Twenty-Sixth Amendment Requires Age-Neutral Access to State-Provided Voting Methods (No-Excuse Absentee-by-Mail)

I. Introduction

This appeal challenged South Carolina’s two-tier absentee-by-mail regime. Under S.C. Code § 7-15-320(B), voters “sixty-five years of age or older” are categorically entitled to absentee-by-mail ballots without providing a reason (“no excuse” absentee). By contrast, voters under 65 may vote absentee-by-mail only if they fit within enumerated excuses in § 7-15-320(A) (e.g., work conflicts with employer certification, caregiving, jail confinement, or absence from the county).

The plaintiffs (five registered South Carolina voters under 65) sued election officials for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging (1) age-based abridgement of the right to vote in violation of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, and (2) age discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on both claims. The Fourth Circuit addressed threshold Article III standing and then resolved both constitutional theories.

Central issues: (a) whether plaintiffs had standing to seek forward-looking relief; (b) what constitutes an “abridg[ment]” of the right to vote “on account of age” under the Twenty-Sixth Amendment when a state offers absentee voting; and (c) whether age-based voting-method differentials trigger heightened scrutiny under Equal Protection.

II. Summary of the Opinion

• Standing: Plaintiffs established injury in fact because the harm alleged was “denial of equal treatment” in access to voting methods. Applying the “able and ready” framework, the court found plaintiffs regularly voted and intended to vote in future elections, making future unequal treatment reasonably foreseeable.
• Twenty-Sixth Amendment: The court held South Carolina’s age-based allocation of “no excuse” absentee-by-mail voting abridges younger voters’ right to vote “on account of age,” violating U.S. Const. amend. XXVI. The court interpreted the Twenty-Sixth Amendment in pari materia with the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Fourth Amendments and rejected narrow baselines (retrogression-only or a minimal “cast a ballot” conception).
• Equal Protection: The court affirmed dismissal because “age is not a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause,” citing Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents. Plaintiffs did not pursue arguments under rational basis or Anderson-Burdick on appeal.
• Remedy: Remanded for the district court to choose an appropriate remedy: “level up” (extend no-excuse absentee to under-65 voters) or “level down” (remove the no-excuse benefit for 65+), subject to election-timing constraints under Purcell v. Gonzalez.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role

1) Standing and justiciability

• Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins supplied the familiar three-part standing test (injury, traceability, redressability) and the requirement that injury be concrete, particularized, and imminent.
• Allen v. Wright and Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't Servs. (TOC), Inc. informed the causation/redressability inquiry, emphasizing likelihood (not speculation) that relief remedies the injury.
• Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville was central: in “barrier to program access” cases, the injury is “denial of equal treatment,” not failure to obtain the ultimate benefit. This framing let plaintiffs focus on unequal access to a voting method rather than proving they would actually vote absentee-by-mail in a specific election.
• Carney v. Adams, Gratz v. Bollinger, and Associated Gen. Contractors provided the “able and ready” test for forward-looking relief. The Fourth Circuit used these cases to distinguish genuine intent from mere litigation-driven assertions and to hold that plaintiffs need not have a “pending application” (or election-specific pledge) to establish imminence.
• Hierholzer v. Guzman (Fourth Circuit) was cited to illustrate that “able and ready” fails where a plaintiff lacks basic eligibility to participate; here, plaintiffs were unquestionably eligible voters.
• Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose and Heckler supported redressability: equal-treatment injuries can be remedied by leveling up or leveling down; plaintiffs may seek a “level playing field” without dictating the legislature’s choice.
• Purcell v. Gonzalez appeared both in standing (rejecting election-specific pledges that force late-cycle litigation) and remedy (cautioning against disruptive changes near elections).

2) Interpreting the Twenty-Sixth Amendment in harmony with other voting-rights amendments

• Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States (and the court’s broader interpretive principle) was invoked for the presumption that identical constitutional language carries consistent meaning across related provisions—here, “denied or abridged.”
• Harman v. Forssenius was used as an example of the Supreme Court reading voting-rights amendments in pari materia (using Fifteenth Amendment precedent to interpret the Twenty-Fourth). This bolstered the Fourth Circuit’s methodological move: the Twenty-Sixth Amendment should track the Fifteenth/Nineteenth/Twenty-Fourth’s anti-discrimination function.
• United States v. Reese provided an early statement of the Fifteenth Amendment’s core: it prevents government from “giving preference” in voting “on account of” a prohibited classification; it creates a right to be free from discriminatory franchise rules, not a freestanding grant of suffrage.
• Rice v. Cayetano reinforced the “mandate of neutrality” in voting and the idea that explicit electorate classifications based on prohibited grounds are unconstitutional on their face—supporting the Fourth Circuit’s treatment of South Carolina’s age line as directly prohibited by the Twenty-Sixth Amendment’s text.
• Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board was pivotal on the meaning of “abridge.” The Fourth Circuit drew a sharp distinction between (a) Section 5 Voting Rights Act retrogression (baseline = status quo) and (b) constitutional voting-rights amendments, which reach “discrimination more generally,” including challenges to the status quo.
• Oregon v. Mitchell supplied historical context: the Twenty-Sixth Amendment’s ratification responded to limits on Congress’s statutory lowering of the voting age, but the court emphasized the Amendment’s language extends beyond that immediate controversy.

3) The absentee-ballot “no right” line and why it did not control

• McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners of Chicago was defendants’ anchor: no freestanding right to an absentee ballot. The Fourth Circuit distinguished it because McDonald itself noted a classification drawn on a constitutionally prohibited basis (like race) would be “highly suspect.” Age became constitutionally protected in voting only after 1971 via the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.
• Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections and Carrington v. Rash framed the broader principle: states have broad power to set voting conditions, but only “on a nondiscriminatory basis and in accordance with the Constitution.”
• Harman v. Forssenius also supported the point that offering alternative voting avenues does not cure a constitutional defect in a particular voting mechanism; unconstitutional conditions are not saved by “other ways to vote.”
• Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. was rejected as inapplicable because it addresses discriminatory intent for facially neutral laws; South Carolina’s law is facially age-classifying.

4) Circuit split and the Fourth Circuit’s rejection of narrower baselines

• Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott (Fifth Circuit) was rejected for applying a retrogression-only test (abridgement exists only if voting becomes harder than before). The Fourth Circuit read Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board to foreclose that narrowing.
• Tully v. Okeson (Seventh Circuit) was also rejected. Although Tully disclaimed retrogression, it adopted a “minimal right to vote” baseline (register/cast/count) and treated absentee restrictions as outside “the right to vote.” The Fourth Circuit instead treated discriminatory allocation of a state-provided voting method as an “abridgement” when based on a prohibited characteristic.

5) Equal Protection doctrinal constraint

• Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents controlled the Equal Protection outcome: age is not a suspect classification, so strict scrutiny is unavailable on that theory. The court treated plaintiffs’ abandonment of rational basis/Anderson-Burdick arguments as dispositive on appeal.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Standing: reframing the injury as unequal treatment in voting access

The court’s standing analysis is not a technical prelude; it foreshadows the merits by defining the injury as unequal access to voting methods, not absolute disenfranchisement. By applying Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, the court held plaintiffs need not prove they would have used no-excuse absentee voting in a particular election. They needed to show they are “able and ready” to vote and face a discriminatory barrier when choosing among voting methods.

The court also treated “voting as a whole” as the relevant “program,” rejecting an attempt to narrow the frame to “no excuse absentee voting.” That move made imminence easier to demonstrate (voters will vote again) and aligned the injury with the Twenty-Sixth Amendment’s anti-discrimination command (neutral administration of state-defined voting opportunities).

2) The core Twenty-Sixth Amendment holding: “abridgement” includes discriminatory allocation of voting opportunities

The Fourth Circuit’s doctrinal innovation lies in its definition of “abridged” under the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. It reasoned that because the Twenty-Sixth Amendment uses the same “deny or abridge” formulation as the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Fourth Amendments, and because Congress expected comparable scope, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment should be read as an anti-discrimination rule, not as a narrow protection of a minimal ballot-casting entitlement.

Under that framework:

• The “baseline” is not the preexisting status quo (retrogression), but “what the right to vote ought to be” understood as state-defined voting rights administered without discrimination.
• “Abridgement” occurs when the state makes voting meaningfully harder for one group than another because of a prohibited classification.

Applying that baseline, the court found South Carolina’s scheme imposes unequal burdens on under-65 voters: they must fit into excuse categories, sometimes secure employer certification, comply with rigid application timelines, and bear the risk of late-breaking conflicts. Meanwhile, voters 65+ receive an unconditional, standing option to vote by mail—functioning as “insurance” against unforeseen conflicts.

Importantly, the court did not announce a general constitutional right to vote by mail. Instead, it held that once a state provides a voting method, the Constitution forbids allocating access to that method on a ground the Twenty-Sixth Amendment prohibits—age.

3) Rejecting “other ways to vote” as a cure

A key logical step is the rejection of the state’s “in-person voting remains available” defense. Drawing on Harman v. Forssenius and the voting-rights amendments’ structure, the court treated unequal allocation of one voting avenue as a cognizable abridgement even if an alternative avenue remains. The Twenty-Sixth Amendment’s neutrality command is violated when age determines which burdens and risks accompany the act of voting.

4) Equal Protection: a doctrinal dead end (on the arguments preserved)

Even though the law facially discriminates by age, the court held strict scrutiny is unavailable under Equal Protection because Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents forecloses treating age as suspect. The court then declined to revisit the district court’s rational basis or Anderson-Burdick analyses because plaintiffs did not argue those standards on appeal.

C. Impact

1) A new, binding Fourth Circuit rule on age discrimination in voting methods

The decision establishes within the Fourth Circuit that the Twenty-Sixth Amendment prohibits states from granting older voters preferential access to a state-provided voting method (here, no-excuse absentee-by-mail) while conditioning younger adults’ access on excuses, documentation, or timing constraints. This is a meaningful expansion of Twenty-Sixth Amendment doctrine beyond “voting age” threshold disputes into the regulation of voting mechanics.

2) Deepening and clarifying an inter-circuit conflict

By expressly rejecting Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott and Tully v. Okeson, the Fourth Circuit sharpened a circuit split on:

• the proper “baseline” for “abridgement” (anti-discrimination neutrality vs retrogression or minimal-right conception), and
• whether discriminatory allocation of absentee voting qualifies as an abridgement when in-person voting remains available.

That split increases the likelihood of Supreme Court review, especially because “no-excuse” absentee rules and age-based carveouts are common election-administration features.

3) Practical consequences for state legislatures and election administrators

• Legislative design constraint: States in the Fourth Circuit may still limit absentee voting, but they must do so on age-neutral terms if they offer it to adults. States can pursue integrity/administrability goals, but not by using age as the sorting mechanism.
• Remedy leverage: The explicit “level up or level down” remedial framing (via Heckler and Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose) means plaintiffs can win without dictating the policy outcome, potentially prompting political branches to choose between expanding access or retracting it.
• Election-timing litigation: The court’s reliance on Purcell v. Gonzalez signals that while the right is recognized, implementation timing will be sensitive; injunctions near elections may be tailored or delayed to reduce confusion.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Standing”: The constitutional requirement that the plaintiffs personally face a real, likely harm that a court order can fix. Here, the harm was not “I can’t vote,” but “the state gives me fewer voting options because of my age.”
• “Able and ready”: A test for forward-looking injunctions. Plaintiffs must show they realistically plan to participate (vote) and are not merely speculating. Past voting plus credible intent to vote again satisfied this.
• “Abridge”: To reduce or burden. The court held it includes making voting harder for one protected group than another by distributing conveniences/risks unequally.
• “In pari materia”: Interpreting related constitutional provisions together. Because multiple amendments use the same “denied or abridged” language, the court read them to share an anti-discrimination meaning.
• “Retrogression” vs “discrimination” baseline: Retrogression asks whether a new rule makes things worse than before. The Fourth Circuit held the Twenty-Sixth Amendment (like the Fifteenth) is not limited to retrogression; it polices discriminatory status quos too.
• “Level up / level down” remedies: If a benefit is unconstitutionally given to one group and withheld from another, courts can order the state either to extend the benefit to all (level up) or remove it from the favored group (level down).
• “Purcell principle”: Courts avoid major election-rule changes close to an election to prevent voter confusion and administrative disruption.

V. Conclusion

Trudy Grant v. Conway Belangia makes the Twenty-Sixth Amendment do significant modern work: when a state offers a voting method, it may not allocate access to that method on account of age. The Fourth Circuit grounded this holding in the shared “deny or abridge” language of the voting-rights amendments and in Supreme Court authority treating those provisions as anti-discrimination mandates rather than minimal-voting floors or retrogression-only rules.

The ruling simultaneously narrows Equal Protection’s utility in age-based voting-method disputes (given Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents) while expanding the Twenty-Sixth Amendment into a robust age-neutrality constraint on election administration. On remand, the remedy choice—expansion or contraction of no-excuse absentee-by-mail—will test how constitutional equality principles intersect with legislative policy preferences and election-timing realities.