Termination Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(v) Requires No “Reasonable Efforts” Showing; Neglect-Statute Efforts Provision Inapplicable

Introduction

In In the Matter of the Termination of Parental Rights To: CCC, CCC and CCC, Minor Children, the Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed a district court order terminating the parental rights of Hailey Nicole Keller (Mother) and Corey Phillip Cruz (Father) to three minor children under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii) and (v). The case arose after repeated incidents of inadequate supervision—most prominently, the middle child repeatedly wandering unsupervised in Rawlins—alongside ongoing concerns regarding substance use, unstable circumstances, and inconsistent parental engagement during the juvenile-court neglect proceedings.

The appeal presented two central questions: (1) whether Father could defeat termination by arguing the Department of Family Services (DFS) acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to follow internal policies (invoking MB), and (2) whether Mother could avoid termination under § 14-2-309(a)(v) by insisting DFS must prove “reasonable efforts” to reunify, and by challenging the finding that she was “unfit.”

Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed termination of both parents’ rights.

  • Father: The Court held Father’s reliance on MB v. Laramie Cnty. Dep't of Fam. Servs. failed because, although DFS had shortcomings (e.g., not updating plans and not completing risk assessments), DFS still created a case plan with tasks, created a visitation plan, held MDT meetings, documented progress, and notified parents of potential termination—making this case distinguishable from MB. Critically, Father did not challenge termination under § 14-2-309(a)(v), thereby abandoning any sufficiency challenge on that independent ground.
  • Mother: The Court reiterated that § 14-2-309(a)(v) does not require DFS to prove reasonable reunification efforts, and that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-440(a) (a Child Protection Act neglect-proceedings provision) does not apply to termination proceedings. The Court further held the record contained clear and convincing evidence supporting Mother’s unfitness at the time of trial, considered in light of her history and the children’s needs.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1. Standard of review; independence of statutory grounds

  • Matter of BAR, 2026 WY 13 (quoting Matter of PML, 2024 WY 37): supplied the Court’s termination-review framework: strict scrutiny, the clear-and-convincing burden, and appellate evidentiary review (viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party while discounting conflicts).
  • Matter of MMD, 2024 WY 35 (citing Matter of ALRW, 2023 WY 20): reinforced the key appellate principle that termination grounds are “separate and independent,” so affirmance requires sufficiency on only one ground. This principle did substantial work in Father’s appeal: the Court affirmed solely on § 14-2-309(a)(v) because Father did not challenge it.

2. DFS policy failures and the reach of MB

  • MB v. Laramie Cnty. Dep't of Fam. Servs., 933 P.2d 1126 (Wyo. 1997): Father invoked MB to argue DFS’s departures from policy rendered termination improper. The Court distinguished MB factually: in MB, DFS provided no tasks, no copy of a case plan, no meaningful review, and no notice that termination could follow noncompliance. Here, by contrast, DFS produced and reviewed a task-based plan, implemented visitation parameters, held MDT reviews, and documented warnings. The Court thus confined MB to circumstances where DFS shortcomings meaningfully impair a parent’s fundamental interest in remaining a legal parent.

3. “Reasonable efforts” and the inapplicability of neglect statutes to termination

  • Matter of KCS, 2019 WY 15 (citing In re SJJ, 2005 WY 3): reaffirmed the doctrinal point that § 14-2-309(a)(v) contains no reasonable-efforts requirement.
  • In re SJJ, 2005 WY 3: specifically supported the proposition that § 14-3-440 does not apply in termination proceedings.
  • Matter of BAD, 2019 WY 83: Mother relied on a special concurrence arguing for importing a reasonable-efforts prerequisite into § 14-2-309(a)(v). The Court rejected that as nonbinding, and held existing precedent controls.
  • Boode v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 458 P.2d 653 (Wyo. 1969) and Matter of JPL, 2021 WY 94 (Kautz, J., specially concurring): used to emphasize that concurring opinions do not establish binding precedent under stare decisis; the majority in BAD, not its special concurrence, governs.
  • Matter of AM-LR, 2018 WY 76 (quoting In re MN v. State, 2003 WY 135): anchored the separation between neglect proceedings (juvenile court) and termination proceedings (district court). This separation undercut Mother’s argument that a neglect-statute “reasonable efforts” concept should be grafted onto § 14-2-309(a)(v).
  • Int. of VS, 2018 WY 119: supplied the “plain error” framework; the Court used it to reject Mother’s newly raised appellate argument because no “clear and unequivocal rule of law” required a reasonable-efforts finding under § 14-2-309(a)(v).

4. Defining and proving “unfitness” under § 14-2-309(a)(v)

  • LeBlanc v. State Dep't of Fam. Servs., 2017 WY 107: provided a non-exhaustive list of factors relevant to “unfitness” (e.g., inability to meet needs, instability, substance use patterns, lack of bond, failure to develop parenting skills, etc.). The district court’s findings tracked multiple LeBlanc factors.
  • Matter of GGMC, 2020 WY 50: supported the proposition that past behavior is “plainly relevant” to current fitness.
  • Matter of JPL, 2021 WY 94 and Matter of BAD, 2019 WY 83: reinforced that unfitness is typically shown by a pattern of incidents and conditions over time, and that LeBlanc’s list is not a mandatory balancing test.
  • Matter of ALRW, 2023 WY 20: supplied the policy framing that when parental rights and a child’s need for stability collide, children’s stability and permanency interests ultimately prevail.
  • Matter of NRAE, 2020 WY 121: cited regarding the best-interests step after statutory grounds are proven; Mother did not appeal best interests, narrowing the appellate dispute to statutory grounds and fitness.

Legal Reasoning

1. Father: distinguishing MB and enforcing issue preservation/abandonment principles

Father’s theory depended on converting DFS policy lapses into a constitutional defect under MB. The Court acknowledged some administrative shortcomings (failure to update plans; incomplete risk assessments), but treated MB as a case where DFS failures deprived a parent of meaningful notice and an actionable reunification pathway. Because Father had a task-based case plan, ongoing MDT reviews, documentation, and notice of potential termination, DFS’s lapses did not rise to the level that “impermissibly affect[ed]” his fundamental parental rights.

Independently, the Court applied the “separate and independent grounds” doctrine: because Father did not challenge termination under § 14-2-309(a)(v), any sufficiency argument as to that ground was deemed abandoned, and affirmance followed on that unchallenged basis alone.

2. Mother: no “reasonable efforts” element in § 14-2-309(a)(v) and no importation from neglect law

The Court treated Mother’s reasonable-efforts argument as foreclosed by text and precedent: § 14-2-309(a)(v) requires only (1) 15 of 22 months in foster care under state responsibility, and (2) parental unfitness. It then rejected the attempt to import the Child Protection Act’s neglect “reasonable efforts” concept (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-440(a)) into termination law, emphasizing that neglect and termination proceedings are legally distinct and occur in different courts.

Because Mother raised this theory for the first time on appeal, the Court also analyzed it through a plain-error lens and found no violation of a “clear and unequivocal rule of law,” given binding precedent holding reasonable efforts are not required under subsection (v).

3. Mother: clear and convincing proof of unfitness at the time of trial, with past conduct as relevant context

Applying the LeBlanc framework (as illustrative, not a checklist), the Court upheld the district court’s finding that Mother was unfit based on a combination of concerns over time, including: difficulty supporting children’s therapeutic needs; reduced and inconsistent contact; contribution to behavioral/emotional problems; unstable home/employment circumstances; substance-use patterns; limited accountability; limited bonding (particularly with middle and youngest child); and incomplete parenting-skill development. The Court acknowledged Mother’s recent improvement steps but held the record still supported a conclusion of continued unfitness when measured against the children’s need for stability and permanency.

Impact

  • Reaffirmed bright-line rule for § 14-2-309(a)(v): Termination under subsection (v) remains a two-element inquiry (time-in-care + unfitness) without an added reasonable-efforts requirement. Litigants should expect renewed resistance to arguments attempting to graft neglect-law “reasonable efforts” obligations onto termination proceedings.
  • Boundary policing between neglect and termination proceedings: The decision strengthens doctrinal separation: neglect statutes and juvenile-court obligations (including § 14-3-440(a)) are not automatically transferable to district-court termination adjudications.
  • Constraining MB-based attacks: By distinguishing MB, the Court signals that DFS administrative imperfections alone will not invalidate termination unless they meaningfully deprive parents of notice, an actionable plan, or a fair opportunity to comply.
  • Appellate strategy consequences: The Court’s affirmance as to Father illustrates the practical force of the “independent grounds” doctrine—failure to challenge a statutory basis (here, § 14-2-309(a)(v)) may be dispositive on appeal.
  • Fitness as a longitudinal concept: The opinion reiterates that trial-time fitness is assessed with full attention to historical patterns; late improvements may not outweigh a long record of instability when children have already spent extended time in care.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Strict scrutiny (in termination cases)
Because parental rights are fundamental, courts require careful, exacting review and insist the State prove statutory grounds with a heightened evidentiary burden.
Clear and convincing evidence
Proof strong enough to make the claim “highly probable”—more than “preponderance,” less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
“Reasonable efforts” to reunify
Services and steps taken by the State aimed at safely returning children to parents. This opinion reiterates that § 14-2-309(a)(v) does not require the State to prove those efforts as an element of termination (even if such efforts may exist in the case history).
15 of 22 months in foster care
A timing threshold in § 14-2-309(a)(v). If met, the State must still prove unfitness, but it need not prove other grounds. The Court characterized the timing element as a “mathematical question.”
Unfitness
Not a single mistake, but an inability—measured in context—to meet children’s ongoing physical, mental, and emotional needs. Courts look at patterns over time and may consider past behavior as highly relevant to present capacity.
Plain error
A narrow appellate doctrine allowing relief for unpreserved arguments only when an obvious, clearly established legal rule was violated. The Court found no such clearly established rule requiring reasonable-efforts findings under § 14-2-309(a)(v).
Independent statutory grounds / abandonment
If multiple statutory grounds support termination, affirmance requires only one. If an appellant does not challenge one ground, the appellate court may affirm on that unchallenged ground alone.

Conclusion

This decision consolidates several practical and doctrinal points in Wyoming termination jurisprudence. Most prominently, it reaffirms that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(v) imposes no reasonable-reunification-efforts prerequisite, and it rejects attempts to import Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-440(a) from juvenile-court neglect proceedings into district-court termination litigation. It also narrows the reach of MB v. Laramie Cnty. Dep't of Fam. Servs. to cases where DFS failures meaningfully deprive a parent of notice and a fair opportunity to comply, and it underscores that appellate outcomes may turn on whether each independent termination ground is actually challenged. In the broader context, the opinion reinforces the system’s emphasis on children’s stability and permanency after prolonged foster-care placement when unfitness persists.