Rule 35(b) Substantial-Assistance Reductions Do Not Break the “Based On Guidelines” Link, and § 1B1.10(c) Removes Mandatory Minimums from the Retroactive-Amendment Recalculation

1. Introduction

United States v. Hilton addresses a recurring, technical question in federal sentencing modification practice: when a defendant originally faced statutory mandatory minimums (including a consecutive 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) term), later received a substantial-assistance reduction under Rule 35(b), and then seeks relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) after the Sentencing Commission retroactively lowers the criminal-history calculation.

The core dispute was eligibility—specifically whether Hilton’s imprisonment term was “based on a sentencing range” and whether that “range ... has subsequently been lowered” by the Commission. The district court held Hilton ineligible, reasoning that her sentence was based on statutory mandatory minimums rather than the Guidelines. The Sixth Circuit disagreed and remanded for the district court to consider the remaining statutory and policy constraints.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Holdings

• “Based on” requirement satisfied: Hilton’s sentence was “based on” a Guidelines sentencing range because the district court calculated the range (120–131 months) and imposed a within-range sentence (120 months), and later granted a Rule 35(b) reduction in explicitly Guidelines-range terms (a “one-level reduction” to an “effective guideline range”).
• Amendment 821 “lowered” the range: Applying U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1) and especially § 1B1.10(c), the court held that mandatory minimums must be disregarded in recalculating the amended range because Hilton previously received a substantial-assistance reduction; thus her post-amendment range became 106–117 months, which is lower than 120–131 months.
• Koons distinguished: Koons v. United States did not control because Hilton’s mandatory minimums did not wholly supplant the Guidelines range; the district court retained discretion within the Guidelines range’s upper portion.
• Disposition: Vacatur and remand in No. 25-5228 for consideration of remaining § 3582(c)(2) steps (including § 3553(a) and policy statements); No. 25-5835 dismissed as moot.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) The “based on” framework: Guidelines as the analytic starting point

The opinion builds on Supreme Court authority recognizing the Guidelines range as the “starting point” and usually a “basis” for the sentence, even when the court ultimately deviates.

• Hughes v. United States: The Sixth Circuit used Hughes to emphasize that a sentence is “based on” a range when the range is a “relevant part of the analytic framework.” Critically, the court quoted Hughes for the proposition that when a judge uses the range “as the beginning point to explain the decision to deviate,” § 3582(c)(2)’s threshold is satisfied.
• Peugh v. United States: Cited (via Hughes) for the principle that the Guidelines provide the “starting point” for sentencing.
• Molina-Martinez v. United States: Cited (via Hughes) for the centrality of the Guidelines range in the sentencing process and for the idea that the range anchors the court’s explanation.
• Freeman v. United States: Quoted through Hughes (plurality) for the “analytic framework” formulation.

2) Standard of review and Sixth Circuit § 3582(c)(2) methodology

• United States v. Watkins and United States v. Curry: These cases supply the de novo standard for reviewing eligibility determinations under § 3582(c)(2).

3) Mandatory minimums and the Koons limitation

• Koons v. United States: The government relied on Koons for the proposition that mandatory minimums can sever the “based on” link. The Sixth Circuit read Koons narrowly: it applies when the mandatory minimum is wholly above the top of the Guidelines range, such that the Guidelines range is effectively discarded and the statutory floor becomes the operative range.
• United States v. Koons: The opinion cited the Eighth Circuit decision to illustrate the factual configuration in which Koons applies (Guidelines range fully below the statutory minimum, leaving no Guidelines-based choice set).
• United States v. Payne: The court used Payne to reinforce the distinction: Koons concerns cases where a “congressional requirement” dictates disregard of the advisory range; in such cases the mandatory minimum “becomes the new range.”

4) Guideline commentary and interpretive limits

• United States v. Havis and United States v. Riccardi: These cases frame the Sixth Circuit’s approach to Guideline commentary: it is not binding when it does more than interpret text, and it cannot override a Guideline’s plain language. The panel invoked them to validate reliance on § 1B1.10’s application note 4(B) because the note merely confirms the clear text of § 1B1.10(c), rather than adding to it.

5) Commission discretion vs. statutory constraints

• United States v. Bricker: Cited for the principle that the Sentencing Commission’s discretion must operate consistently with statutory plain language (including mandatory minimums). The panel used Bricker to acknowledge the constraint, but then explained why § 1B1.10(c) does not conflict with mandatory minimums in this setting given Congress’s authorization to go below them for substantial assistance.

6) Mootness

• Sueing v. Palmer and Coal. to Def. Affirmative Action v. Granholm: These authorities support the court’s decision to dismiss Hilton’s second appeal as moot once the first appeal’s disposition afforded the operative relief (a remand to consider resentencing).

B. Legal Reasoning

Step 1: Was Hilton “sentenced ... based on a sentencing range”?

The Sixth Circuit treated the Guidelines range as the default basis for a sentence (Hughes v. United States), then examined the concrete record indicators showing that the Guidelines were not merely calculated but operationally used:

• The district court correctly calculated a final Guidelines range of 120–131 months (after applying mandatory minimum interactions under §§ 5G1.1 and 5G1.2).
• The court imposed a within-range original sentence (120 months).
• On the later Rule 35(b) motion, both the government and the court described the reduction as a Guidelines concept: a “one-level reduction” producing an “effective guideline range of 100 to 125 months,” and the court selected 100 months.

This record, in the panel’s view, defeated the district court’s premise that mandatory minimums (and the Rule 35(b) motion) displaced the Guidelines as the anchor of the sentencing decision.

Step 2: Did Amendment 821 “lower” Hilton’s sentencing range?

The key interpretive move appears in the interaction of § 3582(c)(2) with the Commission’s policy statement in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10. The court applied:

• § 1B1.10(b)(1): Recalculate the Guidelines range “as if” the amendment had been in effect at the time of sentencing.
• § 1B1.10(c): When the defendant previously received a substantial-assistance reduction that allowed a sentence below a mandatory minimum, the amended-range recalculation is performed without regard to the statutory minimum.

Applying Amendment 821 reduced Hilton’s criminal-history category (IV to III), which in turn reduced the non-minimum-driven range to 106–117 months. Because § 1B1.10(c) removes mandatory minimums from the recalculation (given the earlier Rule 35(b) reduction), this lower range governed the “has subsequently been lowered” inquiry.

The court also relied on § 1B1.10 cmt. n.4(B)—an example closely paralleling Hilton’s scenario—to confirm that the “relevant Guidelines range” is the post-amendment range computed without the mandatory minimum, not the mandatory-minimum-adjusted floor. It addressed commentary skepticism under United States v. Havis and United States v. Riccardi by characterizing the note as interpretive reinforcement of clear text, not an expansion.

Step 3: Why Koons did not bar eligibility

The government attempted to extend Koons v. United States to any case involving mandatory minimums. The Sixth Circuit refused, emphasizing a factual and functional distinction:

• Koons scenario: the mandatory minimum sits wholly above the Guidelines range, leaving the court no Guidelines-based choice set. The sentencing is therefore not “based on” the Guidelines range.
• Hilton scenario: the mandatory minimums truncated only the lower end; the Guidelines range still retained an upper segment in which the court could choose (and the court discussed and applied the case in Guidelines terms). The Guidelines were not disregarded.

The panel also rejected the suggestion that Koons “silently overruled” § 1B1.10(c), noting that Koons was decided solely on the “based on” prong and explicitly did not reach § 1B1.10(c).

Step 4: Remand for the remaining § 3582(c)(2) gates

Having found Hilton eligible at the threshold, the Sixth Circuit did not order a reduction. Instead, it returned the case for the district court to consider (i) the § 3553(a) factors and (ii) whether a reduction would be “consistent with applicable policy statements.”

C. Impact

1) Clarifies eligibility where mandatory minimums only partially constrain the range

The decision draws a practical line for applying Koons v. United States in the Sixth Circuit: mandatory minimums do not categorically defeat § 3582(c)(2) eligibility. Eligibility turns on whether the mandatory minimum wholly displaced the Guidelines range (Koons) or merely bounded it while leaving the Guidelines operative (Hilton).

2) Confirms § 1B1.10(c)’s mandatory-minimum “disregard” rule after substantial assistance

For defendants who have received substantial-assistance reductions (including via Rule 35(b)), the opinion strongly reinforces that district courts must use § 1B1.10(c) in recalculating the amended range. That is especially consequential for retroactive criminal-history amendments like Amendment 821, where mandatory minimums might otherwise obscure the effect of the lowered criminal-history score.

3) Incentivizes careful record-making in Rule 35(b) proceedings

The panel relied heavily on the district court’s language (“one-level reduction,” “effective guideline range”). Future litigants can expect that whether a sentence is “based on” a range will often be proven (or undermined) by the sentencing and Rule 35(b) transcripts and written orders.

4) Limits challenges to § 1B1.10(c) as conflicting with mandatory minimums

By tying § 1B1.10(c) to Congress’s express authorization in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) to sentence below mandatory minimums for substantial assistance, the opinion makes it harder (at least within this circuit’s reasoning) to argue that § 1B1.10(c) is ultra vires in substantial-assistance cases.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction: A limited procedure allowing a sentence reduction when the Sentencing Commission retroactively lowers the applicable Guidelines range. It is not a full resentencing; the court first checks eligibility (“based on” + “lowered”), then considers § 3553(a) and policy statements.
• Mandatory minimum + Guidelines interaction (U.S.S.G. §§ 5G1.1 and 5G1.2): If a mandatory minimum exceeds the bottom of the Guidelines range, it raises that bottom (and if a count like § 924(c) must run consecutively, it is added on top, potentially raising the entire effective range).
• § 924(c) consecutive sentence: A firearm sentence that must run consecutively to the drug sentence, mechanically increasing the total imprisonment term.
• Substantial assistance (18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, Rule 35(b)): Congress allows sentencing below mandatory minimums when the government moves based on the defendant’s substantial assistance. § 5K1.1 typically operates at original sentencing; Rule 35(b) operates after sentencing.
• U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c): A policy statement directing that, when recalculating the amended guideline range after a retroactive amendment, courts disregard mandatory minimums if the defendant previously received a substantial-assistance reduction below those minimums.
• Guidelines commentary vs. text (Havis/Riccardi principle): Commentary is persuasive only to the extent it interprets the Guideline text; it cannot add new rules inconsistent with the text. Here, the application note was treated as an interpretation confirming § 1B1.10(c)’s plain meaning.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Hilton meaningfully clarifies Sixth Circuit § 3582(c)(2) practice in the post-Amendment 821 landscape. The court held that a sentence remains “based on” a Guidelines range when the district court uses the range as the sentencing framework— even where mandatory minimums narrow the range and even where a later Rule 35(b) reduction occurs—so long as the Guidelines remain part of the analytic basis. It further held that Amendment 821 “lowered” Hilton’s range because U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c) requires disregarding mandatory minimums in recalculating the amended range after a substantial-assistance reduction.

The remand underscores the opinion’s limited but important scope: eligibility is only the gateway. Whether Hilton ultimately receives a lower sentence now turns on the district court’s application of the § 3553(a) factors and the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements.