Tennessee Building Burglary Qualifies Under the ACCA: United States v. Markel Strong

Introduction

In United States v. Markel Strong, decided September 22, 2026, the Sixth Circuit considered whether a Tennessee conviction for entering a building with intent to commit a crime could serve as the third predicate conviction for an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Markel Strong, convicted by a jury of possessing a firearm as a felon, also argued that his 221-month sentence was too long. The court rejected both challenges.

The opinion is marked “not recommended for publication.” Its significance lies in its application of existing Sixth Circuit precedent, rather than the announcement of a new rule.

Summary of the Opinion

Strong conceded that two prior aggravated-assault convictions qualified under the ACCA but disputed the use of his Tennessee burglary conviction. The Sixth Circuit held that the conviction, under Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-14-402(a)(1), qualified as generic burglary under controlling circuit precedent. It declined to use the particular facts of Strong’s break-in to change that elements-based conclusion.

The court also upheld the sentence. The district court had calculated a Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months, considered aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and varied downward to 221 months. The Sixth Circuit found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the judgment.

Analysis

The ACCA and the burglary conviction

Ordinarily, the felon-in-possession offense carried a maximum sentence of fifteen years. With three qualifying prior convictions, the ACCA instead imposed a fifteen-year minimum and permitted a sentence up to life imprisonment. Because Strong conceded two predicates, the status of his burglary conviction was decisive.

The court applied the categorical approach: it compared the legal elements of the prior offense with those of generic burglary, rather than asking precisely what Strong did. Tennessee’s burglary statute lists alternative offenses. The court therefore used the modified categorical approach to consult Strong’s burglary indictment for the limited purpose of identifying the applicable alternative, § 39-14-402(a)(1). Existing Sixth Circuit decisions established that convictions under that subsection fit the generic definition of burglary.

Strong pointed out that his prior offense involved a backyard shed and stolen gardening equipment. That account did not alter the categorical analysis. The district court could, however, consider the relative seriousness of that qualifying offense when choosing a sentence; it expressly treated the burglary as a comparatively minor version of the offense and varied downward.

Precedents cited

  • United States v. Wilson supplied the standard of review: whether a prior conviction qualifies under the ACCA is reviewed de novo.
  • Mathis v. United States and Descamps v. United States supplied the elements-based framework. They explain both why an offense broader than generic burglary cannot qualify and why, for a statute listing alternative crimes, specified conviction documents may be consulted to identify the crime of conviction—not to reconstruct its facts.
  • United States v. Stitt supplied the quoted definition of generic burglary: unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure with intent to commit a crime.
  • United States v. Brown and Brumbach v. United States supplied the controlling Sixth Circuit conclusion that convictions under subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3) of Tennessee’s burglary statute fall within generic burglary. That conclusion foreclosed Strong’s challenge to his subsection (a)(1) conviction.
  • United States v. Cervenak reinforced that courts do not consider how a defendant actually committed the prior crime when conducting the categorical comparison. S.C. v. Metro. Gov't of Nash. supplied the separate rule that a Sixth Circuit panel cannot overrule another panel; only the en banc court or the Supreme Court can do so.
  • Gall v. United States, United States v. Rayyan, and United States v. Nunley framed review of the sentence: the appellate court asks whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, under the statutory sentencing factors. United States v. Hamaed, United States v. Betro, and United States v. Greco explained why an attack on a below-Guidelines sentence is especially demanding, though not impossible.

Why the sentence stood

The district court addressed the seriousness of the firearm offense, the circumstances of the conduct discussed at sentencing, deterrence, and Strong’s conduct while in custody. It also considered his upbringing, mental health, family circumstances, education, and opportunities for rehabilitation. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the court had weighed the relevant factors rather than overlooked Strong’s mitigating evidence. Strong’s disagreement with the amount of the downward variance did not establish that the resulting sentence was unreasonable.

The government argued that Strong had waived his ACCA challenge by not objecting at sentencing. Because the panel rejected that challenge on its merits, it did not decide the waiver question.

Impact and concepts simplified

An ACCA predicate is a prior conviction that counts toward the statute’s three-conviction threshold. Calling generic burglary an ACCA “violent felony” reflects Congress’s statutory classification; it does not require proof that the particular burglary involved violence. The categorical approach compares offense definitions. The modified categorical approach identifies which alternative offense in a divisible statute produced the conviction. Neither is an invitation to retry the earlier case.

For future cases within the circuit, the opinion illustrates the continuing force of the existing rule concerning Tennessee burglary under § 39-14-402(a)(1). It also illustrates a distinction important at sentencing: facts about a prior burglary may be irrelevant to whether it legally qualifies under the ACCA yet relevant to the district court’s discretionary assessment of an appropriate sentence. As an unpublished opinion, this decision chiefly reinforces, rather than creates, governing precedent.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed Strong’s ACCA-enhanced, below-Guidelines sentence. His Tennessee building-burglary conviction qualified under controlling precedent, and the district court’s individualized weighing of the sentencing factors supported the 221-month term.