United States v. DeJesus: PSR Page-Reference Incorporation Satisfies Oral Pronouncement of Supervised-Release Conditions; Mental-Health Condition Upheld Where Need Is Self-Evident

1. Introduction

In United States v. DeJesus (2d Cir. July 17, 2026), the Second Circuit affirmed a below-Guidelines 144-month prison sentence and four years of supervised release imposed by the Southern District of New York (Furman, J.) after defendant-appellant Jairo DeJesus pleaded guilty to two fentanyl trafficking offenses.

The appeal raised four core issues: (1) whether the district court erred in denying a Guidelines adjustment for acceptance of responsibility despite an obstruction enhancement; (2) whether the 144-month term was substantively unreasonable; (3) whether the district court improperly imposed discretionary supervised-release conditions by orally referencing the PSR pages listing them rather than reading them aloud; and (4) whether a mental-health treatment condition lacked record support.

The court rejected all challenges. While much of the decision applies established standards, the opinion is especially significant for its concrete application of the Second Circuit’s en banc rule permitting incorporation-by-reference of supervised-release conditions: it confirms that a judge may satisfy the oral-pronouncement obligation by expressly adopting conditions identified by page reference to the PSR, so long as the PSR was made available to the defendant and the written judgment matches what was incorporated.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Acceptance of responsibility: No procedural error in denying the reduction where DeJesus received an obstruction enhancement and failed to show “extraordinary circumstances” under Application Note 4 to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.
  • Substantive reasonableness: The below-Guidelines 144-month sentence was within the range of permissible decisions given the seriousness of fentanyl trafficking, attempted flight, dishonesty during the safety-valve proffer, and minimization of culpability, notwithstanding mitigating factors.
  • Oral pronouncement of conditions: No error where the court incorporated conditions by referencing the PSR pages listing them, consistent with United States v. Maiorana.
  • Mental-health condition: Under plain-error review, the condition was affirmed because the need for it was self-evident in the record, including DeJesus’s statement to Probation that he wanted counseling.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Sentencing review framework: procedural and substantive reasonableness

The court grounded its review in the Second Circuit’s established reasonableness framework:

  • United States v. Davis supplied the two-part reasonableness inquiry (procedural and substantive) and emphasized the “particularly deferential” abuse-of-discretion posture on appeal.
  • United States v. Cossey provided examples of procedural error, including Guidelines miscalculation.
  • United States v. Yilmaz anchored the standard of review: de novo for legal questions (including Guidelines interpretation) and clear error for factual findings.

For substantive reasonableness, the court relied on the en banc benchmark:

  • United States v. Cavera (en banc) set the “range of permissible decisions” test and warned against appellate substitution of judgment for the sentencing judge’s weighing of § 3553(a).
  • United States v. Fabian (quoting United States v. Rigas) supplied the “shockingly high, shockingly low” formulation for the rare case warranting substantive reversal.

B. Guidelines commentary and the acceptance-of-responsibility/obstruction interaction

A central legal move in DeJesus’s procedural challenge was attacking the district court’s reliance on Guidelines commentary—specifically Application Note 4 to § 3E1.1. The panel invoked:

  • United States v. Parnell for the proposition that, post-Booker, district courts must still calculate the Guidelines range “in the same manner as before Booker,” considering the Guidelines and their commentary.
  • Kisor v. Wilkie as the Supreme Court’s modern framework for deference to agency interpretations, and the Second Circuit’s own decisions reaffirming deference to Guidelines commentary in this circuit: United States v. Rainford and United States v. Zheng.
  • United States v. McGrain for the specific rule application: absent extraordinary circumstances, a defendant receiving an obstruction enhancement is not entitled to an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction.

These authorities shaped the holding that the district court did not treat Note 4 as “mandatory” in an impermissible sense; rather, it correctly treated it as part of the required Guidelines-calculation methodology, and then found no extraordinary circumstances on this record.

C. Disparity arguments and the irrelevance of Probation’s recommendation

DeJesus argued his sentence was unreasonable because it exceeded the PSR’s recommended 84 months and exceeded averages. The court answered with:

  • United States v. Eberhard, stating that Probation’s recommendation is only a suggestion and not a benchmark entitled to deference.
  • United States v. Broxmeyer, cited in rejecting the claim that any disparity was unwarranted, reinforcing that defendants must show a meaningful mismatch with similarly situated defendants and that sentencing remains individualized.

D. Oral pronouncement and incorporation-by-reference of supervised-release conditions

This portion is where the opinion’s most concrete operational guidance appears. The court relied on:

  • United States v. Maiorana (en banc), holding that a sentencing court need not read the full text of every condition aloud; it may expressly adopt or specifically incorporate by reference conditions set forth in writing and made available to the defendant (including in the PSR).

Applying Maiorana, the panel upheld the sentencing court’s method: it confirmed DeJesus had the PSR (read to him through an interpreter) and then incorporated “standard conditions” by reference to PSR pages 22–23 and “special conditions” by reference to PSR pages 23–24; the written judgment matched those PSR conditions. This makes explicit that page-referenced incorporation can satisfy the oral-pronouncement requirement when paired with record confirmation of defendant access and identity between referenced text and written judgment.

E. Review of supervised-release conditions; individualized assessment; plain-error posture

On the mental-health condition, the court applied a cluster of precedents defining both the substantive limits on conditions and the procedural requirement of explanation:

  • United States v. Robinson established that when a defendant had notice of a condition and fails to object, review is for plain error.
  • United States v. McAdam reinforced the same plain-error posture in the supervised-release context.
  • United States v. Rivera (quoting United States v. Taylor) stated the three-part plain error test; United States v. Bleau supplied the fourth consideration (fairness/integrity/public reputation).
  • Gall v. United States provided the Supreme Court’s deferential abuse-of-discretion lens for sentencing. United States v. Lawrence applied that deference to supervised-release conditions specifically.
  • United States v. Sims emphasized district courts’ “broad latitude” and clarified that a challenged condition need only bear a reasonable relationship to at least one relevant factor; it need not relate to the offense conduct directly.
  • United States v. Harris supplied the statutory ceiling from 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2): no greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary.
  • United States v. Myers (as invoked through Lawrence) framed when “narrow tailoring” is demanded—i.e., when a fundamental liberty interest is implicated.
  • United States v. Haverkamp and United States v. McLaurin supported the “reasonable relationship” test and the idea that a condition can be upheld if connected to at least one § 3553(a) factor.
  • United States v. Betts required an individualized assessment and on-the-record reasons, but allowed affirmance where the rationale is “self-evident in the record,” a principle applied here through Robinson.

F. Factual and definitional citations

The background discussion cited United States v. Babilonia for the description of a “kilo press,” a factual reference supporting the seriousness and scale of the drug operation.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Acceptance of responsibility: obstruction usually forecloses the reduction

The district court applied an obstruction enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 based on DeJesus’s attempted flight while on pretrial release—conduct DeJesus did not contest on appeal. Under Application Note 4 to § 3E1.1, obstruction “ordinarily” indicates no acceptance-of-responsibility reduction unless the case is “extraordinary.”

The panel’s reasoning proceeded in two steps:

  1. Methodological correctness: It rejected the claim that the district court treated Note 4 as impermissibly “mandatory,” holding that courts must calculate the Guidelines range considering commentary, consistent with Parnell, and that the Second Circuit continues to defer to commentary post-Kisor v. Wilkie via Rainford and Zheng.
  2. No extraordinary circumstances on these facts: The court emphasized DeJesus’s “egregious” flight attempt, subsequent dishonesty during the safety-valve proffer, and continued minimization at sentencing—facts inconsistent with a “clear” demonstration of acceptance. His asserted COVID-related fear in August 2021 did not transform the case into an extraordinary one.

B. Substantive reasonableness: below-Guidelines sentence supported by individualized weighing

The panel upheld the 144-month term under the deferential Cavera/Rigas framework. It credited the district court’s balancing: recognizing mitigating factors (first-time offender; poor detention conditions) while still imposing a substantial sentence due to seriousness (large quantities of fentanyl), obstruction, proffer lies, and minimization of culpability.

Importantly, the opinion rejects two common appellate approaches:

  • Probation recommendation as a yardstick: Eberhard forecloses any notion that the PSR’s recommended term creates a presumptive ceiling.
  • National or district averages as a yardstick: The court treated average-sentence comparisons as non-dispositive because sentencing is case-specific; being above an average is not inherently unreasonable.

C. Oral pronouncement: incorporation-by-reference can be satisfied through PSR page citations

The panel applied Maiorana to conclude that the district court’s oral sentence and written judgment were consistent. The key elements were:

  • The conditions were “set forth in writing” in the PSR (pages 22–24).
  • The PSR was made available to DeJesus and read to him with an interpreter; he confirmed this on the record.
  • The court “specifically incorporate[d] by reference” the conditions by identifying the PSR pages.
  • The written judgment mirrored the PSR conditions that were incorporated.

The logic is practical: where the defendant has access to the written text and the court clearly identifies what it is adopting, the defendant receives notice and the record avoids the risk of later divergence between oral and written sentencing terms.

D. Mental-health condition: “self-evident” justification and plain-error barrier

Because DeJesus had notice (the condition appeared in the PSR) and did not object, review was for plain error under Robinson. The district court did not articulate reasons on the record, but the panel held the rationale was “self-evident” in the record under Betts/Robinson:

  • DeJesus told Probation he wanted counseling and described stressors relating to legal issues and separation from family.
  • The condition was recommended in the PSR in the presence of counsel, and no objection was lodged.
  • The Guidelines contemplate such a condition where the court has reason to believe treatment is needed (U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(5)).

Substantively, the panel found a reasonable relationship to rehabilitation given DeJesus’s expressed interest, the gravity of his criminal conduct, and his demonstrated poor judgment (including obstruction). With no fundamental liberty interest singled out by this condition, the court applied the ordinary “reasonable relationship” test described in Sims and related cases, and concluded there was no plain error.

3.3. Impact

  • Operational clarity for sentencing courts post-Maiorana: The decision confirms that incorporation by reference can be accomplished with specificity as simple as citing the PSR pages containing the conditions—so long as the defendant had access to that document (including through translation) and the written judgment matches what was incorporated.
  • Litigation incentives and preservation: The mental-health condition holding underscores that failing to object to PSR-listed conditions will often shift the appeal to plain-error review, where “self-evident” record support can readily defeat relief.
  • Acceptance-of-responsibility remains difficult after obstruction: The decision reinforces that late-stage admissions or a guilty plea will not necessarily overcome egregious obstruction and subsequent dishonesty; “extraordinary” remains a high bar in practice.
  • Statistical disparity arguments remain limited: The court’s treatment of averages signals continued skepticism toward generic statistical comparisons absent a developed showing of unwarranted disparity among similarly situated defendants.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Presentence Investigation Report (PSR): A Probation-prepared report describing the offense, the defendant’s background, the applicable Guidelines calculation, and recommended sentencing components (including supervised-release conditions).
  • Acceptance of responsibility (U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1): A potential reduction in the Guidelines offense level when a defendant clearly demonstrates genuine acceptance (often through truthful admission and conduct consistent with responsibility).
  • Obstruction enhancement (U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1): An increase in offense level when a defendant obstructs or impedes justice (e.g., attempting to flee prosecution). When obstruction applies, acceptance-of-responsibility is usually unavailable unless the case is “extraordinary.”
  • Safety-valve proffer (18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)): A process allowing eligible defendants to seek relief from mandatory minimums if they truthfully provide all information concerning the offense and meet other criteria. Lying in a proffer undermines eligibility and credibility.
  • Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: Procedural concerns how the sentence was calculated and explained (e.g., correct Guidelines calculation); substantive concerns whether the length/terms are within the range of permissible choices given § 3553(a).
  • Oral pronouncement vs. written judgment: The sentence is pronounced in court; a written judgment follows. Discretionary conditions must be imposed in a way that gives the defendant notice at sentencing. Under Maiorana, that can be done by specific incorporation by reference to written conditions made available to the defendant.
  • Plain-error review: A demanding appellate standard applied when a defendant failed to object below. The defendant must show a clear (plain) error that affected substantial rights and seriously affected the fairness/integrity of proceedings.

5. Conclusion

United States v. DeJesus affirms a below-Guidelines fentanyl-trafficking sentence and provides a clear application of modern Second Circuit sentencing doctrine in four areas: (1) obstruction ordinarily defeats acceptance of responsibility absent truly extraordinary circumstances; (2) below-Guidelines sentences supported by record-based balancing will rarely be disturbed as substantively unreasonable; (3) supervised-release conditions may be validly imposed by expressly incorporating PSR-listed conditions by reference—even via PSR page citations—when the defendant had access and the written judgment matches; and (4) mental-health treatment conditions will be sustained, especially under plain-error review, where the record makes the rehabilitative rationale self-evident, including the defendant’s own request for counseling.