Code Compliance Plus a Detailed Defense Expert Inspection—and Plaintiff’s Inability to Identify Cause—Can Warrant Dismissal of a No-Handrail Premises Claim

1. Introduction

Turner v Voros is a premises-liability decision arising from a tenant’s fall from the back landing of a rented home. The plaintiff, Sharon E. Turner, sued the property owner/landlord, James A. Voros, seeking damages for injuries sustained when she fell while exiting the residence to take a walk. The principal factual features were that the back landing served as the home’s main entrance; the condition of the landing had not changed during plaintiff’s long tenancy (1999 through March 2018); no prior incidents or complaints had occurred; and the landing had no handrails during plaintiff’s occupancy, though marks suggested posts may once have existed.

The appeal centered on whether the landlord met the summary-judgment burden to show (i) no dangerous/defective condition at the fall location and (ii) plaintiff could not identify the cause of the fall without speculation, and whether plaintiff’s expert proof raised a triable issue of fact.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Department reversed the Supreme Court order that denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division granted summary judgment to defendant and dismissed the complaint.

The majority held that defendant satisfied his initial burden through plaintiff’s deposition testimony and a registered architect’s affidavit establishing that the landing/steps were not dangerous or defective, were “in compliance with the applicable codes,” and that plaintiff could not identify the cause of her fall without speculation. The court further held that plaintiff’s opposing expert affirmation was conclusory and speculative on both dangerousness and causation and therefore did not raise a triable issue of fact.

Two justices dissented, reasoning that code compliance is “not dispositive on the issue of negligence” and that defendant’s expert, in their view, effectively relied only on lack of code violations without meaningfully addressing whether the unguarded landing/steps were nonetheless unsafe—especially given evidence suggesting railings once existed. Because the dissent found defendant failed to meet his initial burden, it would have affirmed regardless of plaintiff’s opposition.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 (1980)
  Cited for the foundational summary-judgment framework: the moving party must tender evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish entitlement to judgment as a matter of law before the burden shifts. The majority invoked Zuckerman both to confirm defendant met the initial burden and to conclude plaintiff’s response did not meet the standard required to defeat the motion.
• Corbett v Adelphia W. N.Y. Holdings, LLC, 45 AD3d 1293, 1294–1295 (4th Dept 2007)
  Used by the majority as authority that a defendant can meet the prima facie burden by showing no dangerous/defective condition and code compliance, and by the dissent to underscore that the moving defendant must establish reasonable safety, not simply regulatory compliance. Corbett operates here as a template for the “no defect + code compliance” showing, and for the court’s evaluation of expert submissions at the prima facie and opposition stages.
• Mann v AutoZone Northeast, Inc., 148 AD3d 1646, 1646 (4th Dept 2017) and Zammiello v Senpike Mall Co., 300 AD2d 1124, 1125 (4th Dept 2002)
  Cited as additional Fourth Department support for the proposition that proof of code compliance and absence of a dangerous condition can satisfy a defendant’s initial burden in a fall case.
• Conners v LMAC Mgt. LLC, 189 AD3d 2071, 2072–2073 (4th Dept 2020)
  Central to the causation holding: a defendant may obtain summary judgment by showing the plaintiff cannot identify the cause of the fall without speculation. The majority used Conners both to support the prima facie showing (plaintiff’s inability to identify what caused the fall) and to reject plaintiff’s expert’s speculative causation assertions.
• Darrisaw v Strong Mem. Hosp., 74 AD3d 1769, 1769–1770 (4th Dept 2010), affd 16 NY3d 729 (2011)
  Reinforces the “speculation” bar in slip/trip-and-fall cases: where the plaintiff cannot identify the cause, causation becomes conjectural, warranting dismissal.
• Westermeyer v Whelan, 214 AD3d 1307, 1307 (4th Dept 2023)
  Cited for the two-step burden framework in premises cases: defendant must establish no dangerous/defective condition and code compliance; plaintiff must then raise a triable issue. The majority used it to frame why plaintiff failed to create a factual dispute.
• Ciccarelli v Cotira, Inc., 24 AD3d 1276, 1277 (4th Dept 2005) and Griffith v ETH NEP, L.P., 140 AD3d 451, 452 (1st Dept 2016), lv denied 28 NY3d 905 (2016)
  These cases are cited to police expert proof: an expert’s opinion must explain the basis and methodology; conclusory assertions that a condition was dangerous, without articulating how that conclusion was reached, are insufficient to defeat summary judgment.
• Giardina v Lippes, 77 AD3d 1290, 1291 (4th Dept 2010), lv denied 16 NY3d 702 (2011)
  Supports rejection of expert submissions that are conclusory/speculative on causation—particularly where the plaintiff’s own testimony does not identify a mechanism of the fall.
• Schneider v Corporate Place, LLC, 149 AD3d 1503, 1505 (4th Dept 2017); Belsinger v M & M Bowling & Trophy Supplies, Inc., 108 AD3d 1041, 1042 (4th Dept 2013); and Bamrick v Orchard Brooke Living Ctr., 5 AD3d 1031, 1032 (4th Dept 2004)
  These authorities anchor the dissent: code compliance is “not dispositive,” and a jury may still find an inherently dangerous condition even where regulations are met. The dissent reads these cases to require a defendant’s expert to address reasonable safety beyond mere code analysis—particularly where a lack of guarding/handrails is alleged.
• Gorman v Mooney’s 9, 239 AD3d 1260, 1261 (4th Dept 2025)
  Cited by the dissent to emphasize that if the movant fails to meet the initial burden, the motion must be denied “regardless of the sufficiency of plaintiff’s opposing papers.” This is the dissent’s procedural pivot: it would not reach the adequacy of plaintiff’s expert because it would find defendant’s showing deficient.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The majority’s two-track prima facie showing: (1) no defect + code compliance, and (2) speculative causation

The majority accepted two independent (and mutually reinforcing) bases for summary judgment:

• No dangerous/defective condition, supported by expert inspection and code compliance. Defendant’s registered architect described his credentials; identified materials typically relied upon in the field (surveys, construction/inspection reports, code books); personally visited and inspected the exterior steps; measured the steps/landing; and concluded that because the steps had “only configured with two risers,” “no handrails were required.” He further found the steps/landing structurally sound, in good repair, properly anchored, and capable of supporting loads, and ultimately opined they were not a fall hazard or otherwise unsafe.
• Failure of causation proof: plaintiff could not identify the cause without speculation. Plaintiff testified she did not recall how she fell; her feet did not slip, twist, or wobble; and she did not trip or catch her feet on the concrete. Although she described trash/recycling bins obstructing her path and that she fell while attempting to move them, her testimony did not supply a non-speculative mechanism connecting a dangerous/defective property condition to the fall. Under Conners v LMAC Mgt. LLC and Darrisaw v Strong Mem. Hosp., that inability to identify the cause can be dispositive on summary judgment.

B. Why plaintiff’s expert did not create a triable issue

The majority treated plaintiff’s expert affirmation as legally insufficient because it was conclusory on both (i) the existence of a dangerous condition and (ii) causation. Relying on Ciccarelli v Cotira, Inc. and Griffith v ETH NEP, L.P., the court stressed that an expert must “recite the manner” in which the conclusion was reached; and, relying on Conners and Giardina v Lippes, it rejected speculative causation opinions—particularly where the plaintiff cannot articulate how the fall occurred.

C. The dissent’s core disagreement: “code compliance is not dispositive,” and the defense expert must confront the alleged unsafe condition

The dissent accepted that defendant demonstrated code compliance, but concluded that the defense expert’s ultimate negligence/safety conclusion was inadequately supported because (in the dissent’s view) it did not squarely address whether the unguarded steps/landing were nonetheless dangerous, especially given evidence suggesting railings once existed. Citing Schneider v Corporate Place, LLC, Belsinger v M & M Bowling & Trophy Supplies, Inc., and Bamrick v Orchard Brooke Living Ctr., the dissent framed the question as one of “reasonable safety,” not mere regulatory adherence. On procedure, it relied on Gorman v Mooney’s 9 to argue that a prima facie failure ends the inquiry and requires denial of the motion.

3.3 Impact

• Strengthening the “speculation” pathway to dismissal. The decision underscores that even where a plaintiff can describe surrounding circumstances (e.g., moving bins), the inability to identify a concrete mechanism tying the fall to a dangerous property condition can be fatal at summary judgment under Conners v LMAC Mgt. LLC and Darrisaw v Strong Mem. Hosp..
• What makes a defense expert affidavit “enough.” The majority signals that a defense expert can satisfy the initial burden when the affidavit reflects: (i) a site visit, (ii) measurements, (iii) reference to materials normally relied upon by experts, and (iv) an articulated basis for concluding the configuration does not require handrails and is not hazardous. This is particularly notable because the dissent believed more was required to address the “unguarded” nature of the landing.
• Continuing tension in premises cases: code compliance vs. reasonable safety. While the majority accepted code compliance plus structural findings as sufficient here, the dissent’s reliance on Schneider and Belsinger highlights an enduring line of argument available to plaintiffs: a condition may be unreasonably dangerous despite technical compliance. Future litigants can expect close scrutiny of whether an expert’s affidavit merely “checks code boxes” or meaningfully evaluates hazard and human factors.
• Practical effect for landlords and property owners. The opinion provides a roadmap for summary judgment: pair plaintiff’s deposition concessions (no slip/trip, no identified cause, longstanding unchanged condition, no prior incidents) with a detailed expert inspection addressing configuration, code requirements, and physical integrity.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Summary judgment: a pretrial ruling that ends the case if there is no genuine factual dispute requiring a jury. The moving party must first show entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (the “initial burden”).
• Initial burden / burden shifting: under Zuckerman v City of New York, the defendant must present competent evidence first; only then must the plaintiff produce evidence showing a “triable issue of fact.”
• Premises liability: the legal doctrine holding owners/occupiers (and sometimes landlords) responsible for maintaining property in a reasonably safe condition.
• Code compliance is “not dispositive”: meeting a building code can help show reasonable care, but (per cases like Schneider v Corporate Place, LLC) it does not automatically eliminate negligence if a jury could still find the condition unreasonably dangerous.
• Speculative causation: if the plaintiff cannot identify what caused the fall (as opposed to where it happened), a jury would be forced to guess; courts often dismiss such cases on summary judgment (as in Conners v LMAC Mgt. LLC and Darrisaw v Strong Mem. Hosp.).
• Conclusive vs. conclusory expert opinions: an expert must explain methods, observations, measurements, and reasoning. A bare statement that something was “unsafe” or that a defendant was “negligent” without a factual/technical bridge is typically deemed conclusory and insufficient.

5. Conclusion

Turner v Voros reinforces two decisive principles in New York fall litigation: (1) a defendant can prevail on summary judgment with a detailed expert inspection and proof of code compliance supporting the absence of a dangerous/defective condition, and (2) independently, a plaintiff’s inability to identify the cause of the fall—without speculation—can warrant dismissal. The dissent cautions that code compliance alone should not end the negligence inquiry and argues that experts must address “reasonable safety” beyond the code. The practical significance is a sharpened evidentiary roadmap: meticulous, fact-anchored expert affidavits and clear causation proof (not conjecture) will often determine whether a premises case reaches a jury.