Third Circuit Affirms § 7201 Tax Easion Convictions: Intrinsic Fraud-Income Proof, No Constructive Amendment, and No Brady “Suppression” Where Discovery Was Produced to Counsel

I. Introduction

United States v. Joseph Cammarata (3d Cir. Apr. 7, 2026) is a nonprecedential decision in which the Third Circuit affirmed Joseph Cammarata’s convictions on five counts of tax evasion under 26 U.S.C. § 7201 for tax years 2015–2019. The case sits at the intersection of (1) tax evasion proof built on income derived from an underlying fraud scheme, (2) evidentiary limits on using that underlying fraud at a tax trial, (3) the doctrine of constructive amendment, and (4) post-trial attacks grounded in Brady and criminal discovery rules.

Background and parties. The United States prosecuted Cammarata after it alleged he and co-conspirators Erik Cohen and David Punturieri generated over $40 million through a securities class-action claims fraud scheme (2015–2019). Cammarata had already been convicted in a separate federal prosecution tied to that scheme. See United States v. Cammarata, 145 F.4th 345, 359 (3d Cir. 2025). While awaiting that trial, a New Jersey grand jury indicted him for tax evasion, alleging he filed fraudulent returns for five calendar years and failed to report scheme income.

Key issues on appeal. Cammarata challenged (A) the sufficiency of the evidence (reframed on appeal as a willfulness challenge), (B) admission of “post-2019” fraud-related evidence as unfairly prejudicial or impermissible “other crimes” evidence, (C) alleged constructive amendment (tax-fraud proof under § 7206 when charged under § 7201), and (D) denial of a new trial based on claimed Brady v. Maryland and expert/summaries discovery deficiencies.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed across the board:

  • Sufficiency / willfulness: Applying plain-error review, the court held co-conspirator testimony that Cammarata altered profit spreadsheets, discussed not reporting income “to keep more money,” and instructed others to “fix” returns supported willfulness.
  • Fraud evidence admissibility: Challenges to fraud evidence through 2019 were waived; as to post-2019 evidence, the court held it was intrinsic to the tax evasion charges, probative of unreported income/deficiency, not unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403, and outside Rule 404(b) because intrinsic evidence is not “other crimes” evidence.
  • No constructive amendment: The indictment alleged filing false returns as affirmative acts of evasion; the government proved those acts; therefore, there was no substantial likelihood the jury convicted for an uncharged offense.
  • No new trial: No Brady “suppression” where discovery was produced to counsel, even if the pro se defendant later claimed he personally could not review it; Rule 16 expert-disclosure compliance was supported by an email record; and a summary exhibit could be introduced through an expert who verified it though he did not prepare it.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Prior related decision: United States v. Cammarata, 145 F.4th 345, 359 (3d Cir. 2025)

The panel repeatedly relied on the earlier Third Circuit opinion (from the Securities Fraud Case) for procedural and doctrinal baselines:

  • Intrinsic evidence and prejudice: It quoted the earlier decision’s framing that evidence revealing “legal guilt” may be highly prejudicial but not necessarily “unfairly” prejudicial, borrowing language that itself quoted United States v. Long, 92 F.4th 481, 488 (3d Cir. 2024).
  • Constructive amendment standard: It used the earlier decision’s articulation of constructive amendment and the “key inquiry” (same conduct indicted vs. convicted).
  • Plain-error posture: The panel cited the earlier decision’s approach to plain-error review in comparable contexts.

2. Plain-error review baseline: United States v. Jackson, 849 F.3d 540, 544 (3d Cir. 2017)

United States v. Jackson supplied the standard for plain-error review where an argument (here, sufficiency as to willfulness) was not preserved in the district court. The key practical effect was to raise the appellant’s burden and narrow the appellate lens: even potentially meritorious sufficiency complaints can fail if not properly presented below, especially where the record contains direct testimony supporting the element.

3. Evidence admission discretion: United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 220 (3d Cir. 2000)

United States v. Saada anchored the abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings. This matters because Rule 403 balancing is inherently context-dependent, and the appellate court’s deference makes reversals rare absent an obvious imbalance.

4. Waiver in the trial court: United States v. James, 955 F.3d 336, 344-45 (3d Cir. 2020)

The court treated Cammarata’s statement that he was “okay with” the admission of securities-fraud evidence through December 31, 2019 as a waiver under United States v. James. This foreclosed appellate review as to that evidence, illustrating the sharp distinction between:

  • Forfeiture: failing to object (review may still occur, often for plain error), and
  • Waiver: intentional relinquishment (typically no review at all).

5. Tax deficiency as an element: Boulware v. United States, 552 U.S. 421, 424 (2008)

Boulware v. United States was used to emphasize why fraud-scheme evidence was intrinsic: one element of § 7201 is a tax deficiency, and evidence showing unreported taxable income directly proves deficiency. That doctrinal anchor made it easier for the panel to categorize the fraud evidence as “intrinsic” rather than “other crimes” evidence.

6. Rule 403 and “unfair prejudice”: United States v. Long, 92 F.4th 481, 488 (3d Cir. 2024)

The quoted proposition from United States v. Long—that intrinsically probative guilt evidence is not “unfairly” prejudicial merely because it is powerful—supported affirmance of the district court’s Rule 403 call on post-2019 evidence (including a 2020-filed return for tax year 2019 and 2020 statements connected to a fraudulent claim).

7. Intrinsic vs. extrinsic evidence and Rule 404(b): United States v. Bailey, 840 F.3d 99, 128 (3d Cir. 2016)

The panel relied on United States v. Bailey for the key doctrinal gate: Rule 404(b) applies to extrinsic “other crimes” evidence, but intrinsic evidence “directly proves the charged offense” and therefore is not governed by Rule 404(b). Once the evidence was deemed intrinsic to proving unreported income/deficiency, Rule 404(b) was, in the panel’s view, categorically inapplicable.

8. Affirmative act element of § 7201: Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351 (1965)

Sansone v. United States established that § 7201 requires an affirmative act of evasion. That precedent became dispositive on the constructive-amendment claim: because the indictment itself alleged affirmative acts including filing false returns for each charged year, and the government’s proof tracked those allegations, there was no shift in “essential terms” of the offense.

9. Brady framework: Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and “suppression” requirement: United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2005)

The panel treated the “suppression” element as fatal to the asserted Brady theory. Under Brady v. Maryland, relief requires that favorable evidence was suppressed by the government. Citing United States v. Pelullo, the court found no suppression where materials had been produced to defense counsel; the defendant’s later inability (as a pro se litigant) to personally review what counsel received did not transform production into suppression.

10. Limits on Rule 33 new-trial grounds: United States v. Wright, 363 F.3d 237, 248 (3d Cir. 2004)

United States v. Wright supplied a procedural barrier: under Rule 33, a judge cannot order a new trial “on his own motion,” which the panel used to justify declining to address Brady/discovery complaints not actually included in the Rule 33 motion. In effect, the appellate court treated the Rule 33 motion as defining the permissible universe of new-trial arguments.

11. Rule 33 standard of review and miscarriage of justice: United States v. Kelly, 539 F.3d 172, 181 (3d Cir. 2008) and United States v. Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 150 (3d Cir. 2002)

The court applied abuse-of-discretion review under United States v. Kelly and reiterated United States v. Johnson’s high bar: relief is appropriate only where there is a “serious danger” of a miscarriage of justice—i.e., risk an innocent person was convicted. That framing is consequential because it puts many procedural irregularities outside Rule 33 relief unless they plausibly undermine the verdict’s integrity.

12. Summary exhibits: Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 301 (3d Cir. 1961)

Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. was used to uphold admission of a summary exhibit (G-1004) through an expert who did not prepare it, so long as it accurately summarized the underlying materials. The expert’s testimony that he verified the figures supplied the reliability hook the district court needed to admit the summary.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Sufficiency of evidence: reframing on appeal triggers plain-error constraints

In the district court, Cammarata attacked the “tax due and owing” element; on appeal, he attacked willfulness. The panel treated the willfulness argument as unpreserved and reviewed only for plain error. Within that posture, the court did not reweigh evidence but looked for an absence of error.

The opinion highlights what types of evidence strongly support willfulness in § 7201 cases: co-conspirator testimony about intentional underreporting, instructions to keep returns “consistent” to avoid detection, deliberate alteration of profit spreadsheets before sending them to accountants, and anger when a co-conspirator reported some fraudulent income (followed by direction to “fix it”). This is classic “consciousness of wrongdoing” proof.

2. Evidentiary rulings: intrinsic scheme evidence, waiver, and Rule 403 balancing

The panel’s reasoning proceeds in a sequence that often decides evidence issues before reaching merits:

  1. Waiver cutoff: Because Cammarata accepted admission of evidence through 2019, the court refused to consider objections to that timeframe.
  2. Intrinsic nature: For post-2019 evidence, Cammarata conceded intrinsic relevance—critical because it steered the analysis away from Rule 404(b).
  3. Rule 404(b) inapplicable: Under United States v. Bailey, intrinsic evidence is not “other crimes” evidence. The panel treated this as a categorical exclusion from Rule 404(b).
  4. Rule 403 balancing: The remaining question was unfair prejudice vs. probative value. The court found the post-2019 evidence probative of taxable income/deficiency and not unfairly prejudicial in the Rule 403 sense, relying on the principle quoted from United States v. Long that highly incriminating intrinsic evidence is not “unfair” merely because it is damaging.

3. Constructive amendment: charging § 7201 allows proof of false-return acts without becoming § 7206

Cammarata argued that introducing false-return evidence effectively tried him for a different tax crime (§ 7206) than what the indictment charged (§ 7201). The panel rejected the premise by returning to the indictment’s actual allegations: it expressly pleaded filing false returns as affirmative acts of evasion for each year. Under Sansone v. United States, an affirmative act is required for § 7201, and filing false returns can be such an act.

Applying the constructive-amendment test quoted from United States v. Cammarata (2025), the panel found no “substantial likelihood” the jury convicted for different conduct: the proof matched the charged affirmative acts.

4. New trial: (i) Rule 33 limits what gets reviewed; (ii) Brady needs “suppression”; (iii) summaries need accuracy, not authorship

The opinion resolves the new-trial request through layered gatekeeping:

  • Scope limitation via Rule 33: The court declined to reach grounds not raised in the Rule 33 motion, citing United States v. Wright.
  • No Brady “suppression” where counsel received the materials: The court rejected a Brady claim about documents used to develop a summary chart because Cammarata did not contend the government withheld the documents from the defense; he argued he personally could not review what had been produced to counsel. Under United States v. Pelullo, Brady requires suppression by the government.
  • Rule 16 expert summary: The panel pointed to an email showing the government did provide the required written summary of the expert’s anticipated testimony, undermining the compliance challenge.
  • Summary exhibit sponsorship: Under Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., the summary may be admitted if accurate; the testifying expert need not be the exhibit’s drafter if he can vouch for its accuracy. Mazur’s verification testimony supplied that foundation.

C. Impact

Although designated “NOT PRECEDENTIAL,” the decision is instructive on recurring federal criminal litigation dynamics, particularly in tax prosecutions tied to an underlying fraud:

  • Tax trials may necessarily become “mini fraud trials” when deficiency depends on fraud income. The opinion reinforces that where unreported income is the essence of the deficiency, scheme evidence—even beyond the charged tax-year end—may be treated as intrinsic if it explains income generation, reporting, and the mechanics of concealment.
  • Waiver is outcome-determinative. A defendant’s on-the-record acceptance of evidence can eliminate appellate review entirely, which places a premium on clear objections and carefully framed stipulations.
  • Constructive amendment claims will struggle when the indictment expressly alleges multiple “affirmative acts.” Prosecutors can inoculate against amendment arguments by pleading the affirmative acts with specificity (e.g., filing false returns) and then proving exactly those acts at trial.
  • Brady arguments are vulnerable where production to counsel occurred. The case underscores that Brady “suppression” is not satisfied by a defendant’s later dissatisfaction with access/organization, especially after elective self-representation—unless the government actually withheld favorable evidence.
  • Summary exhibits remain powerful prosecutorial tools. The court reaffirmed that accuracy and verification, not authorship, is the key admissibility criterion—supporting continued reliance on summaries in document-heavy financial prosecutions.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (tax evasion): A felony requiring (commonly) (1) a tax deficiency, (2) willfulness, and (3) an affirmative act to evade or defeat tax (e.g., filing a false return, hiding income, using nominees).
  • Willfulness: In tax crimes, it generally means a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty—often proven circumstantially through conduct showing deliberate concealment or manipulation.
  • Plain-error review: A highly deferential appellate standard used when an argument was not preserved at trial; it is difficult for defendants to win under this standard.
  • Intrinsic vs. extrinsic evidence: “Intrinsic” evidence directly proves the charged offense (here, unreported fraud income establishing deficiency). “Extrinsic” evidence is separate “other acts,” typically analyzed under Rule 404(b).
  • Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Even relevant evidence can be excluded if unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value. “Unfair” prejudice means an improper tendency to decide on emotion or character rather than facts—not simply that the evidence is damaging.
  • Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): Limits use of “other crimes” evidence to show propensity; permits it for specific purposes (motive, intent, etc.). But it generally does not apply to intrinsic evidence.
  • Constructive amendment: A constitutional problem where the trial evidence/arguments effectively change the charged offense so the jury may convict for a different crime than the grand jury charged.
  • Brady v. Maryland: Requires the government to disclose materially favorable evidence to the defense. A Brady violation typically requires that evidence was suppressed, favorable, and material.
  • Rule 33 (new trial): Allows a new trial “if the interest of justice so requires,” but courts apply a demanding standard; issues not raised in the motion may not be considered as new-trial grounds.
  • Summary exhibits: Charts or summaries used to condense voluminous records; admissible if they accurately reflect underlying admissible evidence and the opposing party has access to the source materials.

V. Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s decision affirms a straightforward but practically significant set of principles: (1) co-conspirator testimony about deliberate underreporting and data manipulation can strongly establish willfulness; (2) when tax deficiency depends on scheme income, scheme evidence—potentially including post-period conduct tied to the charged years—may be treated as intrinsic and evaluated primarily under Rule 403, not Rule 404(b); (3) proving false-return conduct does not constructively amend a § 7201 indictment when the indictment itself pleads false returns as affirmative acts; and (4) Brady relief requires governmental suppression, not merely a defendant’s later access difficulties after self-representation, while summary exhibits may be introduced through a witness who verifies accuracy even if not the preparer.