Texas Sovereign Immunity Does Not Bar Property Code Chapter 21 Repurchase Suits; Condemnation Filing Triggers “Through Eminent Domain,” Partial Repurchase Permitted, and County Courts at Law Share Jurisdiction

I. Introduction

In THE STATE OF TEXAS AND KYLE MADSEN IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF RIGHT OF WAY v. JRJ PUSOK HOLDINGS, LLC (Tex. June 12, 2026), the Supreme Court of Texas addressed whether the State may invoke sovereign immunity to defeat a statutory “right to repurchase” condemned property that becomes unnecessary for public use. The dispute arose after TxDOT condemned land for a highway project, later rerouted the project, and identified a small portion as “surplus,” but refused to sell it back at the statutorily prescribed repurchase price. The original owners assigned their repurchase rights to JRJ Pusok Holdings, LLC, which sued the State and the Director of Right of Way.

The case presented four linked issues: (1) whether Chapter 21 repurchase claims are barred by sovereign immunity; (2) whether property is acquired “through eminent domain” when the State files a condemnation action but later settles value and takes title by deed; (3) whether repurchase may be ordered for only a portion of the condemned tract; and (4) whether a county court at law may adjudicate the repurchase claim.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court (Justice Bland) held that:

  • No sovereign immunity bar: Chapter 21 repurchase claims are not defeated by sovereign immunity; to the extent immunity would otherwise exist, it is waived/does not apply in the circumstances Chapter 21 prescribes.
  • “Through eminent domain” satisfied by condemnation filing: The State’s initiation of a condemnation suit sufficiently establishes acquisition “through eminent domain,” even if the parties later settle compensation and convey by deed; settlement does not extinguish the repurchase right.
  • Partial repurchase allowed: A landowner (or assignee) may repurchase the portion of the condemned property that becomes unnecessary for public use within the statutory period.
  • County court at law jurisdiction: County courts at law have concurrent jurisdiction over repurchase claims as “eminent domain cases” within Chapter 21.

The Court affirmed the court of appeals’ denial of the State’s plea to the jurisdiction on the repurchase claim and remanded for further proceedings. Justice Young concurred; Justice Hawkins dissented (joined by Justice Sullivan and partly by Chief Justice Blacklock).

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Foundations of property rights and constitutional limits

  • Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer — Quoted for the proposition that property ownership is “fundamental” and pre-exists constitutions. The Court uses this framing to situate repurchase as an extension of constitutional constraints on eminent domain rather than as a purely discretionary statutory benefit.
  • In re Dallas County and Degan v. Bd. of Trs. of Dall. Police & Fire Pension Sys. — Cited for Texas constitutional interpretation methodology: giving effect to voter intent and context. These cases support the Court’s reliance on the post-Kelo amendment history to understand why repurchase exists and why it must be judicially enforceable.

2. Sovereign immunity: existence, waiver, and interpretive rules

  • Hosner v. DeYoung — The classic statement that the State cannot be sued without consent, anchoring the sovereign-immunity starting point.
  • Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas and Wasson Ints., Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville — Emphasize that while the Legislature waives immunity, courts define the doctrine’s boundaries and determine whether immunity exists “in the first instance.” The Court uses this to justify treating repurchase as flowing from constitutional limits on eminent domain rather than as an ordinary statutory claim presumptively barred.
  • Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor — Supports the proposition that waiver must be found in constitution or enactment, and links governmental power to the people (Tex. Const. art. I, § 2). The Court’s analysis leverages this to read Chapter 21 against voter-driven constitutional amendments.
  • Kerrville State Hosp. v. Fernandez and City of LaPorte v. Barfield — Provide the caution that “clear and unambiguous” waiver cannot be applied so rigidly that legislative intent is disregarded.
  • Worsdale v. City of Killeen — Statutory context matters; the Court uses this to read Subchapter E (repurchase) within the broader Chapter 21 eminent-domain framework.
  • Hillman v. Nueces County and Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg'l Hosp. — The Court applies their “functional waiver” indicators: whether the entity must be joined, whether liability is objectively limited, and whether the statute would be purposeless absent waiver.
  • Oncor Elec. Delivery Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit — Used for the “statute makes no sense if immunity is not waived” principle; the Court treats enforceability of repurchase rights as the statute’s “only apparent purpose.”
  • Texas Department of Transportation v. City of Sunset Valley — Distinguished. In Sunset Valley, a compensation mechanism between governmental units did not waive immunity for a money judgment. Here, by contrast, Subchapter E creates landowner “rights” tied to constitutional limits, and would be largely illusory if unenforceable against the State.
  • In re Nestle USA — Raised by the dissent, but the majority rejects its relevance because that case involved jurisdiction-allocation language (“exclusive and original jurisdiction”), whereas Chapter 21’s repeated “determine all issues” language appears in a scheme that already contemplates suits against the State in eminent-domain contexts.

3. Takings clause, inverse condemnation, and the “constitutional overlay”

  • City of Dallas v. Stewart — Summarizes the evolution of Texas takings/inverse-condemnation jurisprudence and is cited for the crucial point that the Takings Clause is “self-executing.”
  • Steele v. City of Houston — A cornerstone: recognizes inverse condemnation and explains that the Constitution itself waives immunity for takings without adequate compensation. The Court analogizes repurchase to the “back end” enforcement of constitutional limits—this time, the public-use limit.
  • State v. Holland — Reinforces that sovereign immunity does not shield the State from Article I, § 17 takings claims.
  • Hidalgo County Water Improvement District No. 3 v. Hidalgo County Irrigation District No. 1 — Used to support the principle that government cannot invoke immunity to avoid remedial claims “on the back end” of an eminent-domain exercise. The Court extends that logic to condemned property that becomes unnecessary for public use.
  • City of Dallas v. VSC, LLC — Cited to limit the reach of constitutional suits where the Legislature provides an adequate statutory procedure, underscoring that the Court’s holding is confined to Chapter 21’s “strictures” rather than authorizing free-form repurchase litigation.

4. Post-Kelo public-use reforms and interpretive context

  • Kelo v. City of New London — Provides the national trigger. The Court uses Kelo’s invitation for states to impose stricter public-use requirements to contextualize Texas’s constitutional amendments and the repurchase statute’s purpose.
  • KMS Retail Rowlett, LP v. City of Rowlett — Cited (including a dissent excerpt) to illustrate the new, more judicially administrable public-use limitations adopted in Texas and to emphasize enforcing statutes “as written.”

5. Statutory interpretation and meaning of “through eminent domain”

  • In re Allen — Presumption that the Legislature acts with knowledge of existing case law (including Steele), supporting the inference that placing repurchase within Chapter 21 anticipates enforceable suits.
  • In re M.N. — Presumption that the Legislature chose words carefully and omissions are purposeful; used to reject reading “condemnation judgment” into “eminent domain.”
  • Jaster v. Comet II Constr., Inc. (plurality) — Supports the “do not rewrite text” principle; the Court uses it to reject substituting “condemnation judgment” for the Legislature’s chosen phrase “eminent domain.”
  • Sw. Royalties, Inc. v. Hegar — If a term has multiple common meanings, courts select the meaning most consistent with statutory context; used to justify the common-sense reading that acquiring “through eminent domain” means “by means of” the State’s coercive eminent-domain power, not only after a final compensation judgment.
  • Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson — Texas policy favoring settlements; used to support the conclusion that settling compensation should not forfeit statutory repurchase rights, lest the law penalize compromise.

6. Settlement-enforcement analogy for immunity carryover

  • Texas A&M University-Kingsville v. Lawson (plurality) and Hughes v. Tom Green County — The Court analogizes: if a governmental entity lacked immunity in the underlying claim, it cannot invoke immunity to avoid obligations flowing from resolution of that claim. Here, because Chapter 21 eminent-domain proceedings sit in a non-immunity posture (and are constitutionally constrained), the repurchase right persists notwithstanding the settlement.

7. Dissent’s historical anchor and the majority’s rejection

  • City of San Antonio v. Grandjean — Invoked by the dissent to argue public use need only exist at the moment of condemnation. The majority rejects this as inconsistent with modern constitutional amendments that meaningfully constrain public use over time and support statutory repurchase when the public use is canceled or becomes unnecessary.

8. Jurisdiction and court structure

  • State v. Lueck — Confirms a plea to the jurisdiction is the proper vehicle to assert immunity.
  • City of Conroe v. San Jacinto River Auth. — De novo review of subject-matter jurisdiction.
  • Ditech Servicing, LLC v. Perez — Supports the constitutional status of county courts at law as “such other courts as may be provided by law.”
  • Brazos River Conservation & Reclamation Dist. v. Reese — Provides historical context for condemnation proceedings and the role of county-level courts, supporting the Court’s conclusion that county courts at law may hear Chapter 21 matters when the statute grants concurrent jurisdiction.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Why immunity does not defeat Chapter 21 repurchase claims

The Court’s core move is to treat repurchase as part of the constitutional architecture governing eminent domain—not a freestanding statutory gratuity. It emphasizes (i) Article I, § 17’s adequate-compensation and public-use limits, (ii) the post-Kelo constitutional amendments (including the repurchase- enabling language in Tex. Const. art. III, § 52j and the tightened public-use definition in Tex. Const. art. I, § 17(a)), and (iii) the Legislature’s decision to embed repurchase in Property Code Chapter 21, alongside mechanisms for adjudicating condemnation disputes in which the State is a party.

Applying the functional guideposts drawn from Hillman v. Nueces County and Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg'l Hosp., the Court concludes:

  • Placement and context: Repurchase sits within Chapter 21, a framework historically and constitutionally oriented toward enforceable judicial proceedings involving the State’s eminent-domain power.
  • Textual authorization to adjudicate “all issues”: The statute authorizes courts to “determine all issues” in repurchase suits and in suits involving property occupied under eminent-domain authority, expressly including suits “in which this state … is a party.” The Court reads this as more than mere forum assignment given Chapter 21’s remedial function and constitutional overlay.
  • Objective limitation on liability: Repurchase price is pegged to the “price paid … at the time” of acquisition (Tex. Prop. Code § 21.103(b)), so the State is not exposed to open-ended damages; it must simply return the property upon repayment of what it paid (foregoing appreciation windfalls that the constitutional design seeks to prevent).
  • Purpose would be defeated absent enforceability: A “right to repurchase” that the State can block by immunity would largely be illusory, contrary to Oncor Elec. Delivery Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit’s insistence that statutory rights must be exercisable to have meaning.

2. “Through eminent domain” includes acquisition compelled by a filed condemnation action

The State argued that because compensation was settled and title transferred by deed after filing, acquisition was not “through eminent domain” but effectively a voluntary transaction. The Court rejects that characterization, focusing on the coercive nature of eminent-domain power once the State initiates condemnation.

Textually, the Court reasons that “eminent domain” names the power (the “means” of acquisition), not merely a procedural endpoint (a final judgment). It relies on ordinary meaning (“through” as “by means of”) and statutory interpretation principles (In re M.N.; Jaster v. Comet II Constr., Inc.) to refuse rewriting “eminent domain” into “condemnation judgment.” The deed’s reference to “ED proceedings” and the context (the State’s threatened and then filed condemnation) reinforce that the owners’ conveyance was made under compulsion of sovereign power, not market choice.

Normatively, the Court also avoids an anti-settlement rule. Conditioning repurchase rights on litigating to judgment would penalize settlement and undermine Texas’s policy favoring compromise recognized in Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson.

3. Partial repurchase is consistent with the statute’s text and purpose

When only 3% of the tract became surplus, the State argued the statute does not expressly authorize partial repurchase. The Court responds that the statute does not say “entire property” either, and “property” naturally includes a portion of a tract. Reading Subchapter E to forbid partial repurchase would permit the State to avoid repurchase by retaining a sliver for public use while warehousing the rest—an interpretation at odds with the anti-overreach purpose behind the amendments.

The Court further rejects administrability objections, noting the State itself can value property (and had offered to sell at current fair market value), and that § 21.103(b)’s price formula can be applied proportionally to the portion deemed unnecessary.

4. County courts at law can hear repurchase suits

Chapter 21 provides concurrent jurisdiction for “eminent domain cases” in district courts and county courts at law (Tex. Prop. Code § 21.001). Because repurchase is codified inside Chapter 21 and the statute repeatedly empowers courts to decide “all issues” in suits it governs, the Court treats repurchase as a “species” of eminent-domain case. It therefore holds county courts at law may adjudicate repurchase claims, subject to any county-court jurisdictional cap issues to be addressed on remand (the opinion flags the Harris County civil courts at law’s $325,000 amount-in-controversy limit under Tex. Gov’t Code § 25.1032(c)).

C. Impact

  • Enforceability of repurchase rights against the State: The decision makes Subchapter E practically meaningful in disputes with the State by foreclosing a categorical immunity defense at the pleading stage. Future cases will likely focus less on “can you sue?” and more on whether a predicate condition in § 21.101(a)(1)–(5) is met, whether proper notice under § 21.102 was given, and what remedy is available.
  • Settlement will not forfeit repurchase: Condemnation defendants can settle compensation without fear that settling converts the transaction into a purely voluntary sale that strips statutory repurchase protection.
  • Partial-surplus practice changes: TxDOT and other condemnors should expect increased partial repurchase demands when project scope changes. Agencies may adjust internal surplus determinations and documentation to address when (and what portion of) property becomes “unnecessary.”
  • Forum and litigation dynamics: Recognizing county court at law jurisdiction may affect venue choices, case volume, and litigation strategy, particularly given varying jurisdictional limits. Defendants may press amount-in-controversy and valuation disputes earlier.
  • Broader doctrinal signal: The opinion reflects an approach that reads immunity doctrine in light of constitutional property constraints and voter-driven amendments, potentially influencing future disputes where statutory rights are tightly tethered to constitutional limits on government power.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Eminent domain vs. condemnation
Eminent domain is the government’s power to take private property for public use with compensation. Condemnation is the legal process used to exercise that power (including filing suit, valuation proceedings, and judgment). The Court held “through eminent domain” focuses on the power used, not whether the process ended in a final judgment.
Sovereign immunity and waiver
Sovereign immunity generally prevents suits against the State without its consent. A waiver can be explicit (“immunity is waived”) or can be effectively clear from a statute’s structure and function. Here, because repurchase is embedded in Chapter 21 and tied to constitutional limits, the Court held the State cannot use immunity to negate the repurchase right in the circumstances the statute defines.
Takings Clause is “self-executing”
A “self-executing” constitutional provision allows suit directly under the Constitution without waiting for a statute authorizing it. Texas takings law (e.g., Steele v. City of Houston) treats the compensation guarantee this way. The Court did not declare the public-use limitation self-executing, but treated the repurchase statute as implementing that constitutional limit and therefore requiring enforceability.
Repurchase right (Property Code § 21.101)
If condemned property’s public use is canceled, no progress occurs within ten years, or the property becomes unnecessary for public use (among other triggers), the former owner (or assignee) may repurchase it—generally for what the government paid at the time it acquired the property (§ 21.103(b)).
Plea to the jurisdiction
A procedural device used to challenge a court’s power to hear a case, often based on immunity. The State used this device to seek dismissal before reaching merits.

V. Conclusion

This decision establishes four practical rules for Texas eminent-domain law: (1) the State cannot defeat Chapter 21 repurchase suits by asserting sovereign immunity; (2) filing a condemnation action—and thereby compelling a transfer—constitutes acquisition “through eminent domain” even if compensation is later settled; (3) the repurchase right can apply to surplus portions of a condemned tract; and (4) county courts at law share concurrent jurisdiction with district courts over these repurchase claims as “eminent domain cases.”

In broader context, the opinion treats repurchase as a judicially enforceable safeguard born from voter-driven constitutional reforms to the public-use requirement, ensuring that eminent-domain authority cannot be leveraged to acquire (and retain) property that ultimately does not serve the public for which it was taken.