UCCJEA Home-State Jurisdiction for Infants Turns on Where the Child Lived from Birth with a Person Acting as a Parent—Not Place of Birth

Case: In re J.H., No. 25-393 (W. Va. Sup. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2026) (memorandum decision).

Lower court: Circuit Court of Berkeley County (CC-02-2024-JA-171), dispositional order May 14, 2025.

Parties: Petitioner Mother C.B. (appellant) vs. West Virginia Department of Human Services; child J.H. (by guardian ad litem).

1. Introduction

This abuse-and-neglect appeal presented a narrow but dispositive jurisdictional question: whether the Circuit Court of Berkeley County had subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), W. Va. Code §§ 48-20-101 to -404, to adjudicate and ultimately terminate the mother’s parental rights.

The Department of Human Services filed the petition in August 2024 alleging maternal substance abuse and unsafe conditions near the infant’s bassinet, and that the then-two-month-old child tested positive for cocaine. At the preliminary hearing, the parties represented that the child had lived since birth at the paternal grandparents’ home in Martinsburg, West Virginia, although the parents themselves had only recently arrived in West Virginia from Maryland. The circuit court later adjudicated abuse and neglect and terminated parental rights. On appeal, the mother did not challenge the merits; she argued only that the circuit court lacked UCCJEA jurisdiction.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed. Although it noted the circuit court did not conduct an explicit UCCJEA jurisdictional analysis, the Court reviewed the jurisdiction issue de novo and held jurisdiction was proper under the UCCJEA’s first and highest-priority basis: home-state jurisdiction, W. Va. Code § 48-20-201(a)(1).

Because J.H. was under six months old when the proceeding commenced, “home state” meant the state where the child “lived from birth” with a parent or a “person acting as a parent.” Based on the record representations that the child lived since birth in West Virginia with the grandparents (who were functionally acting as parents), West Virginia was the child’s home state at commencement. The Court also emphasized that the child’s place of birth is not dispositive.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and How They Drove the Outcome)

Standard of review framing

  • Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011): established the general abuse-and-neglect appellate standards (clear error for facts; de novo for law). Here, it set the baseline, while the Court ultimately treated the appeal as a pure jurisdictional/statutory question.
  • Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995): provided the direct rule that statutory interpretation issues receive de novo review—critical because UCCJEA jurisdiction is statutory.

UCCJEA as jurisdictional and mandatory

  • Syl. Pt. 2, In re R.D., -- W. Va. --, --, 922 S.E.2d 567 (2025) (quoting Syl. Pt. 6, Rosen v. Rosen, 222 W. Va. 402, 664 S.E.2d 743 (2008)): reaffirmed the foundational proposition that the UCCJEA is jurisdictional, so a court must satisfy the statute’s requirements to have power to decide custody. This is the analytical gateway for the entire decision.

Priority-ordered jurisdictional bases and the “home state” first principle

  • In re Z.H., 245 W. Va. 456, 464, 859 S.E.2d 399, 407 (2021): confirmed that UCCJEA jurisdiction in abuse-and-neglect matters is tested under W. Va. Code § 48-20-201(a) and that the statute’s bases apply in priority order. The Court relied on In re Z.H. both for structure (start with home state) and for infant-specific “lived from birth” guidance.
  • In re K.R., 229 W. Va. 733, 740, 735 S.E.2d 882, 889 (2012): supplied the key methodological rule: the four UCCJEA jurisdictional bases do not operate as free-standing alternatives; courts move to the next only if the prior does not apply. This supported the Court’s decision to “look no further” than home-state jurisdiction once satisfied.

Home state definition; infants under six months; and limiting “birthplace” arguments

  • Rosen v. Rosen, 222 W. Va. 402, 664 S.E.2d 743 (2008) (Syl. Pt. 3): provided the definitional anchor for “home state” under W. Va. Code § 48-20-102(g), including the special rule for children less than six months old: the home state is where the child “lived from birth” with a parent or person acting as a parent.
  • In re Z.H., 245 W. Va. 456, 859 S.E.2d 399 (2021) (Syl. Pt. 7, in part): directed courts, for infants under six months, to consider where the child lived from birth to the commencement of the proceeding. The Court used this to focus on the child’s continuous residence at the grandparents’ West Virginia home.
  • In re Z.H., 245 W. Va. 456, 859 S.E.2d 399 (2021) (Syl. Pt. 8, in part): cautioned that a newborn’s hospital stay incident to birth is insufficient to confer home-state jurisdiction. The Court invoked this principle to reject any implication that the (unclear) location of birth controlled the jurisdictional analysis.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) The Court treated UCCJEA compliance as a threshold jurisdictional question.
By quoting In re R.D. (and ultimately Rosen), the Court reinforced that the UCCJEA is not discretionary or prudential; it defines the court’s power. Accordingly, if the UCCJEA is not satisfied, the circuit court cannot proceed to adjudication or disposition in a custody-affecting case, including abuse and neglect.

(b) The Court applied the statutory priority order and resolved the case at step one: home state.
Relying on In re Z.H. and In re K.R., the Court emphasized that W. Va. Code § 48-20-201(a) is hierarchical. Because home-state jurisdiction under § 48-20-201(a)(1) was satisfied, the Court did not analyze “significant connection,” “declination,” or “default” jurisdiction.

(c) “Home state” for an infant depends on lived-from-birth residence with a qualifying caregiver, not formalities about birth location.
Under W. Va. Code § 48-20-102(g) (as synthesized through Rosen and In re Z.H.), for children less than six months old, the inquiry is practical and residence-focused: where did the child actually live from birth with a parent or “person acting as a parent.” Here, the preliminary-hearing record contained the parties’ representations that:

  • J.H. was two months old when the petition was filed (thus under six months);
  • J.H. had lived at the paternal grandparents’ Martinsburg, West Virginia residence “always” and “since birth”; and
  • the grandparents were already “keeping the child,” supporting the conclusion they were acting in a parental capacity at the relevant time.

Those facts satisfied home-state jurisdiction on the date of “commencement,” which the Court linked to the statute defining commencement as “the filing of the first pleading,” W. Va. Code § 48-20-102(e). The mother’s attempt to create doubt by pointing to an unclear birth location failed because, as the Court underscored, the place of birth is not determinative and a short hospital stay does not control home-state analysis.

(d) The Court implicitly distinguished procedural imperfection from jurisdictional reality.
The Court noted the circuit court “failed to conduct a jurisdictional analysis pursuant to the UCCJEA,” but still affirmed because the record established a valid statutory basis. The decision therefore signals that the absence of an explicit UCCJEA discussion below does not compel reversal when the appellate court can confirm jurisdiction exists under the statute.

3.3. Impact

  • Infant home-state disputes will turn on actual “lived from birth” residence, not the hospital or birthplace. The Court’s reliance on In re Z.H. to discount birth location arguments will discourage jurisdictional challenges premised on where delivery occurred.
  • Grandparents (and similar caregivers) can be central to establishing home-state jurisdiction. By treating the grandparents as the relevant “persons acting as a parent” for the infant’s lived-from-birth analysis, the Court reinforces a functional approach in cases where parents are transient but the child’s residence is stable with extended family.
  • Appellate courts may cure missing UCCJEA analysis when the record is clear—though the trial court should still make findings. Practically, litigants should build a record early (at the preliminary hearing) on where the child lived from birth, who provided day-to-day care, and the precise “commencement” date, because these facts can be dispositive on appeal.
  • Abuse-and-neglect filings involving newborns will likely remain in the state of the child’s primary residence, even if the parents recently arrived. The decision narrows the viability of jurisdictional challenges based on parents’ recent relocation when the child’s residence has been continuous in-state.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

UCCJEA: A uniform law that allocates which state’s court has power to decide child-custody issues (including abuse/neglect cases that affect custody).

Subject matter jurisdiction: The court’s legal power to hear a type of case. If absent, orders can be void regardless of the merits.

“Commencement” (W. Va. Code § 48-20-102(e)): The filing of the first pleading—here, the DHS petition in August 2024.

“Home state” for infants (W. Va. Code § 48-20-102(g)): For a child under six months old, the home state is where the child lived from birth with a parent or a “person acting as a parent.” It is a residence-based inquiry, not a birthplace test.

Priority order of jurisdiction (W. Va. Code § 48-20-201(a)): Courts must consider home-state jurisdiction first; only if it does not apply may they proceed to other bases such as “significant connection” jurisdiction.

De novo review: The appellate court decides the legal issue fresh, without deferring to the lower court’s legal conclusion.

5. Conclusion

In re J.H. reaffirms a practical, statute-first approach to UCCJEA jurisdiction in infant abuse-and-neglect proceedings: for children under six months old, West Virginia is the “home state” when the child has lived in West Virginia from birth with a parent or a person acting as a parent, even if the parents recently moved from another state and even if the child’s birthplace is unclear or out-of-state. The decision strengthens predictability in newborn jurisdiction disputes and underscores that UCCJEA compliance is a threshold question that can decide an appeal independent of the underlying abuse-and-neglect merits.