Triable Issues on Broker Liability Where a Longstanding Client Claims a Specific Request and a “Special Relationship” Despite Not Reading the Policy

1. Introduction

In Adams v Blodgett (2026 NY Slip Op 04684 [4th Dept July 24, 2026]), the Fourth Department addressed when an insurance broker may face negligence liability for a coverage gap after a loss—particularly where the insured claims the broker was asked to insure both a business and separately owned real property, but the issued policy named only the business.

The underlying tort action arose from a slip-and-fall: plaintiff Deborah Adams sued property owner Michael K. Blodgett (among others), alleging she was injured in a parking-lot fall on commercial property after visiting a tenant in a duplex on the premises. The insurer denied coverage to Blodgett because he was not a named insured under the policy in effect. Blodgett then brought a third-party action against the broker, The Cesar Group, Inc. (“Cesar”), alleging (i) negligent failure to procure requested coverage naming him as an insured and (ii) breach of an alleged ongoing advisory duty based on a “special relationship.”

Procedurally, Cesar appealed from an order denying its summary judgment motion to dismiss the third-party complaint; Blodgett cross-appealed from the denial of his own summary judgment motion. The Appellate Division affirmed across the board, holding that material factual disputes required a trial.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • The Fourth Department affirmed denial of summary judgment to both Cesar and Blodgett.
  • The Court held that the “non-client/no privity” framing did not warrant dismissal on this record because the evidence indisputably established Blodgett was a client of Cesar.
  • The Court found triable issues as to whether Blodgett made a specific request that the broker procure insurance covering him individually as owner of the property, and whether the broker failed to do so.
  • The Court held that failure to timely read/understand the policy is, at most, comparative negligence and does not bar the broker negligence claim as a matter of law.
  • The Court further found triable issues whether a special relationship existed, potentially giving rise to a duty to advise about additional coverage even absent a specific request.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) The baseline broker duty and the “specific request” requirement

The Court’s legal framework is anchored in Court of Appeals decisions that tightly define an insurance broker’s default duties:

  • Voss v Netherlands Ins. Co., 22 NY3d 728 (2014) — Quoted for the “general principle”: brokers must obtain requested coverage or timely notify the client they cannot, but have no continuing duty to advise on additional coverage absent special circumstances. Voss also supplies the modern three-factor formulation for “special relationship” (discussed below).
  • American Bldg. Supply Corp. v Petrocelli Group, Inc., 19 NY3d 730 (2012), rearg denied 20 NY3d 1044 (2013) — Cited for two propositions central to this decision: (i) in ordinary broker-client negligence claims, liability generally requires proof that the insured made a particular/specific request for a certain type of coverage that was not procured; and (ii) an insured’s failure to read the policy does not automatically bar recovery (it may support comparative negligence).
  • Murphy v Kuhn, 90 NY2d 266 (1997) — Used to emphasize that brokers ordinarily do not owe an ongoing advisory duty, while recognizing “exceptional and particularized situations” where additional duties may arise by conduct or contract.
  • Hoffend & Sons, Inc. v Rose & Kiernan, Inc., 7 NY3d 152 (2006) — Reinforces that in the ordinary setting, negligence typically turns on whether requested coverage was sought and not obtained.

The Fourth Department applied these authorities to hold that the record contained conflicting testimony on the key “specific request” question—precluding summary judgment for Cesar and also preventing Blodgett from winning as a matter of law.

2) “Special relationship” as an exception to the no-continuing-duty rule

The Court relied primarily on Voss v Netherlands Ins. Co. and Murphy v Kuhn to explain that a broker may owe additional duties where a “special relationship” develops, including a duty to advise or direct a client to obtain additional coverage even without a specific request. The Court highlighted two Voss pathways potentially supported by this record:

  • “some interaction regarding a question of coverage, with the insured relying on the expertise of the agent”; and
  • “a course of dealing over an extended period of time” putting an objectively reasonable agent on notice that advice was sought and relied on.

In support of allowing the special-relationship theory to proceed, the Court also cited:

  • Lincoln Life & Annuity Co. of N.Y. v Wittmeyer, 211 AD3d 1564 (4th Dept 2022) — Cited as a Fourth Department application of Voss in assessing whether the evidence creates a triable issue on special relationship.
  • Finch v Steve Cardell Agency, 136 AD3d 1198 (3d Dept 2016) — Cited for the proposition that interactions about coverage and reliance may raise fact issues on special relationship.

3) The policy-reading issue: comparative negligence, not a complete bar

The Court reiterated the Court of Appeals’ rejection of a per se “you didn’t read the policy” bar:

  • American Bldg. Supply Corp. v Petrocelli Group, Inc., 19 NY3d 730 (2012) — The insured’s failure to read the policy can be comparative negligence but does not defeat the broker-negligence claim as a matter of law.
  • Crosby v AJA Turnpike Props., 224 AD3d 538 (1st Dept 2024) and Gibraltar Contr., Inc. v P.F. Northeast Brokerage, Inc., 189 AD3d 432 (1st Dept 2020) — Cited as recent Appellate Division applications of the same principle.

4) Summary judgment and credibility: why the case could not be decided on motion

The Court emphasized that conflicting testimony about what was requested and what was communicated to the broker raised credibility issues that cannot be resolved on summary judgment:

  • Smith v NGM Ins. Co., 221 AD3d 1450 (4th Dept 2023) — Cited for the rule that credibility determinations are not made on summary judgment.
  • Vega v Restani Constr. Corp., 18 NY3d 499 (2012) — Cited for the general summary judgment standard prohibiting fact-finding/credibility determinations.

5) Pleading/duty framing: duty as an element, not an affirmative defense

Blodgett argued Cesar’s “no duty” position was waived as an unpleaded affirmative defense. The Court rejected that framing by treating duty as an element of negligence that plaintiff must prove (so its “nonexistence” need not be pleaded as an affirmative defense):

  • Archambault v Knost, 132 AD2d 909 (3d Dept 1987) — Quoted for the proposition that the nonexistence of duty is not an affirmative defense to be pleaded/proved by defendant when duty is an element of plaintiff’s claim.
  • US Bank N.A. v Nelson, 169 AD3d 110 (2d Dept 2019), affd 36 NY3d 998 (2020) — Cited for the pleading principle that a general denial of elements suffices; one need not plead an “affirmative defense” that merely negates what the plaintiff must prove.

6) “Client” status and privity: rejecting the “non-client” theory on this record

Cesar argued it owed no duty because Blodgett was a “non-client” lacking privity. The Court held the evidence “indisputably” established Blodgett was a client, noting his prior dealings and procurement of insurance through Cesar for other business/property ventures. The Court distinguished:

  • Gatto v Allstate Indem. Co., 173 AD3d 1711 (4th Dept 2019), lv denied 34 NY3d 904 (2019) — Cited as a contrasting example where the circumstances differed on whether a party could be treated as the broker’s client.

7) Fact-pattern analogs on broker failure-to-procure

On the “specific request”/failure-to-procure theory, the Court cited Appellate Division cases illustrating that where evidence conflicts about what was requested, summary judgment is inappropriate:

  • Crosby v AJA Turnpike Props., 224 AD3d 538 (1st Dept 2024)
  • Gibraltar Contr., Inc. v P.F. Northeast Brokerage, Inc., 189 AD3d 432 (1st Dept 2020)
  • Petri Baking Prods., Inc. v Hatch Leonard Naples, Inc., 151 AD3d 1902 (4th Dept 2017)

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Identify the governing duties. The Court began with the standard rule: brokers must procure requested coverage within a reasonable time or inform the client they cannot; they generally owe no continuing duty to recommend additional coverage.
  2. Resolve the threshold “client” dispute. Although Cesar framed the case as non-client/no-privity, the record showed Blodgett had an established broker relationship with Cesar (including prior business/property policies), and that he arranged the meeting that resulted in the policy at issue. That was sufficient—on this record—to treat him as a client rather than a stranger to the brokerage relationship.
  3. Apply the “specific request” standard to disputed facts. Blodgett and Marcey testified they requested coverage for both the optical business and the property (owned by Blodgett individually). The broker’s memory was incomplete, Cesar’s notes were lost, and some testimony suggested the business failed to convey that Blodgett separately owned the property. The Court held these conflicts create trial issues regarding: (i) what was requested/communicated; (ii) whether the broker was “aware of such request”; and (iii) whether the broker failed to procure the requested coverage.
  4. Reject “failure to read the policy” as dispositive. Even if Marcey (or Blodgett) did not timely read and understand the policy or renewals, that goes to comparative negligence and apportionment—not outright dismissal.
  5. Allow the “special relationship” theory to proceed. The Court found evidence that could support two Voss factors: interactions about the coverage question and reliance on broker expertise, and a course of dealing over time (before and after the initial policy, and across similarly structured ventures). That sufficed to create a triable issue of special relationship and an attendant advisory duty.
  6. Deny plaintiff’s cross-motion for the same reason. Because the record contained credibility questions and factual conflicts, Blodgett was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law either.

C. Impact

  • Practical expansion of “client” arguments in broker cases (fact-driven). The decision signals that broker attempts to re-characterize a party as a “non-client” may fail where there is evidence of an ongoing brokerage relationship and direct involvement in procuring the policy—even if another person (here, Marcey) was the one who purchased/renewed the policy paperwork.
  • Documentation and recordkeeping matter. The broker’s incomplete recollection and the loss of meeting notes underscore the litigation risk brokers face when underwriting conversations are not preserved—especially when the dispute turns on whether a “specific request” was made.
  • Renewals can deepen “special relationship” exposure. The Court’s focus on repeated renewals that continued to omit the property owner suggests that ongoing interactions and repeated transactions may strengthen arguments that advice was sought and relied upon over time (a key Voss pathway).
  • Insureds’ failure to read policies remains relevant—but usually not dispositive. The Court reaffirmed that non-reading is typically a comparative negligence issue; thus, broker defendants should expect that dismissal on this ground alone will be difficult unless other elements fail as a matter of law.
  • More cases may reach trial where testimony diverges. The decision reinforces that broker-liability disputes often hinge on credibility (who said what, what was asked for, what was understood), making summary judgment a challenging vehicle when deposition testimony conflicts.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary judgment
A pretrial ruling granted only if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and one party is entitled to win as a matter of law. If witness accounts conflict on key points, the case usually goes to trial.
Duty (in negligence)
A legal obligation owed by defendant to plaintiff. In broker-negligence cases, the duty typically concerns obtaining requested coverage or advising under special circumstances.
Privity / “non-client”
“Privity” refers to a direct relationship recognized by law. Brokers often argue they owe no duty to strangers to the brokerage relationship. Here, the Court found evidence Blodgett was not a stranger—he was a client.
Specific request for coverage
Under New York law, a broker is usually liable only if the insured asked for a particular kind of coverage and the broker failed to obtain it (a general “get me coverage” request is usually not enough).
Special relationship
An exception where the broker’s conduct and dealings create heightened obligations (e.g., advising on additional coverage) because the insured sought and relied on the broker’s expertise in a way beyond the ordinary broker-client relationship.
Comparative negligence
A rule that reduces (but does not necessarily eliminate) damages if the plaintiff’s own conduct contributed to the loss—here, potentially not reading the policy and missing that Blodgett was not named.
Third-party action
A claim by a defendant (Blodgett) against another party (Cesar) seeking to shift liability or recover damages connected to the main lawsuit.

5. Conclusion

Adams v Blodgett does not rewrite New York broker-liability doctrine; rather, it concretely applies the Court of Appeals framework (Voss v Netherlands Ins. Co., American Bldg. Supply Corp. v Petrocelli Group, Inc., Murphy v Kuhn) to a common commercial scenario: a business policy issued and renewed without naming the property owner, followed by an uncovered premises-liability claim.

The key takeaways are practical and litigation-centered: (1) “non-client” defenses may fail where the record shows an established broker relationship; (2) conflicting evidence about what was requested and communicated will typically defeat summary judgment; (3) failure to read the policy is usually comparative negligence, not a complete bar; and (4) repeated dealings and reliance may create a triable “special relationship” supporting an advisory-duty theory.