Termination Without Improvement Period Where Intellectual-Incapacity Deficits Are Uncorrectable; DHS Not Required to Provide Live-In Assistance

1. Introduction

Case: In re J.D., No. 25-457 (W. Va. Sup. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2026) (memorandum decision).
Lower court: Circuit Court of Monongalia County (Order May 16, 2025).
Parties: Petitioner Mother A.D. (appellant); West Virginia Department of Human Services (“DHS”); minor child J.D. (represented by a guardian ad litem).
Posture: Mother appealed the termination of her parental rights, arguing the circuit court should have granted a post-adjudicatory improvement period and required additional services before terminating.

The case arose immediately upon J.D.’s birth in April 2024, when DHS filed an abuse and neglect petition alleging that Mother’s intellectual and functional limitations—stemming from a severe medical history including brain surgeries and a stroke—rendered her unable to safely parent. The central issues on appeal were (1) whether the circuit court abused its discretion by denying an improvement period and (2) whether the court misapplied the law governing DHS’s obligations in cases involving alleged neglect based on intellectual incapacity.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed. Applying the abuse-and-neglect appellate standards, the Court held there was ample evidence supporting the circuit court’s findings that:

  • Mother received extensive services (supervised visitation, parenting classes, psychological evaluation, and therapies), yet showed little to no improvement in safe parenting skills;
  • Mother did not acknowledge parenting deficiencies, which rendered remediation unlikely;
  • Professional evidence showed her deficits were likely to worsen over time and that reunification would require continuous “live-in” assistance;
  • DHS was not required to provide around-the-clock in-home assistance, and the determination that she could not parent even with available services was made timely with attention to J.D.’s need for permanency;
  • There was “no reasonable likelihood” the conditions could be substantially corrected in the near future, and termination was necessary for the child’s welfare under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6).

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

In re K.S.

The Court began with the governing standards of review: “substantive rulings” for abuse of discretion, factual findings for clear error, and legal issues de novo. By framing the review this way, In re K.S. anchored the Court’s deference to the circuit court’s credibility determinations and child-safety findings—critical in a record built on medical and service-provider testimony.

In re M.M. and In re Tonjia M.

These cases supplied the controlling principle that improvement periods are discretionary. The Court used In re M.M. for the general proposition that the circuit court has discretion whether to grant an improvement period, and In re Tonjia M. for the narrower rule that a court may refuse an improvement period “when no improvement is likely.” In In re J.D., that “no improvement likely” determination was supported by months of services with minimal progress and expert testimony that the deficits were enduring and worsening.

West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6); In re Kristin Y.; In re R.J.M.

The statutory termination standard—no reasonable likelihood of substantial correction in the near future and necessity for the child’s welfare—was the central legal basis for affirmance. The Court reinforced this with In re Kristin Y., which permits termination “without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives” when the statutory threshold is met (quoting In re R.J.M.). This pairing matters because Mother’s argument implicitly sought “less restrictive alternatives” (more services, more time), but the Court treated the circuit court’s “no reasonable likelihood” finding as legally dispositive once supported by evidence.

In re Timber M. and In re Charity H.

The Court relied on these cases for a frequently outcome-determinative improvement-period concept: a parent’s failure to acknowledge the problem can render the problem “untreatable,” making an improvement period futile and unfairly costly to the child’s need for permanency. In In re J.D., Mother denied any parenting issues even after an injury occurred during a supervised visit and after repeated instruction, supporting the circuit court’s finding that she did not understand her shortcomings and that continued efforts would not likely produce safe parenting.

In re Maranda T. and Billy Joe M.

Mother’s second argument targeted DHS’s service obligations in intellectual-incapacity cases. The Court summarized In re Maranda T.’s discussion of the duty recognized in Syllabus Point 4 of Billy Joe M.: when neglect allegations are based on intellectual incapacity, termination should occur only after the social services system makes a thorough effort to determine whether the parent can adequately care for the child with “intensive long-term assistance,” and that determination should be made as soon as possible to maximize the child’s chance for permanency.

Crucially, the Court applied In re Maranda T.’s limiting clarification: around-the-clock in-home services are “neither required” by Billy Joe M. nor necessarily beneficial to the permanency determination. In In re J.D., the record reflected that the only potential path to reunification involved continuous live-in help—something the circuit court found was not required of DHS and, as described, was not even an available service. Thus, the Court held the circuit court did not misapply In re Maranda T.; rather, it followed it by (1) ensuring extensive services were attempted and evaluated and (2) reaching a timely permanency-focused determination.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in two linked steps.

  1. Improvement period denial was within discretion because the record supported futility.

    The circuit court had evidence from hospital staff, an occupational therapist, and a parenting fitness evaluator that Mother could not safely perform core caregiving tasks without cues and hands-on assistance, struggled with memory and processing, and lacked executive functioning necessary for independent parenting. At disposition, service providers testified that months of parenting education and supervised visits did not produce meaningful improvement; the child was even injured during a visit due to unsafe support. The evaluator’s opinion that deficits would worsen over time, and that only continuous assistance could allow parenting, further supported the conclusion that improvement was unlikely.

    The Supreme Court of Appeals treated these facts as satisfying the “no improvement likely” standard under In re Tonjia M., while also invoking In re Timber M./In re Charity H. to highlight that Mother’s refusal to recognize deficits undermined treatability. This combination justified denying an improvement period rather than extending proceedings.

  2. Termination without less restrictive alternatives was authorized once the statutory threshold was met.

    The circuit court explicitly found “no reasonable likelihood” of substantial correction in the near future and that termination was necessary for J.D.’s welfare, especially given the child’s young age and need for stability. Under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) and the interpretive holdings in In re Kristin Y. (quoting In re R.J.M.), those findings allow termination without trying additional intermediate measures. The Supreme Court emphasized that Mother did not challenge those dispositive findings on appeal, further insulating the termination decision.

On the services question, the Court reasoned that DHS satisfied the “thorough effort” principle associated with Billy Joe M. by providing substantial services promptly and by producing professional assessments about Mother’s capacity. The law did not require DHS to provide the only service that might hypothetically make reunification possible—continuous live-in caregiving—and the circuit court properly prioritized timely permanency for an infant.

3.3. Impact

Although issued as a memorandum decision, In re J.D. meaningfully reinforces several practical rules likely to shape abuse-and-neglect litigation in West Virginia:

  • Improvement periods remain a discretionary, evidence-driven tool—not an entitlement. Where service records and expert testimony show minimal progress and poor prognosis, a circuit court may deny an improvement period without committing reversible error.
  • “Thorough effort” in intellectual-incapacity cases does not equate to providing a substitute parent. The decision underscores the In re Maranda T. limitation on Billy Joe M.: DHS must evaluate whether intensive assistance could enable safe parenting, but DHS is not required to supply continuous in-home/live-in support as a prerequisite to termination.
  • Permanency timing is central—especially for very young children. The Court credited the circuit court’s emphasis on J.D.’s age, safety, and stability, reflecting the system’s statutory and jurisprudential preference for early permanency when remediation is not realistically achievable.
  • A parent’s insight matters as a predictor of successful remediation. By invoking In re Timber M. and In re Charity H., the Court highlights that denial of problems can be probative of futility, supporting earlier permanency decisions.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Improvement period: A court-authorized window of time after adjudication during which a parent is given services and an opportunity to correct problems. It is discretionary; the parent typically must show they are likely to participate meaningfully and improve.
  • Adjudicatory hearing vs. dispositional hearing: Adjudication answers whether abuse/neglect occurred and whether the parent is an abusing/neglecting parent. Disposition determines the outcome—services, placement, or termination—based on what best protects the child and whether the parent can correct the conditions.
  • “No reasonable likelihood” of correction: A statutory finding that the problems cannot be substantially fixed soon enough to meet the child’s needs. Once made (and supported), it authorizes termination under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6).
  • Less restrictive alternatives: Options short of termination (e.g., additional services, temporary guardianship, continued supervised visitation). Under In re Kristin Y., courts need not use these alternatives when “no reasonable likelihood” exists and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare.
  • Executive functioning deficits: Impairments in planning, memory, attention, judgment, and problem-solving—skills essential for safely completing multi-step caregiving tasks and responding to a child’s needs without constant prompting.
  • “Intensive long-term assistance” in intellectual-incapacity cases: A concept from Billy Joe M. requiring a serious effort to assess whether supportive services could make parenting safe; In re Maranda T. clarifies it does not require DHS to provide 24/7 in-home/live-in care.

5. Conclusion

In re J.D. affirms that West Virginia circuit courts may deny an improvement period and terminate parental rights when extensive evidence shows parenting deficits tied to intellectual/functional incapacity are not substantially correctable in the near future, particularly where the parent lacks insight and services have been exhausted. The decision also reiterates an important boundary in intellectual-incapacity neglect cases: while DHS must make a thorough, timely effort to assess whether supportive services could enable safe parenting, DHS is not obligated to provide continuous live-in assistance as a condition precedent to termination. In the broader legal context, the opinion reinforces the primacy of child safety and timely permanency—especially for infants—when the record supports futility of further remediation.