TTD Continues to MMI When Light-Duty Job Offers Are Not “Customary Employment” and the Worker Does Not Actually Return to Work

1. Introduction

In The Job Center v. Amy Griffiths (Ky. June 25, 2026) (Not to Be Published), the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed a workers’ compensation award of temporary total disability (TTD) benefits through the claimant’s maximum medical improvement (MMI).

The appellant, The Job Center, is a temporary employment agency that placed Amy Griffiths at DHL. Griffiths fractured her right big toe at work and was treated through August 2022. Although she was released to light-duty restrictions before MMI, and The Job Center issued accommodated job offer letters, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the relevant offered work was not Griffiths’ customary employment and that she did not actually return to work prior to MMI. The Workers’ Compensation Board and Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court did as well.

The case primarily turned on a fact-bound application of Kentucky’s TTD standard under KRS 342.0011(11)(a) and the “customary employment” framework developed in prior decisions, especially Trane Com. Sys. v. Tipton.

2. Summary of the Opinion

• The Court held the appeal presented no new or novel statutory construction issue; instead, the dispositive question was whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s findings.
• Applying the TTD test described in Livingood v. Transfreight, LLC and the “customary employment” standards articulated in Trane Com. Sys. v. Tipton (and reiterated in Davis v. Blendex Co.), the Court concluded substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that Griffiths had not been released to return to customary employment before MMI.
• The Court affirmed the award of TTD benefits from December 21, 2021 through August 16, 2022 (MMI date), emphasizing deference to the ALJ’s fact-finding.
• Because the ALJ found no release to “customary employment,” the Court did not reach the broader legal question urged by the employer—whether TTD must terminate when a claimant refuses a suitable customary job offer.

Publication note: The Opinion is designated “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED” under RAP 40(D). Under RAP 41, it may be cited for consideration only in limited circumstances (e.g., no published opinion adequately addresses the point of law), and it is not binding precedent.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

Lexington Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov't v. Gosper, 671 S.W.3d 184 (Ky. 2023)

Supplied the modern articulation of appellate review in workers’ compensation matters, including: (i) the Court of Appeals’ limited role in correcting the Board only when it overlooks/misconstrues controlling law or commits a grossly unjust evidentiary error; and (ii) the Supreme Court’s limited review under Section 115 of the Kentucky Constitution to “new or novel questions of statutory construction,” reconsideration of precedent, or constitutional issues. The Court used Gosper to frame this case as fact-driven, not a vehicle for revisiting established doctrine.

W. Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685 (Ky. 1992)

Quoted through Gosper to emphasize deference: appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence but correct only extraordinary errors by the Board.

Livingood v. Transfreight, LLC, 467 S.W.3d 249 (Ky. 2015)

Provided the operative two-prong TTD test under KRS 342.0011(11)(a): (1) the worker has not reached MMI; and (2) the worker has not reached a level of improvement that permits a return to employment. This case supplied the conceptual starting point for the Court’s analysis.

Trane Com. Sys. v. Tipton, 481 S.W.3d 800 (Ky. 2016)

The central interpretive authority for what it means to be able to “return to employment.” The Court reiterated Tipton’s instruction that, absent extraordinary circumstances, TTD is inappropriate if: (i) the worker is released to return to customary employment (work within restrictions and matching the worker’s experience, training, and education); and (ii) the worker has actually returned to employment. Here, the Supreme Court treated Tipton as the governing framework but affirmed because the ALJ found the offered work was not “customary.”

Davis v. Blendex Co., 626 S.W.3d 523 (Ky. 2021)

Cited to reinforce Tipton’s two standards as the operational test ALJs apply when analyzing the second prong of TTD (“return to employment”).

Central Kentucky Steel v. Wise, 19 S.W.3d 657 (Ky. 2000)

The key comparator supporting continued TTD when a worker is released only to minimal work rather than the kind of work that is customary or performed at the time of injury. The ALJ relied on Wise to conclude that refusing the food-pantry position did not terminate TTD because it was not customary employment and was characterized as “minimal or make-work.”

Arnold v. Toyota Motor Mfg., 375 S.W.3d 56 (Ky. 2012)

Used for the principle that an ALJ must accurately summarize conflicting evidence and identify an evidentiary basis for conclusions. The Court invoked Arnold to validate the ALJ’s comparative evaluation of Griffiths’ education and work history versus the duties of the offered position.

French v. Rev-A-Shelf, 641 S.W.3d 172 (Ky. 2022)

Cited for the idea that an ALJ may implicitly find MMI and the ability to return to customary employment occur at the same time (or one precedes the other). The Supreme Court read the ALJ’s reasoning as effectively aligning Griffiths’ MMI with any meaningful “return to customary employment” capacity.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Deferential posture controlled the outcome. Through Lexington Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov't v. Gosper, the Court emphasized it would not “third guess” the Board and Court of Appeals on the same evidentiary record; the question was whether the ALJ’s TTD award was supported by substantial evidence.
2. TTD’s second prong—“return to employment”—was evaluated through Tipton’s “customary employment” lens. The Court reiterated that “employment” is not defined in the statute and that Trane Com. Sys. v. Tipton supplies workable standards: a release to customary employment (within restrictions and consistent with experience/training/education) plus an actual return to employment.
3. Fact-finding: the offered job was not “customary employment.” The ALJ credited evidence of Griffiths’ education (associate’s degrees in business administration and criminal justice/paralegal studies) and work history (e.g., blackjack dealer, photographer, horse-related work) and compared it to the food-pantry duties (food distribution, discarding expired items, cleaning). The ALJ inferred the position was not customary and was essentially minimal/make-work, bringing the case within the rationale of Central Kentucky Steel v. Wise.
4. Employer admissions mattered. The ALJ treated The Job Center’s March 15, 2022 letter—acknowledging Griffiths had not reached MMI and could not return full-time to her former position—as supporting the view that she had not regained the capacity to return to customary employment. The Supreme Court noted this as part of the ALJ’s reasoning.
5. No need to decide the “refusal of suitable work” termination theory. The Job Center urged the Court to address whether “actual return to employment” can be satisfied (or effectively bypassed) when a claimant refuses an accommodated job offer. The Court declined because the predicate factual finding—release to customary employment—was not met on this record.
6. MMI remains a bright-line stop, but not an early stop. Consistent with Trane Com. Sys. v. Tipton and the statement that “once an injured employee reaches MMI that employee is no longer entitled to TTD benefits,” the Court affirmed TTD only through the MMI date found by the ALJ.

C. Impact

• Reinforces ALJ discretion in “customary employment” determinations. This Opinion underscores that whether an accommodated position is “customary” is often a record-specific factual inference, driven by the worker’s background and the job’s real demands, and appellate review remains highly deferential.
• Signals evidentiary risks for employers relying on accommodated job letters. Written offers or correspondence acknowledging lack of MMI or inability to return to the prior role may be treated as persuasive support for continued TTD.
• Leaves an open doctrinal question. The Court expressly avoided deciding whether TTD must terminate when a worker refuses a job that is truly “customary employment” within restrictions. That issue remains for a future case with different predicate findings.
• Practical persuasive value despite nonpublication. While not binding (RAP 40(D)), the reasoning may be cited for consideration under RAP 41 when no published Kentucky opinion adequately addresses a similar point.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Temporary Total Disability (TTD)

Wage-replacement benefits paid while an injured worker is still healing and cannot yet return to qualifying work. Under KRS 342.0011(11)(a), the worker generally must (1) not be at MMI and (2) not yet be able to return to employment.

Maximum Medical Improvement (MMI)

The point at which further treatment is not expected to produce meaningful improvement. Once MMI is reached, TTD ends as a matter of law (as reiterated in Trane Com. Sys. v. Tipton).

Customary Employment

In the Tipton framework, work that fits within the worker’s medical restrictions and matches the worker’s experience, training, and education. It does not require returning to the identical pre-injury job, but it must be genuinely within the worker’s customary vocational profile—not merely “make-work.”

Substantial Evidence / Clearly Erroneous

“Substantial evidence” means enough credible evidence that a reasonable fact-finder could reach the ALJ’s conclusion. Appellate courts do not reweigh evidence; they ask whether the ALJ had a reasonable basis for the finding.

Not to Be Published

The decision is not binding precedent (RAP 40(D)). It may be cited only for consideration in limited circumstances under RAP 41, and must be identified as unpublished.

5. Conclusion

The Job Center v. Amy Griffiths affirms a straightforward but consequential application of Kentucky’s TTD doctrine: a light-duty release and an accommodated job offer do not automatically terminate TTD where the ALJ reasonably finds the proposed work is not the claimant’s customary employment and the claimant has not actually returned to work before reaching MMI. The Supreme Court’s analysis is chiefly a reminder of deference—when substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s fact findings, appellate courts will not reweigh the record, even if contrary evidence exists.