Termination Under N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-20(1)(c)(2) Does Not Require an Explicit “Reasonable Efforts” Finding

1. Introduction

Case: Interest of W.S., T.S. & L.S., 2026 ND 86 (Nos. 20260060, 20260061, 20260062).
Court: Supreme Court of North Dakota.
Date: April 22, 2026.
Parties: State of North Dakota (Petitioner/Appellee) vs. S.S. (Father, Respondent/Appellant); T.C. (Mother, Respondent).

The case involves three children (L.S., W.S., and T.S.) repeatedly removed from parental care over several years due to parental drug use and domestic violence. After the most recent removal on January 8, 2024, the State petitioned on January 9, 2025, to terminate parental rights. The juvenile court terminated S.S.’s parental rights, relying on the children’s status as “in need of protection” and their time in foster care.

On appeal, S.S. focused narrowly on reunification: he argued the juvenile court abused its discretion because “reasonable efforts” to reunify were not proven by clear and convincing evidence, and because the juvenile court did not make an explicit reasonable-efforts finding.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed. It held that when parental rights are terminated under N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-20(1)(c)(2) (child in need of protection + at least 450 of the prior 660 nights in foster care/custody), the juvenile court is not required to make an explicit finding that the agency made “reasonable efforts” to reunify.

While the Court noted it may be a best practice to make such findings (including for federal funding considerations), the absence of an explicit finding did not invalidate termination. The Court also concluded the juvenile court’s findings about social services’ actions were sufficient to support its discretionary decision to terminate.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • Int. of A.C., 2022 ND 123, ¶ 5, 975 N.W.2d 567
    Cited for the standard of review: factual findings in termination proceedings are reviewed for clear error. This frames the appellate posture—S.S. needed to show the findings (or absence of a required finding) were legally or factually defective.
  • Int. of J.C., 2025 ND 217, ¶ 6, 29 N.W.3d 598
    Provided the definition of “clearly erroneous”: induced by erroneous law, unsupported by evidence, or leaving a firm conviction of mistake. This standard underpinned the Court’s conclusion that the juvenile court’s findings were adequate and supported.
  • In re J.N., 2012 ND 256, ¶ 8, 825 N.W.2d 868
    Stands for a key proposition S.S. invoked: a court errs as a matter of law if it fails to make a required finding of fact. The Supreme Court accepted that premise—but held that a reasonable-efforts finding is not “required” at termination under the statutory ground used here.
  • S.L.W. v. C.M.T., 2026 ND 21, ¶ 3, 31 N.W.3d 286
    Reiterated that the party seeking termination must prove all statutory elements by clear and convincing evidence. The Court used this to confirm the burden, then focused on what the statute actually makes an “element” when proceeding under § 27-20.3-20(1)(c)(2).
  • In re R.L.-P., 2014 ND 28, ¶¶ 23, 29, 50, 842 N.W.2d 889
    This was the closest analogue. There, the Court noted that a finding of (1) the time-in-care threshold and (2) deprivation (now “child in need of protection”) is sufficient to terminate, and it upheld an implied reasonable-efforts finding. In 2026 ND 86, the Court went further: it clarified that an explicit reasonable-efforts finding is not mandatory at termination under this ground.
  • Interest of A.P., 2022 ND 131, 976 N.W.2d 244
    S.S. relied on this case to argue a reasonable-efforts finding is required. The Supreme Court distinguished it: A.P. included such a finding, but did not announce it as a statutory requirement. The Court emphasized it would not read a requirement into § 27-20.3-20 that is not present.
  • In re J.C., 2024 ND 9, ¶ 22, 2 N.W.3d 228
    Clarified that even if statutory grounds exist, termination is discretionary: the juvenile court “has discretion, but is not required, to terminate.” This matters because S.S. also challenged the court’s discretionary choice (not just its statutory findings).
  • Int. of B.F., 2025 ND 127, ¶ 13, 23 N.W.3d 718
    Provided the abuse-of-discretion definition (arbitrary/unreasonable, not a rational mental process, or legal misapplication). The Court used this to assess whether the juvenile court’s termination decision was rationally supported by its findings, including findings about services offered.
  • In re Griffey, 2002 ND 160, ¶ 8, 652 N.W.2d 351
    Supported the principle that when specific findings are not statutorily required, an appellate court will not upset a decision if valid reasons are “fairly discernible” by inference. This case bolstered affirmance despite the absence of an explicit reasonable-efforts finding at termination.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in two linked steps: (1) what findings are legally required to terminate under the ground used, and (2) whether the juvenile court nevertheless had a sufficient basis to exercise discretion to terminate.

A. No statutory requirement for an explicit reasonable-efforts finding at termination under § 27-20.3-20(1)(c)(2)

The juvenile court terminated under N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-20(1)(c)(2). The Supreme Court highlighted the juvenile court’s findings that (i) “there is no serious dispute” the children were “in need of protection,” and (ii) the children had been in care “737 days of the last 737 days,” far exceeding the 450/660-night threshold.

The Supreme Court then addressed the precise appellate claim: whether the juvenile court had to also make an explicit “reasonable efforts” finding. It held no, for two main reasons:

  • Textual reasoning: “A plain reading of N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-20 does not require the court to make a specific finding” on reasonable efforts at termination.
  • Structural/statutory context: Reasonable-efforts findings are expressly required in other contexts (e.g., to extend foster care orders under N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-16(4)(d)-(e)), and the legislature’s inclusion there—but not in § 27-20.3-20(1)(c)(2)—supports the Court’s conclusion.

B. N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-18 governs agency duties and certain placement orders—without creating a termination-stage finding requirement

S.S. also invoked N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-18, which defines and discusses “reasonable efforts.” The Court acknowledged:

  • Under § 27-20.3-18(6), judicial findings are required for removal/placement orders to comply with federal titles IV-B and IV-E requirements.
  • Under § 27-20.3-16(4)(d)-(e), a court must determine reasonable efforts were made when extending foster care orders.

But the Court emphasized two limiting points:

  • Those placement/extension orders “are not at issue” in this termination appeal.
  • § 27-20.3-18(6) includes a strong anti-collateral-attack clause: it “may not provide a basis for overturning an otherwise valid court order.” The Court treated this as reinforcing that federal-funding compliance provisions do not create a termination-stage reversal hook here.

C. Contrast with statutes that explicitly require findings (“active efforts”)

The Court drew a clear contrast: N.D.C.C. § 27-19.1-01(2) (Indian child context) says “the court shall find that active efforts have been made” (emphasis in opinion). By comparison, the termination statute at issue lacks such mandatory language. This comparison underscores the Court’s interpretive approach: when the legislature requires a specific finding, it says so.

D. Even if not required, the findings supported the discretionary termination decision

The Supreme Court still examined whether the juvenile court’s findings were sufficient to show a rational basis for exercising discretion to terminate. The juvenile court found that social services: offered supervised visits; enrolled children in therapy; adjusted visitation structure; scheduled phone calls after visits were suspended; established and provided a case plan; invited parents to child and family team meetings; and requested drug tests.

The juvenile court also made credibility findings crediting social workers’ testimony that reunification was not appropriate and termination was necessary. With these findings, the Supreme Court held the decision was reviewable and supported under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52, and the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.

3.3. Impact

Doctrinal clarification: The decision clarifies North Dakota termination practice where the State proceeds under § 27-20.3-20(1)(c)(2): an explicit reasonable-efforts finding at the termination stage is not a prerequisite to affirmance.

Practical litigation effects:

  • For appellants: Challenges based solely on the absence of an explicit reasonable-efforts finding are less likely to succeed when termination rests on the time-in-care ground, unless a statute truly requires the missing finding.
  • For juvenile courts: The Court recommends (without mandating) a “best practice” of making a reasonable-efforts finding, which may help appellate review and federal funding qualification concerns (the opinion notes 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b)(1)-(2) (2026)).
  • For agencies/human service zones: While the decision reduces termination-stage vulnerability to missing findings, it does not diminish the underlying duty to provide reasonable efforts where required; it mainly reallocates the significance of those findings to earlier orders and compliance frameworks.

System-level significance: The ruling reinforces the legislature’s choice to make the time-in-care ground a comparatively objective basis for termination (nights-in-care + child in need of protection), while preserving the juvenile court’s discretion to decide whether termination is appropriate.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Child in need of protection”: A legal status indicating the child requires state protection due to circumstances such as abuse, neglect, or unsafe conditions.
  • “450 out of 660 nights” ground (§ 27-20.3-20(1)(c)(2)): If a child has spent at least 450 of the prior 660 nights in foster care or in the custody/control of the department or human service zone, and is in need of protection, the court may terminate parental rights (subject to proof and discretion).
  • “Reasonable efforts” (§ 27-20.3-18): The agency’s due diligence to use appropriate, available services to prevent removal when possible and, after removal, to eliminate the need for removal and reunify safely—while prioritizing the child’s health and safety.
  • “Clear and convincing evidence”: A heightened standard of proof—more than “more likely than not,” less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
  • “Clearly erroneous” review: On appeal, factual findings are upheld unless based on legal error, lack evidentiary support, or leave the appellate court firmly convinced a mistake occurred.
  • “Abuse of discretion” review: Even when statutory grounds exist, termination is a choice. The appellate court asks whether the choice was arbitrary, unreasonable, or legally mistaken.
  • N.D.R.Civ.P. 52 (findings sufficiency): Findings need to be detailed enough to show the basis for the decision. Even without a specific required finding, the decision can stand if valid reasons are discernible.

5. Conclusion

Interest of W.S., T.S. & L.S., 2026 ND 86 establishes a clear procedural rule for terminations under N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-20(1)(c)(2): a juvenile court need not make an explicit “reasonable efforts” finding at the termination stage. The Supreme Court distinguished prior cases that merely included such findings and grounded its holding in statutory text and structure, including comparison to statutes that explicitly mandate effort findings (like “active efforts”).

The decision also signals that while explicit findings may be advisable, appellate affirmance will turn on whether the statutory elements are proved and whether the juvenile court’s exercise of discretion is supported by discernible, non-clearly-erroneous findings—including, where present, findings describing the agency’s reunification-related actions.