UCCJEA Home-State Priority as a Jurisdictional Bar in West Virginia Abuse-and-Neglect Proceedings
In re A.N. and I.N., No. 25-402 (W. Va. June 8, 2026) (memorandum decision)
1. Introduction
This appeal arose from an Ohio County abuse-and-neglect case in which Petitioner Mother J.N.’s parental rights were terminated to two children, A.N. (born in Ohio in January 2024) and I.N. (born in February 2025). The Department of Human Services (“DHS”) initiated the West Virginia proceeding on July 10, 2024, after the parents returned from Ohio with A.N. The case carried a significant history: the mother had been the subject of prior West Virginia petitions since 2019, including an involuntary termination of parental rights to older children in November 2023.
The Supreme Court of Appeals confronted two core issues:
- Jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”): Whether West Virginia had authority to adjudicate and terminate rights as to A.N., given A.N.’s Ohio residence from birth and the timing of the West Virginia filing.
- Merits as to I.N.: Whether the circuit court properly terminated the mother’s improvement period and parental rights regarding I.N., based on dishonesty/noncooperation, missed and positive drug screens, continued substance use, and failure to acknowledge prior abuse.
2. Summary of the Opinion
- A.N.: The Court held the circuit court lacked UCCJEA subject-matter jurisdiction. It vacated the October 30, 2024 adjudicatory order as to A.N. and vacated in part the May 20, 2025 termination order as to A.N. The Court remanded with directions that the circuit court immediately contact the juvenile court in Mahoning County, Ohio to determine whether Ohio will decline jurisdiction. A.N. remains in foster placement while jurisdiction is resolved. If Ohio declines, West Virginia must hold de novo adjudicatory and dispositional hearings; if Ohio exercises jurisdiction, custody must be transferred to Ohio CPS.
- I.N.: The Court affirmed the termination of the mother’s improvement period and parental rights, finding sufficient evidence that there was no reasonable likelihood the conditions of abuse/neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future, and termination was necessary for the child’s welfare.
3. Analysis
3.1. Precedents Cited
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In re K.S. (Syl. Pt. 1) — The Court restated the standard of review in abuse-and-neglect appeals: abuse of discretion for substantive rulings, clear error for factual findings, and de novo for legal issues. This framing positioned the UCCJEA question as a legal issue reviewed de novo.
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State ex rel. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Wilson (Syl. Pt. 2), quoting In re Boggs' Est. (Syl. Pt. 2) — The Court invoked its duty to notice jurisdictional defects “at any time.” This provided the doctrinal basis for the Court’s sua sponte focus on UCCJEA jurisdiction even though the appeal primarily challenged improvement-period termination and parental-rights termination.
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In re A.T.-1 (Syl. Pt. 3), quoting Rosen v. Rosen (Syl. Pt. 6) — The Court emphasized that the UCCJEA is a jurisdictional statute; compliance is a prerequisite to “the power to adjudicate child custody disputes.” This anchored the remedy: orders entered without UCCJEA jurisdiction must be vacated rather than merely reviewed for evidentiary sufficiency.
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In re Z.H. — This was the Court’s main roadmap for UCCJEA analysis in abuse-and-neglect settings:
- It summarized the four jurisdictional bases (home state; significant connection; declination; default) and, critically, held they operate in priority order, not as free alternatives.
- It supplied the operative “home state” definition (including the “lived from birth” rule for children under six months) via the quoted language from Rosen v. Rosen.
- It also supported the remedial direction: if the home state does not decline, West Virginia must yield and transfer the matter appropriately.
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In re J.C. (Syl. Pt. 4) — The Court used this decision to tighten the “significant connection” gateway: a “declination of jurisdiction” must come from the home state court, not from informal actions by other entities. This precedent directly defeated any argument that Ohio CPS involvement or communications could substitute for an Ohio court’s jurisdictional decision.
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In re Brian D. — Cited for the proposition that a circuit court always has authority to terminate an improvement period when evidence shows the parent is not following conditions or is failing to improve, reinforcing that improvement periods are conditional, not guaranteed.
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In re Katie S. (Syl. Pt. 6, in part) — Reinforced the circuit court’s discretion to terminate an improvement period early if not satisfied with progress, supporting affirmance as to I.N.
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In re Timber M. — Provided the key principle on acknowledgment: to remedy abuse/neglect, the problem must be acknowledged; denial makes the problem “untreatable” and an improvement period “an exercise in futility at the child’s expense.” This case was pivotal to the Court’s conclusion that the mother’s refusal to admit prior physical abuse undermined prospects for near-term correction.
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Moore v. Goode (Syl. Pt. 5, in part) — Raised in Justice Trump’s separate opinion to underscore that a judgment without subject-matter jurisdiction is a “nullity,” supporting the dissent/partial dissent’s insistence on the primacy of jurisdictional legitimacy.
3.2. Legal Reasoning
A. The UCCJEA jurisdictional holding (A.N.)
The Court treated the UCCJEA as an absolute threshold requirement. Applying the priority structure outlined in In re Z.H., it determined:
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No “home state” jurisdiction in West Virginia: The record showed A.N. lived in Ohio from birth until sometime between February and July 2024; West Virginia filed on July 10, 2024. Because A.N. had not lived in West Virginia with a parent for “at least six consecutive months” immediately before commencement, Ohio was the home state under the UCCJEA definition quoted from Rosen v. Rosen.
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No “significant connection” jurisdiction: Even if West Virginia had connections, W. Va. Code § 48-20-201(a)(2) requires that the home state court “has declined” jurisdiction. The record contained no Ohio court declination, and In re J.C. foreclosed substituting non-court declination.
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No “declination” or “default” jurisdiction: Because Ohio had home-state jurisdiction and had not declined, the residual bases under W. Va. Code § 48-20-201(a)(3)-(4) could not apply.
The remedy followed from jurisdiction’s non-waivable nature: the Court vacated the adjudication and termination as to A.N. and ordered immediate interstate court-to-court contact to determine whether Ohio will decline. The decision also protected continuity by allowing A.N. to remain in foster placement temporarily while jurisdiction is resolved, and it prescribed two clear paths: (1) Ohio declines → West Virginia conducts de novo adjudication/disposition; (2) Ohio asserts jurisdiction → transfer to Ohio CPS.
B. Improvement period termination and parental-rights termination (I.N.)
As to I.N., the Court’s reasoning moved from procedural compliance (improvement period termination) to dispositional merits:
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Improvement period termination: Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(7), the court “shall terminate” an improvement period upon motion when the parent fails to fully participate. The Court accepted the circuit court’s finding that concealing the pregnancy after an improvement period had been granted reflected a “basic lack of honesty” and lack of cooperation—conduct the court viewed as incompatible with meaningful participation. The Court reinforced discretion to end improvement early through In re Brian D. and In re Katie S..
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Termination of parental rights: The Court affirmed under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6), finding clear and convincing evidence of “no reasonable likelihood” of near-term correction. The analysis relied on the statutory indicators in W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d), including continued substance abuse (missed screens, a cocaine positive, street-obtained Suboxone, continued alcohol use despite prohibition) and failure to respond to a reasonable family case plan. Critically, the Court treated denial/minimization of prior violence as dispositive evidence of non-remediation, applying In re Timber M. (failure to acknowledge renders problems untreatable).
C. The separate opinion (Justice Trump)
Justice Trump concurred in vacating as to A.N. for lack of jurisdiction (citing Moore v. Goode), but dissented from affirmance as to I.N. His principal critique was legal-duty based: neither the circuit court nor the majority cited authority establishing that the mother had a legal duty to disclose her pregnancy, and he rejected labeling nondisclosure as “fraud upon the court” absent grounding in law—particularly in a case where the underlying proceeding was partially jurisdictionally defective.
3.3. Impact
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Mandatory early UCCJEA screening in abuse-and-neglect cases: The decision reinforces that circuit courts must affirmatively establish a UCCJEA jurisdictional basis—especially when a child recently lived in another state—before entering adjudicatory or dispositional custody orders. A failure can nullify months of litigation as to a child.
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“Declination” must be judicial, not administrative: Building on In re J.C., the decision signals that agency involvement (e.g., an out-of-state CPS case) cannot substitute for an out-of-state court’s declination when attempting to proceed under “significant connection” jurisdiction.
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Concrete remedial template: The Court provided an operational roadmap: immediate contact with the home-state juvenile court, interim placement stability, and a binary outcome (de novo proceedings in West Virginia if declination; transfer if not). Future courts and practitioners can treat this as a checklist for curing jurisdictional uncertainty.
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Improvement period fragility where honesty and sobriety collapse: On the merits side, the decision underscores that improvement periods can be terminated when the parent’s conduct demonstrates noncooperation, and that relapse patterns and denial of past violence can support “no reasonable likelihood” findings even when some services are being attended.
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Litigation risk highlighted by the dissent: Justice Trump’s duty-based critique may invite future challenges where termination or improvement-period decisions rest heavily on a parent’s omission (as opposed to a statutory violation), pressing courts to tether “fraud” or “noncooperation” findings to clearer legal duties and record support.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
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UCCJEA: A uniform law that decides which state’s court has authority to make child-custody decisions. In abuse-and-neglect cases, it prevents competing states from issuing conflicting orders.
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“Home state”: Usually where the child lived with a parent for the last six consecutive months. For babies under six months, it is the state where the child lived “from birth.”
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Priority order of jurisdiction: Courts must check “home state” first; only if that does not apply do they consider “significant connection,” and so on. You do not get to choose a preferred category.
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Declination of jurisdiction: The home-state court must formally decide not to take the case; an agency’s choice or informal communication is not enough.
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Adjudication vs. disposition: Adjudication decides whether abuse/neglect occurred; disposition decides the remedy (services, custody arrangements, termination).
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Improvement period: A court-supervised opportunity for a parent to fix problems (e.g., sobriety, mental health, parenting). It can be terminated early if the parent fails to participate or progress.
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“No reasonable likelihood” finding: A statutory conclusion that the parent probably cannot fix the abuse/neglect conditions soon enough to meet the child’s needs, allowing termination when also necessary for the child’s welfare.
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De novo hearing: A do-over hearing; the court hears the evidence fresh rather than relying on prior findings that were vacated.
5. Conclusion
This memorandum decision’s central contribution is its firm jurisdictional directive: when another state is the child’s “home state,” West Virginia courts lack power to adjudicate or terminate parental rights unless the UCCJEA’s priority-ordered bases are satisfied—most notably, unless the home-state court declines where required. The Court paired that directive with a pragmatic remedy requiring immediate interstate court contact and clear next steps.
On the merits as to I.N., the Court reaffirmed that improvement periods and parental rights can be terminated when a parent’s continued substance abuse, missed screening, noncompliance, and denial of prior violence demonstrate an inadequate capacity to correct conditions in the near future—particularly under the acknowledgment principle emphasized in In re Timber M.. The separate opinion, however, spotlights a recurring doctrinal pressure point: courts should anchor “fraud” and nondisclosure-based participation findings in clear legal duties and articulated authority to reduce vulnerability to future challenge.