“Understanding” Testimony Identifying a Phone Number Is Not Hearsay When Offered to Explain Investigative Steps; Strong Presumption Against Impeachment with Stale Convictions

I. Introduction

In United States v. Hantson Alexander Clark (11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed drug-trafficking convictions arising from a distribution relationship between Defendant-Appellant Hantson “Hank” Clark and codefendant Terrence Stevens. The government’s proof centered on communications (calls, FaceTime, texts) used to arrange drug deals and on a key controlled purchase on June 29, 2023, when Stevens testified Clark delivered approximately three pounds of methamphetamine and 100 grams of fentanyl.

On appeal, Clark raised three principal issues: (1) whether testimony linking a phone number ending in -5409 to Clark was inadmissible hearsay; (2) whether the district court wrongly barred impeachment of Stevens with felony convictions more than ten years old under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(b); and (3) whether the evidence was insufficient—principally because Stevens was allegedly unreliable—so the district court should have granted a judgment of acquittal.

The Eleventh Circuit rejected all three arguments, emphasizing (i) the boundary between hearsay and non-hearsay testimony offered to explain investigative actions, (ii) the “strong presumption” against admitting stale convictions for impeachment, and (iii) the deference owed to jury credibility determinations and the permissibility of convictions resting on accomplice testimony not “unbelievable as a matter of law.”

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • Hearsay / phone-number identification: The court held that multiple witnesses’ references to the -5409 number did not amount to inadmissible hearsay. Agent Haynes’s identification was based on voice recognition; Stevens’s identification was based on personal communications; and Officer Powers’s “understanding” testimony was treated as explaining investigative steps rather than proving the truth of an out-of-court statement. Even if admitting Powers’s statement were error, it was harmless due to other properly admitted evidence.
  • Impeachment with stale convictions: The court upheld exclusion of Stevens’s convictions (2004 and 2007), emphasizing Rule 609(b)’s heightened standard and the Eleventh Circuit’s presumption against using convictions older than ten years. The court also found any error harmless because Stevens was extensively impeached by other means, including evidence of incentive to cooperate and admissions about drug dealing.
  • Sufficiency / judgment of acquittal: The court held the evidence sufficient for conspiracy, distribution, and communication-facility counts. Stevens’s testimony, corroborated in part by surveillance and communications, supported each element, and credibility attacks did not render the testimony “incredible as a matter of law.”

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Evidentiary review and harmless error

  • United States v. Keegan, 161 F.4th 1334 (11th Cir. 2025): The court used Keegan to frame both the definition of hearsay and the abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings. It reinforced that hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered for its truth, and it supplied the doctrinal lens for separating personal knowledge/voice recognition from hearsay repetition.
  • United States v. Moore, 76 F.4th 1355 (11th Cir. 2023): Moore provided the operative harmless-error test: reversal is warranted only when an evidentiary mistake had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict.” That standard did substantial work in the opinion: even assuming an error regarding Officer Powers’s identification of the number, the panel deemed it non-prejudicial in light of other admissible proof.

2. Rule 609(b): stale convictions and the presumption against admission

  • United States v. Pope, 132 F.3d 684 (11th Cir. 1998): The court relied on Pope for the proposition that Rule 609(b)’s “substantially outweighs” standard creates a “strong presumption” against impeachment with stale convictions.
  • United States v. Pritchard, 973 F.2d 905 (11th Cir. 1992): Pritchard supplied both the presumption against old convictions and a non-exhaustive list of factors guiding the Rule 609(b) balancing (impeachment value, age, importance of testimony, centrality of credibility, and need for the evidence). The panel applied those considerations to Stevens: while important, the convictions were very old and of limited incremental impeachment value given other credibility attacks available to the defense.
  • United States v. Tisdale, 817 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1987): The panel used Tisdale to underscore that stale convictions should be admitted “very rarely and only in exceptional circumstances,” reinforcing the district court’s discretion to exclude.

3. Sufficiency review; drug offenses; communication-facility facilitation; credibility limits

  • United States v. Fleury, 20 F.4th 1353 (11th Cir. 2021): The court invoked Fleury for the de novo standard on sufficiency and the requirement to view evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, drawing reasonable inferences in its favor.
  • United States v. Colston, 4 F.4th 1179 (11th Cir. 2021): Colston provided elements for § 846 conspiracy and clarified that for § 841(a)(1) a defendant need not know the exact controlled substance, only that he knowingly possessed/distributed an illegal drug.
  • United States v. Cremades, 160 F.4th 1296 (11th Cir. 2025): The panel used Cremades for the three § 841(a) elements (knowledge, possession, intent to distribute), acceptance of circumstantial proof, and definitions of constructive possession and intent inference from quantity.
  • United States v. Gregory, 128 F.4th 1228 (11th Cir. 2025): Gregory anchored both the § 843(b) facilitation standard (“make easier or less difficult, or assist or aid”) and the appellate limits on reconsidering credibility. It also supported the rule that uncorroborated accomplice testimony can suffice unless “unbelievable as a matter of law.”

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Phone-number attribution: separating hearsay from personal knowledge and investigative context

Clark’s hearsay claim targeted testimony that the -5409 number belonged to him. The panel’s treatment reflects a recurring evidentiary line: testimony is not hearsay if it is not repeating an out-of-court statement for its truth, but is instead (i) based on the witness’s own perception or (ii) offered to show its effect on the listener/explain subsequent conduct.

  • Agent Haynes: His attribution of the number to Clark rested on voice identification drawn from the agent’s direct familiarity with Clark’s voice (in-person conversation and jail calls) and his own listening to wiretapped calls. Because this was not a recitation of someone else’s assertion about ownership, it fell outside Rule 801(c).
  • Officer Willingham: The record did not support Clark’s claim because Willingham never actually identified the -5409 number’s owner after the court required a predicate.
  • Stevens: Stevens identified the number as Clark’s based on personal communications via FaceTime and text. Again, the court treated this as personal knowledge rather than hearsay.
  • Officer Powers: Powers ultimately said he “understood” the number belonged to Clark. The panel treated this as testimony offered to explain why investigative steps were taken (e.g., surveillance near Stevens’s house), not as proof that an out-of-court declarant’s assertion about ownership was true.

Notably, the panel also built in a fail-safe: even if Powers’s statement were considered erroneous, it was harmless because ownership of the number was otherwise proven through properly admitted testimony (Haynes and Stevens) and corroborated by a “Here” text sent from -5409 when Clark arrived at Stevens’s home.

2. Impeachment of a cooperating codefendant: Rule 609(b) as a gatekeeping rule

Clark sought to impeach Stevens with felony convictions from 2004 and 2007. Rule 609(a)(1)(A) generally favors admission of felony convictions to attack a non-defendant witness’s credibility, but Rule 609(b) flips the presumption when the conviction (or release) is more than ten years old: it becomes admissible only if its probative value substantially outweighs prejudice.

Applying United States v. Pope, United States v. Pritchard, and United States v. Tisdale, the court emphasized the presumption against stale convictions and agreed with the district court that the probative value did not substantially outweigh prejudice. The panel’s reasoning was pragmatic:

  • Age: The convictions were “more than 17 years” old by the 2024 trial, weighing strongly against admission.
  • Impeachment value: The prior crimes were not treated as providing substantial incremental truthfulness-related impeachment in light of other available attacks.
  • Need and alternatives: The defense was able to impeach Stevens extensively through bias and motive (hope for leniency), admissions (drug dealing, multiple sources), and even by putting some prior-felony information before the jury through Stevens’s indictment being read in part.

The court also held that any exclusion error would be harmless because (i) the jury still heard substantial impeachment information and (ii) Stevens’s account had meaningful corroboration (Agent Upton’s observations, Officer Powers’s identification of Clark driving the sedan while wearing a white tank top, and the communications evidence).

3. Sufficiency of evidence: accomplice testimony, corroboration, and the “incredible as a matter of law” threshold

Clark’s sufficiency challenge largely asked the appellate court to reject Stevens’s credibility. The panel, invoking United States v. Fleury and United States v. Gregory, reiterated that credibility determinations are for the jury and that an appellate court intervenes only when testimony is “unbelievable as a matter of law.”

The court then mapped trial evidence onto statutory elements:

  • Distribution and possession with intent to distribute (§ 841(a)(1)): Under United States v. Cremades, the government needed knowledge, possession, and intent to distribute. Stevens testified Clark repeatedly delivered meth/fentanyl for cash from November 2022 to June 2023 and specifically delivered large quantities on June 29, 2023 for $8,900—supporting possession and distribution, with intent inferable from quantity.
  • Conspiracy (§ 846): Under United States v. Colston, Stevens’s description of repeated negotiated exchanges supported an agreement, Clark’s knowledge, and voluntary participation.
  • Communication facility (§ 843(b)): Under United States v. Gregory, phone use “facilitates” a drug crime if it makes it easier. Evidence of calls/texts arranging and negotiating the June 29 deal supported both counts.

Importantly, the panel reaffirmed the permissibility of convictions based on accomplice testimony—even if uncorroborated—so long as it is not incredible on its face. Here, the court found both that the jury credited Stevens and that the record contained corroborating proof.

C. Impact

Although labeled “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the decision is a useful indicator of how Eleventh Circuit panels approach three recurring trial issues in drug cases.

  • Hearsay objections to “ownership/identity” testimony: The opinion reinforces that the government can often establish identity tied to a phone number through non-hearsay means (voice recognition, direct interactions, and personal communications). It also illustrates how prosecutors may frame “understanding” testimony as context for investigative steps—while still risking hearsay objections if the testimony effectively conveys an out-of-court assertion for its truth.
  • Rule 609(b) remains a high bar: The opinion underscores the Eleventh Circuit’s entrenched presumption against stale convictions. Defendants seeking to impeach a cooperating witness must be prepared to show “exceptional circumstances” and a concrete, specific probative value that substantially outweighs prejudice—especially where alternative impeachment (bias, motive, inconsistent statements, criminal conduct admissions) is available.
  • Appellate sufficiency review is not a retrial on credibility: The decision reiterates that attacking a cooperator’s credibility on appeal rarely succeeds unless testimony is impossible or internally incoherent to the point of being unbelievable as a matter of law.
  • Harmless error as a practical backstop: The panel’s repeated reliance on harmless error signals that even debatable evidentiary rulings may not yield relief if the record contains multiple independent strands supporting the same factual proposition (here, phone-number attribution and Stevens’s version of events).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Hearsay (Fed. R. Evid. 801(c))
An out-of-court statement offered to prove what it asserts. If a witness testifies from personal perception (e.g., “I recognized his voice”) or to explain why police took steps (“Based on what I understood, I began surveillance”), the testimony may not be hearsay— though the line can be contested when the “understanding” implicitly repeats someone else’s assertion.
Harmless error
Even if a judge makes an evidentiary mistake, the conviction stands unless the mistake likely affected the verdict in a substantial way. Here, other admissible evidence independently supported the disputed fact(s).
Rule 609(a) vs. Rule 609(b)
Rule 609(a) generally allows impeachment of a non-defendant witness with felony convictions. Rule 609(b) sharply limits convictions older than ten years: they are admitted only in unusual cases where probative value substantially outweighs prejudice.
Constructive possession
A legal way to prove “possession” without drugs being found in a person’s hand or pocket. It can be shown by dominion or control over where the drugs are kept. (The opinion notes the concept, though Clark’s case also involved evidence consistent with actual delivery.)
Facilitation under 21 U.S.C. § 843(b)
Using a phone (a “communication facility”) to make a drug crime easier—such as negotiating quantities, prices, meeting places, and timing.
“Incredible as a matter of law”
A very high standard: testimony must be essentially impossible to believe (not merely inconsistent, biased, or self-interested). Ordinary credibility disputes are left to the jury.

V. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s affirmance in United States v. Hantson Alexander Clark highlights three durable trial and appellate themes in federal drug prosecutions: (1) identity and phone-number attribution can be proven without hearsay through voice recognition, personal knowledge, and contextual investigative testimony; (2) Rule 609(b) imposes a strong presumption against impeachment with convictions older than ten years, especially when other impeachment tools are available; and (3) sufficiency challenges that depend on reweighing a cooperating witness’s credibility will typically fail absent testimony that is “unbelievable as a matter of law.” Even where evidentiary disputes arise, the harmless-error doctrine often determines whether any arguable misstep warrants reversal.