Date: Feb 20, 2026

Trover v. Oglesby: Skeletal Briefing Forfeits the “Clearly Established” Prong of Qualified Immunity; Rule 37(e)(2)(A) Adverse Inference Requires Intent to Deprive

I. Introduction

Marleis Trover, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Donald D. Gaddis (Plaintiff-Appellant) sued Williamson County Sheriff’s Deputies Craig Oglesby and Dustin Kelley (Defendants-Appellees) after an arrest for trespass at the home of off-duty Marion police officer Bryan DeMattei.

The core dispute arose from an inventory search of Gaddis’s vehicle before towing. Gaddis alleged that deputies unlawfully read his notebook found in the car and gave it to DeMattei to read—conduct he framed as (1) a Fourth Amendment violation actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and (2) trespass to chattels under Illinois law. He also sought an adverse inference sanction based on missing dashcam footage from Oglesby’s patrol car, arguing the video could clarify who searched the car and how the notebook reached DeMattei.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for both deputies and upheld the denial of Rule 37(e)(2)(A) sanctions, emphasizing two litigation-critical themes: (a) plaintiffs must substantively confront qualified immunity—especially the “clearly established” requirement—with legal authority in the district court, and (b) an adverse inference for lost electronic evidence requires proof of intent to deprive, not merely loss or malfunction.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Fourth Amendment / § 1983: The court affirmed summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds because Gaddis failed in the district court to identify authority clearly establishing that the challenged notebook-reading and alleged sharing with DeMattei was unconstitutional in March 2018. The panel also noted it could affirm on any record-supported ground and concluded qualified immunity would cover Oglesby as well.
Illinois trespass to chattels: The court held Gaddis forfeited appellate arguments by failing to respond to the claim in opposition to summary judgment in the district court.
Spoliation / Rule 37(e)(2)(A): The court held the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an adverse inference because Gaddis did not show (as Rule 37(e)(2)(A) requires) that defendants acted with intent to deprive him of the dashcam footage.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Summary judgment framework and appellate review

Taylor v. Schwarzhuber, 132 F.4th 480 (7th Cir. 2025): Used for the standard that, on summary judgment review, facts are stated in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. This frames the panel’s analysis: even under Gaddis’s best version of the facts, his legal showings were deficient.
Smithson v. Austin, 86 F.4th 815 (7th Cir. 2023): Cited for de novo review of summary judgment, reinforcing that the appellate court independently evaluates whether defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Peretz v. Sims, 662 F.3d 478 (7th Cir. 2011): The panel invoked this principle to affirm on a different basis than the district court used for Oglesby. Even though the district court focused on personal involvement, the Seventh Circuit affirmed because qualified immunity would apply—so long as the ground was addressed below and the nonmovant had an opportunity to contest.

2. Qualified immunity structure and the plaintiff’s burden

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009): Quoted for the policy balance underlying qualified immunity (accountability vs. shielding reasonable performance), providing the doctrinal lens through which the court assesses officer liability.
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 (2018): Supplies the two-prong test: (1) violation of a federal right, and (2) clearly established unlawfulness at the time. The opinion also relies on Wesby for the definition of “clearly established” as a level of clarity such that every reasonable official would understand the conduct is unlawful.
Taylor v. City of Milford, 10 F.4th 800 (7th Cir. 2021), quoting Leiser v. Kloth, 933 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2019): Used to allocate burdens: qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, but once raised, the plaintiff must defeat it.
Clash v. Beatty, 77 F.3d 1045 (7th Cir. 1996) and Sinn v. Lemmon, 911 F.3d 412 (7th Cir. 2018): Cited for the plaintiff’s duty to establish both a constitutional violation and the existence of a clearly established right. Sinn is pivotal: failure to address the “clearly established” prong in the district court can foreclose relitigation on appeal.
Sonnleitner v. York, 304 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2002) and White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73 (2017): These cases articulate the level of specificity required. The court emphasized that a plaintiff need not find a case “precisely” mirroring the facts, but must identify a “closely analogous case” or one involving “similar circumstances” where an officer was held to have violated the Fourth Amendment.
Gibbs v. Lomas, 755 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 2014): Stands for the dispositive nature of either prong: if either inquiry is answered in the negative, the official receives qualified immunity and is entitled to judgment.

3. Forfeiture/waiver doctrine for underdeveloped or omitted arguments

Arlin-Golf, LLC v. Village of Arlington Heights, 631 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 2011); Domka v. Portage County, 523 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2008); Humphries v. CBOCS W., Inc., 474 F.3d 387 (7th Cir. 2007), aff’d on other grounds, 553 U.S. 442 (2008): Collectively support the proposition that skeletal arguments and failure to cite relevant legal authority can amount to waiver/forfeiture, and that new, specific arguments raised for the first time on appeal are generally barred.
Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc), quoting CNH Indus. Am. LLC v. Jones Lang LaSalle Ams., Inc., 882 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2018), and Schmitz v. Colvin, 124 F.4th 1029 (7th Cir. 2024): These authorities narrow the escape hatch: in civil cases, “plain error” review is extraordinary and typically unavailable to rescue forfeited arguments—reinforcing why Gaddis could not rehabilitate his qualified immunity presentation on appeal.
Scheidler v. Indiana, 914 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 2019): Cited for the basic rule that issues raised for the first time on appeal are forfeited—applied to the state-law trespass-to-chattels claim because Gaddis’s opposition brief did not address it at all.

4. Rule 37(e) sanctions and adverse inference for lost electronic evidence

Harrington v. Duszak, 971 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2020): Supplies the standard of review—abuse of discretion—tilting appellate deference toward the district court’s sanctions determination.
Park v. City of Chicago, 297 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2002) and S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 695 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1982): Used to emphasize that missing evidence alone does not justify an adverse inference; the critical inquiry is the reason for destruction or loss.
Bracey v. Grondin, 712 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2013): Cited for the “bad faith” requirement in adverse inference analysis—destruction must be for the purpose of hiding adverse information. The panel treated this as aligned with Rule 37(e)(2)(A)’s “intent to deprive” requirement.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Qualified immunity turned on litigation performance, not factfinding

Even assuming the deputies’ conduct could be viewed as a Fourth Amendment violation (reading a notebook during an inventory search and allegedly enabling a private complainant to read it), the panel did not decide that merits question. Instead, it resolved the appeal on the second qualified-immunity prong: whether the unlawfulness was “clearly established” in March 2018.

The court found Gaddis’s district-court response fatally underdeveloped: he argued essentially that the officers knew their conduct was wrong because it violated “policy,” but he did not supply constitutional authority—cases with sufficiently analogous facts—showing that every reasonable officer would have understood the conduct was unlawful. Under Seventh Circuit waiver/forfeiture doctrine (and Sinn v. Lemmon specifically), that omission prevented him from rebuilding the argument on appeal.

The doctrinal move is consequential: qualified immunity is often debated as a substantive merits shield, but here it functioned as a procedural-filter mechanism. The opinion signals that plaintiffs must treat the “clearly established” prong as an essential element requiring citation-driven advocacy at summary judgment; reliance on policy violations or generalized Fourth Amendment principles is insufficient.

2. Affirmance for Oglesby on an alternative ground

The district court granted summary judgment to Oglesby on lack of personal involvement in the inventory search. The Seventh Circuit instead affirmed on qualified immunity, invoking Peretz v. Sims to use an alternative, record-supported ground. This underscores that once qualified immunity is in play and adequately litigated below, the appellate court may dispose of claims on immunity even if the district court relied on different reasoning.

3. State-law claim rejected via forfeiture

Defendants challenged the Illinois trespass-to-chattels claim on limitations (745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/8-101), Illinois Tort Immunity Act grounds (745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/2-201 et seq.), and merits. Gaddis’s opposition brief did not address the claim at all, so the court treated all appellate theories as forfeited. The panel’s approach reflects a consistent Seventh Circuit expectation: summary-judgment oppositions must join issue with the moving party’s grounds or risk losing the claim without merits review.

4. Rule 37(e)(2)(A): intent to deprive as a hard prerequisite to adverse inference

Gaddis sought an adverse inference that the missing dashcam video would have been unfavorable. Rule 37(e)(2)(A), however, authorizes that remedy “only upon finding” intent to deprive. The court held that evidence of failed download attempts and later replacement/malfunction of the system did not establish intent (or bad faith). Without intent, the most severe spoliation remedies—like presumptions of unfavorable content—are unavailable.

C. Impact

Qualified immunity practice: The decision reinforces that in the Seventh Circuit, plaintiffs must present “clearly established” authority in the district court when qualified immunity is raised. A bare assertion that conduct was improper or violated policy is unlikely to survive summary judgment.
Appellate constraints: The opinion highlights how forfeiture doctrine interacts with qualified immunity. Even potentially substantial constitutional questions may go unanswered if briefing fails to develop the correct prong with legal support at the trial-court stage.
ESI spoliation standards: For police-video disputes, the ruling emphasizes that missing footage is not enough for an adverse inference. Litigants must marshal proof of intent to deprive—e.g., deliberate deletion, policy-evading conduct, or admissions—rather than relying on malfunction or unexplained loss alone.
State-law claims in federal civil-rights suits: The case serves as a cautionary example: supplemental state-law claims can be lost through silence at summary judgment, even if potentially viable.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified immunity: A doctrine shielding government officials from damages liability unless they violated a constitutional right that was “clearly established” at the time. It often turns on whether prior cases put the unlawfulness “beyond debate.”
“Clearly established” law: Not a broad statement of rights (e.g., “unreasonable searches are illegal”), but sufficiently specific precedent putting an officer on notice that the particular conduct under similar circumstances is unlawful.
Inventory search: A search of a vehicle’s contents conducted as part of standardized procedures when police impound/tow a car—typically justified as protecting property, guarding against claims of theft, and ensuring safety. Disputes arise when officers appear to use “inventory” as a pretext for investigation.
42 U.S.C. § 1983: A statute allowing suits against state actors for constitutional violations (such as Fourth Amendment claims).
Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling where the court decides there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party wins as a matter of law—often because the opponent failed to produce evidence or adequate legal argument.
Forfeiture/waiver on appeal: If a party does not adequately raise and support an argument in the district court, appellate courts generally will not consider it later. In civil cases, “plain error” is rarely used to excuse the failure.
Rule 37(e) spoliation sanctions: A rule addressing lost electronically stored information (ESI). Severe remedies (like an adverse inference) require a finding of intent to deprive another party of the evidence’s use in the litigation.

V. Conclusion

Trover v. Oglesby affirms summary judgment largely on litigation-process grounds: when qualified immunity is raised, plaintiffs must meaningfully engage the “clearly established” prong with relevant authority in the district court, or they risk forfeiture that cannot be cured on appeal. The decision also underscores the rigor of Rule 37(e)(2)(A): an adverse inference from missing police video requires proof of intent to deprive, not merely a failure to produce footage due to malfunction or replacement. In combination, these holdings encourage disciplined, authority-driven briefing and careful evidentiary development early—before summary judgment narrows the case to what was properly preserved and proven.