Unincorporated Associations Are “Persons” Suable Under VRA § 11(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) in the Tenth Circuit

1. Introduction

Case: Colorado Montana Wyoming State Area Conference v. Smith
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date: July 6, 2026

This consolidated appeal arose from a post-2020-election dispute over alleged voter intimidation in Colorado. Plaintiffs—Colorado Montana Wyoming State Area Conference of the NAACP, League of Women Voters of Colorado, and Mi Familia Vota (collectively, “Voter Organizations”)—sued an unincorporated association, United States Election Integrity Plan (“USEIP”), and three alleged leaders (Shawn Smith, Ashley Epp, and Holly Kasun; “Individual Defendants”).

The Voter Organizations alleged that USEIP’s door-to-door “canvassing” and related messaging intimidated or attempted to intimidate voters in violation of Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), 52 U.S.C. § 10307(b), and that defendants conspired to deprive voting-related equal protection rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.

Two district-court rulings framed the appeal: (1) summary judgment dismissing USEIP on the theory that an unincorporated association is not a suable “person” under the invoked statutes; and (2) a Rule 52(c) judgment for the Individual Defendants after a bench trial. The Tenth Circuit reversed both and remanded for a new trial.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Standing: The Voter Organizations had Article III organizational standing because USEIP’s alleged activities “directly affected and interfered with” their core voter-outreach work, forcing diversion of resources; this was not an impermissible attempt to “spend” into standing.
  • Key holding (new rule): Unincorporated associations are “persons” who can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and under VRA § 11(b), 52 U.S.C. § 10307(b).
  • Lippoldt limited: Lippoldt v. Cole (holding unincorporated associations are not “persons” who can sue under § 1983) does not control § 1985(3) or the VRA.
  • Harmless error rejected: Dismissing USEIP was not harmless; it narrowed relevance and admissibility rulings and materially affected the trial’s evidentiary record.
  • Evidentiary error: Excluding a video of Smith’s public remarks was an abuse of discretion; objections were waived under Rule 26(a)(3)(B), and the stated grounds were weak.
  • Disposition: Reversed the dismissal of USEIP; reversed the Rule 52(c) judgment; vacated final judgment; remanded for a new trial; dismissed the fee appeal as moot.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Standing and organizational injury

  • New England Health Care Emps. Pension Fund v. Woodruff and Awad v. Ziriax anchored the court’s threshold point: standing is jurisdictional, review is de novo, and can be raised at any stage.
  • TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez (with Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife and Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n) supplied the procedural posture rule: after trial, standing facts must be supported by trial evidence, not merely pleadings.
  • Food & Drug Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic Med., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, and Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA framed the modern boundary between (i) a cognizable “diversion of resources” injury and (ii) impermissible self-inflicted injury or manufactured standing through advocacy spending.
  • The court aligned with sister circuits on diversion-of-resources in election-adjacent contexts:
    • Nairne v. Landry (standing based on reallocation of resources to mitigate effects on voter confidence and candidate viability).
    • Republican Nat'l Comm. v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections (standing based on stymied outreach due to diversion to address alleged voter-roll defects).
  • Smith v. Albany Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Trs. (quoting Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker) underscored that standing does not depend on the merits—important here because defendants argued USEIP’s conduct was not actually intimidating.
  • United States v. Thomas provided the “avoid circuit split” prudential backdrop to the court’s decision to align with the Fourth and Fifth Circuits.

B. Interpreting “person” and limiting Lippoldt v. Cole

  • Lippoldt v. Cole was the district court’s foundation: it held unincorporated associations are not “persons” who can sue under § 1983, based on 1871-era common-law understandings and the then-existing Dictionary Act. The Tenth Circuit treated Lippoldt as non-dispositive because the appealed statutes were different.
  • Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. and Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist. were used for method and purpose: civil-rights statutes can use “person” differently depending on statutory function and historical target; and § 1985 addressed private group violence (the Klan problem) in a way § 1983 (state-action focused) did not.
  • United States v. Doe and Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline supported the principle that identical-word presumptions yield when context and statutory purpose differ.
  • Wyodak Res. Dev. Corp. v. United States provided the court’s interpretive framing: choose the interpretation that best reflects Congress’s intent.
  • United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co. supplied the general presumption about identical words, which the panel found outweighed by contextual and purposive differences between § 1983 and § 1985(3).
  • Ngiraingas v. Sanchez was invoked to show how later revisions and reenactments (including changes to definitional statutes) can illuminate congressional intent regarding “person.”
  • Historical sources Hoadley v. Cnty. Comm'rs of Essex and McMahon v. Rauhr supported the proposition that “partnerships” functioned as a category capturing non-incorporated associations.
  • For the VRA, the court relied on interpretive breadth principles from Chisom v. Roemer (the VRA should be construed to provide the broadest possible scope in combating discrimination).

C. “Under color of law” / private actors and statutory breadth

  • United States v. Price clarified “under color of law,” including private actors jointly engaged with state officials.
  • Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms., USA, Inc. supported reading “or otherwise” as an expansive catchall capturing conduct beyond the enumerated category.
  • The court referenced Thompson v. Trump and Blassingame v. Trump to illustrate that organized groups (including non-state groups) can be treated as accountable civil-rights defendants in conspiracy frameworks.

D. Harmless error, trial scope, and new trial

  • Bridges v. Wilson and Hill v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc. supplied the “substantial rights”/harmless-error standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 61—whether the error substantially influenced the outcome or creates grave doubt.
  • Perkins v. Chris Hunt Water Hauling Contractor, Inc. supported remanding for a new trial as to all defendants when an erroneous summary-judgment dismissal narrowed the case.
  • On Rule 52(c), the court cited the rule’s “fully heard” requirement and analogized to procedural fairness principles in Finley v. United States and Stuart v. Jackson.

E. Evidence and waiver

  • Frederick v. Swift Transp. Co. and Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn addressed the abuse-of-discretion standard and trial-court deference in evidentiary rulings.
  • United States v. Durham and United States v. Willis informed the “arbitrary/capricious/whimsical” limit on evidentiary discretion.
  • Griffeth v. United States supported holding that objections can be waived when not timely raised under disclosure rules.
  • The court emphasized Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B) (pretrial disclosure of exhibits) and Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A), (E) (party-opponent and co-conspirator statements) as undermining the exclusion of Smith’s video remarks.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Organizational standing: diversion of resources tied to “core activities”

Applying Food & Drug Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic Med. and Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, the court distinguished between (i) impermissible “advocacy spending” to oppose a policy and (ii) a concrete operational impairment where a defendant’s conduct directly interferes with an organization’s mission-critical work. The Voter Organizations’ evidence showed new programming, revised training/scripts, member/public intake, and outreach changes undertaken to counteract perceived voter intimidation and confusion—an interference with core voter-engagement functions, not mere ideological opposition.

B. The key statutory holding: “person” includes unincorporated associations under § 1985(3)

The district court extended Lippoldt from § 1983 to § 1985(3) based on an “identical words” presumption. The Tenth Circuit rejected that move, explaining that:

  • Different statutory role and target. Section 1983’s “person” is constrained by state-action architecture (“under color of” law) and historically targeted state actors (and municipalities under Monell). Section 1985(3) instead targets private conspiracies—a framework naturally compatible with entity liability for organizations that can conspire through members and agents.
  • Textual fit. Section 1985(3) allows suit against “any one or more of the conspirators” where “two or more persons” conspire. The panel saw nothing in this text that excludes an unincorporated association as a conspirator.
  • Historical purpose. Section 1985 was enacted to suppress Ku Klux Klan violence—activity carried out by an unincorporated association. The opinion referenced contemporaneous legislative debates (Cong. Globe) reflecting an intent to reach “organizations, partnerships, and communities.”
  • Dictionary Act evolution and reenactment logic. Relying on Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, the court explained that later statutory revisions (including definitional updates in 1874 and the revised statutes) support reading “person” broadly in § 1985(3), including forms of unincorporated association.

Critically, the panel stated it was not overruling Lippoldt v. Cole; it held only that Lippoldt is not dispositive for § 1985(3) because the statutory context and historical purpose differ.

C. “Person” under VRA § 11(b): broad coverage of public and private intimidation, including associations

The panel’s VRA analysis was even more direct:

  • The text—“No person, whether acting under color of law or otherwise”—is explicitly expansive. “Under color of law” (per United States v. Price) captures state action; “or otherwise” (per Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms., USA, Inc.) is a catchall reaching private conduct outside that category.
  • The ordinary meaning and functional capacity of associations to intimidate or coerce supported inclusion.
  • The definitional environment in 1965 reinforced breadth: by then, the Dictionary Act included “associations” in “person,” and the common-law disability to sue unincorporated associations had long eroded (the court referenced the doctrinal shift recognized in United Mine Workers of Am. v. Coronado Coal Co.).
  • Construing the VRA broadly (per Chisom v. Roemer) favored inclusion rather than carve-outs.

D. Why the error mattered: USEIP’s dismissal narrowed relevance, hearsay analysis, and the “fully heard” condition for Rule 52(c)

Although defendants argued the erroneous dismissal was harmless, the court held it affected substantial rights under Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. The panel pointed to the district court’s repeated framing that USEIP was “not on trial here,” which led to limiting evidence about organizational conduct, message boards, armed canvassing discussions, surveillance/photo-taking allegations, and other context that could become admissible (including under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)) if USEIP were a party. In short: wrong party-structure → wrong evidentiary scope → trial record too thin to support Rule 52(c) finality.

E. Evidentiary ruling on the Smith video: waiver and non-hearsay

The video of Smith saying election fraudsters “deserve to hang” had been listed as a joint exhibit with no timely objection. The panel held the later objections at trial were untimely under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B) and therefore waived absent good cause (not shown). On the merits, the court also indicated the objections were unlikely to hold: authentication/foundation could be laid, and the statement could be admitted as a party-opponent admission and/or co-conspirator statement (Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A), (E)).

F. The court’s restraint on factual sufficiency (Roberts) vs. procedural insufficiency (scope/context)

The panel did not find clear error in the district court’s factual reading of witness Roberts’s encounter, applying deferential clear-error review (citing Ramos v. Bondi and Anderson v. City of Bessemer City). But it still reversed because the plaintiffs were not “fully heard” on the intimidation claim in the properly framed case—including the organizational defendant and the broader evidentiary context.

3.3. Impact

  • Expanded defendant universe under civil-rights and voting-rights statutes in the Tenth Circuit. The headline doctrinal shift is that unincorporated associations can be sued under § 1985(3) and VRA § 11(b). Practically, this matters for modern political and activist formations that intentionally avoid formal incorporation.
  • Litigation structure and evidentiary consequences. By tying harmless-error analysis to how party dismissal can narrow admissibility and relevance (including hearsay exclusions), the opinion encourages district courts to carefully assess entity-dismissal motions where the entity’s presence affects how proof can be presented (e.g., Rule 801(d)(2) pathways).
  • Standing clarity for voter organizations post-All. for Hippocratic Med. The court reaffirmed that diversion-of-resources standing survives—but only when defendant conduct operationally interferes with core activities, not when plaintiffs merely choose to spend on advocacy against feared harms.
  • Trial practice signal on pretrial exhibit objections. The Rule 26 waiver holding is a concrete reminder: failure to object to listed exhibits can foreclose later evidentiary attacks, absent good cause.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Unincorporated association: A group acting together without forming a corporation/LLC (e.g., a volunteer-led movement). The key question was whether such a group counts as a “person” that can be sued.
  • Section 1985(3) conspiracy: A civil cause of action targeting conspiracies that deprive persons of equal protection or voting-related rights, including conspiracies by private actors (unlike § 1983, which is state-action centered).
  • VRA § 11(b): A broad anti-intimidation provision: no “person” may intimidate, threaten, coerce, or attempt to do so, whether acting with government authority “or otherwise” (i.e., privately).
  • Organizational standing (diversion of resources): An organization can sue based on injury to itself when it must divert resources to counteract a defendant’s conduct that disrupts its core work; it cannot create standing by spending money purely to oppose a policy.
  • Rule 52(c) judgment on partial findings: In a bench trial, a judge can enter judgment mid-trial only after the nonmoving party has been “fully heard” on an issue.
  • Harmless error / “substantial rights” (Rule 61): Even if a court makes a legal mistake, a new trial is ordered only if the mistake likely affected the outcome.
  • Hearsay and co-conspirator statements (Rule 801(d)(2)): Certain statements are not treated as hearsay when offered against an opposing party—especially statements by the party or by co-conspirators made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
  • Mootness (fee appeal): Because the merits judgment was vacated, there was no longer a “prevailing party,” so the fee dispute ceased to present a live controversy.

5. Conclusion

Colorado Montana Wyoming State Area Conference v. Smith establishes a consequential Tenth Circuit rule: unincorporated associations are “persons” subject to suit under VRA § 11(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The decision confines Lippoldt v. Cole to its § 1983 context, emphasizing that statutory purpose, text, and historical targets can demand different meanings for the same word across related civil-rights provisions.

Beyond the definitional holding, the opinion underscores how erroneous party dismissals can distort trial relevance and admissibility rulings and can deprive plaintiffs of being “fully heard” for Rule 52(c) purposes. The remand positions future VRA intimidation and § 1985 conspiracy cases—particularly those involving loosely organized political movements—to proceed with entity defendants in the case and with broader, better-contextualized evidentiary records.