Uncertain Relocation Plans and Discrete Allocation of Legal Parental Rights in Vermont PRR Orders

Note on precedential status: The Opinion is an Entry Order issued by a three-justice panel and, as the face of the decision states, “not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.” Even so, it is a useful synthesis of how Vermont courts apply existing PRR standards to (1) a parent’s possible relocation and (2) “split” legal rights.

1. Introduction

Parties: Sean Gordon (father; cross-appellant below in the caption) and Katy Fogell (mother; appellant in the caption).
Court: Vermont Supreme Court (reviewing the Superior Court, Grand Isle Unit, Family Division).
Context: Final divorce order allocating parental rights and responsibilities (PRR) for two minor children, following a prior remand.

The family division was asked to decide physical and legal PRR amid significant family health issues, a history of the family moving between Vermont and Michigan, and mother’s stated desire to return to Michigan for family support. The key issues on appeal were whether the family court (a) properly analyzed the children’s best interests in light of the possible move, (b) permissibly treated a future move as an “unanticipated change of circumstances,” and (c) properly divided legal decision-making authority between the parents.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. It held that the family division did not abuse its discretion in:

  • weighing the children’s best interests under 15 V.S.A. § 665(b), including the practical consequences of mother’s uncertain Michigan plan;
  • concluding that if mother later relocated to Michigan—after stating she would stay in Vermont if father received custody—such a move could constitute a “real, substantial, and unanticipated change of circumstances” for modification purposes; and
  • dividing legal PRR “along discrete lines of authority,” awarding mother medical/dental/educational decision-making and father the remaining legal rights, based on the finding that mother was the primary coordinator for those domains.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

Gordon v. Fogell (Gordon I), 2025 VT 24

Role in this decision: The present appeal is the post-remand review. In Gordon I, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded because the trial court failed to address (i) the primary-care-provider factor, (ii) evidence regarding mother’s proposed relocation, (iii) its reasoning for divided legal responsibilities, and (iv) physical PRR assignment. On remand, the family division supplied the missing findings and reasoning but largely adhered to the same allocation. The Supreme Court’s affirmance here reflects that the remand’s purpose was to require adequate findings and explanations—not to mandate a different outcome.

Paine v. Buffa, 2014 VT 10

Standard of review: The Court relied on Paine for the “highly deferential” review of PRR orders: findings stand unless clearly erroneous, and the decision is reversed only if discretion is exercised on “unfounded considerations” or is “clearly unreasonable upon the facts presented.”
Relocation principle: Paine is also used to frame relocation as not a stand-alone statutory factor but potentially “dominant” when parents are otherwise similarly situated, and to emphasize that the moving parent should provide concrete facts supporting the relocation’s asserted benefits.

LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 2014 VT 65

Appellate restraint: The Court invoked LeBlanc to reject arguments that merely reweigh evidence. The Opinion characterizes mother’s appeal as largely disputing the trial court’s weighing of the best-interests evidence—an area “exclusively reserved for the trial court” absent abuse of discretion.

Shea v. Metcalf, 167 Vt. 494 (1998)

Split legal rights are permissible: The Court’s core authority for divided legal PRR is Shea, which holds the family court may divide legal rights and responsibilities “along discrete lines of authority,” even without parental agreement. The Opinion quotes Shea for the rationale: splitting legal authority can keep both parents actively engaged, use each parent’s strengths, and avoid assigning responsibility to a parent not well-suited for it.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Best interests and relocation: uncertainty matters

The family court treated mother’s Michigan proposal as insufficiently concrete and therefore less persuasive as a best-interests alternative to remaining in Vermont. The Supreme Court approved this approach as consistent with Paine—especially where the moving party provides limited detail on critical child-centered logistics (here, school planning and educational/social impact).

The Court also rejected the framing that the trial court “directed” mother where to live. Rather, it held the court appropriately evaluated how a move would affect the children’s stability, schooling, and relationships—particularly their connection to father’s parents and their established Vermont community.

2) “Unanticipated change of circumstances” and the parent’s own testimony

The Opinion endorses a practical distinction drawn from Paine: a move may be treated as anticipated (and therefore baked into the initial order) if it is firm and imminent, or unanticipated if no firm decision has been made. The family court found mother’s plan was not firm and that she stated she would remain in Vermont if father received custody. Against that factual backdrop, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to signal that a later relocation could qualify as a “real, substantial, and unanticipated change of circumstances” supporting modification litigation.

3) Dividing legal rights: fitness-by-domain rather than winner-take-all

The Supreme Court upheld the split legal PRR because the trial court made a specific, domain-focused finding: mother was the “primary point person” coordinating medical, dental, and educational providers. That finding supplied the rationale that Gordon I previously found lacking. The Court rejected:

  • Mother’s theory that the division was designed to “compel” her to remain in Vermont (unsupported by the record as characterized by the Court); and
  • Father’s challenge that the finding was unfounded (the Court held the finding adequately supported the allocation).

C. Impact

While nonprecedential, the Opinion illustrates several practical lessons likely to influence trial-level PRR litigation:

  • Relocation requires specifics: A parent proposing relocation should be prepared to present concrete evidence about schooling, continuity of services, and the child’s educational and social adjustment—not just the parent’s support network.
  • Uncertainty can cut against the move: Where the relocation plan is contingent, evolving, or not fully developed, the court may reasonably prefer the stability of the status quo for physical PRR.
  • Courts may prefigure modification pathways: A trial court may indicate that a later move could be a “real, substantial, and unanticipated” change when the initial order rests on an assumption (supported by evidence) that the parent will remain local.
  • Split legal PRR remains viable post-remand scrutiny: When supported by clear findings tied to parental strengths (e.g., medical/educational coordination), discrete allocation of legal authority is sustainable on appeal under Shea.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Physical vs. legal parental rights and responsibilities (PRR): “Physical” PRR concerns where the children live and day-to-day caretaking; “legal” PRR concerns major decisions (health care, education, etc.).
  • Best interests factors (15 V.S.A. § 665(b)): Statutory considerations guiding the PRR decision (e.g., relationships, adjustment to home/school/community, ability to meet needs).
  • Primary-care-provider factor: A best-interests consideration focusing on which parent has historically provided routine care and coordinated the child’s life.
  • Abuse of discretion (appellate standard): The Supreme Court does not decide what it would have done; it asks whether the trial court’s decision was unreasonable or based on improper considerations.
  • Real, substantial, and unanticipated change of circumstances: The threshold showing generally required to modify an existing PRR order. A change can be “unanticipated” if it was not firmly expected or built into the original order.
  • Remand: When the Supreme Court sends a case back to the trial court to correct errors—often to make additional findings or better explain reasoning.

5. Conclusion

The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed a PRR order that (1) favored stability in Vermont over an underdeveloped relocation plan and (2) divided legal decision-making authority by subject matter under Shea v. Metcalf. The Opinion underscores that relocation arguments succeed on detail and child-specific proof, and that appellate review will rarely disturb a trial court’s best-interests weighing absent a clear abuse of discretion—particularly after the trial court has supplied the findings and explanations required on remand.