Tumultuous Conduct Under 13 V.S.A. § 1026a: Loud, Confrontational Door-and-Window Banging Supports Aggravated Disorderly Conduct

Introduction

In State v. Carl Holcomb, Jr. (Vt. Sept. 4, 2026) (entry order), the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed a jury conviction for aggravated disorderly conduct under 13 V.S.A. § 1026a(a), (a)(1). The case arose from a neighbor dispute in which the defendant—intoxicated and agitated—came onto the complainant’s property, banged on her door and window, yelled profanities, demanded she come outside, and used her name while insulting her.

The appeal presented two sufficiency-of-the-evidence questions central to aggravated disorderly conduct: (1) whether the defendant’s conduct was “violent, tumultuous, or threatening,” and (2) whether the defendant acted with the intent to cause inconvenience or annoyance (or disturb peace, quiet, or privacy) through a course of conduct directed at a specific person.

Note on precedential status: This decision is an entry order issued by a three-justice panel; under the court’s own notice, such decisions are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal. Its practical influence is therefore primarily persuasive, illustrating how the Court applies existing standards to a common fact pattern.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court held that the State presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that:

  • The defendant’s conduct was at least tumultuous—i.e., loud, agitated, emotional, confrontational behavior—based on yelling profanities, repeated demands, and prolonged banging on the door and window after being told to leave.
  • The defendant engaged in a course of conduct directed at the complainant and that intent to annoy/inconvenience or disturb peace could be inferred circumstantially from his focused actions (demanding she come out, refusing to leave, using her name, hurling insults).
  • A claim that intoxication prevented formation of intent was not reviewed because it was not raised below.

The conviction for aggravated disorderly conduct was therefore affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) The sufficiency standard on appeal

The Court framed the appeal using well-settled sufficiency principles:

  • State v. McMahon, 2024 VT 67 supplied the governing standard of review: denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal is reviewed de novo, asking whether the evidence (viewed in the light most favorable to the State and excluding “modifying evidence”) could convince a reasonable factfinder of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • State v. Russell, 2011 VT 36 (mem.) reinforced that acquittal is appropriate only when the State has presented no evidence to substantiate a verdict.

Together, these cases emphasize the appellate court’s limited role: it does not reweigh credibility and does not decide which side’s account is more believable.

2) Defining “tumultuous” behavior

To interpret “tumultuous,” the Court relied on its prior approach under the disorderly conduct statute:

  • In re Lund, 144 Vt. 171 (1984) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Begins, 148 Vt. 186 (1987)) was cited for the proposition that the Court has used dictionary definitions to describe “tumultuous” behavior, including a “violent outburst” or conduct that might agitate a crowd.
  • The Court also cited a dictionary definition (Merriam-Webster) describing “tumultuous” as “loud, excited, and emotional” and marked by “upheaval.”

The opinion thus treats “tumultuous” as reaching beyond physical fighting: volume, agitation, persistence, and confrontational escalation can suffice when a jury could reasonably view the incident as an outburst that disrupts another’s security and peace.

3) Distinguishing mere profanity from tumultuous conduct

The defendant relied on State v. McEachin, 2019 VT 37, where profanity directed at police plus walking toward an officer (with a normal gait and no aggressive move) was held insufficient to prove “fighting or violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior.”

The Court distinguished McEachin factually: Holcomb’s conduct involved persistent and escalating confrontation at a private residence, including extended banging on a window after being told to leave, combined with yelling and personally targeted insults. That combination, the Court reasoned, permitted a jury finding of a “violent outburst” (in the Lund sense) or at least “loud, excited, and emotional” behavior (in the dictionary sense).

4) Deference to the jury on credibility and “modifying evidence”

When the defendant testified he did not speak to the complainant and believed her husband was present, the Court treated this as classic “modifying evidence” excluded under the sufficiency lens. Citing State v. Diaz, 2025 VT 58, the Court reaffirmed that it will not substitute its judgment for the jury’s credibility determinations.

5) Preservation of issues for appeal

The defendant’s intoxication-based argument (that alcohol prevented formation of intent) was rejected on preservation grounds under State v. Sole, 2009 VT 24, which bars review of arguments not raised and decided below.

Legal Reasoning

1) The statutory elements applied

The charged theory required proof that the defendant:

  1. Engaged in a course of conduct directed at a specific person with the intent to cause that person inconvenience or annoyance, or to disturb peace, quiet, or privacy; and
  2. Engaged in fighting or in violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior. (13 V.S.A. § 1026a(a), (a)(1))

2) “Tumultuous” as the dispositive path

Rather than deciding whether the conduct was “violent” or “threatening,” the Court affirmed on the narrower basis that the evidence supported a finding of tumultuous behavior. The opinion’s reasoning is cumulative: yelling profanities + approaching the home uninvited + banging on the door + prolonged window-banging after being told to go away + demands that the complainant come outside + personally targeted insults created a record from which a jury could find a loud, agitated, emotional outburst.

This approach matters because it underscores that § 1026a does not require proof of physical contact or an explicit threat if the conduct otherwise meets the “tumultuous” threshold.

3) Inferring intent from conduct and context

Intent is often proven circumstantially. The Court endorsed the trial court’s view that the defendant’s “pattern of conduct” allowed an inference that he intended to inconvenience/annoy or disturb peace—particularly his refusal to leave, insistence on contact, targeted profanity, and actions that caused the complainant to remain inside rather than leave as planned.

The Court treated defendant’s alternative explanation (he did not know she was alone; he did not direct conduct at her) as a credibility contest for the jury, not a basis for acquittal on appeal.

Impact

Although nonprecedential, the entry order signals several practical guideposts likely to influence charging decisions, trial rulings, and litigant expectations:

  • Residential confrontation can satisfy “tumultuous” without physical violence: repeated door/window banging, persistent demands, and loud, agitated yelling at a home may qualify even absent explicit threats or contact.
  • Course-of-conduct + intent can be inferred from persistence and targeting: using a complainant’s name, refusing to leave, demanding engagement, and directing insults supports a finding of intent to disturb peace/quiet/privacy.
  • McEachin remains a limiting comparison for “mere profanity” cases: profanity plus non-aggressive movement may be insufficient, but escalation and intrusion into another’s home environment may push conduct into “tumultuous.”
  • Preservation is outcome-determinative: intoxication-as-intent arguments must be litigated in the trial court to be available on appeal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Sufficiency of the evidence”
A legal test asking whether, taking the evidence in the State’s favor (and not reweighing credibility), a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not a second trial or a re-evaluation of who was more believable.
“Motion for judgment of acquittal”
A request for the judge to end the case (or set aside a guilty verdict) because the evidence is legally inadequate. It succeeds only when the State’s proof is so lacking that a verdict could not lawfully stand.
“Tumultuous” behavior
In this context, not limited to fighting. It can include a loud, excited, emotional, confrontational outburst—especially where conduct escalates and disrupts another person’s peace and sense of safety.
“Specific intent” (intent to annoy/inconvenience or disturb peace)
A mental-state requirement focusing on the defendant’s purpose. Because people rarely announce their intent, juries may infer it from actions, persistence, and surrounding circumstances.
“Preservation”
The rule that an argument generally must be raised in the trial court to be considered on appeal. If it is not, the appellate court usually will not reach it.

Conclusion

State v. Carl Holcomb, Jr. affirms that aggravated disorderly conduct under 13 V.S.A. § 1026a can be proven where a defendant’s loud, agitated, and persistent confrontation at a private residence—such as prolonged door/window banging paired with yelling and targeted insults—supports a jury finding of “tumultuous” behavior and permits an inference of intent to disturb the complainant’s peace, quiet, or privacy. The entry order also reinforces two procedural pillars: appellate courts do not reweigh credibility on sufficiency review, and unpreserved arguments (including intoxication-based intent claims) will not be entertained on appeal.