Unfulfilled Gang Threats Against Police Officers Are Occupational Hazards, Not “Persecution,” and El Salvador’s Anti-Gang Efforts Defeat CAT “Acquiescence”

1. Introduction

In Domingo Lopez Alvarado v. Pamela Bondi (6th Cir. Feb. 4, 2026) (unpublished), the Sixth Circuit reviewed a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of: (1) asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158, (2) withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and (3) protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).

The petitioner, Domingo Antonio Lopez Alvarado, is a Salvadoran former police officer who alleged MS-13 threatened him repeatedly after he refused to smuggle drugs into a jail and after a shootout in which a gang member was killed. He defined his “particular social group” as “former active duty police officers.” The agency found him credible but concluded the threats did not amount to persecution, did not establish a protected-ground nexus, and did not satisfy CAT’s torture-and-acquiescence requirements. The Sixth Circuit denied the petition for review under the substantial-evidence standard.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Disposition: Petition for review DENIED.
  • Timeliness: Although the IJ/BIA deemed asylum/withholding untimely, the Sixth Circuit did not reach the “changed circumstances” exception because the claims failed on the merits.
  • Asylum: Three threats over four years, without physical harm, were supported by substantial evidence as not “persecution,” characterized as dangers inherent in police work and indistinguishable from generalized gang violence.
  • Withholding: Failed for the same reasons as asylum; petitioner did not meet the higher “clear probability” burden.
  • CAT: Country-conditions evidence showed widespread gang violence, but substantial evidence supported the finding that El Salvador was actively combating gangs; thus, no official “acquiescence” (including “willful blindness”) was shown.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Appellate posture, jurisdictional framing, and standards of review

  • Zometa-Orellana v. Garland, 19 F.4th 970 (6th Cir. 2021): Supplied the framework that the BIA decision is the final agency determination when it issues a separate opinion, with IJ review to the extent the BIA adopted the IJ’s reasoning.
  • Turcios-Flores v. Garland, 67 F.4th 347 (6th Cir. 2023) (citing Juan Antonio v. Barr, 959 F.3d 778 (6th Cir. 2020)): Provided the de novo review of legal conclusions and substantial-evidence review of factual findings, including the nexus concept in protection claims.
  • Wright v. Spaulding, 939 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 2019): Cited for the panel-precedent rule (published panel opinions bind later panels absent en banc or Supreme Court overruling). Though not central to the merits, it signals the court’s adherence to existing circuit doctrine.
  • Ramos Rafael v. Garland, 15 F.4th 797 (6th Cir. 2021): Foreclosed petitioner’s request to revisit Sixth Circuit precedent regarding NTA defects and jurisdiction (the court reiterates that, for jurisdictional purposes, the NTA need not contain all required information in a single document).

Asylum: what counts as “persecution” and the limits of threat-based claims

  • Japarkulova v. Holder, 615 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2010): Anchored two core propositions the court applied: persecution is an “extreme concept,” and threats unaccompanied by physical harm generally do not qualify.
  • Mazariegos-Rodas v. Garland, 122 F.4th 655 (6th Cir. 2024): Qualified Japarkulova by recognizing that “immediate and menacing” threats can constitute persecution. The panel used this as the comparison point and found the petitioner’s threats—spread across years without harm—fell short.
  • Akmatov v. Barr, 799 F. App'x 897 (6th Cir. 2020): Supplied the “occupational hazard” framing—threats toward police may reflect the dangers inherent in that work rather than persecution on a protected ground. The court treated this as directly analogous to threats received in the line of duty.
  • Umaña-Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d 667 (6th Cir. 2013): Reinforced that fear of generalized gang violence is insufficient for asylum/withholding; the court invoked this to separate targeted persecution from widespread criminal conditions.

Withholding: higher burden and linkage to asylum outcomes

  • Kolov v. Garland, 78 F.4th 911 (6th Cir. 2023) (citing Berri v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2006)) (abrogated on other grounds by Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259 (2025)): Used for the “clear probability” standard. The court relied on Berri for the familiar proposition that on this record the withholding claim falls with the asylum claim, while noting Riley abrogated Berri only on other grounds.

CAT: torture likelihood and government “acquiescence”

  • Vasquez-Rivera v. Garland, 96 F.4th 903 (6th Cir. 2024): Cited for the requirement that the applicant show it is “more likely than not” he will be tortured if returned.
  • Mateo-Esteban v. Garland, 125 F.4th 762 (6th Cir. 2025): Provided the definition of CAT responsibility: torture must be by, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official; acquiescence requires prior knowledge and failure to intervene despite legal responsibility.
  • Sabastian- Andres v. Garland, 96 F.4th 923 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Amir v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 921 (6th Cir. 2006)): Supplied the “willful blindness” theory of acquiescence and, crucially, the limiting principle that when a country makes meaningful efforts to combat private violence but struggles, officials are generally not “willfully blind.”
  • Zaldana Menijar v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 2015): Cited via Sabastian-Andres for the same “meaningful efforts” constraint on acquiescence findings.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

Asylum: threats, time, and “occupational hazard”

The court’s persecution analysis turns on severity and immediacy. Applying Japarkulova v. Holder and Mazariegos-Rodas v. Garland, the panel emphasized: (1) threats alone are usually insufficient, and (2) even when threats can qualify, they must be “immediate and menacing.” Here, MS-13 threatened Lopez Alvarado three times across roughly four years, and the record showed no physical harm followed. That temporal spacing, coupled with non-execution of the threats, supported the BIA’s conclusion that the threats were not sufficiently immediate.

The court then accepted the agency’s characterization—supported by Akmatov v. Barr—that such threats can be a predictable feature of policing in gang-controlled environments. That framing matters legally because asylum protects against persecution “on account of” a protected ground, not ordinary workplace dangers, even if those dangers are grave.

Finally, the panel relied on Umaña-Ramos v. Holder to distinguish persecution from generalized criminality. The BIA treated evidence of family killings as unrelated to police service and therefore insufficient to convert generalized gang violence into protected-ground persecution.

Withholding of removal: higher burden, same evidentiary failure

Withholding requires a “clear probability” of persecution, a higher threshold than asylum (Kolov v. Garland; Berri v. Gonzales). Because substantial evidence supported the denial of asylum on persecution/future fear grounds, the court held the withholding claim necessarily failed on this record as well.

CAT: meaningful government efforts negate “acquiescence”

CAT required proof of (1) a “more likely than not” risk of torture and (2) government involvement via consent or acquiescence (Vasquez-Rivera v. Garland; Mateo-Esteban v. Garland). The petitioner’s appellate focus was acquiescence: he argued the IJ should have found authorities “unable or unwilling” to protect him. The panel treated that as mismatched to CAT’s specific regulatory test (knowledge + breach of duty to intervene), including “willful blindness” (Sabastian- Andres v. Garland; Amir v. Gonzales).

The decisive move was evidentiary: the petitioner principally cited generalized country-conditions materials showing gang violence, but the record also contained evidence of El Salvador’s active anti-gang efforts (e.g., policing improvements, mano dura operations, emergency measures, security planning, terrorist designations). Under Sabastian- Andres v. Garland (citing Zaldana Menijar v. Lynch), such “meaningful efforts” generally preclude a finding of willful blindness, even if the state has not eliminated the violence. Substantial evidence therefore supported the agency’s no-acquiescence determination.

3.3. Impact

  • Threat-based asylum claims by law-enforcement applicants: The opinion reinforces a demanding threshold for “persecution” where threats are unfulfilled and spread over time, and it underscores that dangers encountered while performing police duties may be treated as “occupational hazards” rather than protected-ground persecution.
  • Generalized gang-violence evidence remains insufficient: Consistent with Umaña-Ramos v. Holder, the court signals that broad country-conditions reports, without individualized proof tying harm to a protected ground, will rarely carry asylum/withholding claims.
  • CAT acquiescence is difficult to establish where the state is trying (even if failing): By emphasizing “meaningful efforts” to combat gangs, the opinion strengthens the evidentiary importance of showing not merely ineffectiveness, but official knowledge coupled with deliberate non-intervention (or willful blindness) in the applicant’s prospective torture.
  • Procedural takeaway: The court again treats NTA-defect jurisdiction arguments as foreclosed in the circuit under Ramos Rafael v. Garland, limiting such challenges absent higher-court change.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Asylum vs. withholding vs. CAT: Asylum is discretionary and requires showing persecution (past or well-founded fear) on a protected ground. Withholding is mandatory if eligibility is met but requires a higher likelihood (“clear probability”) of persecution. CAT is separate: it requires showing a “more likely than not” risk of torture and that officials would inflict it or acquiesce in it.
  • “Persecution”: Not every threat or harm qualifies; it must be severe. Threats alone usually do not suffice unless they are especially imminent and menacing.
  • “Particular social group” and “nexus”: Even if a group is recognized, the applicant must prove the harm happened “on account of” membership in that group—not merely because criminals target people for opportunistic or job-related reasons.
  • “Acquiescence” (CAT): It is not enough to show the government cannot fully control gangs. The applicant must show officials would know about the torture beforehand and then fail to act despite a duty to intervene; “willful blindness” can count, but evidence of genuine enforcement efforts often cuts against it.
  • “Substantial evidence” review: The court does not decide facts anew; it upholds the agency unless the record would compel any reasonable adjudicator to reach the opposite conclusion.

5. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision affirms a restrictive approach to gang-threat claims by law-enforcement applicants: repeated threats over years, without physical harm and framed as risks inherent in policing, may be substantial evidence of no past persecution and no well-founded fear of future persecution. It also underscores that CAT protection requires more than proof of endemic gang violence; where the record shows meaningful state efforts to combat gangs, a finding of official acquiescence—whether direct or via “willful blindness”—will be difficult to sustain.