Third-Party Electric Submetering Providers Are “Electric Light Companies” (Public Utilities) Under R.C. 4905.03(C)

1. Introduction

Case: In re Complaint of Ohio Power Co. v. Nationwide Energy Partners, L.L.C., Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-1406 (Ohio Apr. 22, 2026).
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio.
Parties: Ohio Power Company (“AEP Ohio”) (appellant); Nationwide Energy Partners, L.L.C. (“NEP”) (intervening appellee); Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (“PUCO”) (appellee).

NEP operates a large-scale electric “submetering” business for multi-unit residential properties. Under contracts with landlords, NEP buys electricity (often at commercial rates), installs and maintains metering/distribution equipment, bills tenants directly (including deposits and payment plans), and may disconnect service for nonpayment. AEP Ohio challenged NEP’s model at PUCO, asserting NEP was unlawfully acting as a public utility (and also violating territory and certification statutes). PUCO concluded it lacked jurisdiction, reasoning that (i) tenants were not the “consumers” and (ii) NEP was not “engaged in the business of supplying electricity,” characterizing NEP as the landlords’ “agent.”

The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed. The central statutory question was whether NEP fits the definition of an “electric light company” under R.C. 4905.03(C) and is therefore a “public utility” under R.C. 4905.02(A), subject to PUCO’s supervisory jurisdiction.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court held that NEP is subject to PUCO jurisdiction because NEP is “engaged in the business of supplying electricity … to consumers within this state” under R.C. 4905.03(C).

  • Tenants are “consumers” of electricity within the ordinary meaning of the word; PUCO’s narrower reading was rejected.
  • NEP “supplies” electricity and does so as a business: it purchases electricity, resells it to thousands of tenants, provides the delivery/measurement apparatus, bills directly, and can disconnect.
  • Contract labels do not control: calling NEP an “agent” and asserting landlords “take title” does not alter the substantive/economic reality of NEP’s role.
  • The court reversed PUCO’s no-jurisdiction determination and remanded for PUCO to address AEP Ohio’s remaining claims on the merits.
  • The court vacated PUCO’s order requiring AEP Ohio to file a reseller tariff designed to constrain NEP (because PUCO’s approach and premise required reconsideration) and vacated PUCO’s finding that AEP Ohio violated R.C. 4905.26, remanding both issues for further consideration in light of NEP’s public-utility status.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

In re Complaint of Wingo v. Nationwide Energy Partners, L.L.C., 2020-Ohio-5583

This was the court’s prior major encounter with NEP and submetering. In Wingo, the court reversed PUCO for using an extra-statutory jurisdictional test rather than applying the text of R.C. 4905.03. The present opinion builds on Wingo’s insistence on textual statutory analysis, but goes further by deciding the jurisdiction question on a developed record. The court also reprises Wingo’s observation that the General Assembly could clarify submetering jurisdiction, yet emphasizes that absent legislation, the court must apply the existing statutory text.

Pledger v. Pub. Util. Comm., 2006-Ohio-2989

PUCO treated Pledger as “definitive” on whether landlords (not tenants) are the “consumers.” The court sharply limited Pledger’s force in this setting for multiple reasons:

  • The “consumer” discussion in Pledger was arguably dicta, because the case was already resolved on jurisdictional grounds.
  • Pledger reflected then-prevailing deference to agency statutory interpretation, which the court has since repudiated.
  • Pledger treated statutory definitions as “not self-applying,” an approach incompatible with Wingo’s textual constraint on PUCO and the court.
  • Pledger wrongly assumed there can be only one “consumer”; the present opinion explains both landlords and tenants can be “consumers.”

In effect, the court does not formally overrule Pledger but confines it, correcting its “either-or” framing and re-centering analysis on ordinary meaning.

TWISM Ents., L.L.C. v. State Bd. of Registration for Professional Engineers & Surveyors, 2022-Ohio-4677

TWISM is used for two key propositions: (i) where the issue is purely legal, review is de novo; and (ii) “the judicial branch is never required to defer to an agency’s interpretation of the law.” This provides the methodological backbone for rejecting PUCO’s interpretive stance and for independently construing “consumers” and “supplying electricity.”

In re Application of Moraine Wind, L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-3224

The court cites Moraine Wind for a disciplined understanding of dicta—statements unnecessary to resolve a case lack precedential force. This supports the court’s view that Pledger cannot bear the weight PUCO placed upon it regarding “consumers.”

In re Complaints of Inscho v. Shroyer's Mobile Homes, PUCO Nos. 90-182-WS-CSS, 90-252-WS-CSS, and 90-350-WS-CSS, 1992 WL 937210

This PUCO decision supplied the “Shroyer test” used in older landlord-tenant utility-resale disputes. The Supreme Court’s current opinion does not apply the Shroyer framework; rather, consistent with Wingo, it treats extra-textual tests as improper substitutes for the statutory definition in R.C. 4905.03(C).

Jonas v. Swetland Co., 119 Ohio St. 12 (1928)

Jonas is the origin of what PUCO framed as a “landlord-tenant exception.” The Supreme Court reinterprets Jonas narrowly: it is best understood not as a categorical exemption for landlords, but as a recognition that a landlord reselling utilities incidentally to renting space may not be “in the business of supplying electricity.” This becomes critical: even if a landlord is not in that business, a third-party reseller like NEP can be.

Hanson v. Kynast, 24 Ohio St.3d 171 (1986)

PUCO’s decision leaned on NEP’s contracts describing NEP as an “agent.” The Supreme Court uses Hanson to emphasize the hallmark of agency: the principal’s right of control over the agent’s actions in pursuit of the principal’s objectives. Applying that standard, the court found NEP does not operate as a traditional agent because landlords lack control over crucial decisions (supplier selection; pricing within a cap; operations), NEP is not compensated like an agent (NEP pays landlords), and NEP supplies the tools/equipment.

Willoughby Hills Dev. & Distrib., Inc. v. Testa, 2018-Ohio-4488

The contracts claimed landlords “take title” to electricity at the master meter. Citing Willoughby Hills (and its Black’s Law definition), the court treats “title” as the legal right to control/dispose of property, then finds landlords do not meaningfully obtain such rights: NEP must deliver to tenants; tenants must pay NEP; landlords cannot redirect or resell the electricity. The “title” language is thus not outcome-determinative.

In re Complaint of Wingo, PUCO No. 17-2002-EL-CSS, 2021 WL 3036829

This remand proceeding ended with voluntary dismissal, highlighting why the jurisdiction question remained unresolved post-Wingo—and why the present case became the vehicle for a definitive statutory application to NEP’s model.

In re Complaint of Pledger v. Capital Properties Mgt., Ltd., 2004 WL 2578713

This PUCO order (quoted in Pledger) exemplified the “ancillary to the landlord’s business” rationale. The Supreme Court uses that theme not to immunize third parties, but to explain that “ancillary” reasoning might keep a landlord outside the statutory definition while leaving a specialized reseller (NEP) inside it.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) Text-first approach to jurisdiction

The court framed PUCO’s jurisdiction as a statutory question governed by R.C. 4905.03(C) (definition of “electric light company”) and R.C. 4905.02(A) (public utilities include an electric light company). Because the facts were largely undisputed, the decisive issue was legal: whether those facts satisfy the statutory terms “consumers” and “engaged in the business of supplying electricity.” Under TWISM, the court reviewed de novo without deference.

(b) “Consumers” includes tenants

The court adopted ordinary meaning (dictionary definitions) and concluded tenants plainly “consume” electricity. It rejected PUCO’s attempt to limit “consumer” to landlords and clarified that multiple “consumers” can exist along a chain of purchase/resale. The court also curtailed reliance on Pledger to the extent it suggested otherwise.

(c) NEP “supplies” electricity and does so “as a business”

The opinion emphasizes operational realities: NEP purchases electricity, provides and maintains the distribution and metering equipment, sets resale pricing (subject to a cap in these contracts), bills tenants directly, handles customer service, and disconnects for nonpayment—earning profit on the spread between its purchase cost and resale price. On these facts, NEP “provide[s] or furnish[es]” electricity and is “in the business” of doing so across many properties.

(d) No “pass-through immunity” from landlord status

PUCO reasoned that if landlords can resell utilities without being utilities, then NEP—cast as their agent—should likewise escape jurisdiction. The court rejected the premise: even if a landlord is not “in the business” of supplying electricity (because resale is incidental to renting), it does not follow that a specialized third-party reseller is not in that business. NEP’s scale, profit motive, and dedicated service function make resale central—not incidental—to its enterprise.

(e) Contractual labels (“agent,” “take title”) do not govern statutory status

The court treated “agent” language as non-controlling and tested agency against substance: right of control, compensation structure, and supply of tools/equipment (drawing on Hanson v. Kynast and the Restatement cited in the opinion). Likewise, “take title” wording did not change who actually controlled disposition of electricity; the landlords had no practical legal power consistent with true title.

(f) Remedial posture: reverse, vacate, and remand

Because PUCO’s jurisdictional conclusion drove its disposition of AEP Ohio’s other claims and shaped its tariff directive and R.C. 4905.26 finding, the court reversed the no-jurisdiction ruling and remanded for PUCO to address the merits with the correct jurisdictional premise. It also vacated the reseller-tariff order and the R.C. 4905.26 finding for reconsideration.

3.3. Impact

  • Regulatory inclusion of third-party submeters: The decision establishes that a company with NEP’s functional role—buying electricity, reselling it to end users, billing, and disconnecting—fits within “electric light company” and is a “public utility” under R.C. 4905.03(C) and R.C. 4905.02(A). This invites (and arguably compels) PUCO oversight of similar submetering providers.
  • Limits on “landlord-tenant exception” reasoning: The court recasts Jonas v. Swetland Co. and the “ancillary” rationale as fact-dependent and not transferrable to specialized third-party resellers. Future litigants will have to confront whether resale is incidental to another business (landlord) versus the core business (submetering enterprise).
  • Substance-over-form contracting: The ruling signals that drafting choices—“agency” clauses, “title” clauses, retroactive “deemed ownership” of equipment—will not control jurisdiction when operational and economic realities show the reseller is the supplier in fact.
  • Downstream effects on certification/territory disputes: The court did not decide AEP Ohio’s R.C. 4933.83(A) and R.C. 4928.08(B) claims, but by confirming PUCO jurisdiction it clears the way for PUCO to adjudicate whether and how such statutes apply to NEP’s activities.
  • Administrative-law ripple: By anchoring its approach in TWISM and Wingo, the court reinforces a broader trend: Ohio agencies cannot fill statutory gaps with extra-textual jurisdictional tests, and courts will independently interpret jurisdictional statutes.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Public utility” / “electric light company” (R.C. 4905.02(A); R.C. 4905.03(C)): Ohio law treats an entity as a regulated public utility when it is in the business of supplying electricity to consumers in Ohio. If you sell electricity as a commercial enterprise to end users, you can fall within PUCO’s jurisdiction—even if you are not a traditional electric distribution utility.
  • “Consumer”: The court uses ordinary meaning: a consumer is a person who uses the product. Tenants who use electricity are consumers, even if a landlord or reseller sits between them and the original utility.
  • “Engaged in the business of supplying”: It is not just about who originally generated electricity. It is about who, as a business, provides electricity service to end users—purchasing it, delivering it through equipment, billing for it, and managing nonpayment (including disconnections).
  • Agency (“agent” vs. “independent business”): Calling someone an “agent” in a contract does not make it so. True agency typically requires the principal’s right to control the agent’s key actions and a compensation structure consistent with acting for the principal. Here, NEP’s discretion and profit model made it look like an independent supplier, not a controlled agent.
  • Dicta: A statement in a prior opinion that was not necessary to decide that case. The court treated parts of Pledger as arguably dicta and therefore not binding for the present statutory question.

5. Conclusion

In re Complaint of Ohio Power Co. v. Nationwide Energy Partners, L.L.C. establishes a clear, text-based rule: a third-party submetering company that purchases electricity and resells it directly to tenants—billing them and controlling service disconnection—is “engaged in the business of supplying electricity … to consumers” and therefore qualifies as an “electric light company” and “public utility” under R.C. 4905.03(C) and R.C. 4905.02(A). The court’s reasoning is notable for rejecting agency deference, limiting expansive readings of older landlord-tenant resale cases, and emphasizing economic realities over contractual labels. The immediate effect is to restore PUCO’s jurisdiction to regulate NEP and to require PUCO to reconsider related tariff and discrimination issues on remand under the correct jurisdictional premise.