Therapeutic Reunification as a Condition Precedent to Implementing Grandparent Visitation Under Domestic Relations Law § 72

Case: Matter of Shirley XX. v. Molly YY.
Court: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, New York, Third Department
Citation: 2026 NY Slip Op 03484 (June 4, 2026)

1. Introduction

This Article 6 proceeding concerns a maternal grandmother’s petition for court-ordered visitation with a child born in 2013, opposed by the child’s mother. The grandmother had played a “substantial caretaking role” from the child’s birth and for years thereafter. The parties’ history is marked by repeated cycles of litigation, termination of a prior visitation order, later stipulations restoring contact, and renewed breakdowns in the adult relationship leading to renewed restrictions on the grandmother’s access.

The key issues before the Third Department were (i) whether the grandmother had standing to seek visitation under Domestic Relations Law § 72 despite both parents being alive, and (ii) whether the Family Court’s best-interests determination granting visitation had a “sound and substantial basis in the record,” given the strong presumption favoring a fit parent’s decisions. A secondary issue concerned transportation responsibilities given the child’s residence in North Carolina.

On appeal by the mother and the Attorney for the Child (AFC), and a cross-appeal the court deemed abandoned, the Third Department largely affirmed the grant of visitation—but modified the order to require a structured period of therapeutic contact before the in-person schedule could commence.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Standing affirmed: The grandmother established standing under the “equitable circumstances” prong of Domestic Relations Law § 72(1), based on her prolonged caretaking role, the child’s formerly close bond with her, and the grandmother’s sustained efforts to maintain the relationship despite parental restrictions.
  • Best interests finding affirmed: The court held that the Family Court’s determination that visitation served the child’s best interests had a sound and substantial basis. The record supported findings that the mother’s objections were driven primarily by animus and perceived undermining, not by credible concerns about the grandmother’s caregiving, and that the child’s position had been influenced by the mother and stepfather.
  • Transportation challenge rejected: The mother’s challenge to being made solely responsible for transportation was rejected because the order provided that, after 2024, if the child lived more than 50 driving miles away and the mother was not willing/able, the grandmother must travel or provide transportation.
  • Key modification (new practical rule): Given that the child had not seen the grandmother since November 2025, that the last visit did not go well, and that the relationship remained strained, the Third Department modified the order to impose a six-month period of therapeutic contact (commencing within 30 days), which must occur before the in-person visitation schedule takes effect. The mother must arrange the therapeutic contact in consultation with the grandmother’s schedule, but the grandmother bears the financial cost. Sessions are to be private unless the therapist decides otherwise.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The opinion is best read as a careful synthesis of New York’s grandparent-visitation framework: standing through Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) and best-interests review tempered by constitutional respect for parental autonomy. The cited authorities supply the governing tests and appellate posture.

  • Matter of Emanuel S. v Joseph E. (78 NY2d 178 [1991]) anchors the standing analysis. The Third Department quotes it for the rule that, where parents are alive, grandparents obtain standing only when “equity would see fit to intervene,” and explains that a grandparent must show “a sufficient existing relationship” (or sufficient effort where frustrated) to merit intervention. The court applies this directly to conclude that the grandmother’s extensive caregiving history and continued efforts satisfy the Emanuel S. threshold.
  • Matter of Ferguson v Weaver (165 AD3d 1397 [3d Dept 2018]) and Matter of Daniel RR. v Heather RR. (221 AD3d 1301 [3d Dept 2023]) are cited as Third Department applications of the Emanuel S. standard. They reinforce that “equitable circumstances” standing turns on the relationship/efforts and the court’s perception that the relationship is “deserving” of judicial protection.
  • Matter of Vandenburg v Vandenburg (137 AD3d 1498 [3d Dept 2016]) and Matter of Couse v Couse (72 AD3d 1231 [3d Dept 2010]) illustrate the relationship/effort comparison: the court relies on Vandenburg as supportive of standing where there was a meaningful bond and efforts to maintain it, and contrasts with Couse as a point of comparison for when the showing is weaker.
  • Matter of Articolo v Grasso (132 AD3d 1193 [3d Dept 2015]) supplies the best-interests factor list and the caution that, while parental autonomy matters, courts must assess multiple considerations, not a single factor in isolation. It is also used—via quotation from Matter of Johansen v Lanphear (95 AD2d 973 [3d Dept 1983])—for the proposition that neither the child’s presumed wishes nor parental-grandparent animosity alone is a proper basis to deny visitation.
  • Matter of E.S. v P.D. (8 NY3d 150 [2007]) is cited to reinforce the multi-factor inquiry and to caution against simplistic reliance on animosity or stated wishes without a fuller best-interests assessment.
  • Matter of Stellone v Kelly (45 AD3d 1202 [3d Dept 2007]) is used both for the factor-based framework and, more pointedly, as support for the Family Court’s finding that the child’s changed stance could be influenced by adults.
  • Matter of Dianne SS. v Jamie TT. (235 AD3d 1138 [3d Dept 2025]) and Matter of Melissa X. v Javon Y. (200 AD3d 1451 [3d Dept 2021]) are invoked for the appellate standard: Family Court credibility findings receive great weight, and visitation determinations stand if supported by a “sound and substantial basis.”
  • Matter of Layton v Grace (129 AD3d 1147 [3d Dept 2015]) supports the conclusion that adult influence can affect a child’s expressed preferences, which in turn informs why the Family Court was not required to accept the mother’s asserted explanation at face value.
  • Matter of Susan II. v Laura JJ. (176 AD3d 1325 [3d Dept 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 909 [2020]) and Matter of Jones v Laubacker (167 AD3d 1543 [4th Dept 2018]) supply a critical framing principle: although the presumption favoring a fit parent’s decisions is “strong,” a parent does not have a “constitutionally guaranteed carte blanche veto” over grandparent visitation, especially when the objection rests on “tenuous reasoning” and the grandparent played a substantial caretaking role. This language is central to the Third Department’s affirmance of court-ordered visitation over the mother’s objections.
  • Matter of Donald UU. v Shirleen UU. (242 AD3d 1342 [3d Dept 2025]) is cited alongside Melissa X. and Stellone to support affirmance where the record adequately supports the Family Court’s balancing.
  • Matter of Christine X. v James Y. (244 AD3d 1545 [3d Dept 2025]) is cited in a procedural footnote to deem the grandmother’s cross-appeal abandoned because her brief sought affirmance and advanced no argument for reversal.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) Standing under Domestic Relations Law § 72(1): The court treated standing as a threshold, equity-based gatekeeping inquiry. It emphasized concrete facts demonstrating a real family-function relationship: the grandmother’s early role as primary caregiver, repeated significant caregiving periods, extensive recent contact (including quantified days of visits), involvement with school/extracurriculars, and assistance during a maternal hospitalization. It also relied on the grandmother’s “considerable efforts” to maintain the relationship when access was restricted—precisely the type of “effort to establish” or maintain a relationship contemplated by Matter of Emanuel S. v Joseph E..

(b) Best interests, tempered by the fit-parent presumption: The court explicitly recognized the presumption that a fit parent’s decisions further the child’s best interests and the need for judicial restraint. But it framed that presumption as a starting point, not an ending point, and stressed that it does not operate as an absolute veto. Applying the factor-driven inquiry (relationship history, objections’ reasonableness, nurturing skills, AFC’s assessment, and the child’s wishes), the court accepted the Family Court’s findings that:

  • the grandmother was historically a “critical component” of the caregiving structure;
  • third-party testimony supported a loving, safe bond;
  • the mother’s objection was rooted primarily in adult conflict and anger, not child safety or caregiving deficiencies;
  • the child’s abrupt negative shift was influenced by exposure to adult animus and pressure;
  • the mother did not adequately account for the potential harm of abruptly severing a formerly close relationship.

Appellate deference did real work here. The Third Department repeatedly grounded its affirmance in the “sound and substantial basis” test and the deference owed to Family Court credibility findings following testimony and Lincoln hearings.

(c) Remedial tailoring: therapeutic contact before in-person visitation: The most consequential move in the opinion is remedial. Even while affirming the best-interests determination, the court acknowledged the present-day reality described by the AFC: no visits since November 2025, a failed recent visit, and a strained relationship. Rather than treating that deterioration as a reason to vacate visitation, the court used its equitable and discretionary authority to sequence the remedy—requiring a six-month period of therapeutic contact (potentially virtual) as a prerequisite to resuming in-person visitation.

The court also allocated logistics in a way that mirrors its underlying findings: the mother must arrange therapeutic contact (consistent with her control over the child’s day-to-day life and access to providers), while the grandmother must pay (consistent with avoiding undue financial coercion of the custodial parent and reflecting that the therapeutic process is part of implementing the grandmother’s court-ordered access).

3.3 Impact

This decision’s likely influence is less about changing the doctrinal tests (which remain those stated in Emanuel S. and E.S. v P.D.) and more about implementation in high-conflict, cross-state grandparent visitation cases—especially where a relationship has degraded during litigation.

  • Therapeutic “on-ramp” to visitation: The modification signals that New York courts may treat therapeutic contact as a practical, child-centered condition precedent to restarting in-person visitation when a bond has been disrupted and the child is stressed—without abandoning the conclusion that continued contact is in the child’s best interests.
  • Reduced leverage from conflict-driven restriction: The opinion reinforces that a parent’s conflict with a grandparent—standing alone—will not justify cutting off a substantial preexisting bond, and that a parent cannot convert a strained relationship (even one that worsened after restrictions) into a de facto veto.
  • Cross-jurisdiction realities: With the child residing in North Carolina, the court’s attention to transportation provisions and virtual therapeutic contact reflects increasing judicial adaptation to interstate parenting/visitation logistics.
  • Future litigation posture: By emphasizing quantified contact history and third-party corroboration, the decision encourages litigants and counsel to build visitation records with objective detail (calendars, school involvement, caregiving during crises) and not rely solely on generalized assertions of closeness or harm.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Standing” (in this context): A threshold requirement—before a court decides best interests, it asks whether the grandparent has a legally sufficient basis to ask for visitation at all. Under Domestic Relations Law § 72(1), when parents are alive, standing generally requires showing “equitable circumstances,” typically a meaningful existing relationship (or strong efforts to establish/maintain one that a parent thwarted).
  • “Equity would see fit to intervene”: A flexible fairness standard. It does not mean the grandparent automatically wins—only that the relationship is substantial enough that the court will consider whether visitation is in the child’s best interests.
  • “Fit parent presumption”: Courts presume that a competent parent’s decisions generally serve the child’s best interests. But, as the opinion stresses via Matter of Susan II. v Laura JJ., it is not an absolute veto where the objection is thin and the grandparent’s role has been substantial.
  • “Lincoln hearing”: A private, in-camera interview of the child by the judge (typically with counsel present but outside the parents’ presence), used to learn the child’s perspective while reducing pressure and avoiding direct parental confrontation.
  • “Sound and substantial basis in the record”: The appellate standard of review. The appellate court does not re-try the case; it asks whether the Family Court’s decision is supported by adequate evidence and reasonable findings, giving special deference to credibility determinations.
  • “Therapeutic contact”: Structured, therapist-guided interaction intended to rebuild trust and reduce stress—here used as a bridge before in-person visitation resumes.

5. Conclusion

Matter of Shirley XX. v. Molly YY. reaffirms core New York principles governing grandparent visitation: standing may be established under Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) when a grandparent has played a substantial caretaking role and has made sustained efforts to maintain a meaningful bond, and the fit-parent presumption—though strong—does not create a categorical veto where objections are not reasonable and the child’s welfare favors continued contact.

Its most significant contribution is remedial: when the relationship has deteriorated and the child is stressed, the Third Department endorses a structured, time-limited period of therapeutic contact as a prerequisite to restarting in-person visitation, allocating responsibility for arranging therapy to the custodial parent while placing the financial burden on the petitioning grandparent. The decision thus illustrates a pragmatic, child-centered method of implementing grandparent visitation orders in high-conflict and interstate settings.