Unconditional Open Guilty Plea Waives Suppression Appeals Absent Rule 11(a)(2) Compliance

Introduction

In United States v. Wayne Jerome Johnson (6th Cir. Jan. 28, 2026) (unpublished), the Sixth Circuit addressed two recurring issues in federal criminal practice: (1) whether a defendant who enters an “open” guilty plea can still appeal the denial of a pre-plea motion to suppress, and (2) whether a below-Guidelines sentence imposed after a career-offender finding can be substantively unreasonable because the defendant claims his criminal history is overstated.

After officers searched two motel rooms used by Wayne Jerome Johnson and discovered drugs and paraphernalia, a grand jury indicted him for three counts of possession with intent to distribute a Schedule II controlled substance (Counts 1–3), possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug-trafficking crimes (Count 4), and being a felon in possession of a firearm (Count 5). Johnson filed multiple suppression motions; the only one relevant on appeal was denied as untimely.

Johnson later pleaded guilty without a written plea agreement (an “open” plea). He then appealed, challenging both the suppression ruling and the sentence (300 months’ imprisonment and 8 years of supervised release).

Summary of the Opinion

  • Suppression issue: The court held that Johnson did not preserve the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress because he did not enter a valid conditional guilty plea under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2). His unconditional plea therefore foreclosed appellate review of the suppression ruling.
  • Sentencing issue: The court held the sentence was not substantively unreasonable. The district court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence after weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and Johnson failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness applicable to a below-Guidelines sentence.

The Sixth Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s judgment.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Conditional pleas and waiver of suppression appeals

  • United States v. Corp, 668 F.3d 379 (6th Cir. 2012): Cited for the standard of review—whether appellate rights were waived is reviewed de novo. This frames the issue as a legal question about preservation, not an evidentiary dispute.
  • United States v. Ferguson, 669 F.3d 756 (6th Cir. 2012): Supplies the core rule applied: a defendant waives the right to appeal a pre-plea, non-jurisdictional ruling unless he enters a conditional guilty plea under Rule 11(a)(2).
  • United States v. Mendez-Santana, 645 F.3d 822 (6th Cir. 2011): Provides both (a) the three requirements for a conditional plea (writing, specification of the preserved issue, and government consent) and (b) the principle that, after an unconditional guilty plea, appellate review becomes “sharply circumscribed” to jurisdiction and voluntariness of the plea.
  • United States v. Bell, 350 F.3d 534 (6th Cir. 2003): Quoted via Mendez-Santana for the same three Rule 11(a)(2) elements, reinforcing that the “conditional plea” pathway is formal and limited.
  • United States v. Young, 580 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 2009) and United States v. Mastromatteo, 538 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 2008): These cases articulate the narrow circumstance in which the Rule 11(a)(2) writing requirement may be excused—only when the defendant clearly sought to preserve the issue, the government acknowledged the ability to appeal, and the court accepted that reservation. The panel used these authorities to reject any suggestion that ambiguous colloquy statements or general references to “appeal rights” could substitute for an actual conditional-plea reservation.
  • United States v. O'Neill, 94 F.4th 531 (6th Cir. 2024) and Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973): These authorities supply the doctrinal explanation: a guilty plea is a “break in the chain of events” that extinguishes independent claims relating to pre-plea events unless preserved through the conditional-plea mechanism.
  • United States v. Vasquez-Martinez, 616 F.3d 600 (6th Cir. 2010): The most factually analogous precedent. As in Johnson, the defendant pleaded guilty without a written plea agreement and did not attempt to enter a conditional plea. The court declined to reach the merits of the suppression appeal because Rule 11(a)(2) places an affirmative duty on the defendant to preserve the issue.
  • United States v. Abdulmutallab, 739 F.3d 891 (6th Cir. 2014): Reinforces the consent requirement: absent seeking and obtaining consent of the district court and government to preserve the suppression issue, the defendant’s guilty plea waives the argument.
  • United States v. Bacon, 884 F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 2018): Used to rebut Johnson’s reliance on the absence of explicit waivers. Even when a plea contains “neither any explicit waivers, nor any explicit reservation,” an unconditional plea still waives pre-plea suppression challenges.
  • United States v. Pritchett, 749 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2014): Cited for the appellate forfeiture rule—arguments not raised in the opening brief are forfeited. This foreclosed Johnson’s attempt (in reply) to recast the issue as a claim that his plea was unknowing.

2) Substantive reasonableness and below-Guidelines sentences

  • United States v. Parrish, 915 F.3d 1043 (6th Cir. 2019): Defines substantive unreasonableness as improper balancing of the § 3553(a) factors.
  • United States v. Curry, 536 F.3d 571 (6th Cir. 2008) and United States v. Pirosko, 787 F.3d 358 (6th Cir. 2015): Establish and apply the presumption of reasonableness for below-Guidelines sentences, describing the challenger’s burden as “even more demanding.”
  • United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2018): Confirms the “highly deferential” abuse-of-discretion standard for substantive reasonableness review.
  • United States v. Gardner, 32 F.4th 504 (6th Cir. 2022): Rejects the common appellate posture of simply asking the court to “balance the factors differently.” The Johnson panel relied on this logic to uphold the district court’s weighing of seriousness, community harm, protection of the public, and recidivism risk.

Legal Reasoning

A. Preservation of suppression issues requires Rule 11(a)(2) compliance

The opinion’s primary doctrinal move is straightforward: Johnson’s suppression issue was a pre-plea, non-jurisdictional claim. Under Sixth Circuit law, such claims are waived by an unconditional guilty plea unless the defendant enters a conditional plea satisfying Rule 11(a)(2): (1) in writing, (2) specifying the preserved issue, and (3) with government consent.

Johnson attempted to rely on the procedural history of two rearraignments. At the first (before a magistrate judge), defense counsel expressed a desire to plead guilty while keeping the suppression issue “alive.” The magistrate judge correctly explained that this was not possible without a conditional plea agreement, and the government confirmed it had not consented. That exchange mattered because it undercut any claim of confusion: Johnson was warned that preserving suppression would require a conditional mechanism, yet he proceeded toward a guilty plea anyway.

At the second rearraignment (before the district judge), Johnson entered an “open” guilty plea to all counts without orally or in writing reserving the suppression issue. The panel treated that as dispositive: absent a clear reservation accepted by the court and acknowledged by the government, the exception to the writing requirement (from Young/Mastromatteo) could not apply.

The court also rejected Johnson’s reliance on the district judge’s statement that Johnson had not waived “any appeal rights.” The panel read that statement in context—Johnson had not waived appeal rights by contract (i.e., by plea agreement), but his appeal rights remained limited “to the full extent that the law allows,” and the law after an unconditional guilty plea does not allow a suppression appeal.

B. Substantive reasonableness: deference plus a below-Guidelines presumption

On sentencing, the panel emphasized two layers of deference: (1) abuse-of-discretion review, and (2) a presumption of reasonableness that is especially difficult to overcome when the sentence is below the Guidelines range.

The district court calculated a career-offender range of 322 to 387 months and imposed 300 months—below the range. Johnson argued the Guidelines overstated his criminal history because he had not committed crimes of violence and cited U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 (overrepresentation departures). The panel’s response was pragmatic: § 4A1.3 permits a downward departure/variance, but it does not require one, and the record showed the district court considered Johnson’s upbringing and other mitigating points while also stressing seriousness, community harm, protection of the public, and Johnson’s unwillingness to change.

The panel concluded that Johnson’s argument amounted to an invitation to reweigh § 3553(a) factors, which Gardner forbids on abuse-of-discretion review.

Impact

  • Hard line on suppression-appeal preservation: The decision reinforces that defendants who want to appeal suppression rulings must affirmatively secure a Rule 11(a)(2) conditional plea—ideally in writing, clearly identifying the motion, and obtaining government consent and court approval. “Open” pleas are not a workaround.
  • Colloquy language cannot substitute for a conditional plea: General statements that a defendant retains “appeal rights” do not preserve suppression issues. Preservation requires the specific conditional-plea structure or, at minimum, the clear three-part showing recognized in Young/Mastromatteo.
  • Sentencing appeals remain steep uphill battles when the sentence is below-Guidelines: By applying the “even more demanding” burden from Curry and Pirosko, the opinion signals that mere disagreement with the district court’s balancing—especially where the court articulated multiple § 3553(a) reasons—will rarely succeed.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Open” guilty plea
A guilty plea entered without a plea agreement. It does not automatically preserve the right to appeal pretrial rulings.
Conditional guilty plea (Rule 11(a)(2))
A plea that allows the defendant to plead guilty while reserving the right to appeal a specified pretrial ruling (like denial of suppression). It requires government consent and court approval, and it is typically (and by rule) in writing.
Waiver vs. forfeiture
Waiver is the loss of a right because the law treats it as intentionally relinquished (e.g., unconditional guilty plea waiving suppression appeals). Forfeiture is the loss of an argument because it was not properly raised (e.g., not raised in the opening brief).
Jurisdiction and voluntariness after a guilty plea
After an unconditional guilty plea, appellate courts generally review only whether the court had authority over the case (jurisdiction) and whether the plea was knowing and voluntary. Pre-plea suppression disputes usually fall outside that limited review.
Substantive reasonableness
A challenge claiming the sentence is too harsh (or too lenient) given the statutory factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Appellate courts defer heavily to the sentencing judge’s weighing of those factors.
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 (overrepresented criminal history)
A Guidelines provision allowing a sentencing judge to impose a lower sentence when the calculated criminal history category exaggerates either the seriousness of past conduct or the risk of recidivism. It is discretionary, not mandatory.

Conclusion

United States v. Wayne Jerome Johnson underscores a practical rule with decisive consequences: a defendant who pleads guilty “open” and unconditionally cannot later appeal the denial of a suppression motion unless he preserved that issue through a Rule 11(a)(2) conditional plea (or its narrow functional equivalent recognized in Sixth Circuit precedent). The decision also reinforces the Sixth Circuit’s deferential review of below-Guidelines sentences, especially where the district court expressly weighed multiple § 3553(a) factors and declined to exercise discretionary authority under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3.