Termination of Parental Rights Requires Child-Specific Allegations and Adjudication; Neglect of One Child Is Not Automatically Imputed to Siblings

1. Introduction

Case: In re M.D., D.M., and A.M. (Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, June 24, 2026).
Parties: Petitioner Mother V.M. (mother); West Virginia Department of Human Services (“DHS”); children M.D., D.M., and A.M.; guardian ad litem.
Procedural posture: Appeal from a February 3, 2025 dispositional order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County terminating the mother’s parental rights to all three children.

The case arose from an April 2023 abuse and neglect petition focused on M.D.’s disclosures of homelessness/unstable housing and exposure to substance abuse and unsafe individuals. In September 2023, DHS sought to add M.D.’s half-siblings (D.M. and A.M.) after a report described similar concerns; however, the amended petition did not actually plead any child-specific abuse/neglect allegations as to D.M. and A.M. At adjudication, the mother stipulated to neglect of M.D. based on unsuitable housing; the circuit court adjudicated neglect only as to M.D. and made no findings for D.M. and A.M.

The central issues on appeal were (1) whether termination as to M.D. was supported by findings that the mother could not substantially correct the conditions of neglect in the near future, and (2) whether termination as to D.M. and A.M. could stand where DHS failed to plead specific allegations and the circuit court failed to adjudicate neglect/abuse as to those children.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights to M.D., holding the record supported the statutory finding that there was “no reasonable likelihood” the mother could substantially correct the conditions of neglect in the near future, and that termination was necessary for M.D.’s welfare.

The Court vacated termination of the mother’s parental rights to D.M. and A.M. and remanded, concluding that DHS’s amended petition did not allege specific conduct as to those children and the circuit court made no adjudicatory findings regarding them. The Court directed DHS be permitted to file an amended petition and the circuit court hold a new adjudicatory hearing and any additional proceedings required by applicable statutes and rules.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Syl. Pt. 1, In re K.S., -- W. Va. --, -- S.E.2d --, 2026 WL 1362143 (W. Va. May 15, 2026)

The Court began by stating its review framework for abuse and neglect appeals: substantive rulings for abuse of discretion, factual findings for clear error, and legal issues de novo. This standard anchored the Court’s approach—deferring to supported factual determinations (especially as to M.D.) while independently evaluating the legal adequacy of pleading and adjudication for D.M. and A.M.

In re Samantha M., 205 W. Va. 383, 393, 518 S.E.2d 387, 389 (1999)

The opinion relied on In re Samantha M. to emphasize that the petition’s specificity requirements protect due process by providing notice of the basis for state intervention and an opportunity to respond. This case provided the constitutional framing: without specific allegations as to D.M. and A.M., the mother was not properly on notice of “why the termination proceeding is being conducted” as to them, undermining fundamental fairness.

In re H.B., 252 W. Va. 350, 357-58, 922 S.E.2d 350, 357-58 (2025)

In re H.B. was pivotal to the Court’s rejection of “spillover” adjudication. The Court quoted In re H.B. for the rule that, unlike abuse, neglect is not automatically imputed across children in the home because the neglect statute lacks express imputation language. Here, the mother’s stipulation to neglect of M.D. could not, standing alone, adjudicate neglect of D.M. and A.M.

Syl. Pt. 4, In re R.M., 252 W. Va. 422, 923 S.E.2d 352 (2025)

The Court applied syllabus point 4 of In re R.M. to reinforce that specific findings of fact as to each child’s threatened or harmed health and welfare are a “statutory prerequisite” to moving to disposition. Because the circuit court made no specific adjudicatory findings regarding D.M. and A.M., it lacked the required adjudicatory foundation to terminate rights as to them.

In re K.L., 247 W. Va. 657, 666, 885 S.E.2d 595, 604 (2022)

In re K.L. supplied the corollary limit on termination: parental rights cannot be terminated when the termination is “fundamentally premised on conditions of abuse and/or neglect upon which a parent has not been properly adjudicated.” This supported the vacatur as to D.M. and A.M. because there was no proper adjudication tying the mother’s conduct to neglect/abuse of those specific children.

Syl. Pt. 5, in part, In re Edward B., 210 W. Va. 621, 558 S.E.2d 620 (2001)

Having identified a breakdown in statutory/rules compliance, the Court invoked syllabus point 5 (in part) of In re Edward B. for the remedy: when the process established by abuse and neglect rules and statutes has been “substantially disregarded or frustrated,” the order will be vacated and remanded for compliance and entry of an appropriate order. The Court used this authority to justify vacatur despite waiver concerns (discussed below).

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(A) Affirmance as to M.D.: “No reasonable likelihood” and necessity

The Court upheld termination for M.D. under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6), which permits termination upon (1) a finding of “no reasonable likelihood” the conditions can be substantially corrected in the near future and (2) when necessary for the child’s welfare. The opinion applied West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d)’s definition—an “inadequate capacity to solve the problems of abuse or neglect” on one’s own or with help.

The decisive facts were the mother’s ongoing refusal to remedy the adjudicated condition (unsuitable housing) by continuing to live with a registered sex offender and declining to separate even after the circuit court explicitly conditioned improvement-period consideration on doing so. The Court treated this as evidence not merely of difficulty but of unwillingness—a knowing choice to take no steps to correct the neglect condition. The Court also noted the child’s stability/permanency needs and that the necessity finding was not meaningfully challenged on appeal.

(B) Vacatur as to D.M. and A.M.: Due process, pleading specificity, and adjudication prerequisites

The Court’s vacatur turned on two interlocking errors:

  1. Pleading failure: West Virginia Code § 49-4-601(b) requires an abuse and neglect petition to allege “specific conduct including time and place” and how that conduct meets statutory definitions. DHS’s amended petition added D.M. and A.M. by listing their names and custody arrangements but failed to incorporate any specific neglect/abuse allegations as to them.
  2. Adjudication failure: The circuit court accepted a stipulation as to M.D. only, made no findings regarding D.M. and A.M., and DHS produced no evidence explaining how those children were abused or neglected. Under Syl. Pt. 4, In re R.M., child-specific findings are a prerequisite to disposition; under In re K.L., termination cannot rest on unadjudicated conditions; and under In re H.B., neglect of one child does not automatically adjudicate neglect of siblings.

Consequently, the circuit court erred by proceeding to termination as to D.M. and A.M. without the statutory and constitutional scaffolding—notice, proof, and findings—required to justify that outcome.

(C) Waiver addressed, but not outcome-determinative

The opinion noted the mother did not object below to the amended petition’s sufficiency or to the lack of adjudication findings as to D.M. and A.M., and thus “waived” those issues. But citing In re R.M., the Court reiterated that even waived errors may be reviewed if they reflect a “substantial frustration or disregard” of the governing statutes and rules. Here, the omission of allegations and findings as to two children was treated as precisely that kind of structural error requiring appellate correction.

3.3. Impact

This decision reinforces several practical and doctrinal guardrails in West Virginia abuse and neglect litigation:

  • DHS petition drafting must be child-specific. Adding children to a case demands more than naming them; the petition must allege specific conduct (including time and place) and explain how it constitutes neglect/abuse as to each child.
  • Courts must make explicit adjudicatory findings for each child before disposition. The opinion signals that appellate courts will not allow termination as to a child when the record lacks individualized adjudication and findings.
  • Neglect is not “portable” across siblings. Parties cannot assume that a stipulation or finding for one child automatically supplies adjudication for others, absent statutory authorization.
  • Appellate review may correct structural process failures even when not preserved. The Court’s willingness to reach beyond waiver underscores the judiciary’s responsibility to ensure statutory/rule compliance in proceedings that implicate fundamental parental rights.

For future cases, the opinion should reduce “shortcut” amendments and strengthen the adjudication/disposition boundary: termination must rest on properly pleaded, proven, and found conditions as to the particular child(ren) at issue.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Adjudication vs. disposition: Adjudication answers “Did abuse/neglect occur, and who is responsible?” Disposition decides “What should the court do about it?” (services, custody, termination). This case holds you generally cannot jump to disposition for a child without adjudicating that child.
  • “No reasonable likelihood” (W. Va. Code § 49-4-604): This is a statutory prediction based on evidence—whether the parent has the capacity and willingness to fix the problems soon enough to meet the child’s need for safety and permanency.
  • Due process notice in petitions: The petition must tell the parent what they allegedly did (with specifics) so the parent can prepare a defense and meaningfully participate.
  • Imputation: “Imputation” would mean treating harm to one child as automatically proving harm to siblings. The Court reaffirmed that neglect does not automatically work that way.
  • Waiver with discretionary review: Even if a party fails to object at the right time, an appellate court may still correct certain serious process failures—especially in cases involving fundamental rights and statutory safeguards.

5. Conclusion

In re M.D., D.M., and A.M. delivers a two-part message. First, on the merits, termination may be affirmed when a parent, despite time and opportunity, demonstrates an unwillingness to correct an adjudicated condition such as unsuitable housing—here evidenced by the mother’s sustained decision to remain in an unsafe living arrangement. Second, and more broadly consequential, the Court underscored that termination as to any child requires strict adherence to process: DHS must plead child-specific allegations, the circuit court must adjudicate and make specific findings as to each child, and neglect of one child cannot be used as an automatic substitute for adjudicating siblings. Where those safeguards are “substantially disregarded or frustrated,” vacatur and remand is the required corrective.