Unincorporated Associations Are Suable “Persons” Under § 1985(3) and VRA § 11(b): Lippoldt Limited to § 1983

Introduction

Case: Colorado Montana Wyoming State v. Smith (10th Cir. July 6, 2026).
Parties: Colorado Montana Wyoming State Area Conference of the NAACP; League of Women Voters of Colorado; Mi Familia Vota (collectively, “Voter Organizations”) v. Shawn Smith, Ashley Epp, and Holly Kasun (collectively, “Individual Defendants”) and their unincorporated association, the United States Election Integrity Plan (“USEIP”).
Dispute: Following the 2020 presidential election, USEIP organized door-to-door “canvassing” to “verify” voter roll information. The Voter Organizations sued under Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), 52 U.S.C. § 10307(b), and the Ku Klux Klan Act conspiracy provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, alleging intimidation and attempted intimidation.

The district court (i) granted summary judgment dismissing USEIP because it concluded, relying on Lippoldt v. Cole, that unincorporated associations are not “persons” suable under the VRA or § 1985, and then (ii) after a bench trial against only the Individual Defendants, granted judgment on partial findings under Rule 52(c). The Tenth Circuit consolidated the merits appeal and the fee appeal.

Key issues on appeal included: Article III standing for voter-outreach organizations; whether an unincorporated association is a suable “person” under VRA § 11(b) and § 1985(3); evidentiary error in excluding a video of Smith’s public remarks; and whether Rule 52(c) was properly applied given the narrowed evidentiary scope after USEIP’s dismissal.

Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit:

  • Affirmed jurisdiction via standing: The Voter Organizations established organizational standing because USEIP’s activities “directly affected and interfered with” their core voter-outreach work, causing resource diversion.
  • Announced a major statutory holding: Unincorporated associations are “persons” that may be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and 52 U.S.C. § 10307(b).
  • Reversed summary judgment dismissing USEIP: The district court legally erred by extending Lippoldt v. Cole (a § 1983 case) to § 1985(3) and the VRA.
  • Reversed the Rule 52(c) judgment and ordered a new trial: USEIP’s improper dismissal narrowed relevance and admissibility determinations, meaning plaintiffs were not “fully heard” on dispositive issues.
  • Found evidentiary abuse of discretion: Excluding the video of Smith’s “hang” comment was an abuse of discretion (including because objections were waived under pretrial disclosure rules and the statement was non-hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)).
  • Dismissed the fee appeal as moot: Because the merits judgment was vacated and remanded.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Standing and organizational injury

The court treated standing as a threshold jurisdictional question reviewable de novo, citing New England Health Care Emps. Pension Fund v. Woodruff and Awad v. Ziriax. Because the case proceeded to trial, it applied the evidentiary requirement from TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife and Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n) that standing must be supported by trial evidence, not merely allegations.

For organizational standing, the court relied heavily on Food & Drug Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic Med., which emphasized that organizations cannot “spend” themselves into standing or manufacture standing based on speculative fears; there must be interference with “core business activities.” The court also anchored this in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, while distinguishing self-inflicted injuries under Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA.

To underscore that voter-outreach organizations can be injured by resource diversion responding to election-related conduct, the panel aligned with other circuits’ holdings in Nairne v. Landry and Republican Nat'l Comm. v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, explicitly avoiding a circuit split per United States v. Thomas. It also reiterated that standing does not turn on ultimate legality, citing Smith v. Albany Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Trs. (quoting Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker).

2) Statutory “personhood” and the scope of Lippoldt

The district court relied on Lippoldt v. Cole, which held unincorporated associations are not “persons” who can sue under § 1983. The Tenth Circuit held that extending Lippoldt to § 1985(3) and VRA § 11(b) was legal error.

In addressing the textual presumption that identical words in the same Act have the same meaning, the panel acknowledged United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co. and Lippoldt v. Cole, but held the presumption yields where context and purpose differ, relying on United States v. Doe and Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline. It treated Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. and Lippoldt v. Cole as methodological guides rather than dispositive authority outside § 1983.

For interpreting congressional intent, the court cited Wyodak Res. Dev. Corp. v. United States. It then relied on statutory-history reasoning drawn from Ngiraingas v. Sanchez (successive Dictionary Act enactments), including historical conceptions of partnerships/associations from Hoadley v. Cnty. Comm'rs of Essex and McMahon v. Rauhr.

The court emphasized that § 1985 was designed to reach private group violence, citing Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., and invoked the Reconstruction-era context of Klan activity with United States v. Mitchell.

3) VRA § 11(b): “under color of law or otherwise”

In interpreting VRA § 11(b), the court relied on the breadth of “whether acting under color of law or otherwise,” citing United States v. Price for “under color of law” principles and Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms., USA, Inc. for the interpretive function of a disjunctive catchall. It reinforced the practical plausibility of organizational liability by analogizing to litigation against organized groups, citing Thompson v. Trump.

It also invoked the canon of broad construction for the VRA from Chisom v. Roemer, concluding the VRA’s “person” includes unincorporated associations (consistent with the post-1948 Dictionary Act definition including “associations”).

4) Harmless error, Rule 52(c), and being “fully heard”

The panel applied the “substantial rights” harmless-error inquiry under Rule 61 and 28 U.S.C. § 2111, using the articulation in Bridges v. Wilson (quoting Hill v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc.). It cited Perkins v. Chris Hunt Water Hauling Contractor, Inc. as persuasive support for remanding for a new trial as to all defendants where improper dismissal of parties skewed the trial’s evidentiary posture.

For the Rule 52(c) framework, it emphasized that judgment on partial findings is appropriate only after a party is “fully heard” on the issue. It analogized to fair-opportunity cases like Finley v. United States (en banc) and Stuart v. Jackson.

5) Evidence: video exclusion and procedural waiver

The court reviewed evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion per Frederick v. Swift Transp. Co. (quoting Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn) and also cited United States v. Durham (quoting United States v. Willis) for the “bounds of permissible choice” standard. It held objections to the video were untimely under Rule 26(a)(3)(B), citing Griffeth v. United States as support for waiver principles.

It further noted the objections were substantively weak because Smith’s statements were admissions and potentially co-conspirator statements under Rule 801(d)(2).

6) Review standards for findings

The court treated the Rule 52(c) decision as a challenge to factual and legal sufficiency, citing Nieto v. Kapoor for clear-error review of fact findings and de novo review of legal conclusions. It reiterated deference to permissible views of the evidence per Ramos v. Bondi (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City).

Legal Reasoning

A) The core doctrinal move: limiting Lippoldt to § 1983

The opinion’s central doctrinal innovation is its refusal to treat Lippoldt v. Cole as a universal rule about unincorporated associations and “personhood” across civil rights statutes. Instead, the court insists that “person” must be interpreted statute-by-statute, sensitive to:

  • Text: § 1985(3) targets conspiracies of “two or more persons,” and nothing in its operative language makes organizational participation implausible.
  • Purpose: § 1985(3) was enacted to address private group violence—precisely the kind of conduct organizations (like the historical Klan) perpetrated.
  • Statutory history: The Dictionary Act’s evolution and the 1874 Revised Statutes context support inclusion of “partnerships” and analogous unincorporated group forms within “person.”

This reasoning yields a bright-line holding in the circuit: unincorporated associations are “persons” suable under § 1985(3), while leaving Lippoldt intact for § 1983.

B) VRA § 11(b) is written to reach private actors—including associations

For the VRA, the court’s reasoning is even more direct: the statute explicitly covers “person[s]” acting “under color of law or otherwise.” The court treats “or otherwise” as a deliberate expansion to private conduct and finds no textual reason to carve out unincorporated associations—especially given the Dictionary Act’s definition of “person” at the time of the VRA’s enactment and the VRA’s remedial purpose.

C) Trial fairness and remedial scope: why the USEIP dismissal was not harmless

A notable structural feature of the decision is how it connects the party-dismissal error to downstream trial distortions:

  • Relevance narrowing: Once USEIP was dismissed, the district court repeatedly framed the case as only about “three individuals,” excluding “organization-level” context as immaterial.
  • Evidentiary consequences: Dismissal affected admissibility of message-board and volunteer statements that might be treated differently if USEIP were a party (including under Rule 801(d)(2)).
  • Rule 52(c): Because the plaintiffs’ theory depended on a coordinated intimidation “campaign,” truncating organizational evidence made it improper to conclude plaintiffs were “fully heard.”

This is a functional lesson: party-status determinations can reshape the evidence universe, making doctrinal errors at summary judgment particularly likely to be outcome-determinative in bench trials.

D) Evidence: exhibit-list waiver and the value of “seeing and hearing” the statement

The court’s holding that the video should have been admitted rests both on procedure (Rule 26(a)(3)(B) waiver) and substance (admissions/co-conspirator non-hearsay). The court also implicitly recognizes the evidentiary value of tone and delivery—rejecting the district court’s suggestion that testimony paraphrasing the content is an adequate substitute for the recording itself.

Impact

1) Expanded defendant pool in election intimidation and civil-rights conspiracy cases

The most significant impact is doctrinal and practical: plaintiffs in the Tenth Circuit may sue unincorporated associations directly under:

  • 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (civil conspiracy to deprive equal protection / voting-related intimidation), and
  • 52 U.S.C. § 10307(b) (VRA § 11(b) intimidation/attempts).

This matters in modern political disputes where activity is frequently organized through informal groups, volunteer networks, or unincorporated entities. The ruling reduces incentives to structure operations as unincorporated associations to avoid entity-level accountability.

2) Trial strategy: organizational evidence and admissions become more central

On remand and in future cases, plaintiffs can more plausibly argue that:

  • internal coordination materials (playbooks, message boards) are central to “attempt” and “intimidation” theories;
  • statements by leaders may be admissible not only as individual admissions but as co-conspirator statements;
  • the association’s overall “campaign” can supply the objective context for evaluating whether conduct is intimidating.

3) Organizational standing: confirmation of “resource diversion” in voting-rights context

While consistent with other circuits, the opinion strengthens the Tenth Circuit’s receptivity to standing for voter organizations when defendant conduct interferes with voter-outreach missions. The court’s emphasis on “core business activities” signals that detailed evidence of program disruption, retraining, new materials, and public/member inquiries can be dispositive.

4) Procedural discipline: exhibit objections must be timely

The ruling underscores that litigants cannot hold objections until trial when exhibits are disclosed on a joint list without objection. That guidance is likely to influence trial courts’ pretrial-management rigor and litigants’ approach to evidentiary stipulations.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Article III standing (organizational standing): A plaintiff must show a concrete injury caused by the defendant that a court can remedy. For organizations, an injury can be shown when a defendant’s conduct forces the organization to divert time and money away from its normal work (its “core business activities”), not when the organization merely chooses to spend money advocating.
  • Unincorporated association: A group of people acting together without forming a corporation (often informal). The key question here was whether such a group counts as a statutory “person” that can be sued.
  • Statutory “person”: Many federal statutes impose duties on “persons.” Courts interpret whether “person” includes entities (corporations, associations) by text, purpose, and statutory history (including the Dictionary Act).
  • Rule 52(c) (judgment on partial findings): In a bench trial, a judge may enter judgment mid-trial only after the opposing party has been “fully heard” on the issue—i.e., had a fair chance to present the evidence necessary to prove it.
  • Harmless error / substantial rights (Rule 61): Not every legal mistake requires reversal. But reversal is required when an error likely affected the outcome or substantially influenced what evidence the factfinder considered.
  • Hearsay vs. admissions (Rule 801(d)(2)): A party’s own statement offered against them is not hearsay. Statements of co-conspirators made during and in furtherance of a conspiracy can also be treated as non-hearsay.

Conclusion

Colorado Montana Wyoming State v. Smith establishes a consequential rule in the Tenth Circuit: unincorporated associations are “persons” suable under § 1985(3) and VRA § 11(b), and Lippoldt v. Cole does not control outside § 1983. The decision also reinforces organizational standing for voter-outreach groups harmed by operational disruption, polices trial procedure through exhibit-objection waiver principles, and cautions that erroneous party dismissals can distort evidentiary scope enough to require a full retrial.