UCCJEA Home-State Priority in Abuse-and-Neglect: Vacatur Required Absent Home-State Court Declination

1. Introduction

In re A.N. and I.N., No. 25-396 (W. Va. June 8, 2026) is a memorandum decision from the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia addressing two distinct questions in a consolidated abuse-and-neglect appeal brought by petitioner father S.N.: (1) whether the Ohio County Circuit Court had jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”) to adjudicate and terminate parental rights as to A.N., a child who lived in Ohio from birth and moved to West Virginia less than six months before the petition was filed; and (2) whether there was sufficient evidence to terminate father’s parental rights as to I.N., a later-born child, particularly given the early termination of father’s improvement period.

The Department of Human Services (“DHS”) alleged that father’s substance abuse (especially alcohol), domestic violence history, dishonesty/noncooperation, and failure to protect the children from the mother supported adjudication and ultimate termination. The circuit court terminated father’s parental rights to both children. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals split the outcome: it vacated the adjudication and termination as to A.N. for lack of UCCJEA jurisdiction, but affirmed termination as to I.N.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • A.N. (jurisdiction): The Court held Ohio—not West Virginia—was A.N.’s “home state” when the July 10, 2024 petition commenced because A.N. lived in Ohio from birth until sometime between February and July 2024. Because West Virginia did not satisfy “home state” jurisdiction and there was no record that an Ohio court declined jurisdiction, West Virginia also lacked “significant connection,” “declination,” and “default” jurisdiction. The Court therefore vacated the October 30, 2024 adjudicatory order and vacated in part the May 20, 2025 termination order as to A.N., and remanded with directions to contact the Mahoning County, Ohio court to ask whether it will decline jurisdiction.
  • I.N. (termination merits): The Court held termination was supported by clear and convincing evidence. Father missed screens, tested positive for alcohol and an unprescribed medication, refused recommended treatment, and denied he had an alcohol problem. The Court emphasized that failure to acknowledge the problem renders it “untreatable,” and affirmed the finding of no reasonable likelihood of correction in the near future and that termination was necessary for I.N.’s welfare.

Disposition: Affirmed in part; vacated in part; and remanded with directions.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The Court’s analysis is anchored in a line of UCCJEA jurisdiction decisions and established abuse-and-neglect termination principles.

1) Standards of review and jurisdiction raised sua sponte

  • In re K.S., Syl. Pt. 1 (W. Va. May 15, 2026): The Court reiterated the familiar abuse-and-neglect appellate framework—abuse of discretion for dispositional rulings, clear error for facts, and de novo review for legal issues. This standard enabled the Court to treat UCCJEA compliance as a legal/jurisdictional question reviewed de novo.
  • State ex rel. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Wilson, Syl. Pt. 2 (2017) (quoting In re Boggs' Est., Syl. Pt. 2 (1951)): The Court invoked its duty to notice lack of jurisdiction “on its own motion … at any time.” This is critical: even though the parties litigated the merits, the Court treated UCCJEA defects as structural and nonwaivable.

2) The UCCJEA as a strict jurisdictional gatekeeper

  • In re A.T.-1, Syl. Pt. 3, in part (2023) (quoting Rosen v. Rosen, Syl. Pt. 6 (2008)): The Court reiterated that the UCCJEA “is a jurisdictional statute” and its requirements must be satisfied before a West Virginia court may adjudicate child custody disputes, including abuse-and-neglect custody determinations.
  • In re Z.H. (2021) and In re J.C. (2019): These decisions supply the roadmap the Court applied here:
    • In re Z.H. summarized the four jurisdictional bases in order of priority—(1) home state, (2) significant connection, (3) declination, (4) default—and stressed they do not operate as free alternatives but in a sequenced hierarchy.
    • Rosen v. Rosen (as quoted through In re Z.H.) provided the “home state” definition, including the rule for children under six months: the home state is where the child lived “from birth.”
    • In re J.C., Syl. Pt. 4, in part, supplied a crucial limitation on “significant connection” jurisdiction: the home state must be a court that “declined” jurisdiction; it is not enough that “some other person or entity” (e.g., an agency) declined or did not act.
    In In re A.N. and I.N., these cases effectively dictated the outcome for A.N. once the record showed Ohio was the home state and no Ohio court declination was documented.

3) Termination principles: no reasonable likelihood of correction and the centrality of acknowledgment

  • In re Timber M. (2013) (quoting In re Charity H. (2004)): The Court relied on the maxim that to remedy abuse/neglect “the problem must first be acknowledged”; denial makes the problem “untreatable.” This principle supported the finding that father’s minimization/denial of alcohol addiction undermined any realistic prospect of timely correction.
  • In re Kristin Y., Syl. Pt. 5 (2011) (quoting In re R.J.M., Syl. Pt. 2 (1980)): The Court reaffirmed that termination may be ordered without less restrictive alternatives when there is no reasonable likelihood the conditions can be substantially corrected. This directly answered father’s implicit “not enough time” argument by focusing on capacity and trajectory, not elapsed calendar time.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) A.N.: Jurisdiction is not a merits question—UCCJEA compliance is a prerequisite to power

The Court’s reasoning begins with an unyielding premise: if UCCJEA jurisdiction is absent, everything that follows (adjudication, disposition, termination) is voidable and must be vacated. Applying West Virginia Code § 48-20-201(a) in the priority order described in In re Z.H., the Court concluded:

  1. Home state jurisdiction failed. A.N. lived in Ohio from birth and had not lived in West Virginia for six consecutive months before the July 10, 2024 filing date. Under the statutory definition (as explained in Rosen v. Rosen and repeated in In re Z.H.), Ohio remained the home state.
  2. Significant connection jurisdiction failed. West Virginia could only rely on this basis if the home state court declined jurisdiction. The record contained no such declination, and In re J.C. forecloses substituting agency inaction or statements for a court declination.
  3. Declination/default jurisdiction necessarily failed. Because Ohio had home state jurisdiction and no Ohio court declined, West Virginia could not “skip ahead” to declination or default under § 48-20-201(a)(3)-(4).

Remedy followed jurisdiction: vacatur of the A.N. adjudication and vacatur-in-part of termination, plus a process-forward remand. The Court directed immediate communication with the Mahoning County, Ohio juvenile court to determine whether Ohio will decline jurisdiction. Pending that determination, the Court ordered A.N. to remain in the current foster placement—an interim stability measure while jurisdiction is sorted. If Ohio declines, West Virginia must conduct de novo adjudicatory and dispositional hearings; if Ohio exercises jurisdiction, custody must be transferred to Ohio CPS.

2) I.N.: Termination upheld based on demonstrated incapacity and untreated addiction, not on the length of the improvement period

As to I.N., father framed the issue as insufficient time: the improvement period was terminated early, so (he argued) the “clear and convincing” burden could not be met. The Court rejected this logic and applied the statutory termination framework:

  • West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) authorizes termination when there is no reasonable likelihood of substantial correction in the near future and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare.
  • West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d) defines “no reasonable likelihood” to include an inadequate capacity to solve the problems, even with help.
  • West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d)(1) specifically addresses alcohol addiction that seriously impairs parenting where the parent has not responded to or followed through with recommended treatment.

The evidentiary picture supporting termination was concrete and time-spanning across the case: repeated missed screens, multiple alcohol positives, positives for an unprescribed muscle relaxer, refusal to engage in recommended treatment, and—most importantly—denial of an alcohol problem. The Court used In re Timber M. (quoting In re Charity H.) to treat denial as prognostic: without acknowledgment, treatment is not meaningfully possible, supporting the “near future” finding.

The Court also noted father did not challenge the welfare/necessity finding for I.N. on appeal, narrowing the appellate dispute. Finally, by citing In re Kristin Y. (quoting In re R.J.M.), the Court reaffirmed that once the statutory standard is met, the circuit court need not attempt less restrictive dispositional alternatives.

3) The improvement-period termination rationale as a credibility and cooperation marker

Although the Supreme Court’s ultimate I.N. analysis emphasized substance abuse and denial, the record also reflected the circuit court’s earlier improvement-period termination based on father’s failure to disclose the mother’s pregnancy, which the circuit court characterized as “a fraud upon the Court” and a “basic lack of honesty.” Even where “fraud upon the court” is not the formal basis for termination, the decision highlights how noncooperation and dishonesty can be treated as evidence that the parent is “unwilling and unable” to address conditions—especially when combined with ongoing substance use and refusal of treatment.

C. Impact

1) Practical consequences for cross-border abuse-and-neglect cases

The decision reinforces (and operationalizes) a strict procedural discipline: West Virginia courts and litigants must treat UCCJEA jurisdiction as a threshold issue in abuse-and-neglect cases, particularly where the family has recently moved across state lines or where an infant was born in another state. The Court’s remedy is instructive for practitioners: when the record suggests another state is the home state, the circuit court should promptly initiate court-to-court communication and build a record of any home-state court declination.

2) Record-building expectations and the non-substitutability of agency action for court declination

The Court’s reliance on In re J.C. underscores that “declination” must be by a court of the home state. In future litigation, parties should expect heightened scrutiny of whether the record contains: (a) the correct home-state calculation, (b) documented contact with the home-state court, and (c) an express home-state court decision declining jurisdiction. Absent these, adjudication and termination orders are vulnerable to vacatur—even late in the case.

3) Termination jurisprudence: denial of addiction as a decisive “near future” indicator

For I.N., the case demonstrates that the “near future” analysis can turn less on the formal duration of an improvement period and more on demonstrated capacity, compliance, and insight. The Court treated father’s denial of alcoholism and refusal to engage in treatment as strong evidence that conditions could not be substantially corrected soon—supporting termination notwithstanding father’s argument about insufficient time.

4) Child stability pending jurisdictional resolution

The Court’s directive that A.N. remain in the foster placement while jurisdiction is resolved reflects a pragmatic effort to avoid destabilizing the child during an inter-jurisdictional handoff. Future courts may look to this approach to balance jurisdictional correctness with interim safety and continuity.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

UCCJEA
A uniform law that decides which state’s courts have authority to make child-custody decisions (including custody determinations inside abuse-and-neglect cases) when more than one state is involved.
“Home state”
Usually the state where the child lived with a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the case starts. For a child under six months old, it is the state where the child lived from birth.
“Significant connection” jurisdiction
A backup basis for jurisdiction, generally available only if the home-state court declines jurisdiction and the child/family has meaningful ties and evidence in the new state.
Vacatur
An appellate order setting aside a lower court’s order. Here, the adjudication and termination orders as to A.N. were set aside because the circuit court lacked jurisdiction.
De novo adjudicatory/dispositional hearing
A new hearing “from the beginning,” as if the prior adjudication/disposition had not occurred—required if Ohio declines and West Virginia then properly acquires jurisdiction.
“No reasonable likelihood … can be substantially corrected in the near future”
A statutory standard focusing on whether the parent has the capacity and willingness to fix the abuse/neglect conditions promptly, particularly when offered services. Persistent substance use, missed screens, refusal of treatment, and denial of the problem can support this finding.

5. Conclusion

In re A.N. and I.N. delivers two core lessons. First, UCCJEA jurisdiction is a strict prerequisite in West Virginia abuse-and-neglect proceedings: when another state is the child’s home state, West Virginia courts must secure an express home-state court declination before proceeding on alternate jurisdictional grounds; otherwise, adjudications and terminations are subject to vacatur and remand for court-to-court coordination. Second, as to termination merits, the decision reaffirms that a parent’s persistent substance use, noncompliance, and—most decisively—failure to acknowledge addiction can establish by clear and convincing evidence that conditions cannot be corrected in the near future, permitting termination when necessary for the child’s welfare.