Termination for Post‑Adjudication Nonparticipation; Written‑Motion Requirement for Improvement Periods

Introduction

In In re H.A. and C.M., the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed an Upshur County dispositional order terminating Mother S.A.’s parental rights to H.A. and C.M. The case arose from a June 2024 abuse-and-neglect petition filed by the West Virginia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) alleging (among other things) severe deficiencies in supervision and home conditions, alienation and mental abuse toward H.A., use of racial slurs by adults in the child’s environment, and admissions suggesting corporal punishment. Mother stipulated at adjudication.

The core appellate question was whether the circuit court erred by terminating parental rights rather than pursuing less restrictive alternatives. A secondary issue—raised but not preserved—concerned Mother’s claim that she was wrongly denied an improvement period. The Court also addressed briefing deficiencies that resulted in waiver of additional assignments of error.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed termination. It held that ample evidence supported the circuit court’s finding that there was “no reasonable likelihood” Mother could substantially correct the conditions of abuse and neglect in the reasonably foreseeable future, given her post-adjudication nonparticipation: she repeatedly failed to appear at hearings, largely failed to drug screen as ordered, did not attend MDT meetings, did not complete the court-ordered forensic psychological evaluation (after multiple reschedulings), and never visited the children despite the availability of supervised visitation. The Court also noted that Mother did not challenge the circuit court’s separate “best interests” finding on appeal.

The Court rejected Mother’s improvement-period argument because no written motion for an improvement period appeared in the record, and West Virginia law requires a written motion as a prerequisite to granting one. Finally, it declined to address additional assignments of error due to the failure to cite authority and develop a legally supported argument, consistent with the Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Court’s administrative order on noncompliant filings.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011)
    Role in the decision: The Court anchored its review in the familiar abuse-and-neglect appellate standard: factual findings are reviewed for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. This framing is important because the termination ruling turned on whether the circuit court’s factual findings (nonparticipation, noncompliance, lack of visitation) were supported by the record.
  • Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011) (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980))
    Rule reinforced: Termination “may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives” when there is “no reasonable likelihood” that conditions of abuse or neglect can be substantially corrected. This precedent supplied the doctrinal bridge that permitted affirmance even if less restrictive dispositional alternatives might exist in other circumstances.
  • In re Katie S., 198 W. Va. 79, 90 n.14, 479 S.E.2d 589, 600 n.14 (1996)
    How it influenced the outcome: The Court relied on the principle that a parent’s demonstrated interest in visiting children while out of custody is a “significant factor” in assessing the parent’s potential to improve to minimum parenting standards. Here, the record showed Mother never visited and did not engage with the visitation provider, supporting the “no reasonable likelihood” determination.
  • Syl. Pt. 5, State ex rel. P.G.-1 v. Wilson, 247 W. Va. 235, 878 S.E.2d 730 (2021)
    Procedural holding applied: A circuit court may not grant an improvement period unless the respondent files a written motion requesting it. The Court used this to dispose of Mother’s improvement-period claim because the appellate record contained no such written motion and Mother’s brief failed to pinpoint where the issue was preserved.
  • Administrative Order entered on December 10, 2012, Re: Filings that Do Not Comply With the Rules of Appellate Procedure
    Waiver/enforcement mechanism: The Court invoked this order to explain why it would not address additional assignments of error that lacked citations and developed legal argument, reinforcing that noncompliant briefing can forfeit issues.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeded in a straightforward statutory-and-precedential sequence:

  1. Identify the governing termination framework. Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6), termination is authorized when (1) there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future and (2) termination is necessary for the welfare of the child.
  2. Define “no reasonable likelihood” by statute. The Court emphasized W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(3): “no reasonable likelihood” includes situations where the abusing parent has not responded to or followed through with a reasonable family case plan or other rehabilitative efforts designed to reduce or prevent abuse or neglect.
  3. Apply record evidence of nonresponse/nonparticipation. The decision relied on multiple, mutually reinforcing indicators:
    • Mother did not appear at any hearing after adjudication (despite repeated continuances and representation by counsel).
    • Drug screening was grossly inconsistent with the court’s order (only two screens early on, then three late screens shortly before disposition).
    • No MDT participation.
    • No completion of the ordered forensic psychological evaluation after repeated rescheduling.
    • No visitation with either child and nonresponsiveness to the visitation provider.
    These facts supported the conclusion that services and court oversight were not likely to remediate the underlying problems in a timeframe consistent with the children’s need for permanency.
  4. Address less restrictive alternatives. By invoking In re Kristin Y. and In re R.J.M., the Court confirmed that the circuit court was not required to attempt less restrictive dispositions once the “no reasonable likelihood” finding was supported.
  5. Best interests finding left untouched. The Court noted Mother did not challenge the circuit court’s best-interests determination. While an appellate court can sometimes review unchallenged findings, the absence of argument reinforced affirmance where statutory predicates were otherwise satisfied.
  6. Procedural default on improvement period and other issues. The Court applied State ex rel. P.G.-1 v. Wilson to hold that no improvement period could be granted absent a written motion, and it used the appellate rules plus the 2012 administrative order to decline review of undeveloped assignments of error.

Impact

Although styled as a memorandum decision, In re H.A. and C.M. illustrates several practical, recurring rules likely to shape circuit-court practice and future appeals:

  • Post-adjudication engagement is dispositive. The opinion underscores that even where some late compliance exists (e.g., a few negative drug screens), chronic nonappearance, noncommunication, and nonparticipation in ordered services can sustain a “no reasonable likelihood” finding—especially when paired with complete lack of visitation.
  • Continuances are not unlimited where permanency is at stake. The record reflected multiple continuances driven by Mother’s absence and an outstanding evaluation. The ultimate denial of yet another continuance (and proceeding in her absence with counsel present) reinforces that the child’s need for permanency can outweigh repeated delays attributable to a parent’s nonattendance and noncompliance.
  • Improvement period requests must be properly made and preserved. By reiterating the written-motion requirement from State ex rel. P.G.-1 v. Wilson, the decision signals that improvement periods are not informal or assumed; they require a procedurally valid request and an appellate record that demonstrates preservation.
  • Appellate briefing requirements are enforced. The Court’s reliance on Rule 10(c)(7) and the 2012 administrative order serves as a caution that unsupported assertions—without authority and application—may be treated as waived.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Adjudication” vs. “Disposition”
Adjudication is when the court determines whether abuse/neglect occurred (here, Mother stipulated). Disposition is when the court decides the remedy—services, custody arrangements, or termination.
“No reasonable likelihood that the conditions… can be substantially corrected”
This is a legal threshold for termination. It does not require proof that improvement is impossible in the abstract; rather, it asks whether the parent is likely to correct the problems in a timeframe that meets the child’s need for safety and permanency. Failure to follow through with services and case plans is a statutory example of meeting this threshold. See W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(3).
MDT (Multidisciplinary Treatment Team)
A coordinated group (typically including the agency, providers, counsel, and sometimes family members) that plans, monitors, and adjusts services. Nonattendance can be evidence of nonengagement with the rehabilitative process.
Improvement period
A court-supervised window during which a parent receives and completes services designed to correct abuse/neglect conditions. Under State ex rel. P.G.-1 v. Wilson, the court cannot grant one unless the parent files a written motion requesting it.
Clear error review
On appeal, factual findings stand unless the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. This deference matters in termination cases where credibility and compliance are fact-driven.

Conclusion

In re H.A. and C.M. reaffirms that termination is legally sustainable where a parent, after adjudication, fails to engage meaningfully in the rehabilitative process—by missing hearings, avoiding MDT participation, failing to complete evaluations and ordered screening, and not visiting the children—because such conduct supports the statutory finding of “no reasonable likelihood” of correction under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(3) and authorizes termination under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6). The decision also reinforces two procedural guardrails: improvement periods require a written motion, and appellate courts may treat inadequately briefed issues as waived.