United States v. Levasseur — “Special Danger of Firearm Misuse” Sustains § 922(g)(1) As-Applied Disarmament Despite Nonviolent Predicate Framing

1. Introduction

In United States v. Levasseur (1st Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), the First Circuit affirmed a felon-in-possession conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) against a Second Amendment as-applied challenge. Jason Levasseur, a felon with multiple Maine felony convictions, pleaded guilty but preserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment as unconstitutional under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen.

The case sharpened a recurring post-Bruen issue: even assuming felons may bring as-applied Second Amendment claims, what “dangerousness” showing suffices to justify disarmament consistent with “this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation”? Levasseur argued his predicates were not “violent,” and that disarmament historically required a specific threat of violence.

Parties and posture

  • Appellee: United States of America
  • Appellant: Jason Levasseur
  • Proceeding: Appeal from denial of motions to dismiss indictment; conviction entered on guilty plea with appellate reservation

Key issues

  1. Whether § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment as applied to Levasseur.
  2. How the Bruen/United States v. Rahimi framework applies where the appellant focuses on “nonviolence” rather than “misuse risk.”
  3. Whether the appellant carried his burden on appeal to show error in the district court’s historical-analogue/dangerousness analysis.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The First Circuit affirmed. It assumed without deciding that Levasseur is among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment (step one), and proceeded to step two. It further assumed in Levasseur’s favor that as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) are cognizable, and that Supreme Court dicta describing felon disarmament as “presumptively lawful” was not dispositive.

The court nonetheless held Levasseur failed to show error because he did not meaningfully confront the district court’s premise: history and tradition allow legislatures to disarm categories of persons who present a “special danger of misuse” of firearms even absent (i) prior violent conduct or (ii) an individualized judicial finding of a credible threat to another person. Levasseur instead argued only that he lacked violent predicates and that historical “dangerousness” was narrower—an argument the panel found did not address the district court’s basis for decision.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The opinion is best understood as an “appellate posture” decision operating within the post-Bruen landscape—less about announcing an exhaustive historical account, more about enforcing the obligation to engage the district court’s historical-analogue reasoning and the controlling dangerousness theory actually used.

1) The Supreme Court’s core Second Amendment framework

  • District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008): Establishes the individual right and contains the oft-quoted dicta that “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons” are “presumptively lawful.” Levasseur conceded facial validity of § 922(g)(1) in light of this line.
  • McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (plurality opinion): Repeats Heller’s assurance about felon prohibitions.
  • New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022): Supplies the two-step inquiry used here: (1) coverage by the Second Amendment’s plain text; (2) whether the regulation is consistent with historical tradition.
  • United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024): Provides the “relevantly similar” analogue methodology (why/how the regulation burdens the right) and includes language the district court (and panel) found important: the Court was “not suggest[ing] that the Second Amendment prohibits the enactment of laws banning the possession of guns by categories of persons thought by a legislature to present a special danger of misuse.”
  • Wolford v. Lopez, 609 U.S. ___, 146 S. Ct. 2032 (2026): Cited regarding the “the people”/political community framing and the Court’s “law-abiding citizens” phrasing.

2) The First Circuit’s post-Bruen method and avoidance of step-one scope rulings

  • United States v. Vizcaíno-Peguero, 175 F.4th 34 (1st Cir. 2026): The panel followed it to assume step one and proceed to step two, invoking constitutional avoidance due to the cross-amendment significance of “the people.” This is pivotal: Levasseur declines to decide whether felons fall outside “the people,” thereby avoiding a broad constitutional holding.
  • United States v. Minor, 165 F.4th 616 (1st Cir. 2026): Quoted for the step-two standard and for discussion of restoration mechanics (the panel later references restoration issues in assessing “lifetime” disarmament).

3) Appellate-burden and waiver principles shaping the outcome

  • United States v. Randazzo, 80 F.3d 623 (1st Cir. 1996): Used to underscore that an appellant must show error; Levasseur’s failure to attack the district court’s actual rationale was framed as dispositive.
  • Sparkle Hill, Inc. v. Interstate Mat Corp., 788 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2015): Cited to criticize raising core challenges only in a reply brief and failing to address the grounds relied upon below.
  • Clemente Props., Inc. v. Pierluisi-Urrutia, 165 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2026): Cited for the circuit’s disfavor of arguments first raised in reply; the panel discussed waiver but resolved an argument on the merits anyway.

4) “Dangerousness,” drugs, and firearm misuse

  • United States v. Hemani, 608 U.S. ___, 146 S. Ct. 1677 (2026): Important gloss: the relevant inquiry is “special danger of misuse,” not necessarily physical violence.
  • Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993): Quoted for the “drugs and guns are a dangerous combination” idea, used to support the plausibility of linking drug possession and misuse risk.
  • United States v. Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d 110 (1st Cir. 2011): Recognizes the possibility of “tame and technical” felonies, but the panel held Levasseur did not show meth possession fits that category.

5) Federal statutory purpose: disarming those expected to misuse firearms

  • Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103 (1983): Cited for Congress’s determination that firearms should be kept from those convicted of serious crimes who might be expected to misuse them.
  • Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977): Quoted for Congress’s intent to keep guns from those who “may not be trusted to possess a firearm without becoming a threat to society.”
  • Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980): Cited for the notion that convicted felons are among those disabled from firearm possession due to potential dangerousness.

6) Restoration pathways and their relevance to “lifetime” disarmament

  • Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368 (1994): Cited for the rule that only the convicting jurisdiction can restore civil rights (relevant to § 921(a)(20)).

7) The opinion’s mapping of the circuit split (context, not holding)

The panel canvassed sister-circuit decisions reflecting deep disagreement over step one (“the people”) and the permissibility/shape of as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1), citing: Zherka v. Bondi; Range v. Att'y Gen. U.S. (en banc); United States v. Diaz; United States v. Williams; United States v. Watson; United States v. Duarte (en banc); United States v. Harrison; United States v. Hunt; United States v. Jackson; Pitsilides v. Barr. The panel did not adopt any one circuit’s comprehensive theory; it instead assumed arguendo that Levasseur could bring his challenge and still found he failed to demonstrate reversible error.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The court’s narrowed path: assumption and avoidance

The panel deliberately avoided two sweeping constitutional determinations:

  • Step one (“the people”): The government argued felons fall outside “the people” because they are not “members of the political community” and not “law-abiding.” The court assumed without deciding Levasseur had Second Amendment coverage to avoid broader doctrinal consequences (given “the people” appears in multiple amendments), following United States v. Vizcaíno-Peguero.
  • As-applied justiciability and dicta: The government urged foreclosing as-applied challenges and invoked “presumptively lawful” language from Heller, McDonald, and Rahimi. The court assumed it could entertain the as-applied claim and that the dicta were not dispositive.

This approach makes the decision’s operative rule more practical than theoretical: even on the most defendant-favorable assumptions, the appellant must still engage the district court’s dangerousness rationale and demonstrate error under the step-two analogue method.

2) Step two: dangerousness framed as “special danger of misuse”

The district court upheld § 922(g)(1) as applied to Levasseur on a specific theory: the Nation’s tradition supports disarming those deemed “too dangerous to possess a firearm,” including categories thought to present an unacceptable risk, even absent proof of prior violence or a judicial finding of a credible threat to another person.

The historical analogues summarized by the panel (and relied on below) were not limited to laws targeting “violent criminals.” They included disarmament of groups perceived as threatening social stability (e.g., Loyalists), and post-Founding proposals that would allow disarmament for “crimes committed” or “real danger of public injury,” and would protect arms-bearing for “peaceable citizens.”

3) Appellate failure to meet the decision actually rendered

Levasseur’s appellate strategy targeted a different proposition than the one the district court adopted. He argued: (i) only “violent” felons (as determined by elements) may be disarmed; or (ii) disarmament requires a finding of a specific threatened violence to another person. But the district court’s rationale was broader: disarmament can rest on being in a category posing a special danger of firearm misuse.

The First Circuit held that Levasseur did not “meaningfully engage with or respond to” that reasoning, and did not explain why methamphetamine possession is a “tame and technical” felony outside the misuse-risk category—especially in light of the Court’s recognition that “drugs and guns can sometimes make for a dangerous mix” (United States v. Hemani) and the district court’s “well-known” connection between illegal drug transactions and firearms.

4) The “why/how” analogue attempt and why it did not carry the appeal

Levasseur made two arguments closer to the analogue methodology:

  • “Why” mismatch: He claimed Loyalist-style disarmament targeted “dissidents,” while § 922(g)(1) is mere “crime control.” The panel rejected the premise by citing Supreme Court descriptions of § 922(g)(1)’s purpose as preventing misuse risk by those convicted of serious crimes (Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc.; Scarborough v. United States; Lewis v. United States).
  • “How” mismatch (duration): He argued historical disarmament could be lifted (e.g., by oath), while § 922(g)(1) is “lifetime.” The panel responded that the district court had already rejected demands for a “historical twin,” and added that it is “not clear” § 922(g)(1) is always lifetime given 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (civil rights restoration) and the statutory existence (though defunct in practice here) of 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).

C. Impact

Although the court framed its disposition as dependent on the “limited arguments presented,” Levasseur has several practical impacts in the First Circuit:

  • Reinforces “special danger of misuse” as a sufficient historical-tradition concept: The opinion treats misuse risk as distinct from (and potentially broader than) “violent history” or “credible threat” findings, echoing the Rahimi language emphasized by the district court and the clarification in United States v. Hemani.
  • Encourages historically grounded engagement, not categorical slogans: Appellants must confront the exact analogue theory used below (here, group-based dangerousness), rather than substituting an elements-only “violent felony” test or a Rahimi-specific “credible threat” requirement.
  • Preserves doctrinal flexibility: By assuming (rather than deciding) step-one coverage and as-applied availability, the First Circuit keeps open major questions while still affirming convictions where appellants do not carry the burden to show error.
  • Signals relevance of restoration mechanisms: Future litigants are on notice that arguments premised on “permanent” disarmament may need to grapple with § 921(a)(20) and restoration law (as noted with Beecham v. United States and Maine’s procedures referenced in the opinion).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Facial vs. as-applied challenge: A facial challenge claims a law is unconstitutional in all applications. An as-applied challenge claims the law is unconstitutional for this defendant in this situation. Levasseur conceded § 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional but argued it was unconstitutional as applied to him.
  • Bruen step one / step two: Step one asks whether the Second Amendment’s text covers the conduct (e.g., possessing a rifle). Step two asks whether the government’s regulation fits the Nation’s historical tradition, using historical analogues rather than modern interest-balancing.
  • Constitutional avoidance: Courts sometimes avoid deciding broad constitutional questions unnecessarily. Here, the panel assumed Levasseur was within “the people” rather than deciding whether felons are excluded.
  • Historical analogue (“why” and “how”): Under Bruen/Rahimi, the court compares modern and historical regulations on: (i) why they burden the right (the purpose/justification) and (ii) how they burden it (the means/severity/duration). Exact matches are not required; “dead ringer” laws are unnecessary.
  • “Dangerousness” vs. “violence” vs. “misuse risk”: The opinion treats “dangerousness” as including a category-based judgment that someone poses a special risk of misusing firearms, not limited to prior violent convictions or individualized threat findings.
  • Appellate burden and waiver: On appeal, the appellant must show the district court made a reversible error. Arguments not developed in the opening brief (or not aimed at the district court’s actual reasoning) may be treated as waived or insufficient.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Levasseur affirms a § 922(g)(1) conviction by emphasizing that, even under defendant-favorable assumptions (step-one coverage, availability of as-applied challenges, and non-dispositive dicta), the appellant must confront and defeat the district court’s step-two theory that history supports disarming those who present a special danger of firearm misuse. By focusing narrowly on the absence of “violent” predicates or a Rahimi-style “credible threat” finding, Levasseur did not address the operative rationale. The decision thus functions both as a substantive endorsement of misuse-risk dangerousness as a constitutionally relevant category and as a procedural reminder that appellate review turns on engaging the reasoning actually used below.