U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) “Manager/Supervisor” Enhancement Applies to a Technical “IT” Co-Conspirator Who Directly Controls Participants and Handles Operational Fraud Tasks

1. Introduction

This consolidated appeal arose from a large-scale credit/debit-card fraud scheme prosecuted in the Middle District of Florida. The government alleged that Carlos Tejeda devised and ran a scheme in which participants formed fictitious businesses, obtained merchant-processing accounts and point-of-sale terminals, encoded stolen card data onto counterfeit cards, ran fraudulent charges, and deposited the proceeds—typically paying kickbacks to Carlos.

The three defendants raised distinct appellate issues:

• Carlos Tejeda: challenged the substantive reasonableness of a within-Guidelines sentence.
• Juan Tejeda: challenged a U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) three-level role enhancement as a “manager or supervisor.”
• Pedro Sergio Pelaez Gutierrez: challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board:

• Carlos: The district court’s sentence—at the bottom of the advisory range—fell “in the ballpark of permissible outcomes” and reflected the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including seriousness of the offense and Carlos’s age and lack of criminal history.
• Juan: The court upheld the three-level § 3B1.1(b) enhancement because evidence showed Juan exercised control over at least two participants, dealt with co-conspirators directly (including collecting kickbacks), and performed core operational acts (swiping counterfeit cards), even if his self-described function was the “IT guy.”
• Pelaez: The evidence—shell business formation, possession of terminals and receipts, repeated fraudulent transactions, and recruitment of family members—supported the jury’s findings on conspiracy, wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft; knowledge of real-person identifiers could be inferred circumstantially.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Substantive reasonableness review (Carlos)

• Gall v. United States: Provided the governing “abuse-of-discretion” framework and “totality of the circumstances” approach for substantive reasonableness review.
• United States v. Butler: Supplied the Eleventh Circuit’s formulation that it will affirm if the sentence is “in the ballpark of permissible outcomes,” and reiterated that weighing § 3553(a) factors is largely within the district court’s discretion.
• United States v. Sarras: Supported the expectation that a within-Guidelines sentence is ordinarily reasonable.
• United States v. Boone: Placed the burden on the appellant to show unreasonableness.
• United States v. Robles and United States v. Amedeo: Confirmed that the district court need not explicitly discuss every factor or mitigating argument; silence on mitigation is not proof the court ignored it.

B. Guidelines role enhancement review (Juan)

• United States v. Rothenberg: Set the review framework for Guidelines issues (de novo for legal issues; clear error for facts; “due deference” to application).
• United States v. Shabazz: Identified clear-error review as the standard for aggravating role enhancements.
• United States v. Clarke: Defined clear error as requiring a “definite and firm conviction” of mistake.
• United States v. Sosa: Crucial to the holding—under § 3B1.1(b), the government must show the defendant managed or supervised “one other participant.”
• United States v. Ramirez: Emphasized the § 3B1.1 commentary factors are non-exhaustive; not all must be present.

C. Sufficiency of the evidence and preservation (Pelaez)

• United States v. Zitron: Noted the usual de novo standard for sufficiency challenges.
• United States v. Tovar: In a footnote, the panel relied on it to underscore that the Eleventh Circuit has not held that a general sufficiency objection preserves more specific arguments on appeal; the panel declined to resolve preservation definitively here.
• United States v. Holmes: Framed the motion-for-acquittal inquiry—whether a reasonable trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
• United States v. Gamory and United States v. Cruz-Valdez: Reinforced that courts view evidence in the government’s favor, and the evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
• United States v. Vernon, United States v. Watkins, and United States v. Garcia: Supplied the elements and proof principles for conspiracy and wire fraud, including that conspiracy can be proven circumstantially and that defendants need only know the “essential nature” of the scheme.
• United States v. Bradley (as cited in the opinion): Supported defining intent to defraud and permitting intent to be inferred from conduct.
• United States v. Barrington: Provided the elements for aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1).
• United States v. Gomez-Castro: Supported inferring knowledge from circumstantial evidence for identity-theft mens rea.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Carlos—why the within-Guidelines sentence stood

The panel applied the deferential substantive-reasonableness framework: it did not reweigh § 3553(a) factors or second-guess the district court’s judgment. The district court imposed a bottom-of-range sentence while explicitly crediting mitigating facts (age and lack of criminal history) yet stressing the seriousness of a scheme that defrauded hundreds of victims. Under Gall v. United States and United States v. Butler, that combination placed the outcome comfortably within the court’s discretion, and United States v. Sarras supported an “ordinary” presumption of reasonableness for a within-range sentence.

B. Juan—why a technical “IT” actor can still be a manager/supervisor under § 3B1.1(b)

The panel’s key move was to treat Juan’s role as operationally managerial despite the “IT guy” label. The enhancement did not require Juan to be a top-level organizer; it required proof he managed or supervised at least one participant (and the scheme involved five or more participants, which Juan did not dispute). Citing United States v. Sosa, the court focused on evidence that Juan:

• “dealt directly” with Maida Flores and Walter Flores;
• received kickbacks from them; and
• personally came to swipe counterfeit cards at their terminals (sometimes in Carlos’s place).

The court then tied Juan’s “IT” responsibilities to the nature-of-participation factor from the § 3B1.1 commentary: running the encoding and technological side was not merely ancillary; it was a functional department central to execution. With evidence of direct dealings and control over participants, the district court’s application of § 3B1.1(b) was not clearly erroneous under United States v. Shabazz and United States v. Clarke.

C. Pelaez—why circumstantial evidence supported conspiracy, wire fraud, and identity theft

The panel reiterated standard sufficiency rules: view the evidence favorably to the government (United States v. Gamory), and allow juries to choose among reasonable interpretations (United States v. Cruz-Valdez).

For conspiracy, the panel applied United States v. Vernon and emphasized that knowledge and agreement may be proven circumstantially (United States v. Watkins). Evidence that Pelaez registered a shell business, opened accounts, possessed terminals and anomalous receipts, and recruited family members—while present for scheme explanations—supported inference of knowing participation in the essential nature of the fraud (United States v. Garcia).

For wire fraud, the panel relied on United States v. Watkins and United States v. Bradley (as cited) to hold that intent to defraud can be inferred from conduct, and that a defendant need not personally perform every element if he knowingly joined the scheme and co-schemers used the wires.

For aggravated identity theft, the panel applied United States v. Barrington. With wire fraud established as the predicate felony, the contested issue was knowledge that the identifiers belonged to real people. The panel held that knowledge could be inferred from circumstances (United States v. Gomez-Castro), including the testimony that Pelaez’s son quickly learned the data were stolen (and Pelaez brought him into the scheme), and the volume/pattern of transactions (hundreds, including repeated same-day use of the same card data), supporting an inference that Pelaez understood what he was using.

3.3. Impact

• Role enhancements in tech-enabled fraud: The decision signals that technical specialization does not immunize a defendant from § 3B1.1(b) where evidence shows direct control over participants and handling of core operational tasks. In modern frauds, “IT” functions can be central, and courts may treat them as managerial when they coordinate people and payments, not merely machines.
• Reinforcement of deference in sentencing: The Carlos holding underscores that a within-Guidelines sentence—especially one expressly tied to § 3553(a)—will be difficult to overturn absent a clear misweighing or irrational emphasis.
• Sufficiency and identity-theft mens rea: The Pelaez holding fits within a broad trend: knowledge in § 1028A cases may be inferred from transaction patterns, scheme context, and association with knowledgeable co-conspirators.
• Preservation question left open: By invoking United States v. Tovar and declining to decide whether a general sufficiency objection preserves specific arguments, the panel maintained uncertainty that can matter for appellate strategy; defendants should assume specificity is required when making Rule 29 arguments.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Substantive reasonableness” (sentencing): A sentence is reviewed for whether it is a reasonable outcome under the total circumstances and the § 3553(a) factors—not whether the appellate court would have chosen a different sentence.
• Guidelines “role enhancement” (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b)): Adds levels if the defendant managed/supervised at least one participant and the criminal activity involved five or more participants (or was extensive). It does not require being the mastermind.
• “Clear error” review: A highly deferential standard; the appellate court overturns only when firmly convinced the district court made a mistake.
• Wire fraud: A scheme to defraud plus use (or causing use) of interstate wires to execute it. Joining a scheme can be enough even if the defendant did not personally press every button.
• Aggravated identity theft (18 U.S.C. § 1028A): Using another real person’s identifying information (like card data) without authority during and in relation to certain predicate felonies (including wire fraud). Knowledge can be proven circumstantially.

5. Conclusion

This decision affirms three recurring principles in federal fraud prosecutions: (1) within-Guidelines sentences grounded in § 3553(a) are rarely reversed as substantively unreasonable; (2) a defendant’s “technical” status does not bar a § 3B1.1(b) manager/supervisor enhancement where evidence shows direct control over participants and central operational conduct; and (3) conspiracy participation, intent to defraud, and § 1028A knowledge may be proven through circumstantial evidence and scheme patterns. Even as a non-publication, the opinion offers a practical blueprint for how the Eleventh Circuit evaluates modern, tech-facilitated fraud roles and the evidentiary inferences that sustain identity-theft convictions.