Date: May 25, 2026

Third Circuit Reaffirms Thornhill: § 3553(a)(2)(A) Remains Considerable in Mandatory § 3583(g) Revocations After Esteras

I. Introduction

In United States v. Devon Williams (3d Cir. May 21, 2026) (not precedential), the Court of Appeals reviewed a revocation sentence imposed after Devon Williams—already on federal supervised release—committed serious new state crimes (burglary and armed robberies) and other violations (drug use, treatment failures, and unauthorized residence).

The appeal presented a narrow but recurring sentencing question: in a mandatory revocation proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g), may (or must) a district court consider the “retribution” factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)—namely the need for a sentence to “reflect the seriousness of the offense,” “promote respect for the law,” and “provide just punishment”? Williams argued the district court should not have considered “promot[ing] respect for the law” and “just punishment.”

The Third Circuit affirmed, holding the district court acted consistently with controlling circuit precedent—particularly United States v. Thornhill, 759 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2014)—and that, in any event, Williams could not satisfy plain-error review.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed Williams’s 18-month, bottom-of-the-Guidelines revocation sentence, imposed consecutively to his lengthy state sentence. Because Williams did not object at sentencing, the court reviewed for plain error and found none.

The panel held that under Thornhill, a mandatory revocation sentence under § 3583(g) requires the court to consider the § 3553(a) factors, including § 3553(a)(2)(A). The court acknowledged the Supreme Court’s later decision in Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025), which prohibits considering § 3553(a)(2)(A) in discretionary revocations under § 3583(e)(3), but emphasized that Esteras expressly left open whether the same limitation applies to mandatory revocations under § 3583(g). Accordingly, Thornhill remains good law in the Third Circuit for § 3583(g) cases.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. United States v. Thornhill, 759 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2014)

Thornhill is the decisive authority. It held that in a mandatory revocation proceeding under § 3583(g), the statutory phrase “term of imprisonment” incorporates 18 U.S.C. § 3582, which in turn requires courts to “consider the factors set forth in section 3553(a).” On that logic, Thornhill concluded that the district court must consider the full § 3553(a) set, including § 3553(a)(2)(A).

In Williams’s case, the district judge explicitly relied on Thornhill when clarifying that the court had considered “just punishment,” doing so through the supervised-release framework of “breach of trust.” The Third Circuit treated this as straightforward application of controlling circuit law.

2. Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025)

Esteras is the major intervening Supreme Court decision that reshaped revocation sentencing—but only in the discretionary revocation setting. The Court held that district courts cannot consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) in revocations under § 3583(e)(3).

The Williams panel emphasized the limiting language in Esteras: the Supreme Court “did not resolve” whether § 3553(a)(2)(A) is permissible or required in mandatory revocations under § 3583(g). Because Esteras left that question open, the Third Circuit treated Thornhill as undisturbed and binding in the § 3583(g) context.

3. United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc)

Flores-Mejia supplied the procedural consequence of Williams’s sentencing colloquy: because he did not object to the district court’s consideration of “promot[ing] respect for the law” or “just punishment,” the appellate court applied plain-error review.

4. United States v. Williams, 974 F.3d 320 (3d Cir. 2020) and United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993)

These cases framed the strictness of plain-error relief. Under Olano and Third Circuit applications like United States v. Williams (2020), a defendant must show (among other things) an error affecting “substantial rights,” and even then the court must decide whether to exercise discretion because the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

The panel used this framework to provide an alternative basis to affirm: even assuming arguendo that referencing § 3553(a)(2)(A) were error, nothing suggested those brief references drove the sentence, which the district court justified independently by the seriousness of the violations and the bottom-of-the-range term.

5. Higgins v. Bayada Home Health Care Inc., 62 F.4th 755 (3d Cir. 2023) and United States v. Seighman, 966 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2020)

In a footnote, Williams suggested constitutional concerns (double punishment and Fifth/Sixth Amendment violations) because the revocation was triggered by conduct already punished in state court. The panel noted that a passing argument is likely forfeited under Higgins.

The court also relied on Seighman, which had already rejected similar constitutional attacks on § 3583(g). Additionally, the panel reasoned that any “novel” constitutional theory would be especially unlikely to satisfy plain-error standards.

B. Legal Reasoning

Identify the revocation regime: Williams’s new conduct triggered mandatory revocation under § 3583(g), not discretionary revocation under § 3583(e)(3).
Apply controlling circuit interpretation: Under Thornhill, § 3583(g) sentencing requires consideration of the § 3553(a) factors—including § 3553(a)(2)(A).
Address intervening Supreme Court authority: Esteras bars § 3553(a)(2)(A) consideration in discretionary revocations, but it expressly left open the mandatory revocation question; therefore Thornhill remains binding within the Third Circuit for § 3583(g).
Apply plain-error review: Because Williams did not object, he faced the high burden of showing plain error affecting substantial rights; the panel found no error and no plausible prejudice.

A notable feature is the district court’s articulation of “just punishment” through “breach of trust,” echoing a common revocation principle: revocation sentencing is not simply punishment for the new crime, but a sanction for violating the court’s conditions of supervision.

C. Impact

Doctrinal stability in the Third Circuit (for now): The opinion reinforces that Thornhill continues to govern § 3583(g) mandatory revocations post-Esteras, meaning district courts in the Third Circuit may (and under Thornhill, must) consider § 3553(a)(2)(A).
Deepening the mandatory/discretionary divide: After Esteras, revocation sentencing is now sharply bifurcated: § 3583(e)(3) discretionary revocations exclude § 3553(a)(2)(A), while § 3583(g) mandatory revocations in the Third Circuit include it.
Litigation posture matters: The case underscores how failure to object at sentencing can be outcome-determinative. Even when a legal issue is “in flux” nationally, plain-error review often prevents relief absent clear, prejudicial error.
Potential future Supreme Court resolution: Because Esteras reserved the § 3583(g) question, the legal rule applied here remains vulnerable to further Supreme Court clarification. Until then, Third Circuit district courts are expected to follow Thornhill.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised release revocation: A post-prison supervision system where violating conditions (e.g., drug use, leaving the district, committing new crimes) can result in additional imprisonment.
Mandatory vs. discretionary revocation: Discretionary revocation (often under § 3583(e)(3)) gives the judge a choice whether to revoke. Mandatory revocation (under § 3583(g) when certain violations occur) requires revocation.
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) factors (“retribution” factors): Sentencing considerations focused on seriousness, respect for law, and just punishment—distinct from deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitation.
“Breach of trust”: A revocation concept emphasizing that the defendant violated the court’s trust by breaking supervision rules; the revocation sentence addresses that violation as well as the risk and wrongdoing it reflects.
Plain-error review: A demanding appellate standard applied when the defendant did not object in the trial court; reversal generally requires a clear legal mistake that likely changed the outcome and seriously undermines the fairness or integrity of the proceedings.
Not precedential: The decision does not bind future Third Circuit panels, but it is still informative as to how the court applies binding precedents like Thornhill after Esteras.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Devon Williams confirms that, in the Third Circuit, a district court sentencing on mandatory revocation under § 3583(g) may—and under United States v. Thornhill, must—consider § 3553(a)(2)(A), including promoting respect for the law and providing just punishment. The decision also illustrates the practical power of plain-error review: absent a timely objection and a clear showing of prejudice, even significant sentencing-theory disputes are unlikely to produce reversal.