Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle (ORS 164.135): “Vehicle” Includes Trailers, and Criminal Code Commentary Can Be Decisive Legislative History

Case: State v. McCarthy, 375 Or 157 (Or Apr 23, 2026)
Court: Supreme Court of Oregon (en banc)
Issue: Whether utility trailers are “vehicles” under ORS 164.135 (Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle, “UUV”).

1. Introduction

State v. McCarthy presented a narrow but recurring charging question: does ORS 164.135—Oregon’s UUV statute—reach the knowing, nonconsensual taking of a utility trailer? The defendant was convicted of two UUV counts after stipulated evidence showed he knowingly took two utility trailers without the owners’ consent. He moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that a trailer is not a “vehicle” within the statute’s meaning.

The trial court denied the motion and convicted him; the Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on State v. Phillips, 315 Or App 178 (2021). The Supreme Court allowed review to resolve the statutory-meaning dispute and the defendant’s contention that UUV historically targeted “joyriding” in self-propelled automobiles.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the legislature intended ORS 164.135 to apply to trailers; therefore, a trailer is a “vehicle” for UUV purposes. While the statutory text and context did not conclusively resolve the dispute, the court found the 1971 Criminal Code revision legislative history decisive—especially the Criminal Law Revision Commission commentary expressly stating the statute should protect owners of “trailers, sailboats and gliders.”

The court rejected the defendant’s attempt to confine “vehicle” to “driver-operated and self-propelled” conveyances and rejected the claim that UUV’s controlling purpose was limited to “joyriding.”

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

  • State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160 (2009)
    Provided the interpretive framework: statutory meaning is derived from text and context, with legislative history considered as helpful. The court explicitly followed Gaines in structuring the analysis, ultimately treating legislative history as decisive here.
  • State v. Sierra, 349 Or 506 (2010)
    Supplied the appellate posture rule: because review followed denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, facts were stated “in the light most favorable to the state.” That constrained the case to a pure legal question about statutory meaning.
  • State v. Phillips, 315 Or App 178 (2021)
    The Court of Appeals precedent holding trailers qualify as “vehicles” under ORS 164.135. The Supreme Court did not rely on Phillips as controlling authority (it conducted its own interpretive review) but reached the same bottom line, thereby reinforcing Phillips’s construction.
  • State v. Macomber, 269 Or 58 (1974) and State v. Eastep, 361 Or 746 (2017)
    These were the Supreme Court’s principal prior constructions of ORS 164.135, but the court explained they were of “little help” on the trailer question because both involved trucks and focused on an “operability” boundary (when disassembly/disrepair makes something no longer a “vehicle”).
    • Macomber identified that UUV can apply to “something less than operation,” but suggested a “wrecked” truck not capable of operation may fall outside the statute.
    • Eastep refined the rule: a vehicle need not “currently” run; if it can be made operable with “reasonable repairs,” it remains a “vehicle.” If it cannot, it does not. The court used Eastep primarily to distinguish trailers: a trailer’s “operability” is different because towing is its normal mode of use.
  • State v. Eggers, 372 Or 789 (2024)
    Supported the court’s approach to undefined statutory terms: assume “plain, natural, and ordinary meaning,” and consult dictionaries as a starting point. The court followed that approach but found dictionary breadth inconclusive (because it could encompass wheelbarrows/shopping carts).
  • State v. Walker, 356 Or 4 (2014)
    Provided the articulation of noscitur a sociis, used to evaluate the phrase “vehicle, boat or aircraft.” The parties offered competing readings (self-propelled vs. transportation-oriented), and the court found neither contextual inference decisive on its own.
  • State v. Eyle, 236 Or 199 (1963)
    Appeared in the legislative-history narrative: the project director initially referenced Eyle’s “joy-riding” description to justify a “motor-propelled” limitation. The subcommittee then rejected that limitation, weakening the defendant’s “joyriding-only” theory.
  • State v. Garcia, 288 Or 413 (1980)
    Cited for background on the Criminal Law Revision Commission’s creation and role, framing why Commission materials matter as legislative history for the 1971 code.
  • State v. Williams, 374 Or 648 (2025); State v. Wallace, 373 Or 122 (2024); State ex rel Turner v. Frankel, 322 Or 363 (1995)
    These authorities supported the court’s methodology: the “official” Criminal Law Revision Commission commentary is repeatedly treated as authoritative legislative history for the 1971 Criminal Code, and courts “generally assume” the legislature accepted the Commission’s explanations absent contrary history.
  • State v. Carpenter, 365 Or 488 (2019) and Kohring v. Ballard, 355 Or 297 (2014)
    Cited to delimit when earlier discussions or nonlegislator statements may matter. The court acknowledged it may consider “discussions that preceded the adoption of the final draft” (Carpenter), and may credit nonlegislator-drafter explanations if the legislature relied on them (Kohring), but emphasized that here the written commentary was the “official record” transmitted to the legislature.
  • Wright v. Turner, 354 Or 815 (2014) and Vector Marketing Corp. v. Employment Dept., 275 Or App 999 (2015)
    Mentioned in a footnote distinguishing legislative committee audio recordings vs minutes. The court used these to explain that the preference for audio recordings in committee contexts does not translate to the Commission setting where the written commentary is the principal product presented to the legislature.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) Text and context were plausible but not decisive.
The operative provision, ORS 164.135(1)(a)(A), criminalizes knowingly taking, operating, exercising control over, or otherwise using another’s “vehicle, boat or aircraft.” With “vehicle” undefined, the court began with ordinary meaning (including dictionary definitions focused on transportation), but found the breadth created line-drawing problems (e.g., whether a wheelbarrow might qualify under a purely functional definition).

The court examined contextual cues:

  • The associated terms “boat” and “aircraft” did not clearly imply self-propulsion, given that some boats and some aircraft (e.g., gliders) are not self-propelled.
  • The statute’s verb set (“takes,” “operates,” “exercises control over,” “otherwise uses”) signals that UUV is not limited to “driving” or “joyriding” and may be violated by broader nonconsensual uses.
  • Prior cases (State v. Macomber, State v. Eastep) established an operability boundary but did not define the category’s outer scope as to what kinds of conveyances count. The court also rejected an analogy equating “an inoperable truck that must be towed” with “a trailer,” emphasizing that towing is a trailer’s ordinary mode of operation.

(b) Legislative history resolved the meaning.
The opinion turns on the 1971 Criminal Code revision process. The court traced how the drafting subcommittee initially used “motor-propelled” (influenced by the “joy-riding” framing in State v. Eyle), but then deliberately removed that limitation and used “vehicle, boat or aircraft.” Crucially, the Commission commentary to Preliminary Draft No. 2 explained the reason: the statute should protect owners of “trailers, sailboats and gliders.”

(c) The court privileged the written commentary over ambiguous internal deliberations.
The defendant argued the subcommittee tape did not mention “trailers,” creating a conflict with the commentary. The court disagreed for two core reasons:

  • Oregon courts regularly treat Criminal Law Revision Commission commentary as authoritative legislative history for the 1971 code (supported by State v. Williams, State v. Wallace, and State ex rel Turner v. Frankel), and the commentary—unlike internal tapes—was the official product transmitted to the legislature.
  • Even on the tapes, the subcommittee’s intent about many marginal conveyances was inconclusive; the absence of a trailer reference did not amount to an intent to exclude trailers. By contrast, the written commentary was explicit.

(d) Holding.
Combining (1) a text that does not clearly limit “vehicle” to self-propelled devices and (2) legislative history expressly stating “trailers” were intended to be covered, the court held that “vehicle” in ORS 164.135 includes trailers.

3.3 Impact

  • Charging and proof: Theft-like conduct involving trailers can be prosecuted as UUV (when the elements are met), not merely as other property crimes. The decision removes a categorical defense that trailers fall outside ORS 164.135.
  • Doctrinal clarity on “joyriding” arguments: The opinion reinforces that UUV’s modern text and drafting history support a broader owner-protection rationale than “joyriding,” making purpose-based narrowing arguments harder when the statute’s verbs and covered property are expansive.
  • Methodology for 1971 Criminal Code interpretation: The case strengthens the practical significance of the Criminal Law Revision Commission’s written commentary—especially where it speaks directly to a disputed application—and suggests courts will be reluctant to infer legislative intent from internal subcommittee tapes when the published commentary is explicit and the tapes are at most ambiguous.
  • Relationship to operability doctrine: The decision preserves State v. Eastep’s “reasonable repairs” operability line for vehicles whose ordinary operation is self-propelled, while clarifying that “operability” must be evaluated with the object’s normal function in mind (e.g., a trailer remains “operable” even though it is towed).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle (UUV) (ORS 164.135): A crime committed when someone knowingly takes or otherwise uses another’s covered conveyance (vehicle/boat/aircraft) without consent; it is not limited to “driving away,” because the statute also covers “exercising control over” and “otherwise uses.”
  • Motion for judgment of acquittal: A request that the court rule the evidence is legally insufficient to convict. On appeal, courts view facts in the light most favorable to the prosecution (State v. Sierra).
  • Statutory interpretation under State v. Gaines: Courts look first to text and context, then consider legislative history as helpful. Here, text/context did not settle the scope; legislative history did.
  • Noscitur a sociis: A word’s meaning may be informed by surrounding words (State v. Walker). “Vehicle” was evaluated alongside “boat” and “aircraft,” but the inference did not conclusively resolve whether self-propulsion was required.
  • Criminal Law Revision Commission commentary: Explanatory materials prepared during the 1967–1971 code revision and transmitted with the proposed code. Oregon appellate courts often treat this commentary as an “official” indicator of what the legislature adopted when it enacted the 1971 Criminal Code.

5. Conclusion

State v. McCarthy establishes that trailers fall within “vehicle” for UUV purposes under ORS 164.135, rejecting a limitation to self-propelled, driver-operated conveyances. The opinion’s decisive move is methodological as well as substantive: when interpreting 1971 Criminal Code provisions, explicit Criminal Law Revision Commission commentary can outweigh ambiguous or incomplete internal drafting-record audio.

The ruling aligns Oregon’s UUV statute with a broad owner-protection approach—consistent with the statute’s verbs and the Commission’s stated intent—and will shape both charging decisions involving trailers and future interpretive disputes where the Commission commentary squarely addresses the contested point.