Third-Party Deceit Qualifies as “By Means of Deceit” Under Colorado’s Attempt-to-Influence Statute (§ 18-8-306)

I. Introduction

In Hupke, Michael v. People, 2026 CO 31, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed the scope of section 18-8-306, C.R.S. (2025), which makes it a class 4 felony to attempt to influence a public servant by means of deceit with intent to alter or affect the public servant’s decision or action.

The case arose after Michael Thomas Hupke, while jailed on a parole hold, instructed his mother to give his parole officer a false account about his residential move—information relevant to whether the parole hold would be lifted. His mother conveyed the lie, and Hupke was convicted. The central legal issue was whether a defendant acts by means of deceit when the deceptive statement is delivered to the public servant through a third party rather than spoken directly by the defendant.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed Hupke’s conviction and held that the phrase by means of deceit in section 18-8-306 includes a defendant’s use of a third party to engage in deception on the defendant’s behalf. The Court reasoned that “deceit” is broadly defined as any act designed to mislead someone into believing something untrue, and using a messenger to deliver a lie is itself a deceptive act aimed at influencing a public servant.

Applying this interpretation, the Court concluded the evidence was sufficient: Hupke intended to affect the parole officer’s decision, directed his mother to deliver a false statement, and the lie was actually conveyed to the parole officer.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • People v. Janousek, 871 P.2d 1189 (Colo. 1994)
    • Role in the opinion: Janousek supplied both (1) the stated statutory purpose—to protect public servants from undue influence or intimidation by means of deceit—and (2) a foundational articulation of “deceit,” drawn from legal and general dictionaries.
    • Influence: The Court treated Janousek as anchoring a broad, conduct-focused meaning of deceit (trick, contrivance, false representation), which naturally accommodates indirect methods like using an intermediary.
  • McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44
    • Role: Provided the governing approach to statutory interpretation: courts seek legislative intent by starting with statutory text and applying plain and ordinary meaning.
    • Influence: Supported the Court’s text-first analysis and its refusal to add limitations (such as “personal deceit only”) that do not appear in the statute.
  • People v. Johnson, 2024 CO 32
    • Role: Reinforced the method for discerning ordinary meaning of undefined statutory terms by common usage.
    • Influence: Helped justify consulting modern dictionary definitions to confirm the breadth of “deceit.”
  • Manjarrez v. People, 2020 CO 53; Butler v. People, 2019 CO 87
    • Role: Established the de novo standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence and the rule that evidence is viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution.
    • Influence: Framed the Court’s application section, under which the recorded calls and the mother’s delivery of the lie provided a sufficient basis for a reasonable juror to convict.
  • In re People v. Beverly, 2025 CO 18
    • Role: Supported the presumption that the legislature’s chosen language is deliberate and carries its known effects.
    • Influence: Undercut Hupke’s policy argument that the statute should be read narrowly because comparable class 4 felonies include violent or property crimes; the Court declined to rewrite the statute based on relative severity.
  • People v. Hupke, 2024 COA 73, 557 P.3d 816
    • Role: The Supreme Court reviewed and affirmed the division’s conclusion that the statute’s plain language covers attempts to influence through deceptive misrepresentation designed to trick the public servant, including via a third party.
    • Influence: Provided the interpretive framing adopted and elaborated by the Supreme Court.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Text and ordinary meaning control.

    The Court began with the statutory phrase by means of deceit. Because “deceit” is undefined in section 18-8-306, the Court applied plain-and-ordinary-meaning analysis (supported by McCoy v. People and People v. Johnson) and leaned on People v. Janousek’s earlier definitions.

  2. “Deceit” is conduct-based, not speaker-based.

    The Court emphasized that deceit is any act designed to cause another to believe a falsehood. From that premise, the Court reasoned that using an intermediary to deliver the falsehood is itself an “act designed to deceive or trick”—and may be more effective precisely because the messenger could appear more credible.

  3. “By means of” links the deceptive mechanism to the influence attempt.

    The Court clarified an important limiting principle: section 18-8-306 does not criminalize deceit in the abstract; it targets attempts to influence a public servant by means of deceit. Therefore, if a defendant recruits a third party to lie but the lie never reaches the public servant, the conduct may fit other crimes (the Court referenced solicitation or conspiracy as possibilities) but does not complete an attempt-to-influence under this statute because the public servant cannot be influenced by information never conveyed.

  4. Policy arguments cannot override statutory language and purpose.

    Hupke argued it would be anomalous to treat his conduct as a class 4 felony given other class 4 felonies (the opinion gave examples including second degree assault and second degree motor vehicle theft). The Court rejected this as a basis to narrow the statute, finding no textual limitation and pointing to the statute’s purpose (from People v. Janousek) to protect the integrity of public-servant decision-making.

  5. Sufficiency of evidence followed from the new interpretation and undisputed facts.

    Applying Manjarrez v. People and Butler v. People, the Court held a reasonable juror could find: (1) the parole officer was a public servant; (2) Hupke wanted the hold lifted; (3) he directed his mother to convey a specific false narrative; and (4) the mother delivered the lie. That sequence supported an attempt to influence by means of deceit.

C. Impact

  • Expanded (and clarified) reach of section 18-8-306 to indirect deception.

    The holding squarely forecloses a “personal speech only” defense where a defendant orchestrates a lie through an intermediary. Future prosecutions can focus on whether the defendant used deception as the mechanism of influence, not on who physically spoke to the public servant.

  • Greater exposure for “messenger” scenarios in administrative and criminal-justice settings.

    The case is particularly relevant to contexts where defendants or interested parties commonly communicate through family members or other proxies (e.g., parole/probation interactions, benefit eligibility, licensing inquiries).

  • A built-in boundary: communication must reach the public servant.

    The Court’s explanation that the deceit must actually be used as the means of influence—i.e., conveyed to the public servant—limits overbreadth and separates section 18-8-306 from inchoate offenses like solicitation or conspiracy.

  • Prosecutorial theory may shift from accomplice frameworks to direct statutory satisfaction.

    Although third-party conduct is involved, the Court’s reasoning treats the defendant’s orchestration and use of the third party as satisfying the defendant’s own “by means of deceit” element, reducing the need to rely on derivative liability theories in many cases.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

“By means of deceit”
The deceptive method used to try to change what a public servant decides or does. After this case, the method can be indirect—such as having someone else deliver the lie.
Deceit vs. lying
A lie is one form of deceit. Deceit is broader and includes any trick or act designed to mislead—whether the defendant speaks directly or uses a messenger.
Attempt to influence a public servant
The crime is not “deceit alone,” but trying to affect a public servant’s official decision/action using deceit as the tool. The Court indicated the deceptive information must reach the public servant to serve as the “means.”
Sufficiency of the evidence (appellate review)
The appellate court asks whether, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—not whether the appellate judges would have decided the facts the same way.

V. Conclusion

Hupke, Michael v. People establishes a clear rule for section 18-8-306: a defendant acts by means of deceit even when the deceptive statement is delivered through a third party. The Court’s reasoning rests on the broad ordinary meaning of “deceit,” the statute’s integrity-protecting purpose, and a practical understanding that indirect communication can be a powerful (and sometimes more credible) way to mislead public officials.

Going forward, the decision strengthens enforcement against orchestrated misinformation directed at public servants, while maintaining an important limiting concept: deceit must function as the actual means of attempted influence, which presupposes that the deceptive message is conveyed to the public servant.