Third Circuit: No Plain-Error Allocution Relief Without Showing a Willingness to Speak; Rule 32 “Good Cause” Allows Late Guideline Objections to Ensure a Correct Range

1. Introduction

United States v. Cedrick Hodges (3d Cir. Aug. 27, 2026) is a nonprecedential Third Circuit decision affirming both convictions and a life sentence arising from an armed carjacking spree shortly after Hodges’s release from a lengthy prior sentence for violent sexual and robbery offenses.

The appeal presented a mix of trial and sentencing issues: (i) whether police had probable cause to arrest Hodges (and thus to search him incident to arrest), (ii) whether the District Court improperly limited impeachment of a police witness under the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Sixth Amendment, and (iii) whether multiple alleged sentencing errors— including an asserted denial of allocution, acceptance of an untimely obstruction enhancement request, an upward departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, and skepticism toward mitigation material not provided to probation—required resentencing.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed across the board:

  • Suppression: Officers had probable cause based on the description radioed at the time, Hodges’s proximity to the crimes, and his flight; the search incident to arrest was constitutional.
  • Impeachment / Rule 403: Exclusion of the arresting officer’s DWI-related false statements was not an abuse of discretion under Rule 403.
  • Confrontation Clause: The panel corrected the District Court’s premise that Rule 403 cannot implicate the Sixth Amendment, but held the limitation did not violate confrontation rights because the excluded impeachment would not have produced a “significantly different impression” of the officer’s credibility in this case.
  • Allocution: The District Court plainly erred by not clearly inviting Hodges personally to speak, but relief failed under plain-error prong four because Hodges did not even claim he would have allocuted.
  • Untimely obstruction enhancement request: The District Court could entertain the Government’s late objection for “good cause” under Rule 32(i)(1)(D) to ensure a correct Guidelines calculation.
  • Upward departure: The § 4A1.3 upward departure to criminal history category VI was within discretion given the seriousness of Hodges’s violent history and near-immediate recidivism (even though § 4A1.3 was later deleted by 2025 amendments).
  • Mitigation evidence timing: The District Court could assign limited weight to mitigation claims not earlier disclosed to probation because of verification/corroboration concerns.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Probable cause and suppression

  • United States v. Navedo and United States v. Kithcart (citing Ornelas v. United States): supplied the standard of review (clear error for facts; plenary for legal issues like probable cause).
  • Beck v. Ohio: anchored the principle that a warrantless search incident to arrest depends on probable cause for arrest.
  • Maryland v. Pringle: provided the objective “reasonable ground for belief of guilt” framework.
  • Devenpeck v. Alford (citing Pringle): reinforced that probable cause is assessed based on facts known to the officer at the time of arrest—here, the last dispatch description before Hodges was stopped.
  • Illinois v. Wardlow: supported the weight the panel gave to “headlong flight” as suggestive of wrongdoing when combined with other circumstances.

B. Impeachment limits, Rule 403 deference, and forfeiture

  • United States v. Sussman (quoting United States v. Mathis): emphasized “especially broad” district court discretion under Rule 403.
  • United States v. Universal Rehab. Servs. (PA): articulated the appellate restraint rule—reversal requires the district court’s Rule 403 balance to be “arbitrary or irrational,” not merely debatable.
  • United States v. Pelullo: used to deem Hodges’s broader Rule 608 challenge forfeited because he did not meaningfully develop it on appeal.
  • Gov't of V.I. v. Carino, United States v. Nevitt, and United States v. Rowe: treated as a cautionary detour—Carino’s language about not balancing prejudice to the prosecution was described as “curious,” tied to Nevitt’s now-obsolete reading of Rule 609(a), and undercut by later amendments (with Rowe noting Nevitt’s abrogation).

C. Confrontation Clause framework

  • Smith v. Arizona: supplied the key corrective: evidentiary rules (including Rule 403) do not themselves define the scope of federal constitutional rights.
  • United States v. Noel: provided the Third Circuit’s two-step test for confrontation limits—(1) whether cross-examination was significantly inhibited, and (2) if so, whether limits were reasonable given what the jury otherwise knew and whether credibility impressions would have changed significantly.
  • United States v. Fattah: served as an important comparator demonstrating that even when a witness is critical, district courts may impose “reasonable limits” to avoid confusion, stigma, or prejudice; the panel used Fattah to frame why Hodges’s excluded impeachment did not reach constitutional magnitude.

D. Allocution and plain-error review

  • United States v. Greenspan (quoting Green v. United States): established the requirement that a judge must “unambiguously” address the defendant personally and invite allocution, not merely address counsel or speak ambiguously.
  • United States v. Olano: supplied the four-part plain-error framework.
  • United States v. Adams: provided the Third Circuit’s presumption of prejudice (plain-error prong three) where a defendant was denied allocution and the court had discretion to impose a lower sentence.
  • Puckett v. United States: raised by the Government to challenge Adams, but the panel distinguished Puckett as addressing a different kind of “prejudice” claim and not displacing Adams’s allocution-specific approach.

E. Rule 32 timing, “good cause,” and guideline accuracy

  • United States v. Tomko: supplied standard of review for preserved sentencing procedure challenges (abuse of discretion).
  • United States v. Desu: cited for abuse-of-discretion review of “good cause” determinations under Rule 32.
  • United States v. Slater: a recent Seventh Circuit decision adopted as persuasive authority for allowing late Government objections where the court recognizes an “ultimate responsibility” to get the Guidelines range right.
  • Rosales-Mireles v. United States: used (through Slater) to underscore systemic importance of accurate Guidelines calculations.
  • United States v. Payo: invoked by Hodges to argue the court may not impose an enhancement based on an argument the Government did not make; the panel rejected that analogy because the Government did raise the issue (albeit late) and Rule 32’s good-cause mechanism, not waiver doctrine, controlled.

F. Upward departures and sentencing information

  • United States v. Harris: explained § 4A1.3’s purpose as flexibility where point totals do not fully capture culpability and dangerousness.
  • Pepper v. United States (quoting United States v. Watts) and 18 U.S.C. § 3661: supported the broad information-gathering and consideration authority at sentencing—bolstering the panel’s approval of the court’s decision to discount unverified late-disclosed mitigation without categorically excluding it.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Probable cause: description-at-the-time + proximity + flight

The panel treated the “relevant description” as the one radioed to the arresting officers immediately before the stop, consistent with Devenpeck v. Alford. It then folded in (i) geographic proximity on a cold night with little foot traffic and (ii) flight under Illinois v. Wardlow. The court acknowledged discrepancies (no mask visible; color variations) but characterized them as readily explainable (removable mask; lighting). The aggregate-of-circumstances approach is a straightforward application of Pringle and Beck.

B. Impeachment and Rule 403: high deference, low “arbitrary/irrational” threshold

Hodges sought to impeach the arresting officer with DWI-related lies (admissible in principle under Rule 608(b), per the Government’s concession). The District Court excluded them under Rule 403, reasoning (1) weak probative fit (off-duty, intoxicated, self-protective context) and (2) risk the jury would latch onto the conviction itself even though it was inadmissible. On appeal the panel effectively held: even if the balance is contestable, it was not “arbitrary or irrational” under United States v. Universal Rehab. Servs. (PA), and Rule 403 discretion is “especially broad” under United States v. Sussman.

C. Confrontation Clause: evidentiary discretion has constitutional boundaries, but not crossed here

The panel corrected the District Court’s categorical statement that a Rule 403 exclusion cannot violate the Sixth Amendment, citing Smith v. Arizona. But applying United States v. Noel, it found no confrontation violation because the excluded impeachment would not likely have produced a “significantly different impression” of the officer’s credibility in this case: the lie was personal, off-duty, and intoxication-linked rather than tied to investigative truthfulness in the charged incident.

D. Allocution: plain error exists, but no relief without a concrete claim of lost allocution

The panel read the sentencing transcript against the strict allocution requirement in United States v. Greenspan (and Green v. United States): the court must personally and unambiguously invite the defendant to speak. The panel found a plain error.

The critical move was at plain-error prong four: the court held the error did not “seriously affect” fairness, integrity, or public reputation because Hodges did not even assert that he would have allocuted if properly invited. Drawing from Greenspan’s discussion of strategic incentives (allocution can risk appeal posture or appear unrepentant), the panel treated Hodges’s silence on his intent as dispositive under prong four.

E. Late obstruction enhancement request: Rule 32 “good cause” + court’s independent duty

While acknowledging the Government missed Rule 32(f)(1)’s objection deadline, the panel upheld the district court’s decision to apply the obstruction enhancement anyway because Rule 32(i)(1)(D) permits new objections “for good cause.” The court leaned on United States v. Slater as a close analogue and endorsed the premise that sentencing courts must ensure an accurate Guidelines calculation (invoking Rosales-Mireles v. United States).

Importantly, the panel resisted converting Rule 32 deadlines into a forfeiture/waiver bar: the “consequence” is that the objection becomes discretionary, not that it becomes impossible. The panel also narrowed United States v. Payo by treating Rule 32 as the governing framework for PSR objections.

F. Upward departure and mitigation-weight decisions: discretion anchored to recidivism and verifiability

The court upheld the § 4A1.3 departure to category VI based on Hodges’s prior violent sex/robbery convictions (two separate incidents close in time but treated as one for career-offender purposes due to same arrest/sentencing date) and extremely rapid recidivism. Citing United States v. Harris, the panel framed § 4A1.3 as addressing under-representative point calculations.

On mitigation, the panel drew a distinction between believing Hodges was subjectively sincere and concluding the account’s factual completeness/accuracy was less verifiable because it was not provided early enough for probation to corroborate. Under Pepper v. United States and 18 U.S.C. § 3661, the sentencing judge could consider timing and verification as weight factors.

3.3 Impact

Although designated “NONPRECEDENTIAL,” the decision is likely to be cited for persuasive points in three recurring areas:

  • Allocution (plain-error prong four): The opinion signals that even where the allocution error is plain under Greenspan, a defendant’s failure to say he would have allocuted may be fatal at prong four—especially where strategic reasons not to allocute are plausible.
  • Rule 32 “good cause” flexibility: The panel’s reliance on United States v. Slater supports a practical approach: courts may entertain late guideline objections to avoid incorrect ranges, even when the Government is the late objector.
  • Confrontation vs. evidentiary rules: The opinion reinforces the constitutional “backstop” from Smith v. Arizona while still granting wide berth to trial judges where the marginal impeachment value is attenuated from the case-specific credibility dispute.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Probable cause: More than a hunch, less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt—whether a reasonable officer could believe, based on known facts at the time, that the suspect committed a crime.
  • Rule 403 balancing: Even relevant evidence can be excluded if it is likely to distract the jury, confuse issues, or create unfair prejudice that substantially outweighs its value.
  • Rule 608(b) impeachment: Allows limited questioning about specific instances of a witness’s untruthful conduct, but generally forbids using extrinsic evidence to prove them; trial judges still may limit questioning under Rule 403.
  • Confrontation Clause limits: Defendants have a constitutional right to cross-examine, but judges may impose reasonable limits; the question is whether the jury would have had a significantly different view of credibility without the restriction.
  • Allocution: The defendant’s personal right to address the judge before sentencing to ask for mercy, explain circumstances, or express remorse; courts must personally and clearly invite it.
  • Plain-error review (Olano): If a defendant did not object, reversal requires (1) error, (2) plainness, (3) prejudice to substantial rights, and (4) a serious effect on fairness/integrity of the proceeding.
  • Rule 32 “good cause”: A safety valve allowing late PSR objections when there is a legally sufficient reason—often tied to ensuring accurate Guidelines calculations.
  • Upward departure (former § 4A1.3): A Guidelines-era mechanism allowing a higher criminal history category when the computed category materially understated risk or seriousness (even if point totals were technically correct).

5. Conclusion

United States v. Cedrick Hodges affirms severe convictions and sentencing outcomes while clarifying several procedural pressure points. The opinion (i) applies a conventional, circumstance-aggregating probable-cause analysis; (ii) underscores the breadth of Rule 403 discretion and the demanding “arbitrary or irrational” reversal threshold; (iii) recognizes that evidentiary rules do not define constitutional confrontation rights but finds no Sixth Amendment violation on these facts; (iv) treats allocution error as insufficient for relief absent a concrete indication the defendant would have spoken; and (v) adopts a flexible Rule 32 “good cause” approach permitting late guideline objections in service of correct Guidelines calculations.