Tenth Circuit: Unpreserved Colorado River Challenges Are Waived Absent a Developed Plain-Error Argument; AI-Hallucinated Citations Risk Sanctions

Case: Jackson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., No. 24-3175 (10th Cir. June 15, 2026) (Order and Judgment, nonprecedential)

1. Introduction

In Jackson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., a pro se plaintiff, Chapter Kris Jackson, pursued overlapping litigation arising from a single used-car transaction (a 2018 purchase from “Aristocrat Motors,” operated by T.E.N. Investments, Inc.). Ms. Jackson alleged extensive misconduct—title and mileage falsification, forged loan documents, missing disclosures, and delivery of a different vehicle—followed by collection activity and credit harm after she stopped making payments in 2021.

The procedural posture drove the appeal. Ms. Jackson filed a state-court action in Kansas and, two days later, a federal action (initially in the Western District of Missouri, later transferred to Kansas). The federal defendants ultimately sought a stay under the Colorado River abstention doctrine to avoid duplicative litigation. The district court stayed and administratively closed the federal case pending resolution of the state case. Ms. Jackson appealed that stay order.

Two issues dominated the Tenth Circuit’s disposition:

  • Preservation and appellate review: whether Ms. Jackson could challenge the Colorado River stay on appeal after failing to substantively oppose the motion in the district court, and without presenting a developed plain-error argument on appeal.
  • Scope of appellate jurisdiction: whether the court could review other pending motions and objections that the district court had not ruled upon before entering the stay.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed. It held that Ms. Jackson waived merits challenges to the Colorado River stay because she did not present those arguments to the district court and, on appeal, did not carry the “rigorous” plain-error burden. The court also held that its appellate jurisdiction did not extend to the many additional matters Ms. Jackson attempted to raise—motions and objections that were unresolved (and in several instances not immediately appealable) when the stay was entered.

Separately, the court rejected Ms. Jackson’s contention that the district court was required to decide various pending motions before staying the case, emphasizing the district court’s inherent authority to control its docket.

The panel also issued a pointed warning about the use of “hallucinated” (fabricated) case citations apparently generated by AI tools, citing Jones v. Kankakee Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 164 F.4th 967 (7th Cir. 2026), and cautioning Ms. Jackson that future reliance on fabricated authorities could lead to sanctions.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

A. Pro se construction—liberal, but not advocacy

  • Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106 (10th Cir. 1991): The court reiterated that pro se filings are construed liberally.
  • Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836 (10th Cir. 2005): Liberal construction does not permit the court to act as counsel. This frames the panel’s unwillingness to build arguments—particularly plain-error analysis—on Ms. Jackson’s behalf.

B. Colorado River abstention framework

  • Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976): Provided the foundational doctrine permitting federal courts, in “exceptional circumstances,” to stay or dismiss duplicative federal litigation in favor of parallel state proceedings for reasons of wise judicial administration.
  • Wakaya Perfection, LLC v. Youngevity Int'l, Inc., 910 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 2018): Supplied the Tenth Circuit’s commonly used articulation of the (nonexclusive) multi-factor test for evaluating whether exceptional circumstances justify deference to parallel state proceedings.

Notably, the panel did not reach the substantive balancing of these factors because it resolved the appeal on waiver/preservation grounds.

C. Appellate jurisdiction and the notice of appeal’s scope

  • Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B): The notice must designate the judgment or appealable order.
  • HCG Platinum, LLC v. Preferred Prod. Placement Corp., 873 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2017): Designations in the notice circumscribe the scope of review.
  • Williams v. Akers, 837 F.3d 1075 (10th Cir. 2016): Rule 3 is construed liberally.
  • Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 119 F.3d 847 (10th Cir. 1997): “Functional equivalent” filings can satisfy Rule 3.
  • Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(a) and McBride v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 281 F.3d 1099 (10th Cir. 2002): The “merger” principle—certain interlocutory orders merge into an appealable order/final judgment.
  • Bogle v. Orange Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 162 F.3d 653 (11th Cir. 1998): Rule 3 requires designation of an existent order, not one expected in the future.
  • Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 105 F.3d 562 (10th Cir. 1997): No appellate jurisdiction where the district court has not ruled on objections to a magistrate judge decision.
  • Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424 (1985): Reinforced the final-decision requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, absent a collateral-order basis.

These authorities drove the panel’s jurisdictional boundary: it could review the entered Colorado River stay order, but not the many other pending matters Ms. Jackson listed that had not been decided (and, in some cases, would not be immediately appealable anyway).

D. Preservation, forfeiture/waiver, and plain error

  • United States v. Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2019): Failure to raise an argument below typically results in forfeiture, reviewable only for plain error; failure to argue plain error on appeal generally results in waiver and no review.
  • United States v. Nickl, 427 F.3d 1286 (10th Cir. 2005): Provided the four-part plain-error test.
  • United States v. Rosales-Miranda, 755 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 2014): Emphasized the demanding nature of the “rigorous” plain-error standard.
  • Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 2011): The court’s “end of the road” principle—unpreserved issues without adequate plain-error presentation will not be reversed.

This cluster is the opinion’s operational core: even if the district court’s abstention analysis might be debatable, appellate review was foreclosed because Ms. Jackson did not properly tee up the merits below and did not do the work of plain-error analysis on appeal.

E. Docket control and staying cases

  • Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936): Recognized inherent authority to control the disposition of cases on the docket, including issuing stays.
  • U.S. Abatement Corp. v. Mobil Expl. & Prod. U.S., Inc., 39 F.3d 556 (5th Cir. 1994): Cited for the proposition that district courts have discretion over the order of consideration of motions (supporting the court’s refusal to require rulings on every pending motion before staying the case).

F. AI “hallucinations” and litigant responsibility

  • Jones v. Kankakee Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 164 F.4th 967 (7th Cir. 2026): Used to define AI “hallucinations” and to emphasize that all litigants must read filings and avoid misrepresentations.
  • 10th Cir. R. 46.5(B)(2): Referenced as part of the responsibility framework for filings in the Tenth Circuit.
  • Jackson v. BOK Fin. Corp., No. 25-cv-00297-SHE-SH, 2025 WL 2755868 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 29, 2025): Noted as a prior instance where Ms. Jackson was put on notice about unacceptable citation practices.

Although not outcome-determinative, this portion is significant: it signals the court’s readiness to treat fabricated citations—whether AI-generated or otherwise—as sanctionable conduct, even for pro se litigants, and even where the litigant discloses AI assistance.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The court cabined the appeal to what was actually appealable and decided

The panel began by drawing a clean jurisdictional line. Ms. Jackson’s notice of appeal designated only the order granting the Colorado River motion. The court acknowledged liberal construction and the merger doctrine, but it emphasized a practical constraint: many matters Ms. Jackson sought to litigate on appeal were not just undesignated—they were unresolved. Under Hutchinson v. Pfeil, for example, objections to a magistrate judge’s orders cannot be reviewed by the court of appeals before the district court rules on them. And under Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, many interlocutory matters are not immediately appealable absent collateral-order treatment.

This framing mattered because it prevented the appeal from becoming an omnibus challenge to the entire district court docket. The Tenth Circuit treated the stay order as “the boundary line” and refused to cross it.

B. Waiver foreclosed merits review of the Colorado River stay

On the merits, Ms. Jackson argued that the federal and state cases were not parallel and that the Colorado River factors did not show exceptional circumstances. But the panel did not evaluate those arguments because Ms. Jackson did not substantively respond to the Colorado River motion in the district court; thus, the district court “never passed upon” her current arguments.

Under United States v. Leffler and Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., that failure triggers plain-error review at best, and complete waiver at worst if the appellant does not properly present plain error on appeal. The panel held that Ms. Jackson’s single sentence—“requests plain error review”—without analyzing the four Nickl elements was insufficient. The reply brief did not cure the deficiency, and in any event pointed to sections addressing arbitration issues not properly before the court.

The consequence was categorical: the court declined to review the abstention ruling “for plain error or otherwise.”

C. The renewed motion was not improperly successive

Ms. Jackson tried to defeat the stay by characterizing the abstention motion as a barred rehash of an earlier dismissal motion. The panel rejected that characterization by relying on the district court’s explanation: the earlier motion had been denied “without prejudice to refiling,” and the abstention arguments had not been adjudicated on their merits (in part because the case had been transferred and personal jurisdiction issues in Missouri became moot). Thus, taking up the renewed Colorado River motion was procedurally proper.

D. No requirement to decide all pending motions before issuing a stay

Ms. Jackson also contended the district court should have ruled on her many pending motions (arbitration, recusal, counsel, scheduling, transfer, etc.) before staying the case. The panel rejected this as inconsistent with the district court’s broad docket-control authority under Landis v. N. Am. Co. and the discretion recognized in U.S. Abatement Corp. v. Mobil Expl. & Prod. U.S., Inc.. The court additionally noted problems with Ms. Jackson’s citations purporting to impose such a requirement, leading into its AI-hallucination discussion.

3.3. Impact

A. Practical tightening of preservation requirements in Colorado River appeals

While the decision is labeled nonprecedential, its reasoning is a strong, practice-oriented reminder: if a party does not substantively oppose a Colorado River abstention motion in the district court, appellate review will likely be unavailable unless the appellant presents a fully developed plain-error argument addressing each element. The court’s insistence that a bare request for plain-error review is inadequate is especially consequential for pro se litigants and for counsel attempting to “salvage” unpreserved arguments on appeal.

B. Clear boundary-setting for “kitchen sink” appeals after a stay

Stays often occur midstream, when motions are pending. This opinion underscores that unresolved matters (including unreviewed magistrate-judge objections) generally cannot be packaged into an appeal of a stay order. Litigants should instead pursue rulings in the district court (or wait for an appealable final judgment) rather than trying to litigate everything at once.

C. Emerging appellate intolerance for AI-fabricated citations

The opinion’s most forward-looking component is its warning about AI “hallucinations.” By adopting the vocabulary and responsibility framework discussed in Jones v. Kankakee Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, and by referencing prior warnings to this litigant, the panel signals that disclosure of AI assistance is not a safe harbor. Courts may treat fabricated citations as sanctionable misrepresentation, even where the filer is pro se.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Colorado River doctrine: A narrow exception to the general rule that federal courts must exercise jurisdiction. In “exceptional circumstances,” a federal court may pause (stay) or dismiss a federal case when a parallel state case is already addressing substantially the same dispute, to avoid duplication and inconsistent results.
  • Parallel proceedings: State and federal cases are “parallel” when they involve substantially the same parties litigating substantially the same issues, even if the claims are not perfectly identical.
  • Stay vs. dismissal: A stay pauses the federal case; the case can resume later. A dismissal ends the federal case (though it might be refiled depending on circumstances).
  • Forfeiture vs. waiver: If you fail to raise an argument in time, you typically forfeit it; an appellate court may still review for plain error. But if you also fail to argue plain error on appeal, the issue is treated as waived—meaning the appellate court won’t review it at all.
  • Plain-error review: A demanding standard requiring the appellant to show (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) affecting substantial rights, and (4) seriously affecting the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
  • “Hallucinated” citations: References to cases or quotations that do not exist or do not say what the filing claims—often associated with unchecked AI-generated text. Courts treat this as a serious accuracy and candor problem.

5. Conclusion

Jackson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc. affirms a Colorado River stay not by endorsing a detailed factor analysis, but by enforcing appellate discipline: issues not presented below and not defended through a developed plain-error argument on appeal are effectively unreviewable. The opinion also reinforces that appellate jurisdiction does not extend to unresolved, nonfinal, or unreviewed district-court matters simply because a litigant lists them in an appellate brief.

Beyond abstention doctrine, the decision’s cautionary note on AI-generated “hallucinated” authorities is a salient modern takeaway: parties—represented or pro se—remain responsible for verifying legal citations and quotations, and repeated reliance on fabricated case law may trigger sanctions in future Tenth Circuit filings.