Under Pre-2026 Louisiana Tax Sales, “Statutory Impositions” (Including Decades-Old Ad Valorem Taxes) Must Be Included in the Tax Sale Price and Redemption Price

1. Introduction

Case: Esplanade Mall Realty Holdings, LLC v. Joseph P. Lopinto III, in His Capacity as Sheriff and Ex-Offico Tax Collector for Jefferson Parish
Court: Supreme Court of Louisiana
Date: March 6, 2026
Posture: Direct appeal under La. Const. art. V, § 5(D)(1), because the trial court declared La. R.S. 47:2131 unconstitutional.

The dispute centers on whether Jefferson Parish’s tax collector could, in a 2020 tax sale prompted by unpaid 2019 ad valorem taxes, include in the tax sale “price” (and thus in the redemption amount) a large, long-dormant balance of 1992 ad valorem taxes plus related interest and costs.

The property—known as the “Macy’s Parcel” at Esplanade Mall in Kenner—had a complicated history: a 1993 tax sale occurred while an automatic bankruptcy stay was in effect, was later deemed absolutely null, and a cancellation was recorded in 2000. The Sheriff took no collection action on the 1992 bill for nearly two decades, until a 2018 “Corrected Notice” asserted hundreds of thousands of dollars in “previous bills.”

The litigation was initiated by Esplanade Mall and later prosecuted by a successor owner, Pacifica Kenner, LLC (substituted as plaintiff), seeking declarations that (i) La. R.S. 47:2131 barred collection by tax sale after three years, (ii) the 2020 tax sale “price” could not lawfully include 1992 items, and (iii) the redemption price should exclude them.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s constitutional ruling, rendered judgment on the statutory question, and remanded for the trial court to calculate the redemption price consistent with the Court’s statutory interpretation.

Invoking constitutional avoidance, the Court held it was unnecessary to decide whether La. R.S. 47:2131 is constitutional because the case could be resolved on statutory grounds. Reading Title 47 as written for the 2008–2025 tax sale regime, the Court held:

  • A timely tax sale (here, based on delinquent 2019 taxes) could have a tax sale “price” consisting of all “statutory impositions” due on the property, including 1992 taxes, interest, and costs, because La. R.S. 47:2154(C) required inclusion of all statutory impositions and La. R.S. 47:2122(14) defined statutory impositions broadly.
  • The property remained redeemable because it was adjudicated to Jefferson Parish (no third-party purchaser), triggering the distinct redemption framework for adjudicated property under La. R.S. 47:2246.
  • The redemption statute, La. R.S. 47:2243, required payment of all statutory impositions accruing before the date of payment plus penalty and interest—again without a carve-out for older delinquent taxes.

The Court denied the plaintiff’s requested declaratory relief that would have declared the 1992 components “ineffective and null” or excluded them from redemption, but remanded to compute the redemption price (noting a sharp dispute between the parties’ numbers).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The majority’s methodology and the dissent’s competing approach were shaped by distinct lines of authority.

A. Constitutional avoidance and judicial restraint

  • Cat's Meow, Inc. v. City of New Orleans Through Dep't of Fin.: Cited for the “well-settled principle” that courts should avoid ruling on constitutionality unless essential. It anchored the Court’s decision to sidestep the trial court’s constitutional holding and resolve the case by statutory interpretation.
  • Parker v. County of Los Angeles: Quoted (via Cat’s Meow) to justify deciding only what is necessary in the “confining circumstances” of the case, reinforcing the Court’s refusal to opine on La. R.S. 47:2131’s constitutionality.

B. Civilian method: starting with enacted text

  • Bergeron v. Richardson: Used to emphasize Louisiana’s civilian approach: begin with “primary sources of law” (constitution, codes, statutes). This supported the majority’s text-first reading of La. R.S. 47:2154(C), La. R.S. 47:2122(14), and La. R.S. 47:2243.

C. Limits on add-ons to delinquent property taxes

  • Fransen v. City of New Orleans: Invoked to show that, for delinquent ad valorem taxes on immovables, government subdivisions may impose “only the taxes, interest and costs in proceeding to sell the property,” not extra penalties. The majority used Fransen to bolster the view that “taxes, interest, and costs” comfortably fit within “statutory impositions” (even though Fransen addressed unconstitutional penalties rather than temporal collection limits).

D. Presumption of deliberate legislative drafting

  • Ebinger v. Venus Const. Corp. and Kocher v. Truth in Pol., Inc.: Cited for interpretive presumptions: legislators act knowingly and in light of existing law. The majority used these to infer that the absence (pre-2026) of an express exclusion for taxes delinquent more than three years was intentional—especially in light of the 2026 enactment of La. R.S. 47:2151.1, which expressly adds such an exclusion prospectively.

E. No personal liability for ad valorem taxes on immovables

  • Mooring Tax Asset Group LLC v. Janes: Cited to confirm that delinquent immovable property taxes are collectible only “by acting against the tax debtor’s immovable property,” not via personal judgment against the owner. This case supported the Court’s treatment of the plaintiff’s request for a declaration of “no personal liability” as consistent with established Louisiana law, while leaving the lien/collection-through-property framework intact.

F. Historical jurisprudence emphasized by the dissent

  • Davidson v. Lindop and Succession of Stewart: Central to the dissent’s claim of “over a century of jurisprudence” limiting collection. The majority distinguished these as interpreting predecessor statutes from the 1800s, not the defined-term structure enacted for 2008–2025, and therefore not controlling on the meaning of “statutory impositions” as defined in La. R.S. 47:2122(14).

G. Statutes read together (dissent’s “in pari materia” framework) and anti-surplusage

The dissent relied on the canon of harmonizing related provisions and avoiding superfluity, supported by citations including: ABL Mgmt., Inc. v. Bd. of Sup'rs of S. Univ., Fairbanks Dev., LLC v. Johnson, Theriot v. Midland Risk Ins. Co., SWAT 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond, and First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Beckwith Machinery Co.. The dissent also referenced Eclectic Investment Partners, LP v. City of New Orleans (dissenting opinion below) to warn of “absurd consequences” if tax collectors could wait decades and then fold all delinquencies into a later tax sale.

H. Constitutional “collection” provisions (dissent)

The dissent cited Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman while arguing that La. Const. art. VII, § 3(A) (anti-injunction/anti-restraint language) does not prevent the Legislature from regulating tax-collection methods and deadlines. It also referenced Bilbe v. Foster and Harrier Enters., LLC v. Imbornone regarding the practical concept of an “imprescriptible yet uncollectable” tax debt, and Borel v. Young on legislative awareness of longstanding jurisprudence.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The Court’s use of constitutional avoidance

The trial court declared La. R.S. 47:2131 unconstitutional as conflicting with La. Const. art. VII, § 3(A) and La. Const. art. VII, § 16. The Supreme Court held that was error because the dispute could be resolved without reaching constitutionality. This was not merely prudential; it determined the case’s analytic center: the Court treated the controversy as a matter of statutory price and redemption mechanics under the 2008–2025 tax sale code.

B. Redeemability despite passage of time (adjudicated property)

The Sheriff argued the property was not redeemable (pointing to the general three-year redemption period for tax sales under La. Const. art. VII, § 25(B)(1) and La. R.S. 47:2155(A)). The Court rejected that because the property was adjudicated to Jefferson Parish, so the governing redemption rule was La. R.S. 47:2246 (permitting redemption until later alienation-related events). This threshold holding preserved the live controversy over the correct redemption amount.

C. The core statutory holding: “statutory impositions” must be included without a three-year carve-out

The majority’s decisive move was to treat the statutory scheme as a set of mandatory commands:

  • La. R.S. 47:2154(C) (tax sale price): “The price shall be the amount of statutory impositions due on the property, costs, and interest.”
  • La. R.S. 47:2122(14) (definition): “Statutory imposition” means “ad valorem taxes and any imposition in addition to ad valorem taxes that are included on the tax bill sent to the tax debtor.”
  • La. R.S. 47:2243 (redemption payment): payment “shall include all statutory impositions accruing before the date of payment” plus penalty and interest.

Because the definition of “statutory imposition” contains no temporal limitation, and because La. R.S. 47:2154(C) and La. R.S. 47:2243 use mandatory “shall” language without temporal exclusions, the Court held the Sheriff was required (and authorized) to include the 1992 taxes, interest, and costs in the tax sale certificate and in redemption.

D. How the Court treated La. R.S. 47:2131

La. R.S. 47:2131 provides that once three years after December 31 of the year the taxes are due have passed, “no tax sale shall be conducted with regard to such taxes,” subject to suspension during suits “which presents the collection of the taxes.”

The majority read this as a prohibition on conducting a tax sale based on an older delinquency, but not as a constraint on what may be included in the “price” of a tax sale that is timely as to a newer delinquency. In other words, once an owner fails to pay a current (timely) tax bill and triggers a tax sale, the statutes governing price and redemption sweep in all statutory impositions—even if some are far older than three years.

E. Legislative “fix” in 2026 as confirmatory context (but not retroactive)

The Court highlighted that effective January 1, 2026 the Legislature overhauled the system into a tax lien regime, and (critically) enacted La. R.S. 47:2151.1 providing that “[u]npaid statutory impositions that have been delinquent for a period of three years or more shall not be included in the sale price at any tax lien auction.”

The Court treated this as proof the Legislature can write an explicit exclusion and chose not to do so in the pre-2026 tax sale statutes applicable here; and it applied the non-retroactivity rule in La. R.S. 1:2.

F. The dissent’s competing synthesis

Chief Justice Weimer argued the majority’s approach makes La. R.S. 47:2131 practically meaningless (because any ancient delinquency can be “collected in conjunction with” a later timely sale) and conflicts with historical jurisprudence. The dissent would read the statutes in pari materia so that amounts that cannot be collected by tax sale under La. R.S. 47:2131 are effectively excluded from the tax sale price, even if they fit the definition of “statutory imposition.”

The dissent also would have reached the constitutional question, concluding La. R.S. 47:2131 is constitutional: real property taxes may be imprescriptible as a debt while the Legislature may time-bar a particular enforcement method (tax sale), leaving only a “natural obligation.”

3.3 Impact

A. Practical consequences under the pre-2026 tax sale regime

For tax sales governed by the 2008–2025 framework, the decision establishes (or confirms as binding statewide) that:

  • A taxpayer’s failure to pay a current year’s ad valorem taxes can expose the property to redemption conditioned on paying all “statutory impositions” on the bill, including very old delinquencies, even if those older delinquencies could not themselves have served as the basis for a stand-alone tax sale due to La. R.S. 47:2131’s three-year language.
  • The tax collector has no statutory discretion to “forgive” or omit such items from redemption where the governing statutes use mandatory “shall include” language.

B. Title and transactional risk

The majority acknowledged a potential “snare” and possible inequity: an owner who misses current taxes can be forced to pay a dramatically larger redemption amount due to accumulated old taxes, interest, and costs. The dissent framed this as a threat to the “sanctity of titles,” warning of a “stink bomb being injected into a chain of title.”

C. Forward-looking: harmonization with the 2026 tax lien system

The decision also sharply delineates the break between regimes: the Legislature’s adoption of La. R.S. 47:2151.1 prospectively prevents the same outcome in future tax lien auctions, but the Court’s reasoning indicates that comparable relief for pre-2026 tax sales is a legislative, not judicial, task.

D. Unresolved constitutional question

By avoiding constitutionality, the Court leaves open whether La. R.S. 47:2131 is constitutional in contexts where its meaning cannot be sidestepped. That uncertainty may invite future litigation, particularly in cases where the only delinquency is older than three years, or where parties seek to use La. R.S. 47:2131 to defeat inclusion of aged amounts in other collection contexts.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Tax sale vs. tax lien: Under the pre-2026 system, unpaid taxes could lead to a “tax sale” (a sale of tax sale title/rights). Beginning in 2026, Louisiana shifted to a tax lien certificate process, and the Legislature explicitly barred including delinquencies older than three years in the auction price (La. R.S. 47:2151.1).
  • “Statutory impositions”: A defined term in La. R.S. 47:2122(14) meaning ad valorem taxes and other bill-included charges. The Court treated the definition as sweeping broadly and not time-limited.
  • Redemption: The owner’s ability to get the property back by paying the statutorily defined redemption amount. For adjudicated property (no third-party buyer), redemption rules differ (La. R.S. 47:2246).
  • Prescription vs. imprescriptibility: Many obligations prescribe (expire) after time, but Louisiana’s Constitution treats ad valorem real property taxes as not prescribing as a debt (La. Const. art. VII, § 16). The dissent distinguishes the persistence of the debt from the expiration of a particular enforcement method.
  • Constitutional avoidance: Courts prefer to decide cases on non-constitutional grounds where possible, avoiding constitutional pronouncements unless necessary (Cat's Meow, Inc. v. City of New Orleans Through Dep't of Fin.).
  • Payment under protest: Louisiana law provides mechanisms (e.g., La. R.S. 47:2134) to pay disputed charges under protest while preserving a right to contest and seek recovery. The Court noted the taxpayer’s failure to timely pay current taxes (and/or under protest) as the factual condition that allowed a tax sale to proceed and trigger the broad inclusion rules.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision is a text-driven construction of the pre-2026 tax sale code: when a tax sale is validly triggered by a timely delinquency, the statutory commands governing tax sale price (La. R.S. 47:2154(C)) and redemption (La. R.S. 47:2243) require inclusion of all “statutory impositions” as defined in La. R.S. 47:2122(14)—even if some of those taxes, interest, and costs are decades old.

Equally significant is what the Court did not decide: it declined to rule on the constitutionality of La. R.S. 47:2131 and left policy correction to the Legislature—a point underscored by the Legislature’s prospective 2026 fix in La. R.S. 47:2151.1. For practitioners, the case is a cautionary precedent about the pre-2026 regime’s redemption arithmetic and the importance of promptly addressing current-year tax bills (including through protest procedures) to avoid opening the door to massive historical balances being swept into a tax sale and redemption demand.