Date: Jun 8, 2026

Unambiguous Video Evidence Limits “Reasonably Susceptible” Inferences at Summary Judgment in Hawaiʻi

I. Introduction

Bellamy v. City and County of Honolulu (Haw. June 5, 2026) is a tort-and-summary-judgment decision arising from a late-night Honolulu Police Department response to a 911 report of a gunshot in a Waikīkī apartment building. Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellant Anthony Bellamy sued the City and County of Honolulu and four Honolulu police officers in their individual capacities, alleging multiple torts based on how officers approached his apartment, displayed a rifle, and briefly entered to check for a weapon.

The central issue on certiorari was not whether affidavits can create triable fact disputes in Hawaiʻi (they can), but rather how courts should evaluate a plaintiff’s declaration when the moving party produces undisputed, unambiguous body-worn camera footage depicting the encounter and the non-movant does not challenge the recording’s authenticity, completeness, or clarity. The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court reversed the ICA’s partial vacatur and held that, on this record, Bellamy did not raise a genuine issue of material fact because the evidence was not “reasonably susceptible” to the inferences he urged.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment for Petitioners on all tort claims. The Court held:

Where body-worn camera footage and audio are undisputed and unambiguous, the court may draw only those inferences “of which the evidence is reasonably susceptible,” and a declaration that mischaracterizes what the video shows does not create a genuine issue of material fact.
The ICA misapplied Nozawa v. Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3; Nozawa’s rule that an affidavit need not be corroborated does not require trial when the record evidence cannot reasonably support the affiant’s material allegations.
The Court declined to adopt a separate “Scott v. Harris” standard as unnecessary because Hawaiʻi’s existing HRCP Rule 56 framework already resolves conflicts between video evidence and declarations through the “reasonably susceptible” inference constraint.
Because Bellamy failed to establish any genuine issue of material fact, the Court did not reach Petitioners’ qualified/conditional privilege arguments.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. The governing summary-judgment framework

Nozawa v. Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3, 142 Hawaiʻi 331, 418 P.3d 1187 (2018): Reaffirmed for the proposition that affidavit statements need not be independently corroborated to create a triable issue. The Court emphasized, however, that Nozawa involved a classic “he said, she said” dispute and the record was “reasonably susceptible” to inferences supporting the non-movant.
Ka'upulehu Land LLC v. Heirs and Assigns of Pahukula, 136 Hawai'i 123, 358 P.3d 692 (2015) (citing Winfrey v. GGP Ala Moana LLC, 130 Hawai'i 262, 308 P.3d 891 (2013)): The Court treated these cases as the decisive doctrinal anchor: on summary judgment, courts must view facts in the non-movant’s favor but may draw only inferences the evidence is “reasonably susceptible” to support. Bellamy operationalizes that limitation in the context of clear video evidence.
First Hawaiian Bank v. Weeks, 70 Haw. 392, 772 P.2d 1187 (1989): Cited for the principle that a movant can meet its burden by showing that at trial there would be no competent evidence supporting judgment for the non-movant.
Exotics Hawaii-Kona, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 116 Hawaiʻi 277, 172 P.3d 1021 (2007): Cited for the non-movant’s burden to set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.
Gima v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 156 Hawai'i 78, 569 P.3d 1262 (2025): Cited for the definition of “material fact.”
Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Newtown Meadows ex rel. its Bd. of Directors v. Venture 15, Inc., 115 Hawai'i 232, 167 P.3d 225 (2007): Cited for the constraint that summary judgment is improper unless reasonable minds can draw only one conclusion from the evidence.
Rodriguez v. Nishiki, 65 Haw. 430, 653 P.2d 1145 (1982): Cited in discussing the “reasonable jury” lens—i.e., whether a reasonable jury could reach a contrary conclusion on the record.

2. The “video contradiction” debate and the Court’s choice not to adopt a new rule

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007): Petitioners urged Scott’s “blatantly contradicted by the record” approach. The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court declined to adopt a new standard, holding it was “neither necessary nor warranted” because Hawaiʻi’s existing “reasonably susceptible” inference limitation already filters out fact disputes that are not genuinely supported by competent evidence.
Witt v. W. Va. State Police, Troop 2, 633 F.3d 272 (4th Cir. 2011): Used to illustrate when video evidence does not settle the dispute (e.g., soundless/poor-quality recordings). The Court invoked Witt to signal that this case turned on the recording’s clarity and completeness, not on a categorical preference for video over testimony.
State v. Zuffante, 157 Hawai'i 194, 576 P.3d 243 (2025): Cited to support the proposition that recordings provide a “reliable and objective record” of what was said and the circumstances of speech—reinforcing why an undisputed body-worn camera record may constrain what inferences are reasonable.

3. Torts and related authorities framing Bellamy’s claims

Hac v. Univ. of Hawaii, 102 Hawai'i 92, 73 P.3d 46 (2003): Elements of IIED.
Doe Parents No. 1 v. State, Dep't of Educ., 100 Hawai'i 34, 58 P.3d 545 (2002), as amended (Dec. 5, 2002): Elements of negligence and NIED.
Mukaida v. Hawaii, 159 F. Supp. 2d 1211 (D. Haw. 2001), aff'd, 85 F. App'x 631 (9th Cir. 2004): Elements of assault (here, “assault by threatening”).
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B: Intrusion upon seclusion; used to contextualize Bellamy’s “invasion of privacy”/“improper search and seizure” theories as effectively tracking common-law intrusion principles.
Figueroa v. State, 61 Haw. 369, 604 P.2d 1198 (1979): Cited in a cautionary footnote regarding private rights of action for monetary damages under the Hawaiʻi Constitution.
Runnels v. Okamoto, 56 Haw. 1, 525 P.2d 1125 (1974): Cited by Bellamy for the proposition that malice is generally for the jury (relevant to qualified/conditional privilege), though the Court ultimately did not reach privilege due to the absence of a genuine fact dispute.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986): Quoted for summary judgment’s dual purpose—protecting the jury trial right for factually supported claims while allowing opponents to show “no factual basis” pretrial.
People v. Sibrian, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d 428 (Cal. App. 2016): Cited in a footnote for the meaning of “low ready,” relevant to evaluating whether the rifle was “pointed at” Bellamy.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The key move: “competent evidence” and “reasonably susceptible” inferences

The Court framed the dispositive question as whether Bellamy’s declaration supplied competent evidence that could support material inferences in his favor when placed against an undisputed body-worn camera record. Its reasoning proceeds in three steps:

Identify the material allegations. Bellamy’s tort theories depended on claims that officers pointed an AR-15 “right at” him, shouted commands to keep his hands up, repeatedly demanded “where’s the guns,” and entered without consent through intimidation.
Fix the evidentiary baseline. Petitioners produced continuous body-worn camera footage and 911 audio. Bellamy did not contest authenticity, completeness, clarity, or possible omission—indeed, he argued the recordings corroborated him. The Court treated this as significant because it left no evidentiary opening to argue that the video failed to capture crucial conduct (an argument that might have resembled Witt v. W. Va. State Police, Troop 2).
Apply the “reasonably susceptible” constraint. Under Ka'upulehu Land LLC v. Heirs and Assigns of Pahukula and Winfrey v. GGP Ala Moana LLC, courts cannot invent inferences not supported by what the record can reasonably bear. Because the video showed the rifle oriented down at “low ready,” no raised voices, no “hands up” commands, no “where’s the guns,” and an invitation by Bellamy (“You can come check everything in here”), the Court concluded that Bellamy’s version was not a permissible inference from the record.

2. Distinguishing Nozawa without undermining it

The opinion is careful not to retract Nozawa. Instead, it narrows the ICA’s use of it:

Nozawa stands for the rule that affidavits need not be corroborated and can create genuine disputes.
Bellamy adds that when a party presents clear, undisputed video evidence of the relevant interaction, an opposing declaration does not create a triable issue if the record is not “reasonably susceptible” to the declaration’s material claims.

Put differently, Bellamy is less about preferring video over testimony and more about policing the boundary between (a) credibility disputes appropriate for juries and (b) asserted “disputes” that are not genuinely supported by competent evidence under HRCP Rule 56.

3. Why the Court rejected the ICA’s “jury must decide” approach on this record

The ICA’s rule—“even when the opposing declaration is blatantly contradicted by video evidence supporting the motion”—was, in the Supreme Court’s view, an overextension that would collapse summary judgment’s function. The Court offered a practical illustration: if an unchallenged video depicts no forced entry and no threats, a declaration asserting the opposite (e.g., door kicked down, gun to head, screaming) should not automatically force trial. That would permit any litigant to reach trial by “simply submitting a competing declaration,” contrary to HRCP Rule 56’s design and the efficiency rationale captured in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett.

4. The Court’s restraint on “Scott v. Harris”

Although Petitioners invoked Scott v. Harris, the Court declined to import Scott as a new doctrinal test. Instead, it treated Hawaiʻi’s “reasonably susceptible” inference standard as sufficient to address the same functional problem—preventing trial where the non-movant’s version is not genuinely supportable on the record—without announcing a separate “blatantly contradicted” doctrine.

C. Impact

1. Practical effect on civil litigation in Hawaiʻi involving recordings

Bellamy’s most immediate impact is procedural: where an encounter is captured by clear, continuous recordings and the non-movant does not raise a substantiated challenge to authenticity, completeness, or intelligibility, courts may be more willing to grant summary judgment if the opposing declaration’s “version” cannot be supported by reasonable inferences from the recording.

2. Strategic consequences for parties

For plaintiffs/non-movants: If video exists, opposing summary judgment will often require more than a contradictory narrative. Bellamy signals the importance of developing record-based arguments about why the video is incomplete, ambiguous, misleading due to angle/lighting/audio loss, or otherwise not dispositive—consistent with the opinion’s nod to Witt v. W. Va. State Police, Troop 2.
For defendants/movants (including government defendants): High-quality recordings can support a “no competent evidence” theory under First Hawaiian Bank v. Weeks, narrowing what issues are truly triable.

3. Substantive tort claims remain intact; the decision is record-dependent

The Court did not re-define negligence, IIED/NIED, assault, or intrusion upon seclusion. It held that Bellamy’s claims failed because the record could not reasonably support the essential factual predicates (threatening display, coercive entry, unlawful intrusion). Future plaintiffs with different recordings (or plausible challenges to the recording) may still reach juries on similar theories.

4. Qualified/conditional privilege left unresolved

The Court expressly did not reach qualified privilege. Thus, Bellamy’s precedential force lies primarily in HRCP Rule 56 practice with recordings, not in refining the malice analysis referenced by Bellamy through Runnels v. Okamoto.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Genuine issue of material fact” (HRCP Rule 56): A dispute matters (“material”) if it would affect an essential element of a claim or defense (see Gima v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu). It is “genuine” if a reasonable jury could decide it either way on competent evidence.
“Reasonably susceptible” inferences: Even when courts view evidence in the non-movant’s favor, they can draw only inferences the evidence can reasonably support (see Ka'upulehu Land LLC v. Heirs and Assigns of Pahukula and Winfrey v. GGP Ala Moana LLC). A party cannot defeat summary judgment with an inference that the record cannot logically bear.
Competent evidence: Evidence that could be admissible and actually supports the asserted facts. Bellamy treats an undisputed, clear recording as fixing what occurred, limiting contrary factual claims that are not plausibly reconcilable with that record.
“Low ready” firearm position: A ready stance with the barrel pointed downward, not aimed at a person. The Court relied on video depiction and the definition referenced through People v. Sibrian to evaluate the “pointed right at me” allegation.
Intrusion upon seclusion: A privacy tort (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B) involving an intentional intrusion into private space in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person. The Court indicated Bellamy’s privacy/constitutional framing effectively tracked this common-law concept, but found no triable fact dispute on coercion or non-consent on this record.

V. Conclusion

Bellamy v. City and County of Honolulu strengthens and clarifies the operation of Hawaiʻi’s existing summary-judgment principles in the era of pervasive video evidence: a litigant’s declaration cannot create a “genuine” dispute when undisputed, unambiguous recordings make the record not “reasonably susceptible” to the declarant’s material allegations. The decision preserves Nozawa v. Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3 while limiting its misuse, and it declines to adopt a separate Scott v. Harris framework because Hawaiʻi’s own “reasonably susceptible” inference rule already performs the necessary work. The broader significance is procedural but substantial: where clear recordings exist, litigants must engage the recording’s reliability and interpretive limits—or risk losing at summary judgment even when they offer sworn, personal accounts.