U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1) Requires Explicit Findings Linking the Firearm of Conviction to the “Other Offense”

1. Introduction

This appeal concerns the proper application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines “cross reference” in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1) to a felon-in-possession conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Jonathan Revels was convicted federally for unlawfully possessing firearms. Separately, after the federal case was already on appeal, a North Carolina state court convicted him of voluntary manslaughter for the death of Jason Hunt arising from the same 2016 incident.

At resentencing in federal court, the central dispute was whether Revels’ advisory Guidelines range should be dramatically increased by cross-referencing to a homicide guideline—an enhancement that turns on whether a firearm “cited in the offense of conviction” was used or possessed “in connection with” another offense and death resulted. The Fourth Circuit did not definitively decide whether the cross reference ultimately applies; instead, it vacated because the district court did not make the legally necessary factual findings to support applying § 2K2.1(c)(1) at all.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit vacated Revels’ 84-month sentence and remanded for resentencing because the district court failed to identify which firearm triggered § 2K2.1(c)(1) and failed to make findings establishing that a firearm “cited in the offense of conviction” was used or possessed “in connection with” the voluntary manslaughter offense.

The record involved three firearms (two shotguns and a revolver). The revolver was used to shoot the victim, but it was not referenced in the indictment, and the parties agreed it was not the firearm underlying the § 922(g) conviction. The indictment referenced the shotguns, but the district court did not find that Revels’ possession of either shotgun facilitated (or had the potential to facilitate) the homicide offense. The Fourth Circuit refused to supply those missing findings on appeal, especially given indications that the sentencing proceedings may have improperly focused on the revolver.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

• Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005)
  Used for the appellate-courts-as-reviewers principle—“mindful that we are a court of review, not of first view.” The Fourth Circuit relied on this maxim to justify remand rather than deciding contested factual predicates in the first instance.
• United States v. Avila, 134 F.4th 244, 246 (4th Cir. 2025)
  Provided the controlling framing that resentencing cannot stand when “factual findings were legally insufficient” to support the guideline applied. Avila also supplied a key methodological caution: whether a district court could have made a sustainable finding differs from whether it did make that finding.
• United States v. Bolden, 964 F.3d 283 (4th Cir. 2020)
  The opinion’s closest analogue. Bolden limits appellate “gap-filling” at sentencing: unless the missing finding is “so obvious from the record,” the appellate court will not assume the district court’s fact-finding role. The Revels panel invoked Bolden both to reject the government’s “emboldening/escalation” theory and to define the remand’s task—on remand the district court must determine whether evidence supports facilitation by the qualifying firearm(s).
• Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007)
  Cited for the abuse-of-discretion standard of review and for procedural requirements at sentencing: correctly calculate the Guidelines range and adequately explain the chosen sentence to permit meaningful appellate review.
• United States v. Diaz-Ibarra, 522 F.3d 343 (4th Cir. 2008)
  Reinforced that a Guidelines calculation error “infects all that follows” and renders a sentence procedurally unreasonable even under deferential review. This principle underscores why the cross-reference error required vacatur.
• United States v. Jenkins, 566 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2009)
  Supplied the governing Fourth Circuit standard for “in connection with”: a firearm is possessed in connection with another offense if it “facilitated or had the potential of facilitating” that offense. Revels applies Jenkins but holds the district court did not make findings satisfying it for the shotguns.
• United States v. Aberant, 741 Fed. Appx. 905 (4th Cir. 2018) (per curiam)
  Though unpublished, Aberant was used to clarify the “cited in the offense of conviction” inquiry: the key is whether “the defendant used the same firearm that is the subject of his conviction” in the other offense. Revels distinguishes Aberant because here the indictment identified shotguns but not the revolver, and the government conceded Revels was not convicted for possessing the revolver.
• United States v. Revels, No. 21-4692, 2023 WL 3002747 (4th Cir. Apr. 19, 2023)
  The prior appeal is important procedurally: the Fourth Circuit had already remanded once because the government misrepresented a material sentencing fact. That history heightened the panel’s insistence on careful, explicit resentencing findings.
• State v. Revels, 895 S.E.2d 630, 2024 WL 17229 (N.C. Ct. App. 2024) (unpublished table decision)
  Not a federal sentencing precedent, but central to context: it confirmed a state voluntary manslaughter conviction arising from the same incident, relevant to identifying the “other offense” for the cross reference.
• United States v. Heyward, 42 F.4th 460, 467 n.4 (4th Cir. 2022)
  Cited to justify referencing sealed appendix materials where the cited portions were discussed in unsealed briefs.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning turns on the structure and limits of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1):

• Two-part trigger (plus death-resulted condition): The cross reference applies only if the defendant (1) used or possessed a firearm or ammunition “in connection with” another offense, and (2) that firearm or ammunition was “cited in the offense of conviction.” If death resulted and the cross-referenced offense level is higher, the court applies an analogous homicide guideline.
• “Cited in the offense of conviction” is a gating limitation: The opinion emphasizes that the cross reference is not activated by any firearm connected to wrongdoing; it is limited to the firearm that constitutes the convicted conduct (as framed by § 1B1.2(a)’s definition of offense conduct charged in the count of conviction).

Applying that framework to the record exposed a missing bridge in the district court’s findings:

• The revolver: It is the firearm most directly connected to the death because Revels used it to shoot Hunt. But it was not mentioned in the indictment; the jury did not hear evidence permitting it to find the interstate-commerce element as to that revolver; and the parties agreed it was not the firearm of conviction. As a result, it could not satisfy the “cited in the offense of conviction” requirement as applied here.
• The shotguns: They were named in the indictment and stipulated to have traveled in interstate commerce, making them viable candidates for the firearm-of-conviction requirement. But the district court never specified that a shotgun was the predicate firearm and never found that Revels’ possession of either shotgun facilitated (or had the potential to facilitate) the voluntary manslaughter.

The government attempted to salvage the sentence on appeal by theorizing that possessing the shotguns “embolden[ed]” and “escalat[ed]” the conflict that ultimately led to the revolver shooting. The Fourth Circuit rejected that approach for three interlocking reasons:

• Appellate courts do not supply missing findings: Under United States v. Avila and United States v. Bolden, the question is not whether the district court could have found facilitation, but whether it did. The record did not make facilitation by the shotguns “so obvious” that the Fourth Circuit could confidently affirm on an assumed factual basis.
• Record ambiguity about facilitation: Revels did not shoot Hunt with a shotgun and was not holding a shotgun at the moment of the shooting. A shotgun barrel struck the victim during the melee, but another participant—not Revels—did that. Those facts did not “compel” the facilitation conclusion without explicit district court reasoning tied to the governing Jenkins standard.
• Signals of reliance on the wrong firearm: The sentencing record suggested the cross reference was justified by the revolver-based killing (“a gun … used to kill someone”), not by the shotguns. If the district court actually relied on the revolver, that would be legally impermissible under the “cited in the offense of conviction” constraint as understood by the parties and the panel’s analysis.

Notably, the panel explicitly avoided holding that § 2K2.1(c)(1) is categorically inapplicable. Following Bolden, it left open that, on remand, the district court may apply the cross reference if it makes legally adequate findings—i.e., identifies the firearm(s) of conviction and explains how possession of that firearm facilitated or could have facilitated the homicide offense.

3.3. Impact

The decision’s practical contribution is procedural but significant: it tightens the discipline required when applying § 2K2.1(c)(1) in multi-firearm, multi-episode fact patterns.

• Sentencing courts must “name the gun” and “explain the link”: When multiple firearms appear in the record, courts must identify which one(s) satisfy the “cited in the offense of conviction” condition and make express findings connecting that firearm to the “other offense” under the facilitation standard.
• Limits on appellate affirmance-by-theory: The opinion reinforces that appellate courts in the Fourth Circuit will not affirm major guideline enhancements based on post hoc government theories not anchored in the district court’s actual findings and stated rationale.
• Higher stakes for § 2K2.1(c)(1) cross references: The enhancement here moved the offense level from 14 to 29. The opinion implicitly recognizes that such large guideline swings warrant careful factual specification and transparent reasoning, especially when an enhancement risks being predicated on conduct tied to a firearm not encompassed by the offense of conviction.
• Resentencing procedure scrutiny: Although the panel did not decide the procedural/substantive reasonableness arguments, it flagged concerns: failure to announce the Guidelines range, failure to adopt the PSR on the record, lack of explicit § 3553(a) discussion, and reliance on personal beliefs about whether a defendant will serve a state sentence. Those signals may influence how district courts structure resentencing records going forward.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Cross reference” (U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1)): A guideline mechanism that can replace the normal firearm guideline calculation with another guideline (here, a homicide guideline) when the firearm offense is connected to more serious conduct.
• “Cited in the offense of conviction”: Not every firearm mentioned at sentencing qualifies. The firearm must be tied to the conduct for which the defendant was convicted—typically the firearm charged (or otherwise encompassed) in the count of conviction. In a case with multiple guns, this requirement prevents sentencing from pivoting to a different gun that was not the basis of conviction.
• “In connection with” / “facilitated or had the potential of facilitating” (Jenkins): The firearm must help the other offense happen (or be capable of helping). Mere temporal proximity is not always enough; courts typically look for a functional link (e.g., protection, intimidation, emboldening), supported by specific findings.
• “Procedural reasonableness”: Whether the sentencing process was done correctly—proper guideline calculation, addressing non-frivolous arguments, and adequately explaining the chosen sentence.
• “Vacated and remanded”: The sentence is erased, and the case returns to the district court to resentence under the appellate court’s instructions.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Jonathan Revels establishes (and forcefully applies) a record-building rule for § 2K2.1(c)(1): when a homicide cross reference depends on a firearm “cited in the offense of conviction,” the district court must make explicit, legally sufficient findings identifying the qualifying firearm and explaining how that specific firearm was used or possessed “in connection with” the other offense. Where the record involves multiple firearms and the sentencing court does not specify its predicate firearm or its facilitation theory, the Fourth Circuit will not affirm by inference or appellate fact-finding. The result is a clear directive to district courts and litigants: major guideline cross references must be anchored to the firearm of conviction and supported by articulated findings that permit meaningful review.