal history under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and substantive unreasonableness—despite conceding these were covered by the waiver unless a new exception applied.
  • Supervised-release conditions: two “standard” conditions (financial disclosure and a reasonable-suspicion search condition) that were not in the PSR or read verbatim at sentencing but appeared in the written judgment; the plea waiver did not bar appeal of conditions. (The panel relied on United States v. Arguedas for that proposition.)

The key legal pivot is the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in United States v. Hunter (2026), which recognized a narrow “miscarriage of justice” limitation on enforcement of otherwise valid appeal waivers. The Second Circuit used Matos to define, in practical terms, what that exception does—and does not—reach.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit dismissed Matos’s appeal in part (his procedural and substantive sentencing challenges) and otherwise affirmed.

  • Appeal waiver enforced: After United States v. Hunter, an appeal waiver is unenforceable only when enforcing it would result in a “miscarriage of justice.” Matos’s claims—disputes about criminal history scoring and substantive reasonableness— were “standard-fare” Guidelines-type issues and did not meet Hunter’s “hard-to-meet” standard.
  • Pronouncement satisfied by incorporation: The district court did not violate Matos’s right to be present for sentencing when it imposed “standard conditions” by referencing a standing order (General Order #23). Incorporation by reference to a publicly accessible standing order provided adequate notice and opportunity to object.
  • Individualized assessment error—harmless: The district court erred by not making an individualized assessment on the record for the two discretionary conditions (per United States v. Betts), but the error was harmless because the justification was “self-evident in the record” (as in United States v. Balon, and applied in United States v. Robinson and United States v. McAdam).

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Appeal waivers and contract principles in plea agreements

  • United States v. Green: de novo review of plea agreements and waivers using contract principles.
  • United States v. Granik (quoting United States v. Altro): contract principles are “tempered” by due process concerns unique to plea bargaining.
  • United States v. Lajeunesse: interpretive doubts tend to be resolved in defendants’ favor due to prosecutorial bargaining power.
  • United States v. Ojeda: a knowing and voluntary waiver is “presumptively enforceable.”
  • United States v. Borden: exceptions are confined to a “very circumscribed” area.
  • United States v. Yemitan: policy rationale—if waivers were easily undone, they would lose value as bargaining chips.
  • Cook v. United States: catalogs the Second Circuit’s previously recognized narrow non-enforcement categories (unknowing waiver, unconstitutional factors, government breach, no sentencing rationale, lack of consideration) and notes the Circuit had not previously applied a broader miscarriage-of-justice rule.

B. The new controlling frame: the Supreme Court’s “miscarriage of justice” standard

  • United States v. Hunter: the opinion’s central driver. The Second Circuit reads Hunter to require a miscarriage-of-justice exception, but emphasizes Hunter’s strict limitation: the error must be egregious, obvious, and confidence-undermining; routine Guidelines mistakes cannot “cancel an appeal waiver.” The panel also contrasts Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence with the Court’s controlling majority (and cites Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence to underscore that point).

C. Guidelines errors as waived: intra- and inter-circuit consensus

The panel uses a substantial body of authority to show that ordinary Guidelines disputes—even those involving interpretive questions— fall squarely within what appeal waivers are meant to cover.

  • Second Circuit: United States v. Buissereth (waiver bars correction of alleged procedural sentencing errors); also summary orders United States v. Rodriguez and United States v. Peele.
  • Mutual mistake/prediction issues: United States v. Riggi (mutual Guidelines mistake does not void plea); United States v. Rosen (express plea provisions addressing mistaken predictions).
  • Nationwide consensus cited: Sotirion v. United States, United States v. Castro, United States v. Nulf, United States v. Andis, United States v. Martinez (9th Cir. 1998), United States v. Morales-Figueroa, United States v. Adams; plus additional supporting cases in a footnote: United States v. Jones, United States v. Portillo Palencia (quoting United States v. Riley), United States v. Riggins, and United States v. Waller.
  • Construction vs. application: Perkins v. Endicott Johnson Corp. is cited to reject Matos’s attempt to recharacterize his claim as “interpretation” rather than “application.”

D. Pronouncement and notice for supervised-release conditions

  • United States v. Maiorana (en banc): non-mandatory conditions must be pronounced or the defendant must be notified during sentencing; they cannot later be added in the written judgment. Also clarifies that reading each condition verbatim is unnecessary if conditions are specifically incorporated by reference to a written list “made available” to the defendant.
  • United States v. McAdam: characterizes Conditions 14 and 15 as “discretionary special conditions” despite being labeled “standard” in the standing order; also applies Betts individualized-assessment principles to standing-order conditions.
  • Constitutional presence framing: Kentucky v. Stincer (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts) anchors the due process basis for presence at critical stages.
  • Incorporation-by-reference in other circuits: United States v. Martinez (5th Cir.), United States v. Rodriguez (11th Cir.), United States v. Hayden (6th Cir.), United States v. Hayden (11th Cir.), United States v. Rogers (4th Cir.), and United States v. Matthews (D.C. Cir.). The panel also addresses Ninth Circuit cautionary language in United States v. Montoya and United States v. Avendano-Soto, ultimately concluding that a publicly accessible standing order is sufficient notice.

E. Individualized assessment and harmlessness

  • United States v. Betts (quoting United States v. Balon): discretionary conditions require an individualized assessment and on-the-record reasons; failure is error, but may be harmless if the justification is “self-evident in the record.”
  • United States v. Robinson and United States v. Arguedas: apply “self-evident” rationale to uphold search conditions based on record facts (recidivism, seriousness, deterrence, protection of the public).
  • Review standards: United States v. Oliveras (abuse of discretion), United States v. Williams (plain error when no objection), and United States v. Maiorana/United States v. McAdam (meaningful opportunity to object).
  • Financial-disclosure condition authority: United States v. Lewis, United States v. Brown, and forfeiture mechanics via United States v. Awad.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The post-Hunter rule: miscarriage-of-justice exists, but is exceptionally narrow

The opinion makes two moves that together form its doctrinal contribution.

  1. Adoption (as binding federal law) of a miscarriage-of-justice carve-out: The panel states that, “Following Hunter,” the Second Circuit now recognizes that “an appeal waiver is unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of justice.” This converts what had been dicta/possibility (noted in Cook v. United States) into an operative rule.
  2. Immediate containment of that carve-out: The panel reads Hunter as sharply excluding “standard-fare errors” in applying sentencing law, explicitly including “detailed calculation of a Sentencing Guidelines range.” The court therefore holds that ordinary Guidelines disputes, including those framed as interpretive, remain waived.

Applying that framework, Matos’s claim—that house-arrest parole should be treated like “suspended sentences” for criminal history scoring—was categorized as a conventional Guidelines dispute. Even if the district court were wrong, Hunter instructs that such “unfortunate but inevitable” sentencing mistakes do not impugn the judiciary’s integrity and thus do not defeat the waiver.

The panel also rejects an equity-based argument: Matos and the government had anticipated a lower criminal history category at the plea hearing. Relying on United States v. Riggi and United States v. Rosen, the court explains that mistaken estimates do not vitiate a plea, particularly when the plea agreement expressly warns that Guidelines predictions are non-binding.

B. Pronouncement of conditions: incorporation by reference to a standing order is enough

Under United States v. Maiorana, discretionary conditions must be pronounced or otherwise notified during sentencing; a later-added written condition violates the defendant’s right to be present. In Matos’s case, the district court stated that Matos must comply with “the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court,” which, in context, referred to the Northern District’s General Order #23.

The panel treats “notice and opportunity to object” as the functional core of the pronouncement requirement and aligns the Second Circuit with other circuits holding that incorporation of a written list satisfies due process. The court specifically holds that reference to a “publicly accessible standing order” provides adequate notice to object or seek clarification—thus Conditions 14 and 15 were not impermissibly “added” for the first time in the written judgment.

C. Individualized assessment still required—even for standing-order conditions—but errors can be harmless

Consistent with United States v. Betts and United States v. McAdam, the panel reiterates that discretionary conditions require an individualized assessment and reasons stated on the record. The district court “made no assessment whatsoever” for Conditions 14 and 15, so there was error.

The court then applies the harmlessness doctrine from Betts/Balon: if the justification is “self-evident in the record,” the absence of an explanation will not require remand.

  • Condition 14 (financial disclosure): Self-evident because Matos owed a forfeiture money judgment ($112,650) and the Guidelines recommend financial disclosure when restitution/forfeiture/fines are imposed (as described in McAdam). The condition helps monitor whether Matos acquires assets that can be applied toward forfeiture (citing Awad).
  • Condition 15 (reasonable-suspicion search): Self-evident due to Matos’s extensive, continuous criminal history, repeated supervision violations, dishonesty, and commission of the federal offense while on post-release supervision. The condition is framed as an enforcement tool supporting deterrence, public protection, and detection of violations (as in Robinson and Arguedas), and contrasted with McAdam where the record did not show a comparable reoffense risk.

3.3. Impact

A. Sentencing appeals: clearer boundaries after Hunter

Matos is the Second Circuit’s explicit operationalization of United States v. Hunter in the appeal-waiver context. Its practical impact is to:

  • Open a narrow door (miscarriage-of-justice exists) while closing most attempted routes through it (ordinary Guidelines errors, even if “interpretive,” remain waived).
  • Strengthen the government’s reliance interest in waivers by making clear that waiver value is not undermined by routine sentencing disputes—echoing Hunter’s plea-negotiation rationale.
  • Signal that only extreme errors—e.g., illegal sentences above statutory maxima, sentences infected by constitutionally impermissible considerations—are plausible candidates for the exception, aligning with Hunter’s examples and with the Second Circuit’s preexisting narrow categories in Cook v. United States.

B. Supervised release administration: standing orders can satisfy pronouncement, but courts must still justify discretionary burdens

The opinion provides district courts a workable compliance method under Maiorana: incorporation by reference to an identifiable, accessible standing order can satisfy pronouncement, avoiding the need to read long lists verbatim.

At the same time, Matos reinforces that standing-order convenience does not eliminate Betts obligations. The individualized-assessment requirement remains, though appellate courts may affirm where reasons are obvious from the record. Notably, the opinion’s footnote that the Northern District later removed Conditions 14 and 15 from General Order #23 highlights that local practice may evolve—and that incorporation-by-reference will track whatever conditions are in force at sentencing.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Appeal waiver: A plea-agreement term where the defendant gives up the right to appeal (often up to a specified sentence). Courts generally enforce these if the waiver is knowing and voluntary.
  • Miscarriage-of-justice exception (after United States v. Hunter): A narrow safety valve allowing courts to disregard a waiver only when enforcing it would seriously undermine the integrity or legitimacy of the justice system—typically requiring an obvious, egregious error.
  • Guidelines “criminal history”: A numeric score based on prior sentences that helps determine the advisory sentencing range. Matos argued the court counted the maximum term of indeterminate sentences rather than actual time served.
  • Supervised release conditions: Rules a person must follow after prison. Some are mandatory by statute; others are discretionary and must be justified.
  • Oral pronouncement requirement: Discretionary conditions generally must be announced (or the defendant must be notified of them) at sentencing, not silently added later in a written judgment.
  • Incorporation by reference: Instead of reading each condition aloud, a judge can impose a known written list (e.g., a standing order) by clearly referencing it, so long as the defendant has notice and an opportunity to object.
  • Individualized assessment: The court must explain why a discretionary condition is appropriate for this defendant, on this record. Failure is error, but may be harmless if the reason is obvious from the record.
  • Reasonable-suspicion search condition: Permits probation (often with law enforcement assistance) to search the supervisee or property when there is reasonable suspicion of a violation or unlawful conduct; it is justified as a supervision/enforcement mechanism but implicates privacy interests.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Matos does not expand appellate review for defendants who signed appeal waivers; it largely does the opposite while acknowledging a narrow doctrinal safety valve. The Second Circuit, implementing United States v. Hunter, recognizes that a “miscarriage of justice” can defeat an appeal waiver, but holds that routine Sentencing Guidelines disputes—including criminal history scoring and claimed substantive unreasonableness within the waiver’s range—are exactly what waivers foreclose.

On supervised release, the court harmonizes Maiorana’s pronouncement rule with practical sentencing administration: incorporation by reference to a publicly accessible standing order can provide sufficient notice. Yet Matos also reaffirms Betts: discretionary conditions require individualized justification, even if appellate courts may affirm when that justification is self-evident on the record.