Title III Suppression Is Limited to True “Aggrieved Persons”: Unnamed Co‑Conspirators and Later Call Participants Cannot Suppress Earlier Intercepts

Case: United States v. Leron Liggins (No. 24-1894)  |  Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit  |  Date: February 18, 2026 (Murphy, J.)

1. Introduction

This Sixth Circuit opinion addresses who may invoke the suppression remedy under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (the federal wiretap statute), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520. The government conceded a procedural defect in an Arizona wiretap application (it was signed by an assistant attorney general rather than the “principal prosecuting attorney” contemplated by 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2)). Leron Liggins sought to suppress evidence he claimed was “derived” from interceptions of calls involving suspected trafficker Luz Jiminez—calls that ultimately pointed investigators to him.

The litigation posture was unusual. Liggins’s first trial resulted in convictions, later vacated because the original district judge should have recused. See United States v. Liggins, 76 F.4th 500 (6th Cir. 2023). On remand before a new judge, Liggins filed a pretrial Title III suppression motion targeting (i) cash seized in Phoenix and Jiminez’s testimony, and (ii) heroin seized in Detroit and testimony from courier DeHaven Murphy.

The key issues were:

• Preservation: whether the government waived/forfeited the argument that Liggins was not an “aggrieved person” entitled to seek suppression under Title III.
• Merits: whether Liggins qualified as an “aggrieved person” under 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11), given he did not participate in the intercepted October 21–22 calls that identified “Rondo” (Liggins) and the luggage pickup plan.
• Remedy scope: the case also implicated (but the court did not reach) how far “evidence derived” and attenuation principles extend under 18 U.S.C. § 2515.

2. Summary of the Opinion

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shape the Decision)

1) Title III framework and suppression mechanics

• United States v. Gardner, 32 F.4th 504 (6th Cir. 2022): Cited for the basic structure of Title III—its prohibition and its authorization procedures—anchoring the court’s statutory starting point.

2) “Aggrieved person” as a merits question (not jurisdiction)

• Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 587 U.S. 658 (2019): Used to contrast nonwaivable Article III standing with waivable statutory/merits “standing” concepts.
• Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014): Supports the proposition that statutory standing is typically a merits inquiry about who may sue (or move), not a jurisdictional bar.
• United States v. Jackson, 849 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2017): Reinforces that Title III “standing” is not Article III standing.
• United States v. Russell, 26 F.4th 371 (6th Cir. 2022): Provides the closest analogue—Fourth Amendment “standing” is a personal-rights merits issue that can be waived/forfeited by the government; the court imports that conceptual framework to Title III.

3) Waiver vs. forfeiture; timeliness; appellate review standards

• United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993): Supplies the canonical definitions—waiver is intentional relinquishment; forfeiture is failure to timely assert.
• Walker v. United States, 134 F.4th 437 (6th Cir. 2025): Cited for waiver’s “knowledge + intent” character and standards of review about preservation determinations.
• Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463 (2012): Supports the idea that courts generally should not resurrect intentionally waived defenses.
• United States v. Dale, 156 F.4th 757 (6th Cir. 2025) and Bannister v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 49 F.4th 1000 (6th Cir. 2022): Used for timeliness/custom and plain-error review concepts; in context, they explain why the court did not treat the government’s supplemental raising of the issue as a forfeiture.
• United States v. Clariot, 655 F.3d 550 (6th Cir. 2011): A practical preservation principle—if the district court reaches the merits, the appellate court is reluctant to find forfeiture based on how the issue surfaced.
• United States v. Noble, 762 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2014): Distinguished; Noble involved waiver by failing to raise an issue in the opening appellate brief, unlike this case.

4) Remand/mandate doctrine: “wipe the slate clean” after recusal remand

• United States v. O'Dell, 320 F.3d 674 (6th Cir. 2003): Provides the “mandate rule” framework and when remand limits issues.
• United States v. Moore, 131 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 1997), United States v. McFalls, 675 F.3d 599 (6th Cir. 2012), United States v. Pembrook, 79 F.4th 720 (6th Cir. 2023), United States v. Schumaker, 83 F.4th 1031 (6th Cir. 2023): These cases supply the general-versus-limited remand taxonomy and the presumption of general remand absent limiting language. The panel uses them to hold the recusal remand reopened the case “from scratch,” allowing new litigation positions.
• United States v. Gibbs, 626 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. 2010), plus discussion of United States v. McKinley, 227 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 2000), and United States v. Adesida, 129 F.3d 846 (6th Cir. 1997): These frame “appellate forfeiture” concerns; the court finds them inapplicable because there was no earlier district court ruling against the government on aggrieved-person status and, in any event, the government is the appellee in this appeal.

5) The “aggrieved person” circuit split and the court’s non-resolution

• Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969): Central historically; the opinion draws on Alderman’s treatment of standing in early wiretap contexts and its dictum suggesting Title III standing does not exceed Fourth Amendment standing.
• Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980): Cited to describe older Fourth Amendment “person aggrieved” conceptions (victim of the search; possessory/premises interests).
• United States v. Scasino, 513 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Ruggiero, 928 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Cruz, 594 F.2d 268 (1st Cir. 1979): Illustrate the narrower “historical approach” limiting Title III standing to participants or those with a premises/property nexus.
• United States v. Oliva, 705 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Apple, 915 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Civella, 648 F.2d 1167 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Giraudo, 225 F. Supp. 3d 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (Breyer, J.): Provide the broader “plain-text”/target theory, conferring standing on named “targets” even absent participation or property nexus.
• United States v. Cooper, 868 F.2d 1505 (6th Cir. 1989) and United States v. Asker, 676 F. App'x 447 (6th Cir. 2017): Sixth Circuit touchpoints. Cooper is treated as binding against “one intercepted call gives standing to challenge all calls.” Asker is used to show the question remains open regarding target standing, but also to reinforce call-by-call limitations.

6) “Any” in statutory interpretation (rejecting the “one call opens everything” argument)

• United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 (1997): Notes the generally expansive nature of “any.”
• Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. Dep't of Def., 583 U.S. 109 (2018) and Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004): Provide the crucial caveat—context can narrow “any.”
• Home Depot U. S. A., Inc. v. Jackson, 587 U.S. 435 (2019) and United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350 (1994): Examples where the Court did not give “any” its maximal breadth.
• Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214 (2008) (n.4) and United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398 (1999): Support a constrained, context-sensitive reading.
• Sackett v. EPA, 598 U.S. 651 (2023): Cited in connection with “aggrieved” as a denial of legal rights, reinforcing that the term implies a personal invasion.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Preservation: why the government could press “aggrieved person” on remand

The panel’s preservation analysis proceeds in three steps:

• Title III standing is waivable/forfeitable: It is not jurisdictional; it is a statutory merits limit on who may file a suppression motion. The court treats it like Fourth Amendment “standing.”
• No waiver: The government never intentionally relinquished the argument (no express concession; no withdrawal; no conduct showing knowing abandonment).
• No forfeiture under the district court’s process: Although the government first raised the argument in a supplemental brief after the new judge flagged it, the district court entertained full briefing and argument before ruling. Under Sixth Circuit practice, when the district court addresses an issue on the merits after adversarial development, appellate courts are disinclined to label it forfeited.

Importantly, the court reads its earlier recusal-based remand as general, not limited. That matters because a general remand permits parties (and the new judge) to revisit issues and defenses that were not pressed previously. In effect, the court treated the recusal remand as re-starting the case before a new judge rather than continuing a constrained set of proceedings.

2) Merits: why Liggins was not an “aggrieved person” under either circuit approach

Title III defines an “aggrieved person” as: a person who was a party to any intercepted wire, oral, or electronic communication or a person against whom the interception was directed (18 U.S.C. § 2510(11)).

The court deliberately avoids choosing between:

• Historical/Fourth Amendment approach: standing limited to participants in intercepted calls or those with a premises/property nexus; and
• Plain-text/target approach: standing may extend to investigative targets (often, those named in the application/order).

Liggins failed under both because the record was devoid of the critical connecting facts:

• He did not participate in the October 21–22 intercepted calls.
• The calls were not shown to have occurred on his premises or on his devices.
• He was not identified as a “target” in the Arizona wiretap application or order.
• There was no evidence he was an unnamed-but-actually-targeted person (as opposed to a later-discovered conspirator “by happenstance”).

3) Rejection of Liggins’s three attempted routes to standing

• Later-call bootstrap (October 31): Even if Liggins could suppress a later call in which he participated, that did not give him authority to suppress earlier interceptions. The panel cites Sixth Circuit precedent (United States v. Cooper, as explained in United States v. Asker) and also adopts a contextual statutory reading of “any” to reject “global” standing.
• “Mentioned in the call” theory: Being discussed (Jiminez said “Rondo”) does not make someone a “party” to the call. The court treats “party” as participation, not subject matter.
• Generic “unknown co-conspirators” as “targets”: Broad investigative language seeking to identify “other co-conspirators yet unknown” did not transform every later-discovered co-conspirator into a person “against whom the interception was directed.” The court notes that, in practice, “target” standing in other courts has been tied to those “named” in the wiretap materials (e.g., United States v. Oliva; United States v. Civella).

C. Impact

1) Practical limits on Title III suppression in multi-defendant conspiracies

The opinion meaningfully constrains suppression attempts by defendants who are “downstream” from wiretap interceptions: if they are not participants, not tied to the premises/devices, and not identified (or demonstrably treated) as targets, they cannot invoke Title III suppression—even if intercepted calls indirectly pointed investigators toward them.

2) Call-by-call approach is reinforced in the Sixth Circuit

By treating United States v. Cooper as controlling against “one call opens all calls,” the court reinforces a segmented, communication-specific model: Title III suppression rights attach to the specific interceptions that invade the defendant’s protected statutory interests.

3) Remand and litigation strategy consequences

• For prosecutors: After a general remand (especially following recusal), the government may reframe suppression litigation and raise “aggrieved person” objections even if not advanced earlier—so long as the defendant receives a fair chance to respond.
• For defense counsel: The decision emphasizes the evidentiary burden to prove “aggrieved person” status. It will often require wiretap materials (applications/orders), proof of device/premises use, or record evidence of targeting—not merely conspiracy membership or later investigative developments.

4) The circuit split remains open—inviting a future case

The Sixth Circuit explicitly leaves unresolved whether § 2510(11) embraces “target” standing beyond Fourth Amendment concepts. That keeps forum-dependent outcomes possible and tees up future litigation where a defendant is a named target but not a participant in particular calls (or where the government allegedly omitted a known target from the application).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Title III: The federal statute regulating wiretaps. It sets who can apply, what an application must contain, and what courts must find before authorizing interceptions.
• “Aggrieved person” (18 U.S.C. § 2510(11)): The category of people allowed to ask a court to suppress illegally intercepted communications (and derivative evidence). This is sometimes loosely called “standing,” but it is a statutory eligibility requirement, not constitutional jurisdiction.
• Statutory “standing” vs. Article III standing: Article III standing determines whether federal courts can hear a case at all (jurisdiction). Title III “standing” determines whether a particular defendant qualifies for a statutory remedy (suppression).
• Waiver vs. forfeiture: Waiver is an intentional decision to give up an argument; forfeiture is failing to raise it on time. Waived arguments usually cannot be revived; forfeited arguments sometimes can be reviewed under stricter standards.
• General vs. limited remand: A limited remand sends a case back for a narrow task. A general remand reopens proceedings more broadly. Here, the recusal remand was treated as general—allowing issues to be litigated anew.
• “Evidence derived” / attenuation (18 U.S.C. § 2515): Even when an interception is illegal, suppression typically turns on whether later evidence is truly a product of that illegality or whether intervening events make the connection too weak (“attenuated”). The court did not reach these questions because it resolved the case on aggrieved-person status.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Leron Liggins reaffirms a strict gatekeeping principle for Title III suppression: a defendant must be an actual “aggrieved person” as to the intercepted communications at issue, and cannot obtain suppression merely because intercepted calls indirectly led investigators to him. The court also clarifies litigation mechanics in the remand setting—particularly that a general remand following recusal allows renewed litigation over defenses like Title III “standing,” and that raising such an issue through supplemental briefing can be timely when the district court permits full adversarial testing before ruling.