Twelve Months Equals “One Year or Longer” Under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II)

Introduction

In Oscar Perdomo Ulloa v. Pamela Bondi, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered a narrow but consequential immigration question: whether a state offense carrying a maximum sentence of twelve months qualifies as “a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).

Petitioner Oscar Rene Perdomo Ulloa, a citizen of Honduras who entered the United States without authorization in 2000, sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) after DHS initiated removal proceedings. His eligibility turned on the immigration consequences of a 2012 Virginia conviction for identity fraud under Va. Code § 18.2-186.3(A)(2), a Class 1 misdemeanor punishable by “confinement in jail for not more than twelve months,” Va. Code § 18.2-11(a).

Two petitions were before the court: one challenging the BIA’s affirmance of the Immigration Judge’s denial of cancellation of removal, and another challenging the BIA’s denial of reconsideration (which Petitioner sought in light of Belcher v. Commonwealth). The Fourth Circuit denied both petitions in a published opinion by Judge Wilkinson, joined by Judges Gregory and Quattlebaum.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit held that an offense with a maximum sentence of twelve months is an offense for which “a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). Because “a twelve-month sentence lasts for one year,” it satisfies the statute’s one-year threshold.

The court also noted that Petitioner conceded at oral argument that his Virginia identity-fraud offense is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT), consistent with Salazar v. Garland. With both statutory prerequisites met (CIMT + one-year-or-longer possible sentence), Petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Salazar v. Garland, 56 F.4th 374 (4th Cir. 2023)
    The court relied on Salazar for the proposition that a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-186.3(A)(2) is categorically a CIMT. Although the CIMT question ultimately dropped out due to concession, Salazar provided the governing Fourth Circuit baseline: identity fraud with intent to defraud fits the moral-turpitude category.
  • Belcher v. Commonwealth, 878 S.E.2d 19 (Va. Ct. App. 2022)
    Petitioner invoked Belcher to argue that, in Virginia sentencing practice, “twelve months” is not interchangeable with “one year,” because Virginia law treats misdemeanor (twelve-month) and felony (one-year-and-a-day or more) sentences differently for various administrative and correctional consequences. The Fourth Circuit acknowledged Belcher’s state-law observations but deemed them irrelevant to the meaning of a federal immigration statute focused on sentence length rather than state classification. Importantly, the court emphasized Belcher’s own recognition that “month” and “year” are calendar measures and that twelve calendar months do not become shorter than a calendar year merely because Virginia attaches different collateral consequences to misdemeanors.
  • Singh v. Sessions, 898 F.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2018); Dominguez-Herrera v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 411 (8th Cir. 2017); Ceron v. Holder, 747 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc)
    These circuit decisions were cited for the straightforward proposition that the statutory phrase is satisfied where the maximum possible sentence is one year or more than one year. The Fourth Circuit aligned itself with that consensus view, using these decisions to reinforce that “one year” is not excluded from “one year or longer.”
  • United States v. Woods, 571 U.S. 31 (2013)
    Woods supplied the interpretive default that “or” is “almost always disjunctive.” The court used it to reject Petitioner’s attempted rewriting of “one year or longer” into something like “one year and longer,” which would illogically exclude offenses that cannot be punished by exactly one year but must be punished by more.
  • Ortega-Cordova v. Garland, 107 F.4th 407 (4th Cir. 2024)
    This was the Fourth Circuit’s direct rejoinder to the argument that “one year or longer” should be treated as a term of art meaning “more than one year” (i.e., a proxy for “felony”). Citing Ortega-Cordova, the court reiterated that such an approach contradicts the “clear and unambiguous language” of § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i): legislative history cannot overcome text that plainly includes one year.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Text first: “one year or longer” includes one year.
    The court treated the question as “straightforward statutory interpretation.” A sentence of twelve months lasts one year; therefore it is, in ordinary language, a sentence “of one year.” Because the statute covers “one year or longer,” it necessarily includes one year itself.
  2. State labels do not control a federal immigration threshold.
    Petitioner’s principal move was to leverage Virginia’s misdemeanor/felony sentencing structure, emphasizing that Virginia treats “twelve months” (misdemeanor) differently from “one year” (felony sentencing conventions and collateral administration). The court rejected the premise that § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) incorporates those state-law distinctions. Congress did not write “felony” or adopt state classifications; it wrote a federal, length-based standard.
  3. Rejecting “or” as “and.”
    Petitioner argued the clause really requires both: punishable by one year and punishable by more than one year—an interpretation that would exclude crimes capped at exactly 12 months. Using United States v. Woods, the court read “or” in its ordinary disjunctive sense. It also tested Petitioner’s reading for consequences and found it produced “bizarre outcomes,” such as excluding serious crimes with mandatory minimums exceeding one year because they are “too serious” to permit a one-year sentence.
  4. Rejecting “one year or longer” as a concealed felony-only term of art.
    Petitioner also argued that “one year or longer” really means “more than one year” because felony is often defined as punishable by more than a year (e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)). The court, echoing Ortega-Cordova v. Garland, held that this “flouts” the text. It underscored that Congress knows how to say “more than one year” when it wants to, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 3559(a)(5). The decision thus reaffirms a strict textual approach: the statute means what it says.

Impact

The opinion’s practical significance is substantial because many states set a common misdemeanor maximum at 12 months. By confirming that “twelve months” equals “one year” for § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), the Fourth Circuit ensures that a broad class of misdemeanor CIMTs can trigger immigration consequences that require only a one-year maximum—not “more than one year.”

Key forward-looking implications include:

  • Sharper limits on cancellation of removal eligibility for noncitizens with CIMT convictions in jurisdictions where the maximum term is twelve months.
  • Reduced room for state-law workarounds: arguments relying on state sentencing administration or misdemeanor/felony labeling will generally not change the federal characterization when the federal test is purely temporal.
  • Greater predictability and cross-circuit alignment, consistent with the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits’ approach (Singh, Dominguez-Herrera, Ceron).
  • Litigation focus shifts from “twelve months vs. one year” to (a) whether the offense is categorically a CIMT, and (b) what the statutory maximum is after any state-law reforms that reduce maximum penalties below one year (e.g., 364-day caps).

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Cancellation of removal: A discretionary form of relief that lets certain noncitizens remain in the U.S. despite being removable. It has strict eligibility bars, including certain criminal convictions.
  • Crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT): A long-used immigration category generally involving conduct viewed as inherently dishonest, fraudulent, or seriously wrongful. Here, identity fraud “with intent to defraud” fits squarely.
  • “For which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed”: This looks to the maximum possible sentence under the statute of conviction, not the sentence actually imposed. Thus, even a short or suspended sentence does not prevent the one-year maximum from triggering the provision.
  • De novo review: The appellate court decides the legal question anew, without deferring to the lower tribunal’s legal conclusion (as the Fourth Circuit did here on statutory interpretation).
  • Disjunctive “or”: In ordinary English and legal drafting, “or” usually provides alternatives. The court applied that ordinary meaning to treat “one year” and “longer than one year” as separate, sufficient conditions.
  • Legislative history vs. statutory text: The court reiterated a textualist hierarchy—history cannot give statutory words a meaning they cannot bear. If Congress wanted “more than one year,” it could have said so.

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s decision cements a clear rule for immigration practice within the circuit: an offense punishable by twelve months is punishable by one year, and therefore qualifies as a crime for which “a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). The court rejected attempts to import state sentencing distinctions, rewrite “or” as “and,” or treat the phrase as a hidden felony-only term of art. As a result, misdemeanor CIMT convictions with a 12-month maximum can bar cancellation of removal, reinforcing a uniform, text-driven federal threshold untethered from state labeling.