Transportation Services Agreements Can Create “Contractor” Status: Up-the-Ladder Immunity for Manufacturers Assuming Delivery/Transport Work by Contract

Case: Minova USA, Inc. v. Tom Jolly (Ky. Feb. 19, 2026)  |  Court: Supreme Court of Kentucky  |  Disposition: Reversing Court of Appeals; summary judgment for manufacturer reinstated

1. Introduction

This decision addresses the scope of Kentucky’s “up-the-ladder” workers’ compensation immunity under KRS 342.610(2)(b) and KRS 342.690 when the injured worker is employed by a motor carrier delivering a manufacturer’s raw materials. The core question was whether Minova USA, Inc. (“Minova”), a manufacturer, qualified as a statutory “contractor” entitled to tort immunity after Tom Jolly (“Jolly”), a Trimac-employed truck driver, was seriously injured on Minova’s premises during unloading operations.

Jolly received workers’ compensation benefits from his direct employer, Trimac, but sued Minova in tort. Minova asserted the exclusive-remedy defense, claiming “contractor” status because it had contracted for transportation services that were a regular and recurrent part of its work. The trial court granted Minova summary judgment; the Court of Appeals reversed; the Supreme Court of Kentucky reinstated the trial court’s judgment.

2. Summary of the Opinion

• No waiver of exclusive-remedy defense: Minova adequately pled the exclusive-remedy defense under CR 8.03 by citing KRS 342.690 and KRS 342.610; Kentucky’s notice-pleading standard did not require detailed factual averments in the answer.
• Minova is a “contractor” as a matter of law: The transportation and delivery of limestone filler was “regular or recurrent” work that Minova assumed “by contract” through a detailed transportation services agreement with Trimac.
• Key limiting principle: The Court distinguished (i) substantial transportation services assumed by contract from (ii) delivery “incident to the purchase and sale of goods,” which “without more” would not create statutory employment.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Pleading and waiver of affirmative defenses

• Gordon v. NKC Hospitals, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 360 (Ky. 1994): Recognized that the exclusive-liability provision is an affirmative defense subject to waiver if insufficiently pled. The Court used Gordon as the starting point but held Minova’s pleading met Kentucky’s notice standard.
• Russell v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 610 S.W.3d 233 (Ky. 2020): Reinforced Kentucky’s notice-pleading framework—pleadings must give “fair notice” and identify the claim/defense; evidentiary detail is unnecessary.
• Seiller Waterman, LLC v. RLB Props., 610 S.W.3d 188 (Ky. 2020): Distinguished. Seiller Waterman demanded greater factual support for a disfavored tort claim (WUCP) under CR 8.01. Here, Minova asserted an affirmative defense under CR 8.03, which the Court read as requiring only affirmative identification of the defense.
• Eaker v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 473 S.W.3d 153 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015): Declined as inapplicable because Missouri’s affirmative-defense rule requires “facts showing” entitlement to the defense; Kentucky’s CR 8.03 does not.

2) The up-the-ladder framework and “regular or recurrent” work

• Beaver v. Oakley, 279 S.W.3d 527 (Ky. 2009): Provided the general statement of up-the-ladder immunity and emphasized a “practical and functional—not hypertechnical—” approach.
• Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Sherman & Fletcher, 705 S.W.2d 459 (Ky. 1986): Articulated the policy of preventing subcontracting to irresponsible parties and confirmed that a company may be a contractor even if it “never perform[ed] that particular job with his own employees.”
• General Elec. Co. v. Cain, 236 S.W.3d 579 (Ky. 2007): The controlling modern formulation of “regular or recurrent.” Cain’s key contribution here was twofold: (i) “regular” means customary/usual/normal (including work assumed by contract or required by law); (ii) the work must be of a kind the business “or similar businesses would normally perform or be expected to perform with employees.” Cain also warned that “beneficial,” “incidental,” or “necessary to stay in business” is not enough.
• Daniels v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 933 S.W.2d 821 (Ky. App. 1996): Quoted by Cain for the definition of “recurrent” (repeated, though not “with the preciseness of a clock”).
• Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991): Provided the summary judgment framework (no genuine issue of material fact; entitlement as a matter of law).
• Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409 (Ky. 1998): Defined “substantial evidence” supporting statutory-employer status.

3) Delivery/transport cases and “assumption by contract”

• Tom Ballard Co. v. Blevins, 614 S.W.2d 247 (Ky. App. 1980): Central to the Court’s reasoning. Cain cited Blevins for the proposition that transportation/delivery work can become part of a business “by contract.” Here, the Court extended that logic to a manufacturer that contracted for dedicated transportation services with extensive operational obligations.
• Uninsured Emp'rs' Fund v. Ritchie, 2012-SC-0746-WC, 2014 WL 1118201 (Ky. Mar. 20, 2014): Distinguished because there was “no evidence of [the] manufacturer’s assumption of delivery and transport work by contract.” The Court rejected reliance on Ritchie given Minova’s detailed services agreement.
• Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Uninsured Em'rs' Fund, 364 S.W.3d 88 (Ky. 2011): Quoted to reinforce that a contractor can qualify under KRS 342.610(2)(b) even if it never does the work with its own employees; the analysis is relationship-specific.
• Black v. Dixie Consumer Prods., LLC, 835 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2016): Quoted for the “burden/benefit” tradeoff rationale of workers’ compensation systems and the idea that workers will receive compensation regardless of fault, coupled with corresponding tort immunity.
• Out-of-state and federal persuasive authorities were used primarily to frame the “purchase-and-sale” distinction and to illustrate when transportation is “incident” rather than “substantial services”: Davis v. Ford Motor Co., 244 F.Supp. 2d 784 (W.D. Ky. 2003); Kelly v. TRC Fabrication, LLC, 487 P.3d 723 (Idaho 2021); Dobransky v. EQT Prod. Co., 273 A.3d 1133 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2022).

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The pleading holding: “fair notice” is enough for exclusive-remedy defenses

The Court treated exclusive-liability as a waivable affirmative defense, but held Minova’s answer—explicitly invoking the exclusive-remedy provisions “including” KRS 342.690 and KRS 342.610—provided sufficient notice under Kentucky’s liberal pleading rules. The Court drew a sharp line between:

• CR 8.01 claims (“showing” entitlement to relief), which may require factual allegations beyond legal conclusions in certain contexts (as in Seiller Waterman), and
• CR 8.03 defenses, which require a defendant to “set forth affirmatively” the defense without pleading evidentiary facts.

This also defeated Jolly’s equitable arguments (estoppel/laches) premised on alleged concealment or delay: once the defense was plainly pled in the answer, the case proceeded with discovery on that issue.

2) The immunity holding: substantial contractual transportation services can make delivery “part of the work”

The dispositive question was whether Jolly’s work (transporting limestone filler from Lhoist to Minova) was “work of a kind which is a regular or recurrent part” of Minova’s business under KRS 342.610(2)(b). The Court accepted:

• Regular/recurrent in frequency: hundreds of loads per year and dozens per month established repetition and regularity.
• Assumption “by contract”: Minova’s transportation services agreement did more than arrange incidental delivery; it imposed substantial, ongoing operational duties and integrated Trimac’s work into Minova’s site procedures and performance management.

Using Cain’s framework, the Court reasoned that these provisions demonstrated Minova’s “direct involvement” and that transportation/receipt/unloading of the raw material was “part of the work” of Minova’s business “assumed by contract,” aligning with the principle drawn from Tom Ballard Co. v. Blevins. At the same time, the Court attempted to preserve a limiting line: mere delivery “incident, ancillary, or auxiliary” to a purchase-and-sale transaction—without a particularized showing of contractual assumption of substantial services—would not create statutory employment.

3) Summary judgment posture

Because the material facts were undisputed (including the contract terms and delivery cadence), the Court treated statutory-employer status as a question of law reviewed de novo under General Elec. Co. v. Cain. It held Minova produced “substantial evidence” of statutory employment and Jolly did not produce contrary evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.

C. Impact

1) Practical consequences for manufacturers and logistics contracts

• Expanded pathway to immunity via contract design: Businesses that procure transportation through detailed, operationally integrated “transportation services agreements” (training, site procedures, exclusivity, KPIs, recurring operational meetings) have stronger arguments that transport/delivery is “assumed by contract” and therefore within KRS 342.610(2)(b).
• Fact-intensive boundary remains: The Court expressly distinguished ordinary retail-style delivery (its examples included “Amazon, DoorDash, Uber Eats, Office Depot, Lowe’s”) as typically “incident to the purchase and sale of goods,” implying no immunity absent special contractual assumptions and integration.
• Litigation focus shifts to contract terms and operational control: Future cases will likely turn on (i) whether the agreement is framed as “services” rather than mere shipment; (ii) the degree of site integration, compliance requirements, and performance management; and (iii) dedication/exclusivity that suggests the carrier is functioning as an extension of the recipient’s operations.

2) Pleading impact: defenses can be preserved broadly

• Defendants can preserve workers’ compensation exclusivity defenses with relatively simple, statute-citing pleadings, relying on discovery to develop factual support—reducing waiver risk so long as the defense is clearly identified.

3) The dissent’s warning and likely future fault line

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Exclusive remedy (workers’ compensation): If an injury is work-related, the worker usually can’t sue the employer in tort; the remedy is workers’ compensation benefits.
• Up-the-ladder immunity: Tort immunity can extend beyond the direct employer to a “contractor” higher in the contracting chain if the subcontracted work is a “regular or recurrent” part of the contractor’s business under KRS 342.610(2)(b).
• Statutory employer / contractor: Not necessarily the entity that signs the paycheck. It can be a business that hires another company to do recurring work that is part of its own business (including work it takes on “by contract”).
• “Regular or recurrent”: Work that is customary/usual/normal or repeatedly performed—not merely helpful or necessary in a broad sense. Kentucky also asks whether the business (or similar ones) would normally be expected to do the work with its own employees.
• Purchase-and-sale vs. substantial services: Ordinary delivery that comes with buying goods is usually just part of commerce; but if the contract requires substantial, ongoing operational services (training, site rules, performance metrics, dedicated carriage), a court may treat delivery/transport as part of the recipient’s work.

5. Conclusion

Minova USA, Inc. v. Tom Jolly establishes (and clarifies) two important Kentucky rules. First, a defendant does not waive workers’ compensation exclusivity by failing to plead detailed facts; citing the exclusive-remedy statutes in an answer provides sufficient notice under CR 8.03. Second—and more significantly—Kentucky’s high court confirmed that a manufacturer can qualify as a statutory “contractor” entitled to up-the-ladder immunity when it assumes transportation/delivery work “by contract” through a detailed transportation services agreement integrating the carrier’s work into its operational processes, thereby moving the relationship beyond mere delivery incidental to purchase and sale.