Traffic-Stop Challenges Require Plausible Facts, Not Conclusory Allegations of Misconduct
Case: Andre Davis v. The Borough of Leonia
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Decision date: November 4, 2026
Disposition: Dismissal affirmed, modified to make dismissal of the minor plaintiff’s claims without prejudice.
Precedential status: The opinion expressly states that it is not precedential under Third Circuit I.O.P. 5.7. It therefore applies existing law rather than establishing a new binding rule. Its principal lesson concerns the factual specificity necessary to challenge a traffic stop and the limits of repeated opportunities to amend an insufficient complaint.
1. Introduction
This appeal arose from a March 2023 traffic stop in Leonia, New Jersey, and the subsequent towing and continued retention of Andre Jamel Davis’s vehicle. Davis, proceeding without counsel, brought constitutional and tort claims against the Borough of Leonia, doing business as the Leonia Police Department; Officers Raymond Forsdahl and Brandon McNeil; and Sano’s Broadview Corporation, doing business as Sano’s Towing. His nine-year-old son, K.L.D., was also named as a plaintiff.
The central appellate question was whether Davis had alleged sufficient facts to make unlawful police conduct plausible. Related questions concerned the treatment of allegations of profiling and falsification, the consideration of municipal-court records, and whether Davis should receive another opportunity to amend his complaint.
The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Davis’s claims. It concluded that his allegations did not plausibly undermine the objective grounds for the stop and ensuing enforcement actions. The court nevertheless protected the minor plaintiff’s position by modifying the judgment: because K.L.D. lacked counsel, dismissal of his claims had to be without prejudice.
2. Factual and Procedural Background
The stop and towing
Officer Forsdahl stopped Davis on March 21, 2023, stating that the vehicle’s license plates did not match the vehicle to which they were registered. Davis disputed the stop’s legality and asserted that he was neither “a driver nor a U.S. Citizen,” had no contract with the police department, and was “touring.”
Forsdahl issued citations for driving on a suspended license, failing to produce registration, and failing to produce proof of insurance. Other officers, including McNeil, arrived at the scene. Forsdahl arranged for Sano’s Towing to remove the vehicle, leaving Davis and his son with their belongings. Davis alleged that subsequent efforts to recover the vehicle, including visits to the police department and towing company with proof of ownership, were unsuccessful.
The litigation
Davis filed suit on April 26, 2023. His claims included abuse of process, equal protection, procedural due process, unlawful detention, conversion, and violations of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act. The opinion also identifies unjust enrichment, a Takings Clause claim, and municipal liability among the matters raised during the litigation.
The District Court dismissed the initial complaint and an amended complaint, allowing amendment each time. It then dismissed the operative second amended complaint with prejudice. Davis appealed, challenging both the dismissal and the refusal to permit a third amended complaint.
Although Davis requested guidance concerning representation of K.L.D., no attorney appeared for the child after the appellate court addressed that issue. The Third Circuit therefore considered the appeal only as to Davis and modified the child’s dismissal to be without prejudice.
3. Summary of the Opinion
The court’s disposition rests on six principal conclusions:
- The complaint did not plausibly allege an unlawful stop. Davis failed adequately to plead the absence of reasonable suspicion, particularly in light of the asserted plate discrepancy and the traffic-related circumstances described in his own account.
- Conclusory allegations were insufficient. General assertions of profiling and falsification did not supply enough factual support to make misconduct plausible.
- Objective circumstances controlled the ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis. Allegations about an officer’s subjective intentions did not substitute for facts undermining reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
- Several issues were forfeited on appeal. Davis did not pursue challenges concerning unjust enrichment, conversion, the Takings Clause, municipal liability, or the New Jersey Civil Rights Act in his appellate brief.
- Further amendment was not required. After multiple opportunities to amend without stating a viable federal claim, the District Court acted within its discretion in denying another amendment.
- The minor’s claims required different treatment. Their dismissal was changed to dismissal without prejudice because the child was not represented by counsel.
The judgment was otherwise affirmed. Although that disposition encompassed the judgment involving the towing company, the appellate opinion’s substantive constitutional analysis focused on the Leonia defendants. It did not announce a separate rule governing private towing companies’ liability.
4. Precedents Cited and Their Influence
A. Appellate review and pleading requirements
- Castleberry v. STI Grp., 863 F.3d 259, 262–63 (3d Cir. 2017)
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This decision supplied the standard of plenary review for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The appellate court independently examined whether the complaint stated a legally sufficient claim, rather than deferring to the District Court’s assessment of that question. This differs from the discretionary review applicable to the denial of further amendment.
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009), and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)
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These decisions supplied the governing plausibility standard. A complaint must contain factual material supporting a reasonable inference of liability; legal conclusions and assertions establishing only a possibility of misconduct do not suffice. The court applied that distinction to Davis’s allegations that the officers profiled him and falsely described his license plates.
- Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244–45 (3d Cir. 2013)
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This precedent required liberal construction of Davis’s self-represented pleadings while confirming that a pro se litigant must still allege sufficient supporting facts. It reconciled procedural solicitude for an unrepresented plaintiff with the ordinary requirement that a complaint state a plausible claim.
- Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128–30 (3d Cir. 2010)
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The court used this decision to answer Davis’s argument that the District Court improperly resolved factual disputes against him. Well-pleaded factual allegations receive a presumption of truth, but conclusory assertions do not. Thus, disregarding an unsupported conclusion is analytically different from rejecting a sufficiently pleaded fact.
- Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Twp., 808 F.2d 1023, 1026 (3d Cir. 1987)
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This authority reinforced the conclusion that Davis’s generalized profiling allegations could not simply be accepted at face value. Their deficiency was the absence of factual development explaining the alleged profiling, not a categorical rule that discriminatory policing cannot be challenged.
- Guthrie v. Lady Jane Collieries, Inc., 722 F.2d 1141, 1145 n.1 (3d Cir. 1983)
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This case established that the appellate court could affirm on a ground different from the District Court’s reasoning when the record supported the judgment. Its role was to define the permissible scope of affirmance, not to supply an independent substantive ground for police liability or immunity.
B. Reasonable suspicion, probable cause, and objective justification
- Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000), and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)
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These cases supplied the basic rule permitting a brief investigatory stop when officers possess reasonable, articulable suspicion of unlawful activity. Illinois v. Wardlow also explained that reasonable suspicion is less demanding than probable cause but still requires a minimum level of objective justification. They framed the initial-stop inquiry.
- United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273–74 (2002)
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This decision required consideration of the totality of the circumstances. Its influence was methodological: the court assessed the circumstances collectively rather than treating each allegation in isolation when evaluating the plausibility of Davis’s challenge.
- United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2002)
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The court cited this case for the definition of probable cause: reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a reasonably cautious person to conclude that an offense has occurred. It provided the framework for evaluating the enforcement actions following the stop, while preserving the distinction between probable cause and the lesser reasonable-suspicion standard.
- United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2006)
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The opinion quoted this decision for the proposition that “any technical violation of a traffic code legitimizes a stop.” It supported the conclusion that an objectively supported traffic violation can justify intervention even if the violation appears minor. The requirement of an objective basis for the stop nevertheless remains.
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)
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This decision established that officers’ subjective intentions play no role in ordinary probable-cause analysis. It answered Davis’s attempt to focus the Fourth Amendment inquiry on alleged motives rather than objective circumstances. Its use should not be read as eliminating the distinct relevance of discriminatory intent to a properly pleaded equal-protection claim.
- United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 419 (1981)
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The court relied on this authority to emphasize objective facts known to law enforcement and their collective significance. Together with Whren v. United States, it directed attention away from unsupported characterizations of motive and toward the circumstances supporting the officers’ actions.
- Brown v. City of Albion, 136 F.4th 331, 342 (6th Cir. 2025)
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The court cited this out-of-circuit decision for the need to plead facts plausibly suggesting that officers lacked sufficient evidence to establish a substantial chance of criminal activity. It provided persuasive support for the pleading analysis; as a Sixth Circuit decision, it was not binding Third Circuit authority.
- United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 398 (3d Cir. 2006)
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This case appeared alongside United States v. Mosley in support of the court’s conclusion that the objective circumstances described by Davis justified the traffic-enforcement response. The opinion used it to reinforce the objective traffic-stop framework, not to announce an independent rule authorizing every vehicle impoundment.
C. Amendment, appellate forfeiture, and judicial notice
- Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)
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This decision supplied the established framework for evaluating whether further amendment should be allowed. The court emphasized Davis’s repeated failure to cure deficiencies despite previously permitted amendments. Although amendment is generally favored, that opportunity need not be extended indefinitely.
- Jones v. Unknown D.O.C. Bus Driver and Transp. Crew, 944 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 2019)
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This precedent supported denial of further amendment when amendment would be inequitable or futile. Applied with Foman v. Davis, it supported the District Court’s discretionary decision after Davis had already filed three versions of his complaint without stating a viable federal claim.
- Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 235 (3d Cir. 2004)
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This case supported treating claims not pursued in the appellate brief as forfeited. Its practical consequence was substantial: several claims fell outside meaningful appellate merits review even though they had been part of the litigation below.
- Werner v. Werner, 267 F.3d 288, 295 (3d Cir. 2001)
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This decision supplied the principle that courts may judicially notice facts not subject to reasonable dispute. It allowed the court to recognize the existence of the traffic charges reflected in public records without treating the motion to dismiss as an occasion for ordinary evidentiary fact-finding.
- Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007)
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This authority specifically supported consideration of publicly available state-court records and dockets, including the Leonia Municipal Court documents attached to the defendants’ motion. Its significance concerns the permissible materials considered at dismissal, not an automatic acceptance of every disputed assertion within those materials.
D. Protection of an unrepresented minor
- Osei-Afriye v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 883 (3d Cir. 1991)
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This precedent controlled the treatment of K.L.D.’s claims. A nonlawyer parent cannot litigate a child’s claims as the child’s attorney. Because no counsel appeared for K.L.D., the court confined its substantive review to Davis and modified the judgment so that the child’s claims were dismissed without prejudice rather than conclusively resolved against him.
5. Analysis of the Court’s Legal Reasoning
A. Plausibility, rather than proof, was the decisive threshold
The appeal concerned the legal sufficiency of a complaint, not a trial determination of what actually happened. Davis did not have to prove his case at the pleading stage. He did, however, have to supply factual allegations supporting a reasonable inference that the defendants acted unlawfully.
The court found a mismatch between his accusations and their factual support. Saying that officers engaged in profiling did not explain the factual basis for that accusation. Likewise, describing the license plates as “foreign” and “private,” while asserting that Forsdahl falsely reported a mismatch, did not sufficiently explain why the officer lacked an objective basis for the stop.
The opinion should not be understood to hold that an allegation of police fabrication is inherently conclusory. Its narrower conclusion is that Davis’s particular allegations, considered together, did not make the asserted misconduct plausible.
B. The initial stop and later enforcement actions require distinct attention
The initial stop required reasonable suspicion based on information available when the stop began. The officer’s stated plate discrepancy was therefore especially important. Davis’s later statements and the licensing, registration, and insurance issues were relevant to what happened after the stop.
This temporal distinction matters: facts discovered only after a stop cannot retroactively justify its inception. Although the opinion discusses the circumstances together, it expressly identifies Davis’s failure adequately to plead an absence of reasonable suspicion for initiating the stop. The decision is best read as relying on the alleged plate issue for that initial inquiry and the additional circumstances for the ensuing enforcement response.
Davis’s assertions that he was “touring,” was not a driver, or lacked a contractual relationship with the police did not plausibly negate the objective traffic-related grounds identified by the court. Nor does the opinion treat citizenship status itself as a basis for a stop; the relevant justification concerned vehicle and traffic matters.
C. Objective justification does not erase distinct constitutional inquiries
The court rejected Davis’s effort to place subjective police intentions at the center of the ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis. Nevertheless, the distinction between constitutional claims remains important. An objectively supported traffic stop does not, by itself, defeat every conceivable equal-protection claim. Here, the profiling allegations failed because they lacked sufficient factual support.
Similarly, the opinion does not establish that reasonable suspicion or probable cause necessarily disposes of every procedural-due-process challenge concerning retained property. It resolved the claims as pleaded and argued, without separately developing the procedural protections potentially applicable to continued vehicle retention.
D. Judicial notice established charges, not guilt
The court recognized that municipal-court records showed Davis had been charged with traffic offenses. The existence of those charges was a publicly documented fact appropriate for judicial notice.
That use of records must be distinguished from treating a charge as a conviction or as conclusive proof of the underlying conduct. The opinion did not identify a conviction, and judicial notice did not independently establish the truth of every factual assertion in the municipal records.
E. Forfeiture narrowed the scope of the decision
The affirmance does not mean that every pleaded theory received a developed appellate merits analysis. Challenges involving unjust enrichment, conversion, the Takings Clause, municipal liability, and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act were forfeited because Davis did not pursue them in his appellate brief.
This distinction limits the decision’s substantive reach. In particular, the opinion supplies no developed holding on the elements of municipal liability, the towing company’s status as a constitutional actor, or whether the vehicle’s continued retention independently supported a property-based claim.
F. Repeated amendment justified finality for Davis, but not a merits bar against his son
Davis had received two opportunities to amend before the operative complaint was dismissed. The court concluded that his continued failure to state a viable federal claim justified denying another opportunity. The result was tied to the history and deficiencies of this litigation, not to an automatic rule limiting every plaintiff to a fixed number of complaints.
K.L.D.’s position was different. Without counsel, his claims were not properly presented for merits litigation by his father. The modification to dismissal without prejudice preserved that distinction. It did not decide whether the child had a viable claim or remove any procedural defenses that might apply to a later action.
6. Potential Impact and Limits
Because the opinion is nonprecedential, its likely influence is persuasive and practical rather than binding.
- Traffic-stop pleading: The decision illustrates why a complaint should explain, through concrete facts, how the asserted justification for a stop was absent or fabricated.
- Discrimination allegations: A profiling label alone is insufficient; supporting facts must make discriminatory treatment plausible.
- Self-represented litigation: Liberal construction does not excuse factual deficiencies or preserve claims omitted from appellate briefing.
- Amendment practice: Repeated opportunities to amend strengthen the justification for final dismissal when the underlying defects remain uncured.
- Minor plaintiffs: A parent’s ability to represent himself does not authorize him to litigate his child’s separate claims.
The opinion should not be extended into a general rule that any traffic citation authorizes towing or indefinite vehicle retention. It neither develops such a rule nor comprehensively analyzes the safeguards applicable to impoundment. It also does not resolve qualified immunity or announce new doctrine governing private towing contractors.
7. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Reasonable suspicion
- A specific, objectively supported reason to suspect unlawful activity. It permits a brief investigation and requires less justification than probable cause.
- Probable cause
- Trustworthy facts sufficient to lead a reasonably cautious person to believe that an offense occurred. It is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Plausible pleading
- A complaint must provide enough factual substance to make liability a reasonable inference, rather than merely a possibility.
- Conclusory allegation
- A statement announcing wrongdoing without enough supporting facts—for example, asserting “profiling” without explaining the factual basis.
- Plenary review
- The appellate court independently decides the legal issue without deferring to the lower court’s conclusion.
- Judicial notice
- Recognition of an indisputable fact without ordinary proof, such as the existence of a public court filing. It does not automatically establish that all allegations in the filing are true.
- Forfeiture
- Loss of appellate consideration because an issue was not properly pursued, here through the appellate brief.
- Dismissal with or without prejudice
- Dismissal with prejudice generally prevents relitigation of the dismissed claim. Dismissal without prejudice does not itself impose that merits-based bar, although other obstacles may remain.
- Futile amendment
- An amendment that would not cure the complaint’s legal insufficiency.
8. Conclusion
The Third Circuit applied established pleading and traffic-stop principles to affirm dismissal of Davis’s claims. Its central message is that accusations of unlawful enforcement must be supported by facts plausibly undermining the officers’ objective justification; labels and unsupported conclusions are insufficient.
The opinion also underscores the consequences of abandoning issues on appeal and failing to cure deficiencies through repeated amendments. Its modification protecting K.L.D.’s unrepresented claims provides an important counterbalance: finality for the adult litigant did not justify a merits-preclusive dismissal against his child. These are practical applications of existing law, not new binding circuit precedent.