Third Circuit Limits § 1225(b)(2)(A) Mandatory Detention to Noncitizens Actively “Seeking Admission” and Requires Bond Hearings for Long-Resident EWI Detainees

I. Introduction

In Gabriel Buele Morocho v. Warden Philadelphia FDC (consolidated with Wanderson Lopes De Andrade v. Director Philadelphia Field Office Immigration and Customs Enforcement), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed two habeas grants ordering the release of long-time U.S. residents detained by ICE without bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

The central dispute arose from a recent enforcement shift: until 2025, similarly situated noncitizens—those who entered without inspection years earlier and were later apprehended in the interior—were typically detained (or released on bond) under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Beginning in 2025, the Government increasingly used § 1225(b)(2)(A) to impose mandatory, no-bond detention on this population, relying in part on Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

The Third Circuit addressed two questions:

  1. Statutory: Does § 1225(b)(2)(A) apply to noncitizens long present in the United States after entering without inspection?
  2. Constitutional: Does detaining such noncitizens without a bond hearing violate Fifth Amendment due process?

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed the district courts’ release orders. It held:

  • INA holding: § 1225(b)(2)(A) requires mandatory detention only when the noncitizen is both an “applicant for admission” and is “seeking admission.” Although Petitioners were “applicants for admission” under § 1225(a)(1), they were not “seeking admission” in the ordinary, present-action sense contemplated by the statute. Therefore, § 1225(b)(2)(A) did not authorize their no-bond detention.
  • Due process holding: For long-resident, noncriminal noncitizens apprehended in the interior, detention without a bond hearing violates procedural due process under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The “entry fiction” analysis of Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020) did not control because Petitioners had “established connections” in the United States.

Judge Mascott dissented, reasoning that “seeking admission” should be read broadly to include all unadmitted noncitizens present in the United States, and that detention without bond is consistent with IIRIRA’s structure and Supreme Court precedent.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Statutory interpretation framework

  • Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997): Anchors the court’s method—plain meaning informed by text, context, and statutory structure.
  • Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526 (2004): Reinforces that unambiguous text controls absent absurd results.
  • TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001) and Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001): Support the anti-surplusage canon used to reject an interpretation that would read “seeking admission” out of § 1225(b)(2)(A).
  • Barton v. Barr, 590 U.S. 222 (2020) and Mullin v. Al Otro Lado, 146 S. Ct. 2079 (2026): Cited in addressing redundancy arguments; the court distinguishes them to hold that giving independent meaning to “seeking admission” best fits ordinary usage and the statutory scheme.
  • United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992): Supports the court’s reliance on verb tense (“seeking” as ongoing action).
  • Dep't of Agric. Rural Dev. Rural Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42 (2024): Used to emphasize that statutory definitions (here, “applicant for admission”) are “virtually conclusive.”

2. Administrative deference and independent judicial interpretation

  • Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024) and Miller Plastic Prods. Inc v. NLRB, 141 F.4th 492 (3d Cir. 2025): The court invokes the post-Loper Bright principle that courts must conduct their own statutory analysis and thus declined to defer to the BIA’s interpretation in Matter of Yajure Hurtado.

3. Supreme Court immigration detention and “tracks”

  • Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018): A cornerstone for the majority’s structural account—§ 1225 addresses detention of “aliens seeking admission,” while § 1226 addresses detention of “aliens already in the country.” Though characterized as dicta, the Third Circuit gives it weight.
  • Sanchez v. Mayorkas, 593 U.S. 409 (2021): Supports the distinction between “lawful status” and “admission,” bolstering the court’s insistence that “seeking admission” is not coextensive with all ways of being lawfully present (e.g., asylum).
  • Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020): Distinguished—applies the “entry fiction” at or near the border; does not strip long-resident interior detainees of due process protections.
  • Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953): Cited for the principle that due process applies to “persons” within the United States, including those present unlawfully.

4. Procedural due process methodology and detention justifications

  • Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976): Provides the three-factor balancing test applied to the lack of bond hearings.
  • Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004): Used to underscore the weight of the liberty interest in freedom from physical restraint.
  • United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) and Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979): Frame “dangerousness” and “flight risk” as traditional, constitutionally cognizable grounds that can justify detention—yet requiring neutral assessment to reduce erroneous deprivation.
  • Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003): The Government invoked it to argue flight risk/dangerousness are irrelevant; the Third Circuit rejected that analogy as mismatched to liberty deprivation without prior factual airing.

5. Inter-circuit conflict framing

The Third Circuit aligned with decisions holding § 1225(b)(2)(A) inapplicable to long-present EWI detainees: Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz; Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden; Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft; Cirrus Rojas v. Olson; Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock; Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin; Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami. It rejected the Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ contrary approach in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi and Avila v. Bondi.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The court’s key textual move: “applicant for admission” is not enough

The court begins with § 1225(b)(2)(A) and identifies four elements, focusing on whether an “applicant for admission” must also be “seeking admission.” It holds Congress defined “applicant for admission” in § 1225(a)(1), but did not define “seeking admission,” requiring ordinary-meaning analysis.

2. Ordinary meaning, verb tense, and surplusage

Using dictionary definitions (“ask for,” “try to acquire or gain”), the court treats “seeking” as active, ongoing conduct, reinforced by the present participle. Petitioners—long present after surreptitious entry—were not engaged in an active attempt to obtain “admission” (lawful entry after inspection and authorization, § 1101(a)(13)(A)) at the time of detention.

A decisive interpretive constraint is the anti-surplusage principle: if every “applicant for admission” were always “seeking admission,” Congress’s additional phrase would do no work. The Third Circuit therefore reads the statute to require two distinct conditions (applicant status plus active seeking).

3. The “an” article and the structure of the sentence

The opinion treats the indefinite article (“an alien seeking admission”) as evidence Congress did not intend an automatic identity between “an alien who is an applicant for admission” and “an alien seeking admission,” reinforcing independent meaning.

4. Statutory scheme: § 1225 (border/arrival) vs. § 1226 (interior detention)

The Third Circuit reads the INA as preserving distinct detention tracks:

  • § 1225 is oriented toward inspection and border/arrival processing (“arriving,” “crewm[e]n,” “stowaways,” contiguous-territory return).
  • § 1226 is oriented toward apprehension/detention within the country pending removal proceedings and includes a bond mechanism.

The court uses titles/headings as confirmatory aids and leans on Jennings v. Rodriguez for the same conceptual split.

5. IIRIRA’s purpose: parity in proceedings, not abolition of detention distinctions

The Government argued IIRIRA erased the old “entry doctrine” differences between those who entered unlawfully and those who presented at the border. The Third Circuit accepts that IIRIRA equalized certain features of removal proceedings (e.g., burdens of proof), but finds no clear textual indication it also eliminated the detention distinction between interior detainees eligible for bond and arriving detainees subject to mandatory detention.

6. Later-in-time statutory signals: the Laken Riley Act

The court treats Congress’s 2025 amendment to § 1226(c) via the Laken Riley Act (adding mandatory detention for certain “inadmissible” noncitizens who commit specified crimes) as evidence that Congress assumed § 1226 continues to govern detention of at least some unadmitted noncitizens in the interior. Otherwise, the new mandatory-detention provision would be largely redundant.

7. Due process: Thuraissigiam is a border case; Mathews governs interior long-residents

The court distinguishes Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam as applying to someone apprehended at the threshold of entry. Petitioners, by contrast, had lived in the U.S. for years/decades and thus had “established connections.” Under Mathews v. Eldridge, the court concludes:

  • Private interest: liberty from physical restraint is fundamental.
  • Risk of error: high without a neutral hearing on danger/flight risk; bond hearings add value.
  • Government interest: legitimate in assuring appearance and safety, but not shown to outweigh individualized process here.

The result is a constitutional backstop: even apart from statutory misfit, continued detention without bond hearings for these long-resident noncriminal detainees violates procedural due process.

C. Impact

1. Immediate operational consequences in the Third Circuit

  • Limits DHS’s post-2025 use of § 1225(b)(2)(A) for interior apprehensions of long-present EWI noncitizens.
  • Pushes such cases toward § 1226(a) (bond-eligible) detention practice, absent some other mandatory-detention basis (e.g., § 1226(c) where applicable).

2. Litigation posture and Supreme Court significance

The decision deepens a pronounced circuit split (majority of circuits against the Government’s reading, Fifth and Eighth in favor). The opinion notes pending cert petitions in Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, and Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, making Supreme Court review of the statutory question—and potentially the due process overlay—more likely.

3. Doctrinal significance: post-Loper Bright interpretive posture

By expressly refusing to defer to Matter of Yajure Hurtado and grounding that refusal in Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, the Third Circuit reinforces the practical consequence of a world without Chevron deference: agency/BIA interpretations will rise or fall on courts’ independent readings of the INA.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Applicant for admission” vs. “seeking admission”: Under the INA, some people are “deemed” applicants for admission (a legal category). The Third Circuit held that mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) requires more: the person must be actively seeking lawful entry/admission in an ongoing way.
  • § 1225 vs. § 1226: Think of § 1225 as primarily border/arrival detention rules, and § 1226 as primarily interior detention rules while removal cases proceed, including the possibility of bond.
  • Bond hearing: A hearing before an immigration judge to decide whether a detainee can be released while the case proceeds, typically based on flight risk and danger to the community.
  • “Entry fiction”: A doctrine treating some people stopped at/near the border as if they are not “in” the United States for certain constitutional purposes. The Third Circuit held this doctrine does not extend to people living in the U.S. for years.
  • Mathews balancing: A constitutional test for what process is due, weighing (1) the individual interest, (2) risk of error and value of more process, and (3) government burdens and interests.

V. Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s precedential ruling establishes that § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandatory, no-bond detention does not extend to long-present interior detainees who entered without inspection unless they are actively “seeking admission”. It further holds that, for such long-resident noncitizens with established U.S. connections, detention without a bond hearing violates procedural due process.

The decision both constrains a significant federal detention policy shift and adds weight to a mature circuit split likely destined for Supreme Court resolution, while also illustrating the judiciary’s post-Loper Bright role in independently construing the INA without deference to agency interpretations.