United States v. Ellis: Deliberate Partial Courtroom Closures Are Not “Trivial” and Are Upheld When Supported by a Substantial Reason Under a Modified Waller Test

1. Introduction

In United States v. Tamarcus Ellis (4th Cir. July 20, 2026), the Fourth Circuit addressed when a trial court may partially close a courtroom during criminal trial testimony based on perceived witness intimidation, and whether such a closure can be dismissed as “trivial.” The case arose from Ellis’s federal methamphetamine trafficking trial in the Eastern District of North Carolina.

During the government’s presentation, cooperating witness Malcolm Russell testified. The U.S. Marshals Service reported that one or more spectators in the gallery (described as attending “on behalf of the defendant”) repeatedly “clicked” their teeth and rocked in a way that could be perceived as signaling disagreement with the testimony. The district court, concerned about intimidation and courtroom order, restricted attendance for roughly an hour while Russell finished testifying, allowing Ellis’s wife and daughter (and later defense counsel’s parents) to remain, then reopened the courtroom.

Ellis objected and appealed solely on Sixth Amendment grounds, arguing that the closure violated the Public Trial Clause and required automatic reversal as structural error.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit affirmed. It held:

• The hour-long, deliberate partial closure was not “trivial” and therefore did implicate the Sixth Amendment.
• A Public Trial Clause violation is structural error that would ordinarily require a new trial.
• But because this was a partial closure (limited in who was excluded and limited in time), the court applied a modified closure test: a “substantial reason” (not Waller’s “overriding interest”) plus the remaining Waller safeguards.
• On this record, the court concluded the district court had a substantial reason (preventing intimidation/maintaining order), the closure was narrowly tailored, reasonable alternatives were adequately considered in context, and the court made findings sufficient for appellate review.

Judge Richardson dissented, contending the district court made no adequate findings, did not show intimidation was likely absent closure, and failed to consider measures short of closure as required by Supreme Court precedent.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

(i) Foundations of the public-trial right and its purposes

• In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948): Cited for the historical distrust of secret trials and for the minimum entitlement that an accused should have friends/relatives/counsel present. The majority used it both to frame the Sixth Amendment’s openness norm and to support allowing Ellis’s family to remain.
• Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring): Used to explain the behavioral accountability rationale—officials and witnesses perform more responsibly in open court.
• Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980): Quoted for the “presumption of openness” inherent in criminal trials.
• Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984): The core test for courtroom closure; the majority treated it as the baseline and then applied a modified version for partial closures.
• Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286 (2017): Cited for the breadth of interests protected (public/press as well as the accused) and for structural-error framing in the public-trial context.

(ii) Structural error doctrine

• United States v. Gonzalez- Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006): Cited for the proposition that public-trial violations are structural.
• Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993); Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986): Used to describe structural error as a limited category that “infect[s] the entire trial process,” generally requiring automatic reversal when established.

(iii) The Fourth Circuit’s closure framework (total vs partial)

• Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc): Cited to reaffirm the right is not absolute and that closures may be permissible to protect overriding interests; it also anchors the Fourth Circuit’s articulation of the Waller factors.
• United States v. Barronette, 46 F.4th 177 (4th Cir. 2022): Central to the majority’s reasoning. It recognized “maintaining order” and “preventing witness intimidation” as interests that can justify even total closure, and it articulated the “substantial reason” standard for partial closures in the Fourth Circuit.
• United States v. Smith, 117 F.4th 584 (4th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 92 (2025): Cited for the Fourth Circuit’s adoption of the modified test for partial closures and for the proposition that the remaining Waller factors still apply.

(iv) Nationwide consensus on partial-closure doctrine

The majority reinforced that the Fourth Circuit’s approach aligns with “nearly every other court of appeals,” citing: Bucci v. United States; Woods v. Kuhlmann; United States v. Girard; United States v. Osborne; United States v. Simmons; United States v. Farmer; United States v. Sherlock; Nieto v. Sullivan; Douglas v. Wainwright. These authorities collectively support a doctrinal split: total closure requires an “overriding interest,” while partial closure requires a “substantial reason,” with tailoring/alternatives/findings still required.

(v) The “triviality” doctrine and why it did not apply

• Zornes v. Bolin, 37 F.4th 1411 (8th Cir. 2022): Cited for collecting cases that recognize trivial closures may fall outside Sixth Amendment analysis.
• Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1996): The key “triviality” case discussed. It evaluates whether the closure deprived the defendant of the values of openness (fairness, accountability, encouraging witnesses, discouraging perjury). The majority distinguished it because Peterson involved an inadvertent, unnoticed, ~20-minute closure.
• United States v. Perry, 479 F.3d 885 (D.C. Cir. 2007): Cited as another application of Peterson-style analysis.
• United States v. Patton, 502 F. App’x 139 (3d Cir. 2012): Cited as an example of closures treated as trivial in administrative/seating-capacity contexts.

The majority’s practical rule is significant: an intentional, hour-long partial closure—especially where the trial court tries to justify it on the record and the defendant contemporaneously claims a Sixth Amendment violation— cannot be dismissed as categorically non-implicating (“trivial”) in the way inadvertent or purely administrative restrictions sometimes are.

(vi) Additional closure-record authorities highlighted in the dissent

The dissent invoked Supreme Court precedent requiring specific findings and consideration of alternatives: Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209 (2010) (per curiam), and Press- Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 464 US. 501 (1984), and Press- Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986). While the majority cited Press- Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal. in discussing the adequacy-of-findings requirement, it did not adopt the dissent’s stricter view that the record here was legally insufficient under Presley.

B. Legal Reasoning

(1) Step one: the closure implicated the Sixth Amendment (not trivial)

The court first rejected the government’s attempt to avoid Sixth Amendment scrutiny through “triviality.” The closure was deliberate, lasted about an hour, and arose in a context where the court believed it was addressing witness intimidation; Ellis also objected on constitutional grounds. These factors, in the majority’s view, meant the closure implicated the public-trial values enough to require a structured closure analysis.

(2) Step two: treat it as a partial closure and apply a modified Waller test

Because the district court did not exclude everyone (it permitted certain family members to remain) and because the closure was time-limited to a portion of one witness’s testimony, the Fourth Circuit applied its “less demanding” partial-closure framework: the first prong becomes “substantial reason,” and the other three Waller prongs remain.

(3) Applying the prongs

1. Substantial reason: Preventing witness intimidation and maintaining order qualified. The court emphasized that the district judge received a marshal report of in-court signaling and heard contemporaneous impressions from counsel that the witness seemed scared/off, supporting concern that the conduct could affect testimony.
2. No broader than necessary: The court found narrow tailoring in two dimensions: (a) who was excluded—only the broader public, while allowing specific persons (Ellis’s wife and daughter; counsel’s parents) to remain; and (b) how long—only for completion of the potentially affected witness’s testimony (about an hour), after which the courtroom reopened. The majority also noted practical difficulty in identifying the alleged noisemaker(s) and, additionally, that the record suggested no one was actually turned away during that hour.
3. Reasonable alternatives: The majority treated the court’s movement from an initially contemplated total closure to a more selective closure (admitting certain family members) as sufficient consideration of alternatives in the circumstances. It also linked this to In re Oliver’s admonition that an accused is at least entitled to have friends/relatives/counsel present.
4. Adequate findings: While acknowledging the absence of a formal, single-statement set of findings, the majority held that the record as a whole supplied reviewable findings: the marshal report, the government’s and witness counsel’s observations about the witness’s demeanor, defense counsel’s response, and the judge’s expressed concern about testimony being affected. This, the majority concluded, sufficiently revealed the basis for the ruling to permit appellate review.

(4) The dissent’s competing account

Judge Richardson agreed the closure was not trivial and that public-trial violations are structural error, but argued the closure failed even the partial-closure test because: the court made no finding that intimidation was likely absent closure; the marshal who spoke disclaimed an “indication” of intimidation; the court never asked the witness if he felt threatened; and the court did not consider measures short of closure (admonitions, identifying/removing the specific spectator, increased monitoring), as required by Presley v. Georgia. On this view, the record contained the very sort of conclusory, untested concern that the Supreme Court has deemed insufficient to justify closure.

C. Impact

(1) Limits on “triviality” in the Fourth Circuit

The opinion materially narrows the circumstances in which the government can avoid Sixth Amendment closure scrutiny by labeling a closure “trivial.” A purposeful, on-the-record closure lasting roughly an hour—especially one prompted by perceived intimidation and met with a Sixth Amendment objection—will be treated as constitutionally significant.

(2) Reinforcement of the partial-closure “substantial reason” standard

The decision strengthens the Fourth Circuit’s commitment (consistent with United States v. Smith and United States v. Barronette) to a two-tier framework: total closures require Waller’s “overriding interest,” while partial closures require only a “substantial reason,” with the remaining safeguards preserved. Trial courts confronting perceived intimidation may view this as doctrinal support for short, targeted restrictions rather than full closures.

(3) Practical guidance—and an unresolved tension with Supreme Court “alternatives” rigor

The majority’s approval of the alternatives prong based on moving from total to partial closure may be read as comparatively forgiving, while the dissent’s approach—grounded in Presley v. Georgia— would demand an explicit exploration of non-closure options. Future litigants can be expected to frame disputes around that tension: whether “alternatives” means alternatives to any closure, or whether narrowing the closure itself can satisfy the requirement in some circumstances.

(4) Record-making incentives

Although the majority upheld the closure without formal findings, the dissent’s critique underscores the appellate risk of thin records. Judges and prosecutors who seek closures will likely make more explicit findings (who, what conduct, whether the witness perceived it, why lesser measures are inadequate) to protect convictions on appeal.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Public Trial Clause (Sixth Amendment): The accused generally has the right for the trial to be open to the public. Openness promotes fairness, accountability, and truthful testimony.
• Structural error: A fundamental error that affects the framework of the trial itself (not just one piece of evidence). When preserved on direct appeal, it typically requires a new trial without asking whether the error changed the verdict.
• Total vs. partial closure: A total closure excludes all spectators; a partial closure excludes only some people or only for a limited time (or both).
• Waller test: The Supreme Court’s four requirements for closing proceedings: (1) a sufficiently important interest at risk, (2) narrow tailoring, (3) consideration of reasonable alternatives, and (4) adequate findings.
• “Overriding interest” vs. “substantial reason”: For total closures, the interest must be especially strong (“overriding”). For partial closures, many circuits (including the Fourth) allow a lesser showing (“substantial reason”) because the proceeding remains partly open.
• Triviality doctrine: Some courts treat very brief, inadvertent, or administrative restrictions as too minor to implicate the constitutional public-trial right. This opinion holds the doctrine does not cover deliberate, hour-long restrictions prompted by intimidation concerns.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Ellis establishes (or at least crystallizes) two practical rules in the Fourth Circuit: (1) a deliberate, hour-long partial courtroom closure to address perceived intimidation is not “trivial” and triggers Sixth Amendment analysis; and (2) such partial closures are assessed under a modified Waller framework requiring a substantial reason plus narrow tailoring, consideration of alternatives, and adequate findings—standards the majority found satisfied here. The dissent highlights a competing, stricter reading of Supreme Court requirements for findings and alternatives, signaling an area likely to generate future appellate litigation.