Third Circuit: Long-Present “Applicants for Admission” Detained in the Interior Are Not “Seeking Admission” Under INA § 1225(b)(2)(A) and Must Receive Bond Process Under § 1226(a) and the Fifth Amendment

1. Introduction

These consolidated habeas cases arose from a shift in federal immigration detention practice. Gabriel Antonio Buele Morocho (Ecuador) and Wanderson Lopes De Andrade (Brazil) each entered the United States without inspection (in 2001 and 2014, respectively) and lived in the country for years. In late 2025 and early 2026, Immigration and Customs Enforcement arrested them in the interior and detained them without bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Historically, similarly situated noncitizens apprehended within the United States after an entry without inspection were detained (or released on bond) under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which allows discretionary release if the person is not a danger or flight risk. Beginning in 2025, however, the Government relied on Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), to treat long-present interior arrests as subject to the mandatory detention regime of § 1225(b)(2)(A).

The key questions were (i) statutory—whether long-present, interior-arrested “applicants for admission” are also “seeking admission” so as to trigger mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), and (ii) constitutional—whether detaining such long-present noncitizens without any bond hearing violates the Fifth Amendment.

2. Summary of the Opinion

• Statutory holding (INA): The Third Circuit held that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not authorize mandatory detention of noncitizens who entered without inspection long ago and are arrested in the interior because they are not “seeking admission” within the ordinary meaning of that phrase. Their detention must proceed under § 1226(a), where bond is available.
• Constitutional holding (Due Process): Even apart from the statutory violation, the court held that detaining these long-present noncitizens without bond hearings violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, applying Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
• Disposition: The court affirmed the district courts’ habeas grants ordering release.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Statutory interpretation framework

• Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997): The court anchored its analysis in the “plain meaning” inquiry, emphasizing text, context, and statutory structure.
• Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526 (2004): Reinforced the principle that unambiguous statutory text must be enforced as written absent absurdity.
• TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001); Tavarez v. Klingensmith, 372 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2004): The “anti-surplusage” canon featured prominently; the court refused to read “seeking admission” out of § 1225(b)(2)(A).
• United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992): The court treated verb tense (“seeking” as a present participle) as meaningful, suggesting ongoing, active conduct.
• Dep't of Agric. Rural Dev. Rural Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42 (2024): Congress’s definitions are “virtually conclusive,” supporting use of the statutory definition of “applicant for admission” in § 1225(a)(1).
• Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024); Miller Plastic Prods. Inc v. NLRB, 141 F.4th 492 (3d Cir. 2025): The court declined to defer to the BIA’s new interpretation in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, expressly noting courts must conduct their own statutory analysis post-Loper Bright.
• Mullin v. Al Otro Lado, 146 S. Ct. 2079 (2026): The court used Al Otro Lado both for definitional context (admission) and to caution that redundancy may sometimes be tolerated, but found redundancy unnecessary because the ordinary meaning supported Petitioners.

B. Immigration detention structure and constitutional backdrop

• Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018): Although discussed as dicta, Jennings’ description of the statutory scheme—§ 1225 for those “seeking admission” and § 1226 for those “already in the country”—was treated as a persuasive structural guide.
• Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953): Cited for the principle that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies to “persons” within the United States, including those unlawfully present.
• Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020): The Government’s central due-process authority, rejected as inapposite because it concerned a person apprehended essentially at the border (“threshold of initial entry”), whereas Petitioners had “established connections” after years (or decades) of residence.
• United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004): Used to articulate the liberty interest in freedom from physical restraint and the traditional justifications for detention (danger and flight risk).
• Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003): The Government invoked Doe to argue flight risk/danger are “irrelevant” under § 1225, but the court distinguished Doe as involving reputational interests after a criminal conviction, not deprivation of physical liberty without a meaningful opportunity to contest detention rationales.
• Sanchez v. Mayorkas, 593 U.S. 409 (2021): Supported the court’s separation of “lawful status” from “admission,” reinforcing that “seeking admission” cannot be reduced to “seeking lawful presence” generally.

C. The inter-circuit landscape

The Third Circuit placed itself within a broad majority of circuits holding § 1225(b)(2)(A) inapplicable to long-present interior entrants: Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz; Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden; Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft; Cirrus Rojas v. Olson; Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock; Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin; Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami. It acknowledged the opposing view in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi (5th Cir.) and Avila v. Bondi (8th Cir.), underscoring a mature circuit split with multiple cert petitions pending.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Parsing the statute: “applicant for admission” vs. “seeking admission”

The Government relied on § 1225(a)(1), which “deems” a person “present in the United States who has not been admitted” an “applicant for admission.” The Third Circuit accepted that Petitioners fit that definition. But it treated § 1225(b)(2)(A) as adding a separate, non-redundant requirement: the applicant must also be “an alien seeking admission.”

Because Congress did not define “seeking admission,” the court used ordinary meaning (citing Feliciano v. Dep't of Transp., 605 U.S. 38 (2025)) and grammatical cues (citing United States v. Wilson). “Seeking” connotes a present, ongoing affirmative effort to obtain “admission,” itself defined as “lawful entry … after inspection and authorization” (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A)). People living in the interior for years after surreptitious entry are not ordinarily described as “seeking entry” at that time.

B. Anti-surplusage and article choice (“an”)

Central to the Third Circuit’s reading was the anti-surplusage canon (TRW Inc. v. Andrews). If all “applicants for admission” were necessarily “seeking admission,” Congress would not need to add the latter phrase. The court also drew significance from Congress’s use of “an” in “an alien seeking admission,” reasoning the indefinite article signals a distinct element rather than a mere appositive restatement.

C. Statutory structure: § 1225 (border/arrival) vs. § 1226 (interior/apprehension)

The court reinforced text-based meaning with structural fit. Section 1225 is titled and drafted around “inspection,” “arriving aliens,” and border-adjacent categories (crewmen, stowaways, contiguous-territory return), while 1226 is titled “Apprehension and detention of aliens” and governs detention pending removal decisions. The Supreme Court’s description in Jennings v. Rodriguez—§ 1225 for those “seeking admission” and § 1226 for those “already in the country”—provided a cohesive account consistent with the Third Circuit’s reading.

D. IIRIRA and later congressional action (Laken Riley Act)

The Government argued IIRIRA eliminated the old “entry doctrine” distinctions. The Third Circuit agreed IIRIRA equalized some procedural rules in removal proceedings but concluded it did not abolish the dual-track detention architecture. The court also treated Congress’s 2025 amendment to § 1226 via the Laken Riley Act (adding mandatory detention for certain inadmissible noncitizens involved in specified criminal conduct) as powerful contextual evidence: if § 1225(b)(2)(A) already mandated detention for essentially all unadmitted interior noncitizens, Congress’s targeted expansion of § 1226 would be difficult to explain without creating major redundancy.

E. Due process: Mathews balancing requires a bond hearing for long-present interior detainees

On the constitutional claim, the court emphasized that due process applies to all persons within the United States (Zadvydas v. Davis; Mathews v. Diaz). It treated Thuraissigiam as limited to “threshold of initial entry” scenarios and relied on its own characterization that Petitioners had “established connections” to the United States due to lengthy residence.

Applying Mathews v. Eldridge:

• Private interest: Freedom from physical restraint is a core liberty interest.
• Risk of error and value of safeguards: Without a neutral hearing on danger/flight risk, the risk of erroneous deprivation is high.
• Government interests: While preventing absconding and protecting the public are legitimate, the court found those interests do not justify detention without a hearing—particularly where the Government did not claim bond hearings were unduly burdensome and where the detainees had long residence and no criminal records.

The court therefore held detention without bond hearings violates procedural due process, and it did not reach substantive due process.

3.3. Impact

A. Immediate doctrinal effect in the Third Circuit

• Limits on mandatory detention authority: The Government may not use § 1225(b)(2)(A) to impose no-bond detention on long-present interior entrants solely because they are “applicants for admission” under § 1225(a)(1). The additional “seeking admission” element requires ongoing affirmative conduct to obtain lawful entry.
• Re-centering § 1226(a): Interior arrests of long-present noncitizens who entered without inspection fall back into § 1226(a) practice: eligibility for an individualized custody/bond determination focusing on flight risk and danger.
• Constitutional backstop: Even if statutory authority were disputed in future variations, the Third Circuit announced a due-process floor: prolonged (or even meaningfully significant) detention of long-present noncitizens without a bond hearing is constitutionally suspect under Mathews.

B. National significance

This decision deepens an acknowledged circuit split between the Fifth and Eighth Circuits (Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi; Avila v. Bondi) and the First, Second, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and now Third Circuits. The court’s express reliance on Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo to reject deference to Matter of Yajure Hurtado is particularly consequential: the dispute is framed as a pure judicial reading question, reducing the role of agency interpretation in bridging gaps.

C. The dissent’s alternative rule (and its implications)

Judge Mascott’s dissent would treat “applicant for admission” as necessarily “seeking admission” for purposes of § 1225(b)(2)(A), thereby authorizing mandatory detention without bond even for long-present interior entrants. The dissent also questioned whether due process requires a bond hearing, emphasizing the plenary power tradition and citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), and related removal-detention precedents.

Practically, the dissent’s approach would permit (and arguably require) a substantial expansion of mandatory no-bond detention for the interior undocumented population, shifting bond adjudication away from immigration courts for a large category of cases. The majority rejected that reading as inconsistent with text, structure, and Congress’s subsequent amendments to § 1226.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Applicant for admission”: A statutory label defined by Congress (§ 1225(a)(1)) that can include people already inside the U.S. who were never lawfully “admitted.”
• “Seeking admission”: Not defined by Congress. The Third Circuit read it in its ordinary sense as a current, affirmative effort to obtain lawful entry after inspection (not merely being present without admission).
• § 1225 vs. § 1226 (detention tracks): In the court’s view, § 1225 is the “arrival/inspection” track (border-focused) and § 1226 is the “interior apprehension pending removal” track with bond eligibility.
• Bond hearing: An individualized custody determination by an immigration judge assessing whether detention is necessary because of flight risk or danger.
• Parole: A separate, discretionary mechanism (§ 1182(d)(5)(A)) allowing temporary release for “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit,” not a substitute for bond.
• “Entry fiction”: A doctrine sometimes treating certain persons stopped at or near the border as if they have not “entered” for constitutional purposes. The court held this fiction cannot plausibly extend to people who have lived in the U.S. for many years.
• Mathews balancing: The test used to decide what procedures due process requires by weighing (1) the individual’s interest, (2) risk of error and value of more process, and (3) the government’s burden/interest.

5. Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s precedential decision establishes that mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not extend to long-present noncitizens arrested in the interior solely because they are “applicants for admission” under § 1225(a)(1). To trigger § 1225(b)(2)(A), the noncitizen must also be “seeking admission”—an ongoing affirmative effort to obtain lawful entry—so interior entrants are generally governed by § 1226(a) and must have access to bond determinations.

Independently, the court constitutionalized a baseline procedural safeguard: for long-present noncitizens with established connections to the United States, detention without any bond hearing violates procedural due process under Mathews v. Eldridge. In a landscape of intense inter-circuit disagreement and pending Supreme Court review, the opinion positions the Third Circuit firmly within the majority approach and underscores the post-Loper Bright reality that agency interpretations will not control this question.