Twelve Months Counts as “One Year or Longer” Under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II)

Introduction

In Oscar Perdomo Ulloa v. Pamela Bondi, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed two petitions challenging decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that denied Oscar Rene Perdomo Ulloa eligibility for cancellation of removal. Perdomo Ulloa, a Honduran citizen who entered the United States without authorization in 2000, had been convicted in Virginia of a Class 1 misdemeanor for identity theft with “intent to defraud” under Va. Code § 18.2-186.3(A)(2). Although he received only a suspended 30-day jail sentence, the offense carried a maximum of “not more than twelve months” under Va. Code § 18.2-11(a).

The central statutory issue was interpretive: whether an offense punishable by a maximum of twelve months is “a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), which—when paired with a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude—triggers immigration consequences and, here, foreclosed cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C).

Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit denied both petitions for review. It held:

  • Perdomo Ulloa’s conviction is categorically a “crime involving moral turpitude,” reaffirming Salazar v. Garland.
  • A maximum sentence of twelve months is a sentence of “one year,” and therefore the offense is one “for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).

The court rejected three arguments: (1) that Virginia treats “twelve months” as distinct from “one year” for sentencing administration, relying on Belcher v. Commonwealth; (2) that “or” should be read conjunctively; and (3) that “one year or longer” is a term of art meaning “more than one year” (i.e., a felony threshold), despite legislative history.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Salazar v. Garland, 56 F.4th 374 (4th Cir. 2023)
    The court treated Salazar as controlling on the first prong: that the Virginia identity-theft offense at issue is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. Although Perdomo Ulloa initially challenged that element, he conceded it at oral argument, and the court expressly “reaffirm[ed] as much today.”
  • Singh v. Sessions, 898 F.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2018)
    Cited for the proposition that the statutory phrase reaches crimes with a possible sentence of one year as well as those exceeding one year—supporting the Fourth Circuit’s reading that the one-year mark is included, not excluded.
  • Dominguez-Herrera v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 411 (8th Cir. 2017)
    Used alongside Singh to show inter-circuit agreement: “one year” satisfies “one year or longer.”
  • Ceron v. Holder, 747 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc)
    Reinforced that the provision covers crimes punishable by “one year” and by sentences greater than one year—an interpretive approach the Fourth Circuit adopted as “plainly met” here.
  • Belcher v. Commonwealth, 878 S.E.2d 19 (Va. Ct. App. 2022)
    Invoked by Perdomo Ulloa to argue that Virginia treats “twelve months” differently from “one year” (misdemeanor vs. felony sentencing consequences). The Fourth Circuit found Belcher irrelevant to the federal immigration question: Congress keyed the federal rule to sentence length, not to state classification or collateral features of misdemeanor/felony administration. Importantly, the court emphasized Belcher did not suggest any temporal difference between twelve months and one year, and even acknowledged that “month” and “year” refer to calendar units.
  • United States v. Woods, 571 U.S. 31 (2013)
    Provided the interpretive baseline that “or” is “almost always disjunctive.” The court used Woods to reject the argument that “one year or longer” should be read as “one year and longer,” i.e., requiring both a one-year possibility and an above-one-year possibility.
  • Ortega-Cordova v. Garland, 107 F.4th 407 (4th Cir. 2024)
    The court relied on its recent rejection of the “term of art”/legislative-history theory that “one year or longer” really means “more than one year.” Quoting Ortega-Cordova, the court held that reading “flouts the clear and unambiguous language of § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).”

Legal Reasoning

  1. Textual anchor: time equivalence
    The court treated the question as “straightforward” statutory interpretation: “A twelve-month sentence lasts for one year,” and thus falls within “one year or longer.” This is a literal, temporal reading of the phrase “one year.”
  2. Federal standard turns on maximum possible punishment, not the sentence imposed
    Although Perdomo Ulloa received a suspended 30-day sentence, the statute asks whether a sentence of one year or longer “may be imposed.” The court applied the maximum possible sentence for the offense (twelve months).
  3. State misdemeanor/felony labels do not control federal immigration consequences
    Perdomo Ulloa’s primary move was to import Virginia’s internal sentencing distinctions (jail vs. prison, early-release credits, suspension/modification dynamics) into the federal phrase “one year or longer.” The court refused: Congress did not write “felony” into 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II); it wrote a punishment-length test. Consequently, “the length of the sentence” matters, not “how the crime is classified under state law.”
  4. “Or” is disjunctive; the alternative reading creates absurdity
    The court held “or” creates two paths: crimes with a possible sentence of one year, and crimes with a possible sentence exceeding one year. It stressed that a conjunctive reading would generate “bizarre outcomes,” such as excluding crimes with mandatory minimum sentences exceeding one year simply because they do not allow a one-year sentence.
  5. Legislative history cannot override unambiguous text
    Addressing the claim that “one year or longer” is a felony term of art (and thus should be read as “more than one year”), the court held there is “no textual basis” for that rewrite. It also underscored that Congress knows how to specify “more than one year” when it wants to, citing other statutes as examples, but “did not do so here.”

Impact

The decision cements (and aligns the Fourth Circuit with other circuits) a bright-line rule: a state offense with a maximum penalty of twelve months satisfies the “one year or longer” threshold in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). Practically:

  • Expanded reach to certain misdemeanors: Offenses labeled “misdemeanors” under state law may still meet the federal one-year threshold if punishable by up to twelve months, making them potential triggers for ineligibility for discretionary relief (here, cancellation of removal), when paired with a crime involving moral turpitude.
  • Reduced leverage in state “twelve months vs. one year” arguments: Litigants in immigration cases will have less room to argue that state-law sentencing terminology meaningfully changes the federal threshold.
  • Text-first interpretive signal: The court’s reliance on plain meaning and its refusal to use legislative history to narrow “one year” reinforces a textualist approach to immigration-disqualification provisions—particularly where Congress chose a numerical punishment benchmark.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Crime involving moral turpitude” (CIMT): A category in immigration law generally covering conduct involving fraud or dishonesty (among other morally culpable behavior). Here, identity theft with “intent to defraud” qualified.
  • “For which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed”: This focuses on the maximum potential sentence authorized for the offense, not the sentence the person actually received.
  • Cancellation of removal: A discretionary form of relief that can allow an otherwise removable person to remain in the United States if statutory eligibility requirements are met. Certain convictions render an applicant ineligible.
  • De novo review: The court decided the legal questions independently, without deferring to the BIA on the statutory interpretation issue as presented in this opinion.
  • Disjunctive “or”: In ordinary statutory drafting, “A or B” means either A or B is sufficient. The court used this to reject an interpretation that would require both.

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s opinion establishes a clear rule for immigration adjudications within the circuit: an offense punishable by up to twelve months is punishable by “one year,” and thus satisfies 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II)’s “one year or longer” requirement. State-law administrative distinctions between “twelve months” and “one year,” and legislative-history-based efforts to recast the phrase as “more than one year,” cannot overcome the statute’s plain text. Combined with the reaffirmed CIMT holding under Salazar v. Garland, this interpretation foreclosed Perdomo Ulloa’s cancellation-of-removal eligibility and offers a predictable, text-driven benchmark for future cases.