Sovereign-Citizen Rhetoric Alone Does Not Defeat a Faretta Waiver or Trigger a Sua Sponte Competency Hearing; Consent Waives Objections to Remote Rule 15 Testimony

1. Introduction

This consolidated Fourth Circuit appeal arose from a “workshop” fraud scheme in which Willie Lamont Hicks and Mary Ann Mendoza held themselves out as husband and wife and sold purported “keys to financial success,” including pseudo-legal and pseudo-financial strategies (e.g., stopping mortgage payments; filing sham instruments). Hicks primarily presented lectures; Mendoza managed finances and interacted with participants. Victims paid cash and in-kind benefits; many suffered severe financial harm.

After a jury trial in the District of Maryland, both defendants were convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and substantive wire fraud. On appeal, Hicks challenged the validity of his self-representation and the district court’s failure to order a competency evaluation. Mendoza challenged (i) admission of a cancer-stricken victim’s Rule 15 video deposition, (ii) sufficiency of the interstate-wire element, and (iii) multiple sentencing issues, including presence and upward deviation from the Guidelines.

2. Summary of the Opinion

• Hicks: The court upheld Hicks’ waiver of counsel as clear, knowing, intelligent, voluntary, and timely, notwithstanding sovereign-citizen-inflected statements. It also rejected his procedural competency claim, holding the district court lacked “reasonable cause” to sua sponte order a competency evaluation under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a).
• Mendoza: The court held Mendoza waived any Confrontation Clause objection to the victim’s remote Rule 15 deposition by consenting to the procedure and failing to request in-person attendance. It found sufficient evidence that the charged wire traveled interstate (Georgia to Maryland) without requiring proof of server location or the wire’s “actual path.” At sentencing, it rejected the claim Mendoza was denied presence, emphasized waiver/consent and the permissibility of hearsay at sentencing, and affirmed her above-Guidelines sentence as harmless even assuming an upward departure error because the district court stated it would impose the same sentence as an upward variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

A. Self-representation, waiver of counsel, and competency

• Faretta v. California — Provided the foundational requirement that courts ensure a defendant’s waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent before permitting self-representation, framing the district court’s extended colloquy.
• United States v. Ductan — Supplied the “default position” principle: counsel is presumed unless the defendant clearly and unambiguously elects pro se status; this supported affirmance where Hicks repeatedly insisted on self-representation.
• United States v. Ziegler and United States v. Bernard — Provided the Fourth Circuit’s three-part test for a valid waiver (clear/unequivocal; knowing/intelligent/voluntary; timely) and emphasized district-court discretion given its superior vantage point. These cases also supported the conclusion that frivolous strategies and unconventional courtroom behavior do not automatically create “reasonable cause” to doubt competence.
• United States v. Frazier-El — Anchored the key doctrinal point that competency to waive counsel is identical to competency to stand trial; this undercut Hicks’ attempt to impose a higher threshold.
• Indiana v. Edwards — Addressed by the panel to reject Hicks’ reading: Edwards permits (does not require) courts to deny self-representation to borderline defendants; it does not forbid allowing a competent defendant to proceed pro se.
• Herrington v. Dotson and United States v. Roof — Cited for the minimal constitutional assurances a trial court must obtain (charges, potential punishment, how counsel can help), reinforcing that no “precise formula” is required.
• Dusky v. United States — Supplied the competency standard (rational and factual understanding; ability to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding).
• United States v. Mason, United States v. Banks, and United States v. Snyder — Structured the procedural competency framework: when a court must order a competency hearing/evaluation under § 4241(a), the deference owed to district courts, and (here) the plain-error review posture for a sua sponte reconsideration claim raised first on appeal.
• United States v. Solis-Rodriguez and United States v. Olano — Supplied the plain-error test and the discretionary fourth prong (effect on fairness/integrity/public reputation), tightening the path to reversal on Hicks’ unpreserved competency argument.
• United States v. James (7th Cir.) — Used persuasively to illustrate that unusual “sovereign citizen” beliefs may be sincere or strategic without implying incompetency that makes trial impossible.
• Burket v. Angelone and Hall v. United States — Reinforced that mental illness, even if present, is not synonymous with legal incompetence.

B. Confrontation Clause and Rule 15 depositions

• United States v. Smith and United States v. Dargan — Supplied the governing Confrontation Clause framework for testimonial statements: unavailability plus prior opportunity for cross-examination.
• Maryland v. Craig — Cited (via Smith) to support the proposition that Rule 15 procedures can comport with confrontation values, particularly where cross-examination opportunities exist.
• United States v. Boyd and Wood v. Milyard — Supplied the definition of waiver as the intentional relinquishment of a known right; these cases did the heavy lifting to dispose of Mendoza’s remote-deposition complaint because she opted in and did not object.

C. Wire fraud: interstate element and evidentiary sufficiency

• United States v. Fall — Set the appellate posture: sufficiency review asks whether substantial evidence supports the verdict when viewed favorably to the Government.
• United States v. Taylor and United States v. Elbaz — Framed the elements of wire fraud and identified the interstate transmission requirement as jurisdictional, guiding the analysis that origin/destination proof can satisfy the “interstate commerce” component.
• S. Atl. Ltd. P'ship of Tenn., L.P. v. Riese — Cited to explain that good faith can be a complete defense to fraud, which the panel used to show Hicks’ trial testimony reflected a comprehensible defense theory (supporting competence rather than undermining it).

D. Sentencing: presence, hearsay, departures/variances, and harmless error

• United States v. Lawrence — Confirmed that Rule 43’s “presence” requirement means physical presence at sentencing; the panel used it to reject Mendoza’s characterization where she was physically present for her own sentencing hearing.
• United States v. Muslim — Supported plain-error review when an argument was not raised below.
• United States v. Powell — Disposed of the constitutional framing by reiterating that the Confrontation Clause does not apply at sentencing.
• United States v. Oliver, United States v. Fowler, United States v. Provance, and United States v. Huskey — Supplied the procedural/substantive reasonableness framework and deference to district courts’ § 3553(a) balancing.
• United States v. Mills, United States v. Savillon-Matute, United States v. Simmons — Provided the harmless-error approach to procedural sentencing mistakes and the Government’s burden to show the same sentence would have been imposed and would be reasonable.
• United States v. Evans — Established that departures are not the sole mechanism for going outside the Guidelines; variances can justify the same result, enabling affirmance even if the departure were flawed.
• United States v. Legins (and cited United States v. Brown (3d Cir.)) — Clarified the conceptual distinction between Guidelines “departures” and § 3553(a) “variances,” which mattered to the harmlessness analysis.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Hicks: A valid waiver despite sovereign-citizen statements

The panel treated the district court’s Faretta colloquy as the centerpiece: it covered penalties, rules of evidence, courtroom protocol, the risks of self-representation, and Hicks’ reasons for proceeding pro se (discovery dissatisfaction, avoidance of delay, objection to “sovereign citizen” labeling). The court emphasized that eccentric legal beliefs did not negate a defendant’s demonstrated understanding of the proceedings and consequences.

On equivocation, the panel read Hicks’ “going back and forth” comment in context: it reflected deliberation, not indecision, especially given his repeated affirmations (at least ten) that he wanted to represent himself.

B. Hicks: No sua sponte competency evaluation required

Applying § 4241(a) and the procedural competency framework, the panel held there was no “reasonable cause” requiring the district court to order an evaluation. Key facts: Hicks’ rational explanations, coherent interaction with the court, his ability to conduct trial tasks (opening/closing, cross-examination, objections), and his ability to coordinate at least occasionally with standby counsel. The court treated the sovereign-citizen strategy as “frivolous” but not dispositive of incompetence.

The post-trial psychological report (delusions; likely schizoaffective disorder) did not compel reversal: the report was developed for sentencing mitigation, emerged after conviction, and—critically—mental illness alone is not legal incompetence absent impairment of the ability to understand proceedings or assist in defense.

C. Mendoza: Confrontation Clause complaint defeated by consent and waiver

Rather than deciding whether a remote Rule 15 deposition is inherently problematic, the panel resolved the claim on waiver. Mendoza, out on bond, had an opt-in right under Rule 15(c)(2) to request in-person attendance. She did not request it; she affirmatively agreed to appear remotely; and she did not object at trial to the deposition’s admission. That combination fit classic intentional relinquishment under Boyd/Wood.

D. Mendoza: Interstate wire element proved by circumstantial origin/destination evidence

The panel rejected a “server location/actual routing” requirement. The jury could reasonably infer interstate transmission where the sender was a long-time Georgia resident, used Georgia address/phone on the wire, testified she assumed she wired from Georgia, and the wire landed in Maryland with subsequent ATM withdrawals in Maryland. That sufficed for 18 U.S.C. § 1343’s interstate commerce element.

E. Mendoza: Sentencing presence and the use of transcripted victim statements

The panel treated Mendoza’s claim as a mislabeling of a hearsay/confrontation objection. Rule 43 was satisfied because she was physically present at her own sentencing and had the opportunity to allocute. Her lawyer agreed to the use of victim testimony from Hicks’ sentencing (with a transcript provided), constituting waiver. Independently, the Confrontation Clause does not apply at sentencing, and 18 U.S.C. § 3661 broadly permits sentencing courts to consider information about a defendant’s conduct.

F. Mendoza: Upward deviation affirmed via harmlessness (variance backstop)

Even assuming an error in the upward “departure,” the district court explicitly stated it would impose the same 144-month sentence as an upward “variance” under § 3553(a). Under Savillon-Matute and related harmless-error authority, that statement—combined with a rationale tied to Mendoza’s role, in-person exploitation, and serious victim harm—made any departure error harmless because the same sentence would be reasonable as a variance.

3.3 Impact

• Self-representation and “sovereign citizen” defendants: The decision reinforces that courts should separate unconventional ideology and “fringe” legal rhetoric from the legal competency inquiry. A thorough Faretta colloquy and observable courtroom functioning can sustain a waiver even where a defendant espouses bizarre theories.
• Procedural competency claims face steep appellate hurdles: When raised for the first time on appeal, plain-error review plus deference to trial judges makes reversal unlikely absent concrete indicia that the defendant could not understand the proceedings or participate rationally.
• Rule 15 remote depositions: The case underscores that defendants on bond must affirmatively request in-person attendance under Rule 15(c)(2). Agreement to remote procedure and failure to object can waive Confrontation Clause challenges.
• Wire fraud jurisdictional proof: The panel’s approach confirms that juries may infer interstate transmission from common-sense origin/destination evidence; the Government need not prove the “route” of electronic transmissions.
• Sentencing practice: The opinion illustrates two sentencing realities: (i) hearsay is broadly admissible and confrontation rights do not apply, and (ii) a district court can often “salvage” an above-Guidelines sentence by clearly stating an alternative variance rationale grounded in § 3553(a).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Faretta waiver: A defendant may represent himself if he clearly chooses to do so, understands the risks and charges, and acts voluntarily. The judge’s colloquy is designed to ensure that choice is informed.
• Competency vs. poor strategy: Competency concerns a defendant’s ability to understand the case and assist in defense—not whether his legal theories are good. A “frivolous” defense does not automatically mean incompetence.
• Procedural competency claim: An argument that the judge should have held a competency hearing—even if the defendant cannot prove he was actually incompetent.
• Rule 15 deposition: A pretrial deposition used to preserve testimony of a witness likely unavailable at trial (e.g., due to severe illness).
• Waiver vs. forfeiture: Waiver is an intentional surrender of a right (often fatal to appellate review). Forfeiture is a failure to object (usually reviewed for plain error). The court found waiver for Mendoza’s remote deposition procedure and sentencing transcript use.
• Departure vs. variance: A “departure” adjusts a sentence based on Guidelines rules; a “variance” adjusts based on the broader statutory factors in § 3553(a). If the judge would impose the same sentence either way, an error in the “departure” label can be harmless.

5. Conclusion

In affirming both convictions and sentences, the Fourth Circuit emphasized functional competence over ideological eccentricity: sovereign-citizen rhetoric, without more, neither invalidates a properly conducted Faretta waiver nor compels a sua sponte competency evaluation. The opinion also spotlights waiver doctrine in criminal procedure—particularly where defendants consent to remote Rule 15 depositions and to sentencing efficiencies—and it reaffirms that interstate transmission in wire fraud may be proven through practical origin/destination evidence rather than technical routing proof. Finally, on sentencing, the court illustrates how a clearly articulated alternative upward variance can render a contested departure harmless.